RFC 9582

A Profile for Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs)

📅 published May 2024, from ietf

A Profile for Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs) ✨

Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) 🌸 This one's an IETF doc, RFC 9582, dated May 2024. It's on the Standards Track 📜 (so it's an actual Internet Standard, not just a suggestion, bestie 💅) and it's published under ISSN 2070-1721. It obsoletes RFC 6482 🔄, which means 6482 is retired and this doc is its replacement. It doesn't say it updates anything else.

The authors are J. Snijders (Fastly), B. Maddison (Workonline), M. Lepinski (Carleton College), D. Kong (Raytheon), and S. Kent (Independent). Five brilliant minds, one spec 🧚

Abstract

okay so this doc defines a standard profile for Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs) 💖 A ROA is a digitally signed object 🔐 that lets anyone check that an IP address block holder has authorized an Autonomous System (AS) to originate routes to one or more prefixes inside that block. Basically it's the receipt that says "yep, this network is allowed to announce these addresses" ✨ This document obsoletes RFC 6482.

Status of This Memo

This is an Internet Standards Track document 📜

This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) 🌈 It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It went through public review and got approved for publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG), so it's very official and very legit 👑 More info on Internet Standards is in Section 2 of RFC 7841.

Info about the current status of this doc, any errata, and how to give feedback lives at https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9582 🔗

Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. 🎀

This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) as they're in effect on the date of publication. Please read these carefully, bestie, because they explain your rights and restrictions for this doc. Code Components extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions, and they're provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License 💜

Table of Contents

1.  Introduction
  1.1.  Requirements Language
  1.2.  Changes from RFC 6482
2.  Related Work
3.  The ROA Content Type
4.  The ROA eContent
  4.1.  The version Element
  4.2.  The asID Element
  4.3.  The ipAddrBlocks Element
    4.3.1.  Type ROAIPAddressFamily
    4.3.2.  Type ROAIPAddress
    4.3.3.  Canonical Form for ipAddrBlocks
5.  ROA Validation
6.  Security Considerations
7.  IANA Considerations
  7.1.  SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type
        (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1)
  7.2.  RPKI Signed Objects Registry
  7.3.  File Extension
  7.4.  SMI Security for S/MIME Module Identifier
        (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.0)
  7.5.  Media Type
8.  References
  8.1.  Normative References
  8.2.  Informative References
Appendix A.  Example ROA eContent Payload
Acknowledgements
Authors' Addresses

1. Introduction

so the big picture 🦋 The primary purpose of the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is to improve routing security. (See [RFC6480] for more information.) As part of this system, we need a way for entities to verify that an Autonomous System (AS) has been given permission by an IP address block holder to advertise routes to one or more prefixes inside that block. That's the job of a Route Origin Authorization (ROA) ✨

The ROA uses the template for RPKI digitally signed objects [RFC6488] 🧁 That template defines a Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) wrapper [RFC5652] for the ROA content, plus a generic validation procedure for RPKI signed objects. So to finish specifying the ROA (see Section 4 of [RFC6488]), this document defines:

  • The OID that identifies the signed object as a ROA. (This OID shows up in the eContentType in the encapContentInfo object, and also in the content-type signed attribute in the signerInfo object.) 🔑
  • The ASN.1 syntax for the ROA eContent. (This is the payload that names the AS being authorized to originate routes, plus the prefixes that AS may originate routes for.) The ROA eContent is ASN.1 encoded using the Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) [X.690] 💅
  • Additional steps required to validate ROAs, on top of the validation steps specified in [RFC6488] 🫶

1.1. Requirements Language

Here's the rules-of-the-game part 📜 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. ⭐

1.2. Changes from RFC 6482

this section is the "what's new" recap 🌈 It summarizes the significant changes between [RFC6482] and the profile described in this document.

  • Clarified the requirements for the IP address and AS identifier X.509 certificate extensions. 🧚
  • Strengthened the ASN.1 formal notation and definitions. 💪
  • Incorporated errata for RFC 6482. 🩹
  • Added an example ROA eContent payload, and a complete ROA (Appendix A). 🍓
  • Specified a canonicalization procedure for the content of ipAddrBlocks. 🎀

It's assumed you already know the terms and concepts from "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile" [RFC5280] and "X.509 Extensions for IP Addresses and AS Identifiers" [RFC3779]. No pressure, but this is the prerequisite reading 📚

This document also makes use of the RPKI signed object profile [RFC6488], so familiarity with that one is assumed too. Note that the RPKI signed object profile uses certificates that follow the RPKI resource certificate profile [RFC6487], so familiarity with that profile is assumed as well 🦋

3. The ROA Content Type

The content-type for a ROA is defined as id-ct-routeOriginAuthz, and it has the numerical value 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.24 🔢

