RFC 7382

Template for a Certification Practice Statement (CPS) for the Resource PKI (RPKI)

📅 published April 2015, from ietf

RFC 7382: Template for a Certification Practice Statement (CPS) for the Resource PKI (RPKI) 💖✨

Who wrote it: S. Kent, D. Kong, and K. Seo, all from BBN Technologies 🧚
Category: Best Current Practice (it's BCP: 173) 🎀
Date: April 2015 🦋
ISSN: 2070-1721 🌸
Obsoletes / Updates: nothing is listed in its title block 🙈

Abstract ✨

okay so this doc is basically a template 📝 for writing a Certification Practice Statement (CPS) 💅. It's meant for any organization that's part of the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI), like a resource allocation registry or an ISP 🌈. Iconic.

Status of This Memo 🌟

this memo documents an Internet Best Current Practice 💜.

it's a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) 🫶. it represents the consensus of the IETF community, it got public review, and the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG) approved it for publication 🔥. if you want more on BCPs, check out Section 2 of RFC 5741 📚.

for the current status, any errata, and how to give feedback, go to http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7382 🦋.

Copyright Notice 🎀

this doc is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) as they stand on the date it was published 📜. please actually read those, bestie, because they spell out your rights and restrictions for this document 🙈. any Code Components pulled out of this document must include Simplified BSD License text, as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions, and they come without warranty, as described in the Simplified BSD License 💅.

Table of Contents 🗂️

Preface ............................................................8
1. Introduction ....................................................9
   1.1. Overview ..................................................10
   1.2. Document Name and Identification ..........................10
   1.3. PKI Participants ..........................................11
        1.3.1. Certification Authorities ..........................11
        1.3.2. Registration Authorities ...........................11
        1.3.3. Subscribers ........................................11
        1.3.4. Relying Parties ....................................11
        1.3.5. Other Participants .................................12
   1.4. Certificate Usage .........................................12
        1.4.1. Appropriate Certificate Uses .......................12
        1.4.2. Prohibited Certificate Uses ........................12
   1.5. Policy Administration .....................................12
        1.5.1. Organization Administering the Document ............12
        1.5.2. Contact Person .....................................12
        1.5.3. Person Determining CPS Suitability for the Policy ..12
        1.5.4. CPS Approval Procedures ............................13
   1.6. Definitions and Acronyms ..................................13
2. Publication and Repository Responsibilities ....................14
   2.1. Repositories ..............................................14
   2.2. Publication of Certification Information ..................14
   2.3. Time or Frequency of Publication ..........................14
   2.4. Access Controls on Repositories ...........................15
3. Identification and Authentication ..............................15
   3.1. Naming ....................................................15
        3.1.1. Types of Names .....................................15
        3.1.2. Need for Names to Be Meaningful ....................15
        3.1.3. Anonymity or Pseudonymity of Subscribers ...........15
        3.1.4. Rules for Interpreting Various Name Forms ..........15
        3.1.5. Uniqueness of Names ................................16
        3.1.6. Recognition, Authentication, and Role of
               Trademarks .........................................16
   3.2. Initial Identity Validation ...............................16
        3.2.1. Method to Prove Possession of Private Key ..........16
        3.2.2. Authentication of Organization Identity ............16
        3.2.3. Authentication of Individual Identity ..............17
        3.2.4. Non-verified Subscriber Information ................17
        3.2.5. Validation of Authority ............................17
        3.2.6. Criteria for Interoperation ........................17

   3.3. Identification and Authentication for Re-key Requests .....18
        3.3.1. Identification and Authentication for
               Routine Re-key .....................................18
        3.3.2. Identification and Authentication for
               Re-key after Revocation ............................18
   3.4. Identification and Authentication for Revocation Request ..18
4. Certificate Life Cycle Operational Requirements ................18
   4.1. Certificate Application ...................................18
        4.1.1. Who Can Submit a Certificate Application ...........18
        4.1.2. Enrollment Process and Responsibilities ............19
   4.2. Certificate Application Processing ........................19
        4.2.1. Performing Identification and
               Authentication Functions ...........................19
        4.2.2. Approval or Rejection of Certificate Applications ..19
        4.2.3. Time to Process Certificate Applications ...........19
   4.3. Certificate Issuance ......................................19
        4.3.1. CA Actions during Certificate Issuance .............19
        4.3.2. Notification to Subscriber by the CA of
               Issuance of Certificate ............................20
        4.3.3. Notification of Certificate Issuance by the
               CA to Other Entities ...............................20
   4.4. Certificate Acceptance ....................................20
        4.4.1. Conduct Constituting Certificate Acceptance ........20
        4.4.2. Publication of the Certificate by the CA ...........20
        4.4.3. Notification of Certificate Issuance by the
               CA to Other Entities ...............................20
   4.5. Key Pair and Certificate Usage ............................20
        4.5.1. Subscriber Private Key and Certificate Usage .......20
        4.5.2. Relying Party Public Key and Certificate Usage .....21
   4.6. Certificate Renewal .......................................21
        4.6.1. Circumstance for Certificate Renewal ...............21
        4.6.2. Who May Request Renewal ............................21
        4.6.3. Processing Certificate Renewal Requests ............22
        4.6.4. Notification of New Certificate Issuance to
               Subscriber .........................................22
        4.6.5. Conduct Constituting Acceptance of a
               Renewal Certificate ................................22
        4.6.6. Publication of the Renewal Certificate by the CA ...22
        4.6.7. Notification of Certificate Issuance by the
               CA to Other Entities ...............................22
   4.7. Certificate Re-key ........................................22
        4.7.1. Circumstance for Certificate Re-key ................22
        4.7.2. Who May Request Certification of a New Public Key ..23
        4.7.3. Processing Certificate Re-keying Requests ..........23
        4.7.4. Notification of New Certificate Issuance to
               Subscriber .........................................23

