RFC 6484

Certificate Policy (CP) for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)

📅 published February 2012, from ietf

RFC 6484 at a glance 🎀

Okay bestie, this is RFC 6484, published by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) as Request for Comments 6484 💖. It's titled Certificate Policy (CP) for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) ✨.

The authors are S. Kent, D. Kong, K. Seo, and R. Watro, all from BBN Technologies 🧚. It's a Best Current Practice (BCP 173), so it's a Category: Best Current Practice doc, ISSN 2070-1721, and it came out in February 2012 📅. The title block doesn't list anything it obsoletes or updates, so there's no drama there 💅.

Abstract 🌸

Okay so this doc is all about the certificate policy for a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) that backs up attestations about Internet Number Resource (INR) holdings 🦋. Every organization that hands out IP addresses or Autonomous System (AS) numbers to another organization will, at the same time, issue a (public key) certificate that reflects that handout 🎀. These certificates let you verify that the resources listed in the certificate were given to whoever holds the matching private key, and that this organization is the current, unique holder of those resources 🔥. Literally the receipts for who owns what, iykyk 🫶.

Status of This Memo ✨

This memo documents an Internet Best Current Practice 💅.

This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) 🌈. It represents the consensus of the IETF community, and it went through public review before the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG) approved it for publication 👑. If you want more on BCPs, check out Section 2 of RFC 5741 🧚.

For the current status, any errata, and how to send feedback on this doc, head to http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6484 💜.

Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved 🌸.

This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) as they stand on the date this document was published 📜. Please read these documents carefully, because they spell out your rights and restrictions for this doc 🙈. Code Components pulled out of this document need to include Simplified BSD License text, as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions, and they come without warranty, as described in the Simplified BSD License 💖.

Table of Contents 🧚

   1. Introduction ....................................................6
      1.1. Overview ...................................................7
      1.2. Document Name and Identification ...........................7
      1.3. PKI Participants ...........................................7
           1.3.1. Certification Authorities ...........................8
           1.3.2. Registration Authorities ............................8
           1.3.3. Subscribers .........................................8
           1.3.4. Relying Parties .....................................8
           1.3.5. Other Participants ..................................8
      1.4. Certificate Usage ..........................................9
           1.4.1. Appropriate Certificate Uses ........................9
           1.4.2. Prohibited Certificate Uses .........................9
      1.5. Policy Administration ......................................9
           1.5.1. Organization Administering the Document .............9
           1.5.2. Contact Person ......................................9
           1.5.4. CP Approval Procedures ..............................9
      1.6. Definitions and Acronyms ..................................10
   2. Publication and Repository Responsibilities ....................11
      2.1. Repositories ..............................................11
      2.2. Publication of Certification Information ..................11
      2.3. Time or Frequency of Publication ..........................12
      2.4. Access Controls on Repositories ...........................12
   3. Identification and Authentication ..............................12
      3.1. Naming ....................................................12
           3.1.1. Types of Names .....................................12
           3.1.2. Need for Names to Be Meaningful ....................12
           3.1.3. Anonymity or Pseudonymity of Subscribers ...........13
           3.1.4. Rules for Interpreting Various Name Forms ..........13
           3.1.5. Uniqueness of Names ................................13
      3.2. Initial Identity Validation ...............................13
           3.2.1. Method to Prove Possession of the Private Key ......13
           3.2.2. Authentication of Organization Identity ............13
           3.2.3. Authentication of Individual Identity ..............14
           3.2.4. Non-Verified Subscriber Information ................14
           3.2.5. Validation of Authority ............................14
           3.2.6. Criteria for Interoperation ........................14
      3.3. Identification and Authentication for Re-Key Requests .....14
           3.3.1. Identification and Authentication for
                  Routine Re-Key .....................................14
           3.3.2. Identification and Authentication for
                  Re-Key after Revocation ............................15
      3.4. Identification and Authentication for Revocation Request ..15

Okay bestie, we're still in the table of contents, and this is where the big meaty parts start to show up: certificate life-cycle rules, facility and personnel controls, technical security controls, and the security considerations at the end 👀🔐✨