This OID MUST appear within both the eContentType in the encapContentInfo object and the content-type signed attribute in the signerInfo object (see [RFC6488]). Yes, both places, no skipping 🙈

4. The ROA eContent

The content of a ROA identifies a single AS that the address space holder has authorized to originate routes, plus a list of one or more IP address prefixes that will be advertised. If the address space holder needs to authorize multiple ASes to advertise the same set of address prefixes, the holder issues multiple ROAs, one per AS number. Okay, one ROA per AS, that's the whole vibe 💖 A ROA is formally defined as:

RPKI-ROA-2023
  { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
  pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) smime(16) mod(0)
  id-mod-rpkiROA-2023(75) }

DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN

IMPORTS
  CONTENT-TYPE
  FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax-2010 -- in [RFC6268]
    { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
      pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-2009(58) } ;

ct-routeOriginAttestation CONTENT-TYPE ::=
  { TYPE RouteOriginAttestation
    IDENTIFIED BY id-ct-routeOriginAuthz }

id-ct-routeOriginAuthz OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
  { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
    pkcs-9(9) id-smime(16) id-ct(1) routeOriginAuthz(24) }

RouteOriginAttestation ::= SEQUENCE {
  version [0]   INTEGER DEFAULT 0,
  asID          ASID,
  ipAddrBlocks  SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..2)) OF ROAIPAddressFamily }

ASID ::= INTEGER (0..4294967295)

ROAIPAddressFamily ::= SEQUENCE {
  addressFamily ADDRESS-FAMILY.&afi ({AddressFamilySet}),
  addresses     ADDRESS-FAMILY.&Addresses
                               ({AddressFamilySet}{@addressFamily}) }

ADDRESS-FAMILY ::= CLASS {
  &afi          OCTET STRING (SIZE(2)) UNIQUE,
  &Addresses
} WITH SYNTAX { AFI &afi ADDRESSES &Addresses }

AddressFamilySet ADDRESS-FAMILY ::=
  { addressFamilyIPv4 | addressFamilyIPv6 }

addressFamilyIPv4 ADDRESS-FAMILY ::=
  { AFI afi-IPv4 ADDRESSES ROAAddressesIPv4 }
addressFamilyIPv6 ADDRESS-FAMILY ::=
  { AFI afi-IPv6 ADDRESSES ROAAddressesIPv6 }

afi-IPv4 OCTET STRING ::= '0001'H
afi-IPv6 OCTET STRING ::= '0002'H

ROAAddressesIPv4 ::= SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF ROAIPAddress{ub-IPv4}
ROAAddressesIPv6 ::= SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF ROAIPAddress{ub-IPv6}

ub-IPv4 INTEGER ::= 32
ub-IPv6 INTEGER ::= 128

ROAIPAddress {INTEGER: ub} ::= SEQUENCE {
  address       BIT STRING (SIZE(0..ub)),
  maxLength     INTEGER (0..ub) OPTIONAL }

END

4.1. The version Element

The version number of the RouteOriginAttestation entry MUST be 0. Zero, always zero, no exceptions 🔢

4.2. The asID Element

The asID element contains the AS number that is authorized to originate routes to the given IP address prefixes. 🧾

4.3. The ipAddrBlocks Element

The ipAddrBlocks element encodes the set of IP address prefixes that the AS is authorized to originate routes for. Note that the syntax here is more restrictive than the one used in the IP address delegation extension defined in [RFC3779]. That extension can represent arbitrary address ranges, whereas ROAs only need to represent IP prefixes. So it's a stricter, tidier version, and honestly iconic 💅

4.3.1. Type ROAIPAddressFamily

Within the ROAIPAddressFamily structure, the addressFamily element contains the Address Family Identifier (AFI) of an IP address family. This specification only supports IPv4 and IPv6, so addressFamily MUST be either 0001 or 0002. IPv4 prefixes MUST NOT appear as IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses (Section 2.5.5.2 of [RFC4291]). Not a single mapped address in sight 🙅‍♀️

There MUST be only one instance of ROAIPAddressFamily per unique AFI in the ROA. Thus, the ROAIPAddressFamily structure MUST NOT appear more than twice. One per family, two max, that's it 🫶

The addresses field contains IP prefixes as a sequence of type ROAIPAddress.