        4.7.5. Conduct Constituting Acceptance of a
               Re-keyed Certificate ...............................23
        4.7.6. Publication of the Re-keyed Certificate by the CA ..23
        4.7.7. Notification of Certificate Issuance by the
               CA to Other Entities ...............................23
   4.8. Certificate Modification ..................................23
        4.8.1. Circumstance for Certificate Modification ..........23
        4.8.2. Who May Request Certificate Modification ...........24
        4.8.3. Processing Certificate Modification Requests .......24
        4.8.4. Notification of Modified Certificate
               Issuance to Subscriber .............................24
        4.8.5. Conduct Constituting Acceptance of Modified
               Certificate ........................................24
        4.8.6. Publication of the Modified Certificate by the CA ..24
        4.8.7. Notification of Certificate Issuance by the
               CA to Other Entities ...............................24
   4.9. Certificate Revocation and Suspension .....................25
        4.9.1. Circumstances for Revocation .......................25
        4.9.2. Who Can Request Revocation .........................25
        4.9.3. Procedure for Revocation Request ...................25
        4.9.4. Revocation Request Grace Period ....................25
        4.9.5. Time within Which CA Must Process the
               Revocation Request .................................25
        4.9.6. Revocation Checking Requirement for Relying
               Parties ............................................25
        4.9.7. CRL Issuance Frequency .............................26
        4.9.8. Maximum Latency for CRLs ...........................26
   4.10. Certificate Status Services ..............................26
5. Facility, Management, and Operational Controls .................26
   5.1. Physical Controls .........................................26
        5.1.1. Site Location and Construction .....................26
        5.1.2. Physical Access ....................................26
        5.1.3. Power and Air Conditioning .........................26
        5.1.4. Water Exposures ....................................26
        5.1.5. Fire Prevention and Protection .....................26
        5.1.6. Media Storage ......................................26
        5.1.7. Waste Disposal .....................................26
        5.1.8. Off-Site Backup ....................................26
   5.2. Procedural Controls .......................................27
        5.2.1. Trusted Roles ......................................27
        5.2.2. Number of Persons Required per Task ................27
        5.2.3. Identification and Authentication for Each Role ....27
        5.2.4. Roles Requiring Separation of Duties ...............27

part 1 of 7 done! 🧚 the Introduction and the rest of the doc are coming next, so stay tuned, bestie 💅🌸

      5.3. Personnel Controls ........................................27
           5.3.1. Qualifications, Experience, and Clearance
                  Requirements .......................................27
           5.3.2. Background Check Procedures ........................27
           5.3.3. Training Requirements ..............................27
           5.3.4. Retraining Frequency and Requirements ..............27
           5.3.5. Job Rotation Frequency and Sequence ................27
           5.3.6. Sanctions for Unauthorized Actions .................27
           5.3.7. Independent Contractor Requirements ................27
           5.3.8. Documentation Supplied to Personnel ................27
      5.4. Audit Logging Procedures ..................................28
           5.4.1. Types of Events Recorded ...........................28
           5.4.2. Frequency of Processing Log ........................28
           5.4.3. Retention Period for Audit Log .....................28
           5.4.4. Protection of Audit Log ............................28
           5.4.5. Audit Log Backup Procedures ........................28
           5.4.6. Audit Collection System (Internal vs.
                  External) [OMITTED] ................................29
           5.4.7. Notification to Event-Causing Subject [OMITTED] ....29
           5.4.8. Vulnerability Assessments ..........................29
      5.5. Records Archival [OMITTED] ................................29
      5.6. Key Changeover ............................................29
      5.7. Compromise and Disaster Recovery ..........................29
      5.8. CA or RA Termination ......................................29
   6. Technical Security Controls ....................................29
      6.1. Key Pair Generation and Installation ......................29
           6.1.1. Key Pair Generation ................................29
           6.1.2. Private Key Delivery to Subscriber .................30
           6.1.3. Public Key Delivery to Certificate Issuer ..........30
           6.1.4. CA Public Key Delivery to Relying Parties ..........30
           6.1.5. Key Sizes ..........................................30
           6.1.6. Public Key Parameter Generation and Quality
                  Checking ...........................................30
           6.1.7. Key Usage Purposes (as per X.509 v3 Key
                  Usage Field) .......................................30
      6.2. Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module
           Engineering Controls ......................................31
           6.2.1. Cryptographic Module Standards and Controls ........31
           6.2.2. Private Key (n out of m) Multi-Person Control ......31
           6.2.3. Private Key Escrow .................................31
           6.2.4. Private Key Backup .................................31
           6.2.5. Private Key Archival ...............................31
           6.2.6. Private Key Transfer into or from a
                  Cryptographic Module ...............................31
           6.2.7. Private Key Storage on Cryptographic Module ........31
           6.2.8. Method of Activating Private Key ...................32
           6.2.9. Method of Deactivating Private Key .................32
           6.2.10. Method of Destroying Private Key ..................32
           6.2.11. Cryptographic Module Rating .......................32
      6.3. Other Aspects of Key Pair Management ......................32
           6.3.1. Public Key Archival ................................32
           6.3.2. Certificate Operational Periods and Key
                  Pair Usage Periods .................................32
      6.4. Activation Data ...........................................32
           6.4.1. Activation Data Generation and Installation ........32
           6.4.2. Activation Data Protection .........................32
           6.4.3. Other Aspects of Activation Data ...................33
      6.5. Computer Security Controls ................................33
      6.6. Life Cycle Technical Controls .............................33
           6.6.1. System Development Controls ........................33
           6.6.2. Security Management Controls .......................33
           6.6.3. Life Cycle Security Controls .......................33
      6.7. Network Security Controls .................................33
      6.8. Time-Stamping .............................................33
   7. Certificate and CRL Profiles ...................................33
   8. Compliance Audit and Other Assessments .........................34
   9. Other Business and Legal Matters ...............................34
      9.1. Fees ......................................................34
           9.1.1. Certificate Issuance or Renewal Fees ...............34
           9.1.2. Certificate Access Fees [OMITTED] ..................34
           9.1.3. Revocation or Status Information Access
                  Fees [OMITTED] .....................................34
           9.1.4. Fees for Other Services (if Applicable) ............34
           9.1.5. Refund Policy ......................................34
      9.2. Financial Responsibility ..................................34
           9.2.1. Insurance Coverage .................................34
           9.2.2. Other Assets .......................................34
           9.2.3. Insurance or Warranty Coverage for End-Entities ....34
      9.3. Confidentiality of Business Information ...................34
           9.3.1. Scope of Confidential Information ..................34
           9.3.2. Information Not within the Scope of
                  Confidential Information ...........................34
           9.3.3. Responsibility to Protect Confidential
                  Information ........................................34
      9.4. Privacy of Personal Information ...........................34
           9.4.1. Privacy Plan .......................................34
           9.4.2. Information Treated as Private .....................35
           9.4.3. Information Not Deemed Private .....................35
           9.4.4. Responsibility to Protect Private Information ......35
           9.4.5. Notice and Consent to Use Private Information ......35
           9.4.6. Disclosure Pursuant to Judicial or
                  Administrative Process .............................35
           9.4.7. Other Information Disclosure Circumstances .........35