   4. Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements ................16
      4.1. Certificate Application ...................................16
           4.1.1. Who Can Submit a Certificate Application ...........16
           4.1.2. Enrollment Process and Responsibilities ............16
      4.2. Certificate Application Processing ........................16
           4.2.1. Performing Identification and
                  Authentication Functions ...........................16
           4.2.2. Approval or Rejection of Certificate Applications ..16
           4.2.3. Time to Process Certificate Applications ...........17
      4.3. Certificate Issuance ......................................17
           4.3.1. CA Actions during Certificate Issuance .............17
           4.3.2. Notification to Subscriber by the CA of
                  Issuance of Certificate ............................17
      4.4. Certificate Acceptance ....................................17
           4.4.1. Conduct Constituting Certificate Acceptance ........17
           4.4.2. Publication of the Certificate by the CA ...........17
           4.4.3. Notification of Certificate Issuance by the
                  CA to Other Entities ...............................17
      4.5. Key Pair and Certificate Usage ............................18
           4.5.1. Subscriber Private Key and Certificate Usage .......18
           4.5.2. Relying Party Public Key and Certificate Usage .....18
      4.6. Certificate Renewal .......................................18
           4.6.1. Circumstance for Certificate Renewal ...............19
           4.6.2. Who May Request Renewal ............................19
           4.6.3. Processing Certificate Renewal Requests ............19
           4.6.4. Notification of New Certificate Issuance to
                  Subscriber .........................................19
           4.6.5. Conduct Constituting Acceptance of a
                  Renewal Certificate ................................19
           4.6.6. Publication of the Renewal Certificate by the CA ...20
           4.6.7. Notification of Certificate Issuance by the
                  CA to Other Entities ...............................20
      4.7. Certificate Re-Key ........................................20
           4.7.1. Circumstance for Certificate Re-Key ................20
           4.7.2. Who May Request Certification of a New Public Key ..20
           4.7.3. Processing Certificate Re-Keying Requests ..........21
           4.7.4. Notification of New Certificate Issuance to
                  Subscriber .........................................21
           4.7.5. Conduct Constituting Acceptance of a
                  Re-Keyed Certificate ...............................21
           4.7.6. Publication of the Re-Keyed Certificate by the CA ..21
           4.7.7. Notification of Certificate Issuance by the
                  CA to Other Entities ...............................21
      4.8. Certificate Modification ..................................21
           4.8.1. Circumstance for Certificate Modification ..........21
           4.8.2. Who May Request Certificate Modification ...........21
           4.8.3. Processing Certificate Modification Requests .......22
           4.8.4. Notification of New Certificate Issuance to
                  Subscriber .........................................22
           4.8.5. Conduct Constituting Acceptance of Modified
                  Certificate ........................................22
           4.8.6. Publication of the Modified Certificate by the CA ..22
           4.8.7. Notification of Certificate Issuance by the
                  CA to Other Entities ...............................22
      4.9. Certificate Revocation and Suspension .....................22
           4.9.1. Circumstances for Revocation .......................22
           4.9.2. Who Can Request Revocation .........................22
           4.9.3. Procedure for Revocation Request ...................23
           4.9.4. Revocation Request Grace Period ....................23
           4.9.5. Time within which CA Must Process the
                  Revocation Request .................................23
           4.9.6. Revocation Checking Requirement for Relying
                  Parties ............................................23
           4.9.7. CRL Issuance Frequency .............................23
           4.9.8. Maximum Latency for CRLs ...........................23
      4.10. Certificate Status Services ..............................24
   5. Facility, Management, and Operational Controls .................24
      5.1. Physical Controls .........................................24
           5.1.1. Site Location and Construction .....................24
           5.1.2. Physical Access ....................................24
           5.1.3. Power and Air Conditioning .........................24
           5.1.4. Water Exposures ....................................24
           5.1.5. Fire Prevention and Protection .....................24
           5.1.6. Media Storage ......................................24
           5.1.7. Waste Disposal .....................................24
           5.1.8. Off-Site Backup ....................................24
      5.2. Procedural Controls .......................................24
           5.2.1. Trusted Roles ......................................25
           5.2.2. Number of Persons Required per Task ................25
           5.2.3. Identification and Authentication for Each Role ....25
           5.2.4. Roles Requiring Separation of Duties ...............25
      5.3. Personnel Controls ........................................25
      5.4. Audit Logging Procedures ..................................25
           5.4.1. Types of Events Recorded ...........................25
           5.4.2. Frequency of Processing Log ........................25
           5.4.3. Retention Period for Audit Log .....................26
           5.4.4. Protection of Audit Log ............................26
           5.4.5. Audit Log Backup Procedures ........................26
           5.4.8. Vulnerability Assessments ..........................26
      5.6. Key Changeover ............................................26
      5.7. CA or RA Termination ......................................26
   6. Technical Security Controls ....................................26
      6.1. Key Pair Generation and Installation ......................27
           6.1.1. Key Pair Generation ................................27
           6.1.2. Private Key Delivery to Subscriber .................27
           6.1.3. Public Key Delivery to Certificate Issuer ..........27
           6.1.4. CA Public Key Delivery to Relying Parties ..........27
           6.1.5. Key Sizes ..........................................27
           6.1.6. Public Key Parameters Generation and
                  Quality Checking ...................................28
           6.1.7. Key Usage Purposes (as per X.509 v3 Key
                  Usage Field) .......................................28
      6.2. Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module
           Engineering Controls ......................................28
           6.2.1. Cryptographic Module Standards and Controls ........28
           6.2.2. Private Key (N out of M) Multi-Person Control ......28
           6.2.3. Private Key Escrow .................................28
           6.2.4. Private Key Backup .................................28
           6.2.5. Private Key Archival ...............................28
           6.2.6. Private Key Transfer into or from a
                  Cryptographic Module ...............................29
           6.2.7. Private Key Storage on Cryptographic Module ........29
           6.2.8. Method of Activating a Private Key .................29
           6.2.9. Method of Deactivating a Private Key ...............29
           6.2.10. Method of Destroying a Private Key ................29
           6.2.11. Cryptographic Module Rating .......................29
      6.3. Other Aspects of Key Pair Management ......................29
           6.3.1. Public Key Archival ................................29
           6.3.2. Certificate Operational Periods and Key
                  Pair Usage Periods .................................29
      6.4. Activation Data ...........................................30
      6.5. Computer Security Controls ................................30
      6.6. Life-Cycle Technical Controls .............................30
           6.6.1. System Development Controls ........................30
           6.6.2. Security Management Controls .......................30
           6.6.3. Life-Cycle Security Controls .......................30
      6.7. Network Security Controls .................................30
      6.8. Timestamping ..............................................30
   7. Certificate and CRL Profiles ...................................31
   8. Compliance Audit and Other Assessments .........................31
   9. Other Business and Legal Matters ...............................31
      9.12.  Amendments ..............................................31
           9.12.1. Procedure for Amendment ...........................31
           9.12.2. Notification Mechanism and Period .................31
           9.12.3. Circumstances under Which OID Must Be Changed .....32
   10. Security Considerations .......................................32
   11. Acknowledgments ...............................................33
   12. References ....................................................33
      12.1. Normative References .....................................33
      12.2. Informative References ...................................33

1. Introduction ✨

okay so bestie, this is the doc that sets the rules for a PKI (public key infrastructure 🔐) used to prove who holds Internet Number Resources (INRs) 🌐. That means IP addresses or Autonomous System (AS) numbers. An organization that hands INRs out to another organization MAY, at the same time, issue a (public key) certificate for that handout 🎀. These certificates let anyone check that the resources were given to whoever holds the matching private key, and that this organization is still the current holder 💖.

The most iconic part of this PKI 💅 is that it does NOT try to identify an INR holder by the subject name in their certificate. Instead, each certificate lets an entity prove, in a verifiable way, that it currently holds an INR, based on the current records of the entity in charge of those resources 🦋. Checking the claim comes down to two things: whether the entity can digitally sign data that the public key in its certificate can verify, and whether that certificate validates inside this PKI 🔥.

This PKI is built ONLY for checking claims about current INR holdings 🧚. That includes certificates made to support running this infrastructure, for example for integrity or access control of the repository system in Section 2.4 🌸. Those transitive uses are allowed under this policy too. Using the certificates and Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) managed under this PKI for anything else is a violation of this CP, and relying parties (RPs) SHOULD reject certificates presented for those uses 🙈.

Note: This document is based on the template specified in RFC 3647 [RFC3647], a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) stream. To keep things short, a bunch of template sections were left out because they don't apply to this PKI. We still kept the RFC 3647 section numbering so you can compare with the outline in Section 6 of RFC 3647 🍓. Every omitted section should be read as "No stipulation" in Certificate Policy (CP) / Certification Practice Statement (CPS) parlance 🫶.

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119] 📚.

1.1. Overview

This PKI exists to support validation of claims by current INR holders, based on the records of the organizations acting as Certification Authorities (CAs) in this PKI 💜. Being able to verify these claims is essential for making sure resources are handed out unambiguously [RFC6480] ✨.

The RPKI is laid out to match the number resource allocation framework of the Internet 🌈. IANA allocates number resources to Regional Internet Registries (RIRs), to others, and for special purposes [RFC5736]. The RIRs then manage the allocation of number resources to end users, Internet Service Providers, and others 🎀.

This PKI includes several types of certificates (see [RFC6487] for more details) 👑:

  • CA certificates for each organization distributing INRs and for INR holders
  • End-entity (EE) certificates for organizations to validate digital signatures on RPKI signed objects

1.2. Document Name and Identification

The name of this document is "Certificate Policy (CP) for the Resource PKI (RPKI)" 🏷️.

This policy has been assigned the following OID 🔢:

   id-cp-ipAddr-asNumber OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)

                         identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)

                         security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) cp(14) 2 }

1.3. PKI Participants

Quick vocab check 🧠: in a PKI, "subscriber" means an individual or organization that is the subject of a certificate issued by a CA. This document uses it that way everywhere, with no extra qualifiers, and it's NOT the same as the networking meaning of someone who gets service from an ISP 🙅‍♀️. For that networking meaning, the term "network subscriber" will be used. Also, to keep things short, this document always calls PKI participants organizations or entities, even though some of them are individuals 💅.