4.3.2. Type ROAIPAddress

A ROAIPAddress structure is a sequence containing an address element of type BIT STRING and an optional maxLength element of type INTEGER. 🎀

4.3.2.1. The address Element

The address element is of type BIT STRING and represents a single IP address prefix. This field uses the same representation of an IP address prefix as a BIT STRING as the IPAddress type defined in Section 2.2.3.8 of [RFC3779]. Same format, same vibe, no reinventing the wheel ✨

Part 1 of 3 is done, bestie 🦋 More sections are coming, so stay tuned 💖

4.3.2.2. The maxLength Element 🦋

okay so the maxLength element is where the AS gets to say how far down it's allowed to go 👀 It tells you the longest IP address prefix that the AS is authorized to advertise. If the maximum length is the same as the prefix length, you SHOULD NOT encode maxLength at all, because it's just superfluous. Certification Authorities SHOULD anticipate that future Relying Parties will get increasingly strict about extra maxLength elements and treat them as an encoding error 🙈 so keep it clean, bestie 💅

If it IS present, maxLength MUST be:

  • an integer greater than or equal to the length of the accompanying prefix, and
  • less than or equal to the maximum length (in bits) of an IP address in the applicable address family: 32 in the case of IPv4 and 128 in the case of IPv6.

Here's an example to make it click ✨ say the IP address prefix is 203.0.113.0/24 and maxLength is 26. The AS is authorized to advertise any more-specific prefix with a maximum length of 26. So it can advertise 203.0.113.0/24, 203.0.113.128/25, or 203.0.113.192/26, but NOT 203.0.113.0/27. Main character energy for the /26 💖 See [RFC9319] for more information on the use of maxLength.

When maxLength is not present, the AS is only authorized to advertise the exact prefix specified in the ROAIPAddress structure's address element. No wiggle room at all 🎀

4.3.2.3. Note on Overlapping or Superfluous Information Encoding 🌸

Okay this one is lowkey tricky so pay attention 🧚 A valid ROA may contain an IP address prefix (within a ROAIPAddress element) that is encompassed by another IP address prefix (within a separate ROAIPAddress element). For example, a ROA may contain the prefix 203.0.113.0/24 with maxLength 26, AND the prefix 203.0.113.0/28 with maxLength 28. This ROA would authorize the indicated AS to advertise any prefix beginning with 203.0.113 with a minimum length of 24 and a maximum length of 26, as well as the specific prefix 203.0.113.0/28. Overlapping, but still valid 🫶

Also, a ROA MAY contain two ROAIPAddress elements where the IP address prefix is identical in both cases. However, this is NOT RECOMMENDED 🙅‍♀️ because the ROAIPAddress element with the shorter maxLength grants no additional privileges to the indicated AS, so it can be omitted without changing the meaning of the ROA. Why keep the extra copy when it does nothing? 💀

4.3.3. Canonical Form for ipAddrBlocks ✨

So the ROA ASN.1 module lets you write the same set of IP address info in a bunch of different ways, which is honestly chaotic 😭 That's why there's a canonical form, so every set of IP address information has exactly one unique representation. To produce and verify this canonical form, the process in this section SHOULD be used to make sure information elements are unique with respect to one another and sorted in ascending order. Certification Authorities SHOULD anticipate that future Relying Parties will impose a strict requirement for the ipAddrBlocks field to be in this canonical form 👑 This canonicalization procedure builds upon the canonicalization procedure specified in Section 2.2.3.6 of [RFC3779].

To semantically compare, sort, and deduplicate the contents of the ipAddrBlocks field, each ROAIPAddress element gets mapped to an abstract data element made of four integer values:

  • afi: the AFI value appearing in the addressFamily field of the containing ROAIPAddressFamily, as an integer.
  • addr: the first IP address of the IP prefix appearing in the ROAIPAddress address field, as a 32-bit (IPv4) or 128-bit (IPv6) integer value.
  • plen: the length of the IP prefix appearing in the ROAIPAddress address field, as an integer value.
  • mlen: the value appearing in the maxLength field of the ROAIPAddress element if present; otherwise, the above prefix length value.

So yes, you can totally test whether two ROAIPAddress elements are equal or in what order they sit just by comparing their abstract representations 🧠🌈

4.3.3.1. Comparator 🔥

The set of ipAddrBlocks is totally ordered. The order of two ipAddrBlocks is decided by the first non-equal comparison in this list:

  1. Data elements with a lower afi value precede data elements with a higher afi value.
  2. Data elements with a lower addr value precede data elements with a higher addr value.
  3. Data elements with a lower plen value precede data elements with a higher plen value.
  4. Data elements with a lower mlen value precede data elements with a higher mlen value.

If all four values compare equal, the data elements are duplicates of one another 👯‍♀️

4.3.3.2. Example Implementations 💜

  • A sorting implementation [roasort-c] in ISO/IEC 9899:1999 ("ANSI C99").
  • A sorting implementation [roasort-rs] in the Rust 2021 Edition.