      9.5. Intellectual Property Rights (if Applicable) ..............35
      9.6. Representations and Warranties ............................35
           9.6.1. CA Representations and Warranties ..................35
           9.6.2. Subscriber Representations and Warranties ..........35
           9.6.3. Relying Party Representations and Warranties .......35
      9.7. Disclaimers of Warranties .................................35
      9.8. Limitations of Liability ..................................35
      9.9. Indemnities ...............................................35
      9.10. Term and Termination .....................................35
           9.10.1. Term ..............................................35
           9.10.2. Termination .......................................35
           9.10.3. Effect of Termination and Survival ................35
      9.11. Individual Notices and Communications with Participants ..35
      9.12. Amendments ...............................................35
           9.12.1. Procedure for Amendment ...........................35
           9.12.2. Notification Mechanism and Period .................35
      9.13. Dispute Resolution Provisions ............................35
      9.14. Governing Law ............................................35
      9.15. Compliance with Applicable Law ...........................36
      9.16. Miscellaneous Provisions .................................36
           9.16.1. Entire Agreement ..................................36
           9.16.2. Assignment ........................................36
           9.16.3. Severability ......................................36
           9.16.4. Enforcement (Attorneys' Fees and Waiver of
                   Rights) ...........................................36
           9.16.5. Force Majeure .....................................36
   10. Security Considerations .......................................36
   11. References ....................................................37
      11.1. Normative References .....................................37
      11.2. Informative References ...................................37
   Acknowledgments ...................................................38
   Authors' Addresses ................................................38

Preface ✨

This RFC is basically a fill-in-the-blanks template 🎀. The bits meant to be used are wrapped in the markers <BEGIN TEMPLATE TEXT> and <END TEMPLATE TEXT>, and that template text is covered by Section 9(b) of the Trust Legal Provisions 📜.

This doc gives you a template for writing a Certification Practice Statement (CPS) for an organization that's part of the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) 🔐. Quick note: "organization" is used super broadly here, so the entity might just be a business unit of a bigger org 🏢.

No one is expecting a CPS to get published as an RFC, bestie 🙅‍♀️. The org publishes it wherever RPKI users can actually find it, like its website 🌐. As a best current practice, orgs are expected to use this template instead of starting from scratch 💅, because the template already has text that SHOULD appear in every CPS, plus spots for org-specific stuff marked in angle brackets ✨.

The user of this document should:

Extract the text between the <BEGIN TEMPLATE TEXT> and <END TEMPLATE TEXT> delimiters 🧚.
Replace the instructions between the angle brackets with the required information 🍓.

Okay so this doc was generated to go along with the Certificate Policy (CP) for the RPKI [RFC6484] 🦋. Like RFC 6484, it's built on the template from RFC 3647 [RFC3647]. A bunch of sections from that template got left out because they didn't apply to this PKI 🙈, but the section numbering was kept so you can easily compare it with RFC 3647 and RFC 6484. Main character numbering energy 👑.

Conventions Used in This Document:

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119] 💜. They're the official requirement words, so iykyk 🫶.

Here's the template text, exactly as it sits between the markers:

<BEGIN TEMPLATE TEXT>

   <Create a title page saying, e.g., "<Name of organization>
   Certification Practice Statement for the Resource Public Key
   Infrastructure (RPKI)" with date, author, etc.>

   <Create a table of contents.>

1. Introduction ✨

Okay bestie, so this doc is the Certification Practice Statement (CPS) of <name of organization> 💖. It spells out the practices the <name of organization> Certification Authority (CA) uses in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) 🔐. Those practices are built to follow the Certificate Policy (CP) [RFC6484] for the RPKI, which is basically the rulebook 📜.

The whole point of the RPKI is letting people check claims from current holders of Internet Number Resources (INRs) (Section 1.6) against what the organizations acting as CAs have on record. Being able to verify those claims is what keeps these resources uniquely and unambiguously handed out 🦋.

This PKI copies the shape of the existing INR distribution hierarchy 🌈. IANA hands resources to the Regional Internet Registries (RIRs). In some regions, National Internet Registries (NIRs) sit as a tier below the RIRs for INR distribution. Then Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and network subscribers make even more tiers under the registries 💅.

Conventions Used in This Document:

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. 🎀

1.1. Overview

So this CPS covers:

Participants
Publication of the certificates and Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs)
How certificates are issued, managed, re-keyed, renewed, and revoked
Facility management (physical security, personnel, audit, etc.)
Key management
Audit procedures
Business and legal issues

This PKI has a few types of certificates (see [RFC6480] for more details) 🧚:

CA certificates for each organization distributing INRs and for each subscriber INR holder.
End-entity (EE) certificates for organizations to use to validate digital signatures on RPKI-signed objects (see definition in Section 1.6).
In the future, the PKI also may include end-entity certificates in support of access control for the repository system as described in Section 2.4.

1.2. Document Name and Identification

The name of this doc is "<Name of organization> Certification Practice Statement for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)". 📝 <If this document is available via the Internet, the CA can provide the URI for the CPS here. It SHOULD be the same URI as the URI that appears as a policy qualifier in the CA certificate for the CA, if the CA elects to make use of that feature.>

1.3. PKI Participants

Quick note, bestie 🫶: in a PKI, "subscriber" means an individual or organization that is the subject of a certificate issued by a CA. That's how the term gets used all through this doc, no extra qualifiers. It should not be confused with the networking meaning, which is someone who receives service from an ISP. For those cases, this doc uses "network subscriber". Also, to keep things short, this doc always calls PKI participants organizations or entities, even though some of them are actually individuals 🌸.

1.3.1. Certification Authorities

<Describe the CAs that you will operate for the RPKI. One approach is to operate two CAs: one designated "offline" and the other designated "production". The offline CA is the top-level CA for the <name of organization> portion of the RPKI. It provides a secure revocation and recovery capability in case the production CA is compromised or becomes unavailable. Thus, the offline CA issues certificates only to instances of the production CA, and the CRLs it issues are used to revoke only certificates issued to the production CA. The production CA is used to issue RPKI certificates to <name of organization> members, to whom INRs have been distributed.>

1.3.2. Registration Authorities

1.3.3. Subscribers

Organizations that get INR allocations from this CA are subscribers in the RPKI 🍓.

1.3.4. Relying Parties

Entities or individuals that act in reliance on certificates or RPKI-signed objects issued under this PKI are relying parties. Relying parties may or may not be subscribers within this PKI. (See Section 1.6 for the definition of an RPKI-signed object.) 👀

1.3.5. Other Participants

1.4. Certificate Usage

1.4.1. Appropriate Certificate Uses

The certificates issued under this hierarchy are for authorization in support of validation of claims of current holdings of INRs. ✅

Additional uses of the certificates are also permitted under RFC 6484, as long as they match that basic goal we just talked about 💜.

Some of the certificates that may be issued under this PKI could be used to support operation of this infrastructure, e.g., access control for the repository system as described in Section 2.4. Such uses also are permitted under the RPKI certificate policy 🔥.

1.4.2. Prohibited Certificate Uses

Any uses other than those described in Section 1.4.1 are prohibited. 🚫

1.5. Policy Administration

1.5.1. Organization Administering the Document

This CPS is administered by <name of organization>. <Include the mailing address, email address, and similar contact info here.>

1.5.2. Contact Person

1.5.3. Person Determining CPS Suitability for the Policy

Not applicable. Each organization issuing a certificate in this PKI is attesting to the distribution of INRs to the holder of the private key corresponding to the public key in the certificate. The issuing organizations are the same organizations as the ones that perform the distribution, so they are authoritative with respect to the accuracy of this binding. 🦋

1.5.4. CPS Approval Procedures

1.6. Definitions and Acronyms

Here's the glossary, and it's giving very organized 🗂️:

BPKI   Business PKI.  A BPKI is an optional additional PKI used by an
       organization to identify members to whom RPKI certificates can
       be issued.  If a BPKI is employed by a CA, it may have its own
       CP, separate from the RPKI CP.