1.3.1. Certification Authorities

The organizations that distribute IP addresses and AS numbers (IANA, RIRs, NIRs, ISPs) act as CAs in this PKI 👑.

Organizations that don't distribute INRs but still hold them ALSO act as CAs when they create EE certificates 🦋.

1.3.2. Registration Authorities

This PKI doesn't require a registration authority (RA) function that's separate from the one that comes built into the CA function 🌸. The RA function MUST be provided by the same entity operating as a CA, for example the entities listed in Section 1.3.1. An entity acting as a CA in this PKI already has a formal relationship with each organization it distributes INRs to 🫶. Those CAs already do the RA function implicitly, since they already take responsibility for distributing INRs 💖.

1.3.3. Subscribers

These are the organizations receiving INR distributions: RIRs, NIRs, ISPs, and other organizations 🌐.

Heads up 👀: any of these organizations may have gotten distributions from more than one source over time. This is true even for RIRs, which take part in inter-registry exchanges of address space 🔁. This PKI makes room for those relationships ✨.

1.3.4. Relying Parties

Entities or individuals that act in reliance on certificates or RPKI signed objects issued under this PKI are relying parties 🧚. Relying parties may or may not be subscribers within this PKI. (See Section 1.6 for the definition of an RPKI signed object.) 📖

1.3.5. Other Participants

Every organization that takes on a CA role in this PKI is responsible for filling the RPKI distributed repository system with the certificates, CRLs, and RPKI signed objects it issues 🗂️. The organization MAY run its own publication point, or it MAY outsource this function (see Sections 2.1 and 2.2) 🎀.

1.4. Certificate Usage

1.4.1. Appropriate Certificate Uses

The certificates issued under this hierarchy are for authorization in support of validating claims of current INR holdings 💅.

Other uses that match the basic goal above are ALSO allowed under this policy 🌈. For example, certificates may be issued to support integrity and access control for the repository system in Section 2.4. Those transitive uses are permitted under this policy 🦋.

1.4.2. Prohibited Certificate Uses

Any uses other than the ones described in Section 1.4.1 are prohibited under this policy 🚫.

1.5. Policy Administration

1.5.1. Organization Administering the Document

This CP is administered by 🏢:

   Internet Engineering Steering Group
   c/o Internet Society
   1775 Wiehle Avenue, Suite 201
   Reston, VA 20190-5108
   U.S.A.

1.5.2. Contact Person

Here's how to reach them 📬:

   EMail: iesg@ietf.org
   Phone: +1-703-439-2120 (Internet Society)

1.5.4. CP Approval Procedures

If a replacement BCP is needed that updates or obsoletes the current BCP, then the replacement BCP MUST be approved by the IESG following the procedures of the IETF Standards Process as defined in RFC 2026 [RFC2026] 🔥.

1.6. Definitions and Acronyms

Let's get the alphabet soup sorted 🍲:

CPS - Certification Practice Statement. A CPS is a document that specifies the practices that a Certification Authority (CA) employs in issuing certificates in this PKI 📝.

Distribution of INRs - A process of distribution of the INRs along the respective number hierarchy. IANA distributes blocks of IP addresses and AS numbers to the five Regional Internet Registries (RIRs). RIRs distribute smaller address blocks and AS numbers to organizations within their service regions, who in turn distribute IP addresses to their customers 🌸.

IANA - Internet Assigned Numbers Authority. IANA is responsible for global coordination of the IP addressing system and AS numbers used for routing Internet traffic. IANA distributes INRs to Regional Internet Registries (RIRs) 🌍.

INRs - Internet Number Resources. INRs are number values for three protocol parameter sets, namely 🎯:

  • IP version 4 addresses,
  • IP version 6 addresses, and
  • Identifiers used in Internet inter-domain routing, currently Border Gateway Protocol-4 AS numbers.

ISP - Internet Service Provider. This is an organization managing and providing Internet services to other organizations 🛜.

LIR - Local Internet Registry. In some regions, this term is used to refer to what is called an ISP in other regions 🗺️.

NIR - National Internet Registry. This is an organization that manages the distribution of INRs for a portion of the geopolitical area covered by a Regional Registry. NIRs form an optional second tier in the tree scheme used to manage INRs 🌳.

RIR - Regional Internet Registry. This is an organization that manages the distribution of INRs for a geopolitical area 🌏.

RPKI signed object - An RPKI signed object is a digitally signed data object (other than a certificate or CRL) that is declared to be such by a Standards Track RFC, and that can be validated using certificates issued under this PKI. The content and format of these data constructs depend on the context in which validation of claims of current holdings of INRs takes place. Examples of these objects are repository manifests [RFC6486] and Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs) [RFC6482] 💜.

2. Publication and Repository Responsibilities

2.1. Repositories

Certificates, CRLs, and RPKI signed objects (intended for public consumption) MUST be made available for downloading by all relying parties, so they can validate this data 📥. That's why a robust, distributed repository system is needed 💪. Each CA MUST maintain a publicly accessible online repository and publish all RPKI-signed objects (intended for public consumption) through that repository, in a manner that conforms with "A Profile for Resource Certificate Repository Structure" [RFC6481] ✨. (This function MAY be outsourced, as noted in Section 2.2 below.) Put all the repositories together and you get the RPKI distributed repository system 🌈.

2.2. Publication of Certification Information ✨

Okay bestie, this part is all about putting things where people can actually find them 📢. Each CA MUST publish the certificates (intended for public consumption) that it issues via the repository system 💖.

Each CA MUST publish the CRLs (intended for public consumption) that it issues via the repository system 🧾.

Each CA MUST publish its RPKI signed objects (intended for public consumption) via the repository system 🎀.

Each CA that issues certificates to entities outside of its administrative domain SHOULD create and publish a CPS that meets the requirements set forth in this CP 📝. Publication means that the entities to which the CA issues certificates MUST be able to acquire a copy of the CPS, and MUST be able to ascertain when the CPS changes 👀. (An organization that does not allocate or assign INRs does not need to create or publish a CPS 🙈.)

An organization MAY choose to outsource publication of RPKI data -- certificates, CRLs, and other RPKI signed objects -- so it doesn't have to run the whole publishing thing itself 🧚.

The CP will be published as an IETF-stream RFC and will be available from the RFC repository 🌸.

2.3. Time or Frequency of Publication ⏰

The CPS for each CA MUST specify the following information 💜:

The period of time within which a certificate will be published after the CA issues the certificate.

The period of time within which a CA will publish a CRL with an entry for a revoked certificate after it revokes that certificate.

Expired and revoked certificates SHOULD be removed from the RPKI repository system, upon expiration or revocation, respectively 🗑️. Also, please note that each CA MUST publish its CRL prior to the nextUpdate value in the scheduled CRL previously issued by the CA 🚨.

2.4. Access Controls on Repositories 🔐

Each CA or repository operator MUST implement access controls to prevent unauthorized persons from adding, modifying, or deleting repository entries 🚫. A CA or repository operator MUST NOT intentionally use technical means of limiting read access to its CPS, certificates, CRLs, or RPKI signed objects 🙅‍♀️. This data is intended to be accessible to the public 🌈.