5. ROA Validation 🛡️

Before a Relying Party can use a ROA to validate a routing announcement, the Relying Party MUST first validate the ROA. Not optional, no skipping 🙅‍♀️ To validate a ROA, the Relying Party MUST perform all the validation checks specified in [RFC6488], as well as these additional ROA-specific validation steps:

  • The IP address delegation extension [RFC3779] is present in the end-entity (EE) certificate (contained within the ROA), and every IP address prefix in the ROA payload is contained within the set of IP addresses specified by the EE certificate's IP address delegation extension.
  • The EE certificate's IP address delegation extension MUST NOT contain "inherit" elements as described in [RFC3779].
  • The Autonomous System identifier delegation extension described in [RFC3779] is not used in ROAs and MUST NOT be present in the EE certificate.
  • The ROA content fully conforms with all requirements specified in Sections 3 and 4.

If any of the above checks fail, the ROA in its entirety MUST be considered invalid, and an error SHOULD be logged. Rejected, and the paper trail is a nice touch 📝

6. Security Considerations 💀

Okay, serious moment, bestie 🥺 There is no assumption of confidentiality for the data in a ROA. It's anticipated that ROAs will be stored in repositories that are accessible to all ISPs, and maybe to all Internet users, so don't put secrets in there 🙈 There is no explicit authentication associated with a ROA, since the PKI used for ROA validation provides authorization but not authentication. And even though the ROA is a signed, application-layer object, there is no intent to convey non-repudiation via a ROA.

The whole purpose of a ROA is to convey authorization for an AS to originate a route to the prefix or prefixes in the ROA. So the integrity of a ROA MUST be established. This ROA specification uses the RPKI signed object format, so all security considerations discussed in [RFC6488] also apply to ROAs. On top of that, the signed object profile uses the CMS signed message format for integrity, so ROAs inherit all security considerations associated with that data structure. It's a lot, but it's all relevant 😭

The right of the ROA signer to authorize the target AS to originate routes to the prefix or prefixes is established through the address space and AS number PKI described in [RFC6480]. Specifically, one MUST verify the signature on the ROA using an X.509 certificate issued under this PKI, and check that the prefix or prefixes in the ROA are contained within those in the certificate's IP address delegation extension. Verify the signature, check the prefixes, no shortcuts, periodt 🔐

7. IANA Considerations 🌈

7.1. SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1) 🎀

IANA has updated the id-ct-routeOriginAuthz entry in the "SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1)" registry as follows:

          +=========+========================+============+
          | Decimal | Description            | References |
          +=========+========================+============+
          | 24      | id-ct-routeOriginAuthz | RFC 9582   |
          +---------+------------------------+------------+

                               Table 1

7.2. RPKI Signed Objects Registry 🍓

IANA has updated the Route Origination Authorization entry in the "RPKI Signed Objects" registry created by [RFC6488] as follows:

   +===================+============================+===========+
   | Name              | OID                        | Reference |
   +===================+============================+===========+
   | Route Origination | 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.24 | RFC 9582  |
   | Authorization     |                            |           |
   +-------------------+----------------------------+-----------+

                              Table 2

7.3. File Extension 🧚

IANA has updated the entry for the ROA file extension in the "RPKI Repository Name Schemes" registry created by [RFC6481] as follows:

+====================+=================================+===========+
| Filename Extension | RPKI Object                     | Reference |
+====================+=================================+===========+
| .roa               | Route Origination Authorization | RFC 9582  |
+--------------------+---------------------------------+-----------+

                              Table 3

7.4. SMI Security for S/MIME Module Identifier (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.0) 🦋

IANA has allocated the following entry in the "SMI Security for S/MIME Module Identifier (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.0)" registry:

           +=========+=====================+============+
           | Decimal | Description         | References |
           +=========+=====================+============+
           | 75      | id-mod-rpkiROA-2023 | RFC 9582   |
           +---------+---------------------+------------+

                              Table 4

7.5. Media Type 📱

IANA has updated the media type application/rpki-roa in the "Media Types" registry as follows:

Type name:  application

Subtype name:  rpki-roa

Required parameters:  N/A

Optional parameters:  N/A

Encoding considerations:  binary

Security considerations:  Carries an RPKI ROA (RFC 9582).  This media
   type contains no active content.  See Section 6 of RFC 9582 for
   further information.

Interoperability considerations:  None

Published specification:  RFC 9582

Applications that use this media type:  RPKI operators

Additional information:

   Content:  This media type is a signed object, as defined in
      [RFC6488], which contains a payload of a list of prefixes and
      an AS identifier as defined in RFC 9582.
   Magic number(s):  None
   File extension(s):  .roa
   Macintosh file type code(s):  None

Person & email address to contact for further information:
   Job Snijders <job@fastly.com>

Intended usage:  COMMON

Restrictions on usage:  None

Change controller:  IETF

8. References 📚

8.1. Normative References 📚

okay so these are the docs the spec needs you to read first, bestie 🎀 if you skip them you're gonna be so lost 💀

8.2. Informative References 🦋

these ones are more like bonus reading 🧚 handy to have, but the spec doesn't lean on them the same way

Appendix A. Example ROA eContent Payload 🎀