CP     Certificate Policy.  A CP is a named set of rules that
       indicates the applicability of a certificate to a particular
       community and/or class of applications with common security
       requirements.  The CP for the RPKI is [RFC6484].

CPS    Certification Practice Statement.  A CPS is a document that
       specifies the practices that a Certification Authority employs
       in issuing certificates.

Distribution of INRs   A process of distribution of the INRs along
       the respective number hierarchy.  IANA distributes blocks of
       IP addresses and Autonomous System Numbers (ASNs) to the five
       Regional Internet Registries (RIRs).  RIRs distribute smaller
       address blocks and Autonomous System Numbers to organizations
       within their service regions, who in turn distribute IP
       addresses to their customers.

IANA   Internet Assigned Numbers Authority.  IANA is responsible for
       global coordination of the Internet Protocol addressing
       systems and ASNs used for routing Internet traffic.  IANA
       distributes INRs to RIRs.

INRs   Internet Number Resources.  INRs are number values for three
       protocol parameter sets, namely:

       o  IP version 4 addresses,

       o  IP version 6 addresses, and

       o  Identifiers used in Internet inter-domain routing,
          currently Border Gateway Protocol-4 ASNs.

ISP    Internet Service Provider.  An ISP is an organization managing
       and selling Internet services to other organizations.

NIR    National Internet Registry.  An NIR is an organization that
       manages the distribution of INRs for a portion of the
       geopolitical area covered by a Regional Internet Registry.
       NIRs form an optional second tier in the tree scheme used to
       manage INR distribution.

RIR    Regional Internet Registry.  An RIR is an organization that
       manages the distribution of INRs for a geopolitical area.

RPKI-signed object   An RPKI-signed object is a digitally signed data
       object (other than a certificate or CRL) declared to be such
       an object by a Standards Track RFC.  An RPKI-signed object can
       be validated using certificates issued under this PKI.  The
       content and format of these data constructs depend on the
       context in which validation of claims of current holdings of
       INRs takes place.  Examples of these objects are repository
       manifests [RFC6486] and Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs)
       [RFC6482].

2. Publication and Repository Responsibilities 📦

2.1. Repositories

As per the CP, certificates, CRLs, and RPKI-signed objects MUST be made available for downloading by all relying parties, so they can validate this data 🔓.

The <name of organization> RPKI CA will publish certificates, CRLs, and RPKI-signed objects via a repository that is accessible via <insert IETF-designated protocol name here> at <insert URL here>. This repository will conform to the structure described in [RFC6481]. 🗄️

2.2. Publication of Certification Information

<Name of organization> will publish certificates, CRLs, and RPKI-signed objects issued by it to a repository that operates as part of a worldwide distributed system of RPKI repositories. 🌍

2.3. Time or Frequency of Publication

The <name of organization> CA will publish its CRL prior to the nextUpdate value in the scheduled CRL previously issued by the CA. ⏰

2.4. Access Controls on Repositories 🔐

okay so this one is all about who gets a key to the repo 🗝️ bestie, you have to describe the access controls the organization uses so that only authorized parties can modify repository data 💅 you also cover any controls used to mitigate denial-of-service attacks against the repository 🛡️ and if the organization offers repository services to its subscribers, you describe the protocol(s) it supports for publishing signed objects from subscribers 🦋

<Describe the access controls used by the organization to ensure that only authorized parties can modify repository data, and any controls used to mitigate denial-of-service attacks against the repository. If the organization offers repository services to its subscribers, then describe here the protocol(s) that it supports for publishing signed objects from subscribers.>

3. Identification and Authentication 🎀

3.1. Naming 🏷️

3.1.1. Types of Names

the subject of every certificate this organization issues is identified by an X.500 Distinguished Name (DN) 🪪 the DN is made up of a single Common Name (CN) attribute, and its value is generated by <name of organization> 💖 the serialNumber attribute can optionally be added next to the common name (to form a terminal relative distinguished name set) 🧚 this helps tell apart the successive instances of certificates tied to the same entity ✨

3.1.2. Need for Names to Be Meaningful

the Subject name in each certificate SHOULD NOT be "meaningful" 🙅‍♀️ in the conventional, human-readable sense ✨ the reason is that these certificates are used for authorization to support applications that make use of attestations of INR holdings 🔑 they are not used to identify subjects 💅

3.1.3. Anonymity or Pseudonymity of Subscribers

so even though Subject names in certificates issued by this organization SHOULD NOT be meaningful and might look "random" 🎲 anonymity is not a function of this PKI 🙈 which means there is no explicit support for this feature 💀

3.1.4. Rules for Interpreting Various Name Forms

None 🫶

3.1.5. Uniqueness of Names

<Name of organization> certifies Subject names that are unique among the certificates it issues 💜 it's desirable that these Subject names be unique throughout the PKI, to facilitate certificate path discovery 🧭 but that kind of uniqueness is not required, and it's not enforced through technical means 🤷‍♀️ <Name of organization> generates Subject names to minimize the chances that two entities in the RPKI will be assigned the same name 🎯 specifically, <insert Subject name generation description here, or cite RFC 6487> ✨

3.1.6. Recognition, Authentication, and Role of Trademarks

because the Subject names are not intended to be meaningful, <name of organization> makes no provision either to recognize or to authenticate trademarks, service marks, etc. 🏳️‍🌈 not its job, bestie 💅

3.2. Initial Identity Validation 🪪

3.2.1. Method to Prove Possession of Private Key

<Describe the method whereby each subscriber will be required to demonstrate proof-of-possession (PoP) of the private key corresponding to the public key in the certificate, prior to certificate issuance.>

3.2.2. Authentication of Organization Identity

certificates issued under this PKI do not attest to the organizational identity of subscribers 🏢 however, certificates are issued to subscribers in a fashion that preserves the accuracy of distributions of INRs as represented in <name of organization> records 📒✨

<Describe the procedures that will be used to ensure that each RPKI certificate that is issued accurately reflects your records with regard to the organization to which you have distributed (or sub-distributed) the INRs identified in the certificate. For example, a BPKI certificate could be used to authenticate a certificate request that serves as a link to the <name of organization> subscriber database that maintains the INR distribution records. The certificate request could be matched against the database record for the subscriber in question, and an RPKI certificate would be issued only if the INRs requested were a subset of those held by the subscriber. The specific procedures employed for this purpose should be commensurate with any you already employ in the maintenance of INR distribution.>