3. Identification and Authentication 🪪

3.1. Naming 🏷️

3.1.1. Types of Names

The distinguished name for every CA and end-entity consists of a single CommonName (CN) attribute with a value generated by the issuer of the certificate 🎀. Optionally, the serialNumber attribute MAY be included along with the common name (to form a terminal relative distinguished name set), to distinguish among successive instances of certificates associated with the same entity 🔢.

3.1.2. Need for Names to Be Meaningful

The subject name in each certificate SHOULD NOT be "meaningful", i.e., the name is not intended to convey the identity of the subject to relying parties 🙊. The rationale here is that certificates issued under this PKI are used for authorization in support of applications that make use of attestations of INR holdings 💅. They are not used to identify subjects 🫶.

3.1.3. Anonymity or Pseudonymity of Subscribers 🎭

Although subject (and issuer) names need not be meaningful, and may appear "random," anonymity is not a function of this PKI; thus, no explicit support for this feature is provided 🤷‍♀️.

3.1.4. Rules for Interpreting Various Name Forms

None.

3.1.5. Uniqueness of Names 🔍

There is no guarantee that subject names are globally unique in this PKI. Each CA certifies subject names that MUST be unique among the certificates it issues. Although it is desirable that these subject names be unique throughout the PKI, name uniqueness within the RPKI cannot be guaranteed 😬.

However, subject names in certificates SHOULD be constructed in a way that minimizes the chances that two entities in the RPKI will be assigned the same name 🎯. The RPKI Certificate Profile [RFC6487] provides an example of how to generate (meaningless) subject names in a way that minimizes the likelihood of collisions 📚.

3.2. Initial Identity Validation 🧐

3.2.1. Method to Prove Possession of the Private Key 🔑

Each CA operating within the context of this PKI MUST require each subject to demonstrate proof of possession (PoP) of the private key corresponding to the public key in the certificate, prior to issuing the certificate 💪. The means by which PoP is achieved is determined by each CA and MUST be declared in the CPS of that CA 📋.

3.2.2. Authentication of Organization Identity 🏢

Each CA operating within the context of this PKI MUST employ procedures to ensure that each certificate it issues accurately reflects its records with regard to the organization to which the CA has distributed the INRs identified in the certificate 🗂️. The specific procedures employed for this purpose MUST be described by the CPS for each CA. Relying parties can expect each CA to employ procedures commensurate with those it already employs as a registry or ISP in the management of the INRs 🧠. This authentication is solely for use by each CA in dealing with the organizations to which it distributes INRs, and thus should not be relied upon outside of this CA-subscriber relationship 🚧.

3.2.3. Authentication of Individual Identity 🧑‍💼

Each CA operating within the context of this PKI MUST employ procedures to identify at least one individual as a representative of each organization that is an INR holder. The specific means by which each CA authenticates individuals as representatives for an organization MUST be described by the CPS for each CA. Relying parties can expect each CA to employ procedures commensurate with those it already employs as a registry or ISP in authenticating individuals as representatives for INR holders ✨.

3.2.4. Non-Verified Subscriber Information 🙅

A CA MUST NOT include any non-verified subscriber data in certificates issued under this certificate policy except for Subject Information Access (SIA) extensions 🚫.

3.2.5. Validation of Authority 🛂

Each CA operating within the context of this PKI MUST employ procedures to verify that an individual claiming to represent an organization to which a certificate is issued is authorized to represent that organization in this context. The procedures MUST be described by the CPS for the CA. Relying parties can expect each CA to employ procedures commensurate with those it already employs as a registry or ISP, in authenticating individuals as representatives for INR holders 🌷.

3.2.6. Criteria for Interoperation

This PKI is neither intended nor designed to interoperate with any other PKI 🙅‍♀️.

3.3. Identification and Authentication for Re-Key Requests 🔄

3.3.1. Identification and Authentication for Routine Re-Key

Each CA operating within the context of this PKI MUST employ procedures to ensure that an organization requesting a re-key is the legitimate holder of the certificate to be re-keyed and the associated INRs, and MUST require PoP of the private key corresponding to the new public key 🔐. The procedures employed for these purposes MUST be described in the CPS for the CA. With respect to authentication of the holder of the INRs, relying parties can expect each CA to employ procedures commensurate with those it already employs as a registry or ISP, in the management of INRs 🫧.

Note: An issuer MAY choose to require periodic re-keying consistent with contractual agreements with the recipient. If so, this MUST be described by the CPS for the CA 📆.

3.3.2. Identification and Authentication for Re-Key after Revocation 🔁

Each CA operating within the context of this PKI MUST employ procedures to ensure that an organization requesting a re-key after revocation is the same entity to which the revoked certificate was issued and is the legitimate holder of the associated INR 🕵️‍♀️. The CA MUST require PoP of the private key corresponding to the new public key. The specific procedures employed for these purposes MUST be described by the CPS for the CA. With respect to authentication of the holder of the INRs, relying parties can expect each CA to employ procedures commensurate with those it already employs as a registry or ISP, in the management of INRs. Note that there MAY be different procedures for the case where the legitimate subject still possesses the original private key as opposed to the case when it no longer has access to that key 🗝️.

3.4. Identification and Authentication for Revocation Request ❌

Each CA operating within the context of this PKI MUST employ procedures to ensure that:

  • an organization requesting revocation is the legitimate holder of the certificate to be revoked.
  • each certificate it revokes accurately reflects its records with regard to the organization to which the CA has distributed the INRs identified in the certificate.
  • an individual claiming to represent an organization for which a certificate is to be revoked is authorized to represent that organization in this context.

The specific procedures employed for these purposes MUST be described by the CPS for the CA. Relying parties can expect each CA to employ procedures commensurate with those it already employs as a registry or ISP, in the management of INRs 🫶.

4. Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements 🔄💫

4.1. Certificate Application 📨

4.1.1. Who Can Submit a Certificate Application 🙋‍♀️

Any entity that distributes INRs SHOULD acquire a certificate. This includes Internet Registries and ISPs. Additionally, entities that hold INRs from an Internet Registry, or that are multi-homed, MAY acquire a certificate under this PKI. The (CA) certificates issued to these entities MUST include one or both of the extensions defined by RFC 3779 [RFC3779], "X.509 Extensions for IP Addresses and AS Identifiers", as appropriate 🧩.

The application procedure MUST be described in the CPS for each CA 📋.

4.1.2. Enrollment Process and Responsibilities

The enrollment process and procedures MUST be described by the CPS for each CA. An entity that desires one or more certificates should contact the organization from which it receives its INRs 📞.

4.2. Certificate Application Processing ⚙️

CAs SHOULD make use of existing standards for certificate application processing. Section 6 of the Resource Certificate Profile [RFC6487] defines the standard certificate request formats that MUST be supported 📜.

Each CA MUST define via its CPS, the certificate request/response standards that it employs 🗒️.

