RFC 6485

RFC 6485: The Profile for Algorithms and Key Sizes for Use in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) 🎀

Okay bestie, this one is a Standards Track doc from February 2012, written by G. Huston at APNIC (Geoff Huston, whose contact info is at the bottom 💌). It's published as Request for Comments: 6485 with ISSN 2070-1721. The title block doesn't list anything it obsoletes or updates, so it's not replacing or changing any other RFCs 🫶

Abstract ✨

This doc spells out the algorithms, the algorithm parameters, the asymmetric key formats, the asymmetric key size, and the signature format. It's for RPKI subscribers who make digital signatures on certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists, and signed objects, and for the relying parties (RPs) who check those signatures 💅

Status of This Memo 📋

This is an Internet Standards Track document 🌸

This doc is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community, got public review, and was approved for publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). More info on Internet Standards is in Section 2 of RFC 5741.

For the current status of this document, any errata, and how to give feedback on it, check http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6485.

Copyright Notice ⚖️

Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.

This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, because they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions, and they are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.

1. Introduction 🦋

This document specifies:

• the digital signature algorithm and parameters;
• the hash algorithm and parameters;
• the public and private key formats; and,
• the signature format

RPKI subscribers use these when they apply digital signatures to certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs), and signed objects (for example, Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs) and manifests). Relying parties (RPs) also use the algorithms defined here to verify RPKI subscribers' digital signatures [RFC6480].

Other RPKI profiles and specs point at this document, including the RPKI Certificate Policy (CP) [RFC6484], the RPKI Certificate Profile [RFC6487], the SIDR Architecture [RFC6480], and the Signed Object Template for the RPKI [RFC6488]. Familiarity with these is assumed 🧠

1.1. Terminology 🔑

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

2. Algorithms 💖

Two cryptographic algorithms are used in the RPKI:

• The signature algorithm used in certificates, CRLs, and signed objects is RSA Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1 Version 1.5 (sometimes called "RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5") from Section 5 of [RFC4055].
• The hashing algorithm used in certificates, CRLs, and signed objects is SHA-256 [SHS]. The hashing algorithm is not identified by itself when used in certificates and CRLs, because it's combined with the digital signature algorithm (see below).

When used in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) SignedData, the hash algorithm (sometimes called a message digest algorithm here) is identified by itself. For CMS SignedData, the object identifier and parameters for SHA-256 (as defined in [RFC5754]) MUST be used when populating the digestAlgorithms and digestAlgorithm fields.

NOTE: The exception to the above hashing algorithm is the use of SHA-1 [SHS] when Certification Authorities (CAs) generate authority and subject key identifiers [RFC6487].

When you use the hash and digital signature algorithms to generate and verify digital signatures, they're referred to together, like "RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 with SHA-256" or more simply "RSA with SHA-256". The Object Identifier (OID) sha256withRSAEncryption from [RFC4055] MUST be used.

The locations for this OID are:

• In the certificate, the OID appears in the signature and signatureAlgorithm fields [RFC4055];
• In the CRL, the OID appears in the signatureAlgorithm field [RFC4055];
• In CMS SignedData, the OID appears in each SignerInfo signatureAlgoithm field [RFC3370] using the OID from above; and,
• In a certification request, the OID appears in the PKCS #10 signatureAlgorithm field [RFC2986] or in the Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF) POPOSigningKey signature field [RFC4211].

3. Asymmetric Key Pair Formats 🧁

The RSA key pairs used to compute the signatures MUST have a 2048-bit modulus and a public exponent (e) of 65,537.

3.1. Public Key Format 🔐

The subject's public key is included in subjectPublicKeyInfo [RFC5280]. It has two sub-fields: algorithm and subjectPublicKey. Here's how the structures and their sub-structures work:

• algorithm (which is an AlgorithmIdentifier type): The object identifier for RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 with SHA-256 MUST be used in the algorithm field, as specified in Section 5 of [RFC4055]. The value for the associated parameters from that clause MUST also be used for the parameters field.
• subjectPublicKey: RSAPublicKey MUST be used to encode the certificate's subjectPublicKey field, as specified in [RFC4055].

3.2. Private Key Format 🗝️

Local policy determines the private key format.

4. Signature Format ✍️

The structure for the certificate's signature field is as specified in Section 1.2 of [RFC4055]. The structure for the CMS SignedData's signature field is as specified in [RFC3370].

5. Additional Requirements 🌈

It's expected that the RPKI will need updated key sizes and a different set of signature and hash algorithms over time, so it can keep an acceptable level of cryptographic security protecting the integrity of signed products in the RPKI. This profile should be replaced to specify such future requirements, as and when appropriate 🔄

CAs and RPs SHOULD be capable of supporting a transition that allows for the phased introduction of additional encryption algorithms and key specifications, and that also accommodates the orderly deprecation of previously specified algorithms and keys. Accordingly, CAs and RPs SHOULD be capable of supporting multiple RPKI algorithm and key profiles simultaneously within the scope of such anticipated transitions. The recommended procedures to implement such a transition of key sizes and algorithms are not specified in this document 🙈

6. Security Considerations 🚨

The Security Considerations of [RFC4055], [RFC5280], and [RFC6487] apply to certificates and CRLs. The Security Considerations of [RFC5754] apply to signed objects. No new security threats are introduced as a result of this specification.

7. Acknowledgments 🫶

The author acknowledges the reuse in this document of material originally in working drafts of the RPKI Certificate Policy [RFC6484] and the resource certificate profile [RFC6487] documents. The co-authors of those two documents, namely Stephen Kent, Derrick Kong, Karen Seo, Ronald Watro, George Michaelson, and Robert Loomans, are acknowledged with thanks. The constraint on key size noted in this profile came out of comments from Stephen Kent and review comments from David Cooper. Sean Turner also gave additional review input 💜

9. Normative References 📚

• [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
• [RFC2986] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7", RFC 2986, November 2000.
• [RFC3370] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) Algorithms", RFC 3370, August 2002.
• [RFC4055] Schaad, J., Kaliski, B., and R. Housley, "Additional Algorithms and Identifiers for RSA Cryptography for use in the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 4055, June 2005.
• [RFC4211] Schaad, J., "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)", RFC 4211, September 2005.
• [RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.
• [RFC5754] Turner, S., "Using SHA2 Algorithms with Cryptographic Message Syntax", RFC 5754, January 2010.
• [RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, February 2012.
• [RFC6484] Kent, S., Kong, D., Seo, K., and R. Watro, "Certificate Policy (CP) for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)", BCP 173, RFC 6484, February 2012.
• [RFC6487] Husotn, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", RFC 6487, February 2012.
• [RFC6488] Lepinski, M., Chi, A., and S. Kent, "Signed Object Template for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)", RFC 6488, February 2012.
• [SHS] National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), "FIPS Publication 180-3: Secure Hash Standard (SHS)", FIPS Publication 180-3, October 2008.

Author's Address 💌

Geoff Huston APNIC

EMail: gih@apnic.net