3.2.3. Authentication of Individual Identity

okay so certificates issued under this PKI do not attest to the individual identity of a subscriber 🙅‍♀️ but <name of organization> keeps contact information for each subscriber so it can handle certificate renewal, re-key, and revocation 📞💖

<Describe the procedures that are used to identify at least one individual as a representative of each subscriber. This is done in support of issuance, renewal, and revocation of the certificate issued to the organization. For example, one might say "The <name of organization> BPKI (see Section 3.2.6) issues certificates that MUST be used to identify individuals who represent <name of organization> subscribers." The procedures should be commensurate with those you already employ in authenticating individuals as representatives for INR holders. Note that this authentication is solely for use by you in dealing with the organizations to which you distribute (or sub-distribute) INRs and thus MUST NOT be relied upon outside of this CA/subscriber relationship.>

3.2.4. Non-verified Subscriber Information

no non-verified subscriber data is included in certificates issued under this certificate policy 🙌 the only exception is Subject Information Access (SIA) extensions [RFC6487] 🎀

3.2.5. Validation of Authority

<Describe the procedures used to verify that an individual claiming to represent a subscriber is authorized to represent that subscriber in this context. For example, one could say "Only an individual to whom a BPKI certificate (see Section 3.2.6) has been issued may request issuance of an RPKI certificate. Each certificate issuance request is verified using the BPKI." The procedures should be commensurate with those you already employ in authenticating individuals as representatives of subscribers.>

3.2.6. Criteria for Interoperation

the RPKI is neither intended nor designed to interoperate with any other PKI 🚫🌸

<If you operate a separate, additional PKI for business purposes, e.g., a BPKI, then describe (or reference) how the BPKI is used to authenticate subscribers and to enable them to manage their resource distributions.>

3.3. Identification and Authentication for Re-key Requests 🔁

3.3.1. Identification and Authentication for Routine Re-key

<Describe the conditions under which routine re-key is required and the manner by which it is requested. Describe the procedures that are used to ensure that a subscriber requesting routine re-key is the legitimate holder of the certificate to be re-keyed. State the approach for establishing PoP of the private key corresponding to the new public key. If you operate a BPKI, describe how that BPKI is used to authenticate routine re-key requests.>

3.3.2. Identification and Authentication for Re-key after Revocation

this one's a big deal 🚨 the procedures used to make sure an organization requesting a re-key after revocation is the legitimate holder of the INRs in the certificate being re-keyed MUST also include the method used for verifying PoP of the private key corresponding to the new public key 🔐 💅

<Describe the procedures used to ensure that an organization requesting a re-key after revocation is the legitimate holder of the INRs in the certificate being re-keyed. This MUST also include the method employed for verifying PoP of the private key corresponding to the new public key. If you operate a BPKI, describe how that BPKI is used to authenticate re-key requests. With respect to authentication of the subscriber, the procedures should be commensurate with those you already employ in the maintenance of INR distribution records.>

3.4. Identification and Authentication for Revocation Request 🗑️

<Describe the procedures used by an RPKI subscriber to make a revocation request. Describe the manner by which it is ensured that the subscriber requesting revocation is the subject of the certificate (or an authorized representative thereof) to be revoked. Note that there may be different procedures for the case where the legitimate subject still possesses the original private key as opposed to the case when it no longer has access to that key. These procedures should be commensurate with those you already employ in the maintenance of subscriber records.>

4. Certificate Life Cycle Operational Requirements 🌈

4.1. Certificate Application 📝

4.1.1. Who Can Submit a Certificate Application

any subscriber in good standing who holds INRs distributed by <name of organization> can submit a certificate application to this CA 💌 (the exact meaning of "in good standing" follows the policy of <name of organization> 📖)

4.1.2. Enrollment Process and Responsibilities

<Describe your enrollment process for issuing certificates both for initial deployment of the PKI and as an ongoing process. Note that most of the certificates in this PKI are issued as part of your normal business practices, as an adjunct to INR distribution, and thus a separate application to request a certificate may not be necessary. If so, reference should be made to where these practices are documented.>

4.2. Certificate Application Processing 🧾

<Describe the certificate request/response processing that you will employ. You should make use of existing standards for certificate application processing (see [RFC6487]).>

4.2.1. Performing Identification and Authentication Functions

<Describe your practices for identification and authentication of certificate applicants. Often, existing practices employed by you to identify and authenticate organizations can be used as the basis for issuance of certificates to these subscribers. Reference can be made to documentation of such existing practices.>

4.2.2. Approval or Rejection of Certificate Applications

<Describe your practices for approval or rejection of applications, and refer to documentation of existing business practices relevant to this process. Note that according to the CP, certificate applications will be approved based on the normal business practices of the entity operating the CA, based on the CA's records of subscribers. The CP also says that each CA will follow the procedure specified in Section 3.2.1 to verify that the requester holds the private key corresponding to the public key that will be bound to the certificate the CA issues to the requester.>

4.2.3. Time to Process Certificate Applications

<Specify here your expected time frame for processing certificate applications.>

4.3. Certificate Issuance 🎁

4.3.1. CA Actions during Certificate Issuance

<Describe your procedures for issuance and publication of a certificate.>

4.3.2. Notification to Subscriber by the CA of Issuance of Certificate

<Name of organization> will notify the subscriber when the certificate is published 📬

<Describe here your procedures for notifying a subscriber when a certificate has been published.>

4.3.3. Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities

<Describe here any other entities that will be notified when a certificate is published.>

4.4. Certificate Acceptance ✅

4.4.1. Conduct Constituting Certificate Acceptance

when a certificate is issued, the <name of organization> CA publishes it to the repository and notifies the subscriber 📣

<This may be done without subscriber review and acceptance. State your policy with respect to subscriber certificate acceptance here.>

4.4.2. Publication of the Certificate by the CA

certificates will be published at <insert repository URL here> once issued, following the conduct described in Section 4.4.1 🌐 this will be done within <specify the time frame within which the certificate will be placed in the repository and the subscriber will be notified> ⏰

<Describe any additional procedures with respect to publication of the certificate here.>

4.4.3. Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities

<Describe here any other entities that will be notified when a certificate is published.>

4.5. Key Pair and Certificate Usage ✨

bestie, here's the quick rundown of how the RPKI actually gets used 💅 the full use model is right below 👀

4.5.1. Subscriber Private Key and Certificate Usage 🔑

the certificates <name of organization> issues to subordinate INR holders are CA certificates 🦋 the private key tied to each one is what signs subordinate (CA or EE) certificates and CRLs. main character signing energy, no cap 🔥

4.5.2. Relying Party Public Key and Certificate Usage 🧚

the main people relying on this PKI are orgs that use RPKI EE certificates to verify RPKI-signed objects 🎀 if you want more guidance on what it means to rely on RPKI certificates, go check out Section 4.5.2 of [RFC6484] 📚

4.6. Certificate Renewal 🌸

4.6.1. Circumstance for Certificate Renewal

okay so as per RFC 6484, a certificate gets processed for renewal based on its expiration date or a renewal request from the certificate Subject 💖 the request can be implicit (like a side effect of renewing a resource holding agreement) or explicit. if <name of organization> kicks things off based on the expiration date, then <name of organization> will notify the subscriber <insert the period of advance warning, e.g., "2 weeks in advance of the expiration date", or the general policy, e.g., "in conjunction with notification of service expiration">. the validity interval of the new (renewed) certificate will overlap the previous one by <insert length of overlap period, e.g., 1 week>, so there's zero gap in coverage ✨

the renewed certificate keeps the same public key as the previous one 🔑 unless the private key has been reported as compromised (see Section 4.9.1 🙈). if a new key pair is being used, the stipulations of Section 4.7 apply.