4.2.1. Performing Identification and Authentication Functions 🕵️

Existing practices employed by registries and ISPs to identify and authenticate organizations that receive INRs form the basis for issuance of certificates to these subscribers. It is important to note that the Resource PKI SHOULD NOT be used to authenticate the identity of an organization, but rather to bind subscribers to the INRs they hold 💡. Because identity is not being vouched for by this PKI, certificate application procedures need not verify legal organization names, etc. 🙌

4.2.2. Approval or Rejection of Certificate Applications ✅

Certificate applications MUST be approved based on the normal business practices of the entity operating the CA, based on the CA's records of INR holders 🏦. Each CA MUST follow the procedures specified in Section 3.2.1 to verify that the requester holds the private key corresponding to the public key that will be bound to the certificate the CA issues to the requester 🔑. The details of how certificate applications are approved MUST be described in the CPS for the CA in question 📖.

4.2.3. Time to Process Certificate Applications ⏰

No stipulation, so the RFC doesn't set a timing rule here 🫶 BUT each CA MUST declare its expected time frame to process (approve, issue, and publish) a certificate application, and it has to do that as part of its CPS. So every CA has to write down how long it takes to approve, issue, AND publish. Transparency is the whole vibe 💅

4.3. Certificate Issuance 🎀

4.3.1. CA Actions during Certificate Issuance

If a CA decides the request is acceptable, it MUST issue the matching certificate and publish it in the RPKI distributed repository system by putting it at the CA's repository publication point 📮

4.3.2. Notification to Subscriber by the CA of Issuance of Certificate

The CA MUST notify the subscriber once the certificate is published 🔔 The way the subscriber gets notified MUST be defined by each CA in its CPS, so each CA gets to pick its own method, as long as it's written down.

4.4. Certificate Acceptance 🫧

4.4.1. Conduct Constituting Certificate Acceptance

Within the timeframe in its CPS, the CA MUST put the certificate in the repository and notify the subscriber. This MAY be done without the subscriber reviewing and accepting it first 👀 Each CA MUST state in its CPS the procedures it follows for publishing the certificate and for notifying the subscriber.

4.4.2. Publication of the Certificate by the CA

Certificates MUST be published in the RPKI distributed repository system by putting them at the CA's repository publication point, following the conduct described in Section 4.4.1 🌈 The procedures for publication MUST be defined by each CA in its CPS.

4.4.3. Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities

The CPS of each CA MUST say whether any other entities will be notified when a certificate is issued 📣

4.5. Key Pair and Certificate Usage 🔑

A summary of the use model for the RPKI is provided below ✨

4.5.1. Subscriber Private Key and Certificate Usage

Every holder of an INR is eligible to request an X.509 [X.509] CA certificate that contains the appropriate RFC 3779 extensions 🌸 Holders of CA resource certificates also MAY issue EE certificates to themselves so they can verify the RPKI signed objects they generate.

4.5.2. Relying Party Public Key and Certificate Usage

Reliance on a certificate must be reasonable under the circumstances. If the circumstances point to a need for extra assurances, the relying party must get those assurances for the reliance to count as reasonable 🧐

Before any act of reliance, relying parties MUST independently (1) verify that the certificate will be used for an appropriate purpose that is not prohibited or otherwise restricted by this CP (see Section 1.4), and (2) assess the status of the certificate and all the certificates in the chain (ending at a trust anchor (TA) accepted by the RP) that issued the certificates relevant to the certificate in question. If any certificate in the chain has been revoked or has expired, the relying party is solely responsible for deciding whether relying on a digital signature checked by the certificate in question is acceptable. Any such reliance is made solely at the relying party's own risk 😬

If a relying party decides the certificate is appropriate to use, the relying party must use appropriate software and/or hardware to do digital signature verification as a condition of relying on the certificate. On top of that, the relying party MUST validate the certificate in a way that's consistent with the RPKI Certificate Profile [RFC6487], which specifies the extended validation algorithm for RPKI certificates 💜

4.6. Certificate Renewal 🔄

This section covers the procedures for certificate renewal. Renewal means issuing a new certificate to replace an old one before it expires. Only the validity dates and the serial number (the field in the certificate, not the DN attribute) change. The public key and all other information stay the same 🦋

4.6.1. Circumstance for Certificate Renewal

A certificate MUST be processed for renewal based on its expiration date or on a renewal request from the subscriber. Before an existing subscriber's certificate expires, it is the subscriber's responsibility to renew it so the certificate keeps being used without a gap ⏳ If the issuing CA starts the renewal process based on the certificate expiration date, then that CA MUST notify the holder in advance of the renewal process. The validity interval of the new (renewed) certificate SHOULD overlap that of the previous certificate so usage stays continuous. It is RECOMMENDED that the renewed certificate be issued and published at least 1 week before the certificate it replaces expires 🗓️

Certificate renewal SHOULD use the same public key as the previous certificate, unless the private key has been reported as compromised. If a new key pair is being used, the stipulations of Section 4.7 apply 🫶

4.6.2. Who May Request Renewal

Only the certificate holder or the issuing CA may start the renewal process 🙌 The certificate holder MAY request an early renewal, for example if it expects to be unavailable to support the renewal process during the normal expiration period. An issuing CA MAY start the renewal process based on the certificate expiration date.

4.6.3. Processing Certificate Renewal Requests

Renewal procedures MUST make sure that the person or organization asking to renew a certificate really is the subscriber (or authorized by the subscriber) of that certificate, and is the legitimate holder of the INR associated with the renewed certificate 🕵️‍♀️ Renewal processing MUST verify that the certificate in question has not been revoked.

4.6.4. Notification of New Certificate Issuance to Subscriber

No additional stipulations beyond those of Section 4.3.2 📬

4.6.5. Conduct Constituting Acceptance of a Renewal Certificate

No additional stipulations beyond those of Section 4.4.1 ✅

4.6.6. Publication of the Renewal Certificate by the CA

No additional stipulations beyond those of Section 4.4.2 📮

4.6.7. Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities

No additional stipulations beyond those of Section 4.4.3 📣

4.7. Certificate Re-Key 🗝️

This section covers the procedures for certificate re-key. Re-key means issuing a new certificate to replace an old one because the key needs replacing. Unlike renewal, the public key DOES change 💫

4.7.1. Circumstance for Certificate Re-Key

Re-key of a certificate SHOULD be performed only when it's required, based on:

  1. knowledge or suspicion of compromise or loss of the associated private key, or
  2. the expiration of the cryptographic lifetime of the associated key pair

A CA re-key operation has dramatic consequences, because all certificates issued by the re-keyed entity need to be reissued 😱 So it should be performed only when necessary, and in a way that keeps relying parties able to validate certificates whose validation path includes the re-keyed entity. CA key rollover MUST follow the procedures defined in "CA Key Rollover in the RPKI" [RFC6489] 🔁

Note that if a certificate is revoked to replace the RFC 3779 extensions, the replacement certificate MUST incorporate the same public key rather than a new key. This applies when you are adding INRs (revocation not required) and when you are removing INRs (revocation required (see Section 4.8.1)).