4.6.2. Who May Request Renewal

the subscriber or <name of organization> can start the renewal process 🫶

4.6.3. Processing Certificate Renewal Requests 📋

4.6.4. Notification of New Certificate Issuance to Subscriber 📬

<Name of organization> will notify the subscriber when the certificate is published. <Describe your procedure for notification of new certificate issuance to the subscriber. This should be consistent with Section 4.3.2.>

4.6.5. Conduct Constituting Acceptance of a Renewal Certificate 🙌

See Section 4.4.1. <If you employ a different policy from that specified in Section 4.4.1, describe it here.>

4.6.6. Publication of the Renewal Certificate by the CA 📢

See Section 4.4.2.

4.6.7. Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities 💌

See Section 4.4.3.

4.7. Certificate Re-key 🔄

4.7.1. Circumstance for Certificate Re-key

as per RFC 6484, a re-key only happens when it's actually needed, based on:

knowledge or suspicion of compromise or loss of the associated private key, or
the expiration of the cryptographic lifetime of the associated key pair

if a certificate is revoked to replace the RFC 3779 extensions, the replacement certificate will incorporate the same public key, not a new key 🧩

if the re-key is based on a suspected compromise, then the previous certificate will be revoked 🚨

4.7.2. Who May Request Certification of a New Public Key 🗝️

only the holder of a certificate can request a re-key 💅 on top of that, <name of organization> can start a re-key based on a verified compromise report. <If the subscriber (certificate Subject) requests the re-key, describe how authentication is effected, e.g., using the <name of registry> BPKI. Describe how a compromise report received from other than a subscriber is verified.>

4.7.3. Processing Certificate Re-keying Requests ⚙️

<Describe your process for handling re-keying requests. As per the RPKI CP, this should be consistent with the process described in Section 4.3, so reference can be made to that section.>

4.7.4. Notification of New Certificate Issuance to Subscriber 📬

4.7.5. Conduct Constituting Acceptance of a Re-keyed Certificate 🙌

when a re-keyed certificate is issued, the CA will publish it in the repository and notify the subscriber. See Section 4.4.1.

4.7.6. Publication of the Re-keyed Certificate by the CA 📢

<Describe your policy regarding publication of the new certificate. This should be consistent with the publication process for any new certificate (see Section 4.4.2).>

4.7.7. Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities 💌

See Section 4.4.3.

4.8. Certificate Modification ✏️

4.8.1. Circumstance for Certificate Modification

as per RFC 6484, a certificate gets modified to implement changes to the RFC 3779 extension values or the SIA extension in a certificate 💫 a subscriber can request a certificate modification when this info in a currently valid certificate has changed, because of changes in the subscriber's INR holdings, or because of a change in the repository publication point data.

if a subscriber is going to receive a distribution of INRs on top of their current one, and they don't ask for a brand-new certificate with only those additional INRs, then it's handled through a certificate modification 🍓 when a modification is approved, a new certificate gets issued. it keeps the same public key and the same expiration date as the original, but the incidental information gets corrected and/or the INR distribution gets expanded. when previously distributed INRs need to come off a certificate, the old certificate gets revoked and a new one (reflecting the new distribution) is issued 🦋

4.8.2. Who May Request Certificate Modification 🙋

the subscriber or <name of organization> may start the certificate modification process. <For the case of the subscriber, state here what steps will be taken to verify the identity and authorization of the entity requesting the modification.>

4.8.3. Processing Certificate Modification Requests ⚙️

4.8.4. Notification of Modified Certificate Issuance to Subscriber 📬

4.8.5. Conduct Constituting Acceptance of Modified Certificate 🙌

when a modified certificate is issued, <name of organization> will publish it to the repository and notify the subscriber. See Section 4.4.1.

4.8.6. Publication of the Modified Certificate by the CA 📢

<Describe your procedure for publication of a modified certificate. This should be consistent with the publication process for any new certificate (see Section 4.4.2).>

4.8.7. Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities 💌

See Section 4.4.3.

4.9. Certificate Revocation and Suspension 🚫

4.9.1. Circumstances for Revocation

as per RFC 6484, certificates can get revoked for a few different reasons 🥀 either <name of organization> or the subject might want to end the relationship expressed in the certificate, which creates cause to revoke. if one or more of the INRs bound to the public key in the certificate are no longer associated with the subject, that counts as a basis for revocation too. a certificate can also be revoked because the private key corresponding to its public key was lost or compromised. and finally, a certificate may be revoked in order to invalidate data signed by the private key associated with that certificate 🫠

4.9.2. Who Can Request Revocation 🙋

the subscriber or <name of organization> may request a revocation. <For the case of the subscriber, describe what steps will be taken to verify the identity and authorization of the entity requesting the revocation.>

4.9.3. Procedure for Revocation Request 📝

<Describe your process for handling a certificate revocation request. This should include:

<Procedure to be used by the subscriber to request a revocation.>
<Procedure for notification of the subscriber when the revocation is initiated by <name of organization>.>

4.9.4. Revocation Request Grace Period ⏰

a subscriber is required to request revocation as soon as possible after the need for revocation has been identified 🏃‍♀️💨

4.9.5. Time within Which CA Must Process the Revocation Request ⏳

<Describe your policy on the time period within which you will process a revocation request.>

4.9.6. Revocation Checking Requirement for Relying Parties 🔍

as per RFC 6484, a relying party is responsible for acquiring and checking the most recent, scheduled CRL from the issuer of the certificate, whenever the relying party validates a certificate 🧐

4.9.7. CRL Issuance Frequency 🗓️

<State the CRL issuance frequency for the CRLs that you publish.> each CRL contains a nextUpdate value, and a new CRL will be published at or before that time. <Name of organization> will set the nextUpdate value when it issues a CRL, to signal when the next scheduled CRL will be issued 💜

4.9.8. Maximum Latency for CRLs ⏱️

a CRL will be published to the repository system within <state the maximum latency> after generation.

4.10. Certificate Status Services 🌈

<Name of organization> does not support the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) or the Server-Based Certificate Validation Protocol (SCVP). <Name of organization> issues CRLs 🎀

5. Facility, Management, and Operational Controls 🏰

5.1. Physical Controls 🧱

<As per RFC 6484, describe the physical controls that you employ for certificate management. These should be commensurate with those used in the management of INR distribution.>

5.1.1. Site Location and Construction 🏗️

5.1.2. Physical Access 🚪

5.1.3. Power and Air Conditioning ❄️

5.1.4. Water Exposures 💧

5.1.5. Fire Prevention and Protection 🔥

5.1.6. Media Storage 💾

5.1.7. Waste Disposal 🗑️

5.1.8. Off-Site Backup ☁️

5.2. Procedural Controls 📋

<As per RFC 6484, describe the procedural security controls that you employ for certificate management. These should be commensurate with those used in the management of INR distribution.>

5.2.1. Trusted Roles 👑

5.2.2. Number of Persons Required per Task 👯

5.2.3. Identification and Authentication for Each Role 🪪

5.2.4. Roles Requiring Separation of Duties ⚖️

5.3. Personnel Controls 💖

okay bestie, this section is all about the people 🫶 As per RFC 6484, describe the personnel security controls that you employ for individuals associated with certificate management. These should be commensurate with those used in the management of INR distribution. (the people side needs to be just as serious as the tech side, no cap 💅)

5.3.1. Qualifications, Experience, and Clearance Requirements 🎓

5.3.2. Background Check Procedures 🔍

5.3.3. Training Requirements 📚

5.3.4. Retraining Frequency and Requirements 🔁

5.3.5. Job Rotation Frequency and Sequence 🔄

5.3.6. Sanctions for Unauthorized Actions 🚫

5.3.7. Independent Contractor Requirements 🧑‍💻

5.3.8. Documentation Supplied to Personnel 📄

5.4. Audit Logging Procedures 🪵

As per the CP, describe in the following sections the details of how you implement audit logging. ✨

5.4.1. Types of Events Recorded 📝

Audit records will be generated for the basic operations of the Certification Authority computing equipment. Audit records will include the date, time, responsible user or process, and summary content data relating to the event. Auditable events include:

Access to CA computing equipment (e.g., logon, logout)
Messages received requesting CA actions (e.g., certificate requests, certificate revocation requests, compromise notifications)
Certificate creation, modification, revocation, or renewal actions
Posting of any material to a repository
Any attempts to change or delete audit data
Key generation
Software and/or configuration updates to the CA
Clock adjustments

5.4.2. Frequency of Processing Log 🔎

5.4.3. Retention Period for Audit Log 🗄️

5.4.4. Protection of Audit Log 🛡️

5.4.5. Audit Log Backup Procedures 💾

5.4.6. Audit Collection System (Internal vs. External) [OMITTED] 🙈

5.4.7. Notification to Event-Causing Subject [OMITTED] 🙈

5.4.8. Vulnerability Assessments 🕵️‍♀️

5.5. Records Archival [OMITTED] 🙈

5.6. Key Changeover 🔑

The <name of organization> CA certificate will contain a validity period that is at least as long as that of any certificate being issued under that certificate. When <name of organization> CA changes keys, it will follow the procedures described in [RFC6489]. ✨

5.7. Compromise and Disaster Recovery 🌪️

5.8. CA or RA Termination 🌅

6. Technical Security Controls 🔐

This section describes the security controls used by <name of organization>. 💜

6.1. Key Pair Generation and Installation 🧩

6.1.1. Key Pair Generation 🎲

6.1.2. Private Key Delivery to Subscriber 📬

6.1.3. Public Key Delivery to Certificate Issuer 📮

<Describe the procedures that will be used to deliver a subscriber's public keys to the <name of organization> RPKI CA. These procedures MUST ensure that the public key has not been altered during transit and that the subscriber possesses the private key corresponding to the transferred public key.> See RFC 6487 for details. 🎀

⚠️ the MUST in that bit is doing a LOT of work, so the public key can't get tampered with on the way, and the subscriber has to actually hold the matching private key 😭

6.1.4. CA Public Key Delivery to Relying Parties 🤝

CA public keys for all entities (other than trust anchors) are contained in certificates issued by other CAs and will be published to the RPKI repository system. Relying parties will download these certificates from this system. Public key values and associated data for (putative) trust anchors will be distributed out of band and accepted by relying parties on the basis of locally defined criteria, e.g., embedded in path validation software that will be made available to the Internet community. 🌐

6.1.5. Key Sizes 📏

The key sizes used in this PKI are as specified in [RFC6485]. 🔢

6.1.6. Public Key Parameter Generation and Quality Checking ✅

The public key algorithms and parameters used in this PKI are as specified in [RFC6485]. 🧮

<If the procedures in Section 6.1.1 include subscriber key pair generation, EITHER insert here text specifying that the subscriber is responsible for performing checks on the quality of its key pair and saying that <name of organization> is not responsible for performing such checks for subscribers OR describe the procedures used by the CA for checking the quality of these subscriber key pairs.>

6.1.7. Key Usage Purposes (as per X.509 v3 Key Usage Field) 🏷️

The KeyUsage extension bit values employed in RPKI certificates are specified in [RFC6487]. 🗝️

6.2. Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering Controls 🛡️

6.2.1. Cryptographic Module Standards and Controls 🔧

6.2.2. Private Key (n out of m) Multi-Person Control 👯

<If you choose to use multi-person controls to constrain access to your CA's private keys, then insert the following text. "There will be private key <insert here n> out of <insert here m> multi-person control.">

6.2.3. Private Key Escrow 🫙

6.2.4. Private Key Backup 📦

6.2.5. Private Key Archival 🏛️

See Sections 6.2.3 and 6.2.4.

6.2.6. Private Key Transfer into or from a Cryptographic Module 🔀

The private key for the <name of organization> production CA <if appropriate, change "production CA" to "production and offline CAs"> will be generated by the cryptographic module specified in Section 6.2.1. The private keys will never leave the module except in encrypted form for backup and/or transfer to a new module. 🔐

6.2.7. Private Key Storage on Cryptographic Module 💽

The private key for the <name of organization> production CA <if appropriate, change "production CA" to "production and offline CAs"> will be stored in the cryptographic module. It will be protected from unauthorized use <say how here>. 🙅‍♀️

6.2.8. Method of Activating Private Key ⚡

6.2.9. Method of Deactivating Private Key 💤

6.2.10. Method of Destroying Private Key 💥

6.2.11. Cryptographic Module Rating ⭐

6.3. Other Aspects of Key Pair Management 🗂️

6.3.1. Public Key Archival 📁

6.3.2. Certificate Operational Periods and Key Pair Usage Periods ⏳

The <name of organization> CA's key pair will have a validity interval of <insert number of years>. <These key pairs and certificates should have reasonably long validity intervals, e.g., 10 years, to minimize the disruption caused by key changeover. Note that the CA's key lifetime is under the control of its issuer, so the CPS MUST reflect the key lifetime imposed by the issuer.>

6.4. Activation Data 🎟️

6.4.1. Activation Data Generation and Installation 🛠️

6.4.2. Activation Data Protection 🔒

Activation data for the CA private key will be protected by <describe your procedures here>.