If the re-key is based on a suspected compromise, then the previous certificate MUST be revoked 🚨

4.7.2. Who May Request Certification of a New Public Key

The holder of the certificate may request a re-key. In addition, the CA that issued the certificate MAY choose to start a re-key based on a verified compromise report 🫡

4.7.3. Processing Certificate Re-Keying Requests

The re-key process follows the general procedures of certificate generation as defined in Section 4.3 🧩

4.7.4. Notification of New Certificate Issuance to Subscriber

No additional stipulations beyond those of Section 4.3.2 📬

4.7.5. Conduct Constituting Acceptance of a Re-Keyed Certificate

No additional stipulations beyond those of Section 4.4.1 ✅

4.7.6. Publication of the Re-Keyed Certificate by the CA

No additional stipulations beyond those of Section 4.4.2 📮

4.7.7. Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities

No additional stipulations beyond those of Section 4.4.3 📣

4.8. Certificate Modification ✏️

4.8.1. Circumstance for Certificate Modification

Modification means changing selected attribute values in a certificate. In the context of the RPKI, the only changes that certificate modification covers are changes to the INR holdings described by the RFC 3779 extension(s) and changes to the SIA extension 🌷

When a certificate modification is approved, a new certificate is issued. If no INR holdings are removed from the certificate, the new certificate MUST contain the same public key and the same expiration date as the original certificate, but with the SIA extension and/or the INR set expanded. In this case, revoking the previous certificate is not required 🌱

When previously distributed INRs are removed from a certificate, then the old certificate MUST be revoked and a new certificate MUST be issued, reflecting the changed INR holdings. (The SIA extension in the new certificate will be unchanged, unless the affected INR holder supplies a new SIA value.) 💅

4.8.2. Who May Request Certificate Modification

Either the certificate holder or the issuer can start the certificate modification process 🙋‍♀️

4.8.3. Processing Certificate Modification Requests

The CA MUST determine that the requested modification is appropriate and that the procedures for issuing a new certificate are followed (see Section 4.3) 🔍

4.8.4. Notification of New Certificate Issuance to Subscriber

No additional stipulations beyond those of Section 4.3.2 📬

4.8.5. Conduct Constituting Acceptance of Modified Certificate

No additional stipulations beyond those of Section 4.4.1 ✅

4.8.6. Publication of the Modified Certificate by the CA

No additional stipulations beyond those of Section 4.4.2 📮

4.8.7. Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities

No additional stipulations beyond those of Section 4.4.3 📣

4.9. Certificate Revocation and Suspension 🚫

4.9.1. Circumstances for Revocation

A certificate MUST be revoked (and published on a CRL) if there is reason to believe that a subscriber's private key has been compromised 🔐 A certificate also MAY be revoked to invalidate a data object signed by the private key associated with that certificate. Other circumstances that justify revoking a certificate MAY be specified in a CA's CPS 🧾

Note: If new INRs are being added to an organization's existing distribution, the old certificate does not need to be revoked. Instead, a new certificate MAY be issued with both the old and the new resources and the old key. If INRs are being removed or if there has been a key compromise, then the old certificate MUST be revoked (and a re-key MUST be performed in the event of key compromise). ⚠️

4.9.2. Who Can Request Revocation

This MUST be defined in the CPS of the organization that issued the certificate 🫶

4.9.3. Procedure for Revocation Request 📝

okay so a subscriber MAY submit a request to the certificate issuer for a revocation 💅 This request MUST identify the certificate being revoked, and it MUST be authenticated 🔐 The procedures for making the request MUST be described in the CPS for each CA 📚 The RPKI provisioning document [RFC6492] describes a protocol that MAY be used to make revocation requests ✨

A certificate issuer MUST notify the subscriber when revoking a certificate 🔔 The notification requirement is satisfied by CRL publication, which is such a neat shortcut 🙌 The CPS for a CA MUST indicate the means by which the CA will inform a subscriber of certificate revocation 🫶

4.9.4. Revocation Request Grace Period ⏰

A subscriber SHOULD request revocation as soon as possible after the need for revocation has been identified 🏃‍♀️ There is no specified grace period for the subscriber in this process 🙈

4.9.5. Time within which CA Must Process the Revocation Request ⏳

No stipulation. Each CA SHOULD specify its expected revocation processing time in its CPS 📋

4.9.6. Revocation Checking Requirement for Relying Parties 👀

A relying party MUST acquire and check the most recent, scheduled CRL from the issuer of the certificate, whenever the relying party validates a certificate 🔍✨

4.9.7. CRL Issuance Frequency 🗓️

The CRL issuance frequency MUST be determined by each CA and stated in its CPS. Each CRL carries a nextScheduledUpdate value, and a new CRL MUST be published at or before that time. A CA MUST set the nextUpdate value when it issues a CRL, to signal when the next scheduled CRL will be issued 📆

4.9.8. Maximum Latency for CRLs 📮

The CPS for each CA MUST specify the maximum latency associated with posting its CRL to the repository system 🏃‍♀️💨

4.10. Certificate Status Services 🛰️

This PKI does not make provision for use of the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) [RFC2560] or Server-Based Certificate Validation Protocol (SCVP) [RFC5055]. That's because it's anticipated that the primary RPs (ISPs) will acquire and validate certificates for all participating resource holders. These protocols are not designed for such large-scale, bulk certificate status checking 🙅‍♀️ RPs MUST check for new CRLs at least daily. It is RECOMMENDED that RPs perform this check several times per day, but no more than 8-12 times per day (to avoid excessive repository accesses) 🧺

5. Facility, Management, and Operational Controls 🏢

5.1. Physical Controls 🧱

Each CA MUST maintain physical security controls for its operation that are commensurate with those employed by the organization in the management of INR distribution. The physical controls employed for CA operation MUST be specified in its CPS. Possible topics to be covered in the CPS are shown below. (These sections are taken from [RFC3647].) 🏗️

5.1.1. Site Location and Construction

5.1.2. Physical Access

5.1.3. Power and Air Conditioning

5.1.4. Water Exposures

5.1.5. Fire Prevention and Protection

5.1.6. Media Storage

5.1.7. Waste Disposal

5.1.8. Off-Site Backup

5.2. Procedural Controls 📋

Each CA MUST maintain procedural security controls that are commensurate with those employed by the organization in the management of INR distribution. The procedural security controls employed for CA operation MUST be specified in its CPS. Possible topics to be covered in the CPS are shown below. (These sections are taken from [RFC3647].) 🎀

5.2.1. Trusted Roles

5.2.2. Number of Persons Required per Task

5.2.3. Identification and Authentication for Each Role

5.2.4. Roles Requiring Separation of Duties

5.3. Personnel Controls 👩‍💼

Each CA MUST maintain personnel security controls that are commensurate with those employed by the organization in the management of INR distribution. The details for each CA MUST be specified in its CPS 💼

5.4. Audit Logging Procedures 🕵️‍♀️

Details of how a CA implements the audit logging described in Sections 5.4.1 to 5.4.8 MUST be addressed in its CPS 📝

5.4.1. Types of Events Recorded 📜

Audit records MUST be generated for the basic operations of the certification authority computing equipment. Audit records MUST include the date, time, responsible user or process, and summary content data relating to the event. Auditable events include:

  • Access to CA computing equipment (e.g., logon, logout) 🔑
  • Messages received requesting CA actions (e.g., certificate requests, certificate revocation requests, compromise notifications) 📨
  • Certificate creation, modification, revocation, or renewal actions 🔄
  • Posting of any material to a repository 📤
  • Any attempts to change or delete audit data 👀
  • Key generation 🗝️
  • Software and/or configuration updates to the CA 🛠️
  • Clock adjustments ⏰

5.4.2. Frequency of Processing Log 🔁

Each CA MUST establish its own procedures for review of audit logs.

5.4.3. Retention Period for Audit Log 🗄️

Each CA MUST establish its own policies for retention of audit logs.

5.4.4. Protection of Audit Log 🛡️

The audit log SHOULD be protected based on current industry standards.

5.4.5. Audit Log Backup Procedures 💾

The audit log SHOULD be backed up based on current industry standards.

5.4.8. Vulnerability Assessments 🔍

The RPKI subsystems of a registry or ISP SHOULD participate in any vulnerability assessments that these organizations run as part of their normal business practice.

5.6. Key Changeover 🔑

When a CA wishes to change keys, it MUST acquire a new certificate containing its new public key. See [RFC6489] for a description of how key changeover is effected in the RPKI 🦋

5.7. CA or RA Termination 🌅

In the RPKI, each subscriber acts as a CA for the specified INRs that were distributed to that entity. Procedures associated with the termination of a CA MUST be described in the CPS for that CA. These procedures MUST include a provision to notify each entity that issued a certificate to the organization that is operating the CA that is terminating 😭

Since the RA function MUST be provided by the same entity operating as the CA (see Section 1.3.2), there are no separate stipulations for RAs 🙌

6. Technical Security Controls 🔐

The organizations that distribute INRs to network subscribers are authoritative for these distributions. This PKI is designed to enable ISPs and network subscribers to demonstrate that they are the holders of the INRs that have been distributed to them. Accordingly, the security controls used by CAs and subscribers for this PKI need only to be as secure as those that apply to the procedures for administering the distribution of INR data by the extant organizations. Details of each CA's security controls MUST be described in the CPS issued by the CA 💖

6.1. Key Pair Generation and Installation 🗝️

6.1.1. Key Pair Generation

In most instances, public key pairs will be generated by the subject, i.e., the organization receiving the distribution of INRs. However, some CAs MAY offer to generate key pairs on behalf of their subjects at the request of the subjects, e.g., to accommodate subscribers who do not have the ability to perform key generation in a secure fashion. (The CA has to check the quality of the keys only if it generates them; see Section 6.1.6.) Since the keys used in this PKI are not for non-repudiation purposes, generation of key pairs by CAs does not inherently undermine the security of the PKI. Each CA MUST describe its key pair generation procedures in its CPS 🧪

6.1.2. Private Key Delivery to Subscriber 📬

If a CA provides key pair generation services for subscribers, its CPS MUST describe the means by which private keys are delivered to subscribers in a secure fashion 🔒

6.1.3. Public Key Delivery to Certificate Issuer 📮

When a public key is transferred to the issuing CA to be certified, it MUST be delivered through a mechanism ensuring that the public key has not been altered during transit and that the subscriber possesses the private key corresponding to the transferred public key 🫶

6.1.4. CA Public Key Delivery to Relying Parties 🤝

CA public keys for all entities (other than trust anchors) are contained in certificates issued by other CAs. These certificates MUST be published in the RPKI distributed repository system. Relying parties download these certificates from the repositories. Public key values and associated data for (putative) trust anchors are distributed out of band and accepted by relying parties on the basis of locally defined criteria 🌐

6.1.5. Key Sizes 📏

The algorithms and key sizes used in the RPKI are specified in "A Profile for Algorithms and Key Sizes for Use in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure" [RFC6485] 📐

6.1.6. Public Key Parameters Generation and Quality Checking ✅

The public key parameters used in the RPKI are specified in [RFC6485]. Each subscriber is responsible for performing checks on the quality of its key pair. A CA is not responsible for performing such checks for subscribers, except in the case where the CA generates the key pair on behalf of the subscriber 🧐

6.1.7. Key Usage Purposes (as per X.509 v3 Key Usage Field) 🎯

The Key usage extension bit values used in the RPKI are specified in RPKI Certificate Profile [RFC6487] 🌸

6.2. Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering Controls 🛡️

6.2.1. Cryptographic Module Standards and Controls 🔐

The cryptographic module standards and controls employed by each CA MUST be described in the CPS issued by that CA 📖

6.2.2. Private Key (N out of M) Multi-Person Control 👯

CAs MAY employ multi-person controls to constrain access to their private keys, but this is not a requirement for all CAs in the PKI. The CPS for each CA MUST describe which, if any, multi-person controls it employs 👑

6.2.3. Private Key Escrow 🚫

No private key escrow procedures are required for the RPKI.

6.2.4. Private Key Backup 💾

Because of the adverse operational implications associated with the loss of use of a CA private key in the PKI, each CA MUST employ a secure means to back up its private keys. The details of the procedures for backing up a CA's private key MUST be described in the CPS issued by the CA 😱

6.2.5. Private Key Archival 🗃️

The details of the process and procedures used to archive the CA's private key MUST be described in the CPS issued by the CA.

6.2.6. Private Key Transfer into or from a Cryptographic Module 🔄

The details of the process and procedures used to transfer the CA's private key into or from a cryptographic module MUST be described in the CPS issued by the CA.

6.2.7. Private Key Storage on Cryptographic Module 🧊

The details of the process and procedures used to store the CA's private key on a cryptographic module and protect it from unauthorized use MUST be described in the CPS issued by the CA.

6.2.8. Method of Activating a Private Key ⚡

The details of the process and procedures used to activate the CA's private key MUST be described in the CPS issued by the CA.

6.2.9. Method of Deactivating a Private Key 🌙

The details of the process and procedures used to deactivate the CA's private key MUST be described in the CPS issued by the CA.

6.2.10. Method of Destroying a Private Key 💥

The details of the process and procedures used to destroy the CA's private key MUST be described in the CPS issued by the CA.

6.2.11. Cryptographic Module Rating ⭐

The security rating of the cryptographic module MUST be described in the CPS issued by the CA.

6.3. Other Aspects of Key Pair Management 🌷

6.3.1. Public Key Archival 🗂️

Because this PKI does not support non-repudiation, there is no need to archive public keys ✨

6.3.2. Certificate Operational Periods and Key Pair Usage Periods

okay so the INRs a CA holds can shift around now and then whenever it gets new distributions 🦋 but to keep things calm, the CA key pair MUST NOT change just because INRs got added to its certificate 🫶

if ISP and network-subscriber certificates are tied to how long their service agreements last, these certificates should have validity periods that match the length of those agreements 💅 and in any case, the validity period for certificates MUST be chosen by the issuing CA and described in its CPS ✨

6.4. Activation Data

each CA MUST document in its CPS how it will generate, install, and protect its activation data 🔐

6.5. Computer Security Controls

each CA MUST document the technical security requirements it uses for CA computer operation in its CPS 💻

6.6. Life-Cycle Technical Controls

6.6.1. System Development Controls

the CPS for each CA MUST document any system development controls required by that CA, if applicable 🛠️

6.6.2. Security Management Controls

the CPS for each CA MUST document the security controls applied to the software and equipment used for this PKI 🧚 and these controls MUST be commensurate with those used for the systems the CAs use to manage INRs 💖