6.4.3. Other Aspects of Activation Data 💫

6.5. Computer Security Controls 💻

6.6. Life Cycle Technical Controls ♻️

6.6.1. System Development Controls 🧑‍🔬

6.6.2. Security Management Controls 🧰

6.6.3. Life Cycle Security Controls 🔁

6.7. Network Security Controls 🌐

6.8. Time-Stamping ⏰

The RPKI does not make use of time-stamping. 🙅‍♀️

7. Certificate and CRL Profiles 📜

See [RFC6487]. 🎀

8. Compliance Audit and Other Assessments 🧐

9. Other Business and Legal Matters 💼

9.1. Fees 💸

9.1.1. Certificate Issuance or Renewal Fees 🧾

9.1.2. Certificate Access Fees [OMITTED] 🙈

9.1.3. Revocation or Status Information Access Fees [OMITTED] 🙈

9.1.4. Fees for Other Services (if Applicable) 🛍️

9.1.5. Refund Policy 🔙

9.2. Financial Responsibility 🏦

9.2.1. Insurance Coverage 🌂

9.2.2. Other Assets 🪙

9.2.3. Insurance or Warranty Coverage for End-Entities ✨

9.3. Confidentiality of Business Information 🤫

9.3.1. Scope of Confidential Information

9.3.2. Information Not within the Scope of Confidential Information

9.3.3. Responsibility to Protect Confidential Information

9.4. Privacy of Personal Information 🔒

9.4.1. Privacy Plan

9.4.2. Information Treated as Private

9.4.3. Information Not Deemed Private

9.4.4. Responsibility to Protect Private Information

9.4.6. Disclosure Pursuant to Judicial or Administrative Process

9.4.7. Other Information Disclosure Circumstances

9.5. Intellectual Property Rights (if Applicable) 💜

9.6. Representations and Warranties 🎀

9.6.1. CA Representations and Warranties

9.6.2. Subscriber Representations and Warranties

9.6.3. Relying Party Representations and Warranties

9.7. Disclaimers of Warranties 🙈

9.8. Limitations of Liability 🌸

9.9. Indemnities 🫶

9.10. Term and Termination ⭐

9.10.1. Term

9.10.2. Termination

9.10.3. Effect of Termination and Survival

9.11. Individual Notices and Communications with Participants 📬

9.12. Amendments 🦋

9.12.1. Procedure for Amendment

9.12.2. Notification Mechanism and Period

9.13. Dispute Resolution Provisions 🤝

9.14. Governing Law ⚖️

9.15. Compliance with Applicable Law ✅

9.16. Miscellaneous Provisions 🧚

9.16.1. Entire Agreement

9.16.2. Assignment

9.16.3. Severability

9.16.4. Enforcement (Attorneys' Fees and Waiver of Rights)

9.16.5. Force Majeure

<END TEMPLATE TEXT>

10. Security Considerations 🔐

okay bestie, this section is SO important 😭 how much a relying party can trust the binding inside a certificate depends on a few things, and each one is giving main character energy:

the practices followed by the Certification Authority (CA) in authenticating the subject
the CA's operating policy, procedures, and technical security controls, including the scope of the subscriber's responsibilities (for example, in protecting the private key)
the stated responsibilities and liability terms and conditions of the CA (for example, warranties, disclaimers of warranties, and limitations of liability)

this document gives you a framework for the technical, procedural, personnel, and physical security of Certification Authorities, Registration Authorities, repositories, subscribers, and relying party cryptographic modules 🛡️ so that certificate generation, publication, renewal, re-key, usage, and revocation all get done in a secure way. the sections that do the heavy lifting for PKI entities like CA, RA, repository, subscriber systems, and relying party systems are:

Section 3 ("Identification and Authentication" (I&A))
Section 4 ("Certificate Life Cycle Operational Requirements")
Section 5 ("Facility, Management, and Operational Controls")
Section 6 ("Technical Security Controls")
Section 7 ("Certificate and CRL Profiles")
Section 8 ("Compliance Audit and Other Assessments")

bestie, read every bullet above like it's your group chat drama 💀 security is not the place to skim 💅

11. References 📚

11.1. Normative References

these are the must-reads, ngl 🌈

[RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
           Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997,
           <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

[RFC6484]  Kent, S., Kong, D., Seo, K., and R. Watro, "Certificate
           Policy (CP) for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
           (RPKI)", BCP 173, RFC 6484, February 2012,
           <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6484>.

[RFC6485]  Huston, G., "The Profile for Algorithms and Key Sizes for
           Use in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)",
           RFC 6485, February 2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/
           info/rfc6485>.

[RFC6487]  Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for
           X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", RFC 6487,
           February 2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6487>.

11.2. Informative References

these ones are good to know too, iykyk 🦋

[FIPS]     Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-3
           (FIPS-140-3), "Security Requirements for Cryptographic
           Modules", Information Technology Laboratory, National
           Institute of Standards and Technology, Work in Progress.

[RFC3647]  Chokhani, S., Ford, W., Sabett, R., Merrill, C., and S.
           Wu, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
           Policy and Certification Practices Framework", RFC 3647,
           November 2003, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3647>.

[RFC6480]  Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
           Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, February 2012,
           <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6480>.

[RFC6481]  Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for
           Resource Certificate Repository Structure", RFC 6481,
           February 2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6481>.

[RFC6482]  Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route
           Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482, February 2012,
           <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6482>.

[RFC6486]  Austein, R., Huston, G., Kent, S., and M. Lepinski,
           "Manifests for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
           (RPKI)", RFC 6486, February 2012,
           <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6486>.

[RFC6489]  Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and S. Kent, "Certification
           Authority (CA) Key Rollover in the Resource Public Key
           Infrastructure (RPKI)", BCP 174, RFC 6489, February 2012,
           <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6489>.

Acknowledgments 🫶

the authors want to give a big thank you to Matt Lepinski for help with the formatting, Ron Watro for help with the editing, and the other members of the SIDR working group for reviewing this document 💖 literal queens 👑

Authors' Addresses 🦋

Stephen Kent
BBN Technologies
10 Moulton Street
Cambridge, MA  02138
United States

Phone: +1 (617) 873-3988
EMail: skent@bbn.com


Derrick Kong
BBN Technologies
10 Moulton Street
Cambridge, MA  02138
United States

Phone: +1 (617) 873-1951
EMail: dkong@bbn.com


Karen Seo
BBN Technologies
10 Moulton Street
Cambridge, MA  02138
United States

Phone: +1 (617) 873-3152
EMail: kseo@bbn.com

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ietf: rfc7382 2015-04
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