6.6.3. Life-Cycle Security Controls

the CPS for each CA MUST document how the equipment (hardware and software) used for this PKI will be procured, installed, maintained, and updated 🌸 this MUST be done in a fashion commensurate with the way equipment for managing and distributing INRs is handled 👑

6.7. Network Security Controls

the CPS for each CA MUST document the network security controls employed for CA operation 🌐 these MUST be commensurate with the protection used for the computers that manage distribution of INRs 🔥

6.8. Timestamping

the RPKI does not make use of timestamping. no timestamps here, bestie ⏰🙈

7. Certificate and CRL Profiles

please refer to the RPKI Certificate and CRL Profile [RFC6487] 📜✨

8. Compliance Audit and Other Assessments

the certificate policy for a typical PKI defines the criteria used to evaluate prospective CAs, and it sets out requirements they must meet 📋 but in this PKI, the CAs are already authoritative for managing INRs, and the PKI just supports verifying that those resources were distributed to network subscribers 🦋 so whatever audits and other assessments already protect the management of INRs is sufficient for this PKI 💅 the CPS for each CA MUST describe what audits and other assessments are used 🔍

as noted throughout this certificate policy, the organizations managing the distribution of INRs are authoritative in their roles as managers of this data 👑 they MUST operate this PKI so the holders of INRs can generate digitally signed data that attests to these distributions 🫶 therefore, the way those organizations handle their business and legal matters for this PKI MUST be commensurate with how they already handle them in their existing roles 💼

since there is no single set of answers for this section that fits every organization, the topics listed in Sections 4.9.1 to 4.9.11 and 4.9.13 to 4.9.17 of RFC 3647 SHOULD be covered in the CPS issued by each CA, although not every CA may choose to address all of these topics 🌈 please note that the topics in those sections of RFC 3647 become sections 9.1 to 9.11 and 9.13 to 9.17 in the CPS 📝

9.12. Amendments

9.12.1. Procedure for Amendment

the procedure for amending this CP is written notice from the IESG, in the form of a new (BCP) RFC that updates or obsoletes this document 📣

9.12.2. Notification Mechanism and Period

successive versions of the CP will be published with the following statement:

This CP takes effect on MM/DD/YYYY.

MM/DD/YYYY MUST be a minimum of 6 months from the date of publication 🗓️✨

9.12.3. Circumstances under Which OID Must Be Changed

if the IESG judges that changes to the CP do not materially reduce the acceptability of certificates issued for RPKI purposes, there will be no change to the CP OID 🌸 but if the IESG judges that changes to the CP do materially change the acceptability of certificates for RPKI purposes, then there MUST be a new CP OID 🚨💀

10. Security Considerations

okay this section is SERIOUS, so buckle up 😭🔐 according to X.509, a certificate policy (CP) is "a named set of rules that indicates the applicability of a certificate to a particular community and/or class of applications with common security requirements." 🎀 a relying party can use a CP to help decide whether a certificate and the binding inside it are trustworthy enough, and appropriate for a particular application 💜 this document describes the CP for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) ✨ there are separate documents (CPSs) that cover the factors deciding how much a relying party can trust the binding in a certificate 🔍

how much that binding can be trusted depends on a few things, like: the practices the CA follows when authenticating the subject 🧐; the CA's operating policy, procedures, and technical security controls, including the scope of the subscriber's responsibilities (for example, in protecting the private key) 🔑; and the CA's stated responsibilities and liability terms and conditions (for example, warranties, disclaimers of warranties, and limitations of liability) 📑 it's a lot, but it all matters 💅

since name uniqueness within the RPKI cannot be guaranteed, there is a risk that two or more CAs in the RPKI will issue certificates and CRLs under the same issuer name 😬 path validation implementations that conform to the resource certification path validation algorithm (see [RFC6487]) verify that the same key was used to sign both the target (the resource certificate) and the corresponding CRL 🫶 so a name collision will not change the result ✅ using the basic X.509 path validation algorithm, which assumes name uniqueness, could result in a revoked certificate being accepted as valid, or a valid certificate being rejected as revoked 💀 relying parties must ensure that the software they use to validate certificates issued under this policy verifies that the same key was used to sign both the certificate and the corresponding CRL, as specified in [RFC6487] 🛡️🔥

11. Acknowledgments

the authors would like to thank Geoff Huston, Randy Bush, Andrei Robachevsky, and other members of the RPKI community for reviewing this document, and Matt Lepinski for his help with the formatting 🙏💖

12. References

12.1. Normative References

  • [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. 🎀
  • [RFC2026] Bradner, S., "The Internet Standards Process -- Revision 3", BCP 9, RFC 2026, October 1996. 📚
  • [RFC3779] Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779, June 2004. 🌐
  • [RFC6481] Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for Resource Certificate Repository Structure", RFC 6481, February 2012. 🗂️
  • [RFC6485] Huston, G., "The Profile for Algorithms and Key Sizes for Use in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)", RFC 6485, February 2012. 🔐
  • [RFC6487] Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", RFC 6487, February 2012. 📜
  • [RFC6489] Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and S. Kent, "CA Key Rollover in the RPKI", BCP 174, RFC 6489, February 2012. 🔄

12.2. Informative References

  • [RFC2560] Myers, M., Ankney, R., Malpani, A., Galperin, S., and C. Adams, "X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP", RFC 2560, June 1999. 🧾
  • [RFC3647] Chokhani, S., Ford, W., Sabett, R., Merrill, C., and S. Wu, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Policy and Certification Practices Framework", RFC 3647, November 2003. 📖
  • [RFC5055] Freeman, T., Housley, R., Malpani, A., Cooper, D., and W. Polk, "Server-Based Certificate Validation Protocol (SCVP)", RFC 5055, December 2007. 🛰️
  • [RFC5736] Huston, G., Cotton, M., and L. Vegoda, "IANA IPv4 Special Purpose Address Registry", RFC 5736, January 2010. 🗺️
  • [RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, February 2012. 🛣️
  • [RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482, February 2012. 📍
  • [RFC6486] Austein, R., Huston, G., Kent, S., and M. Lepinski, "Manifests for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)", RFC 6486, February 2012. 📋
  • [RFC6492] Huston, G., Loomans, R., Ellacott, B., and R. Austein, "A Protocol for Provisioning Resource Certificates", RFC 6492, February 2012. 📮
  • [X.509] ITU-T Recommendation X.509 | ISO/IEC 9594-8, "Information technology -- Open systems interconnection -- The Directory: Public-key and attribute certificate frameworks", November 2008. 🏛️

Authors' Addresses ✨

Stephen Kent
BBN Technologies
10 Moulton Street
Cambridge MA 02138
USA

Phone: +1 617 873 3988
EMail: skent@bbn.com
Derrick Kong
BBN Technologies
Moulton Street
Cambridge MA 02138
USA

Phone: +1 617 873 1951
EMail: dkong@bbn.com
Karen Seo
BBN Technologies
10 Moulton Street
Cambridge MA 02138
USA

Phone: +1 617 873 3152
EMail: kseo@bbn.com
Ronald Watro
BBN Technologies
10 Moulton Street
Cambridge MA 02138
USA

Phone: +1 617 873 2551
EMail: rwatro@bbn.com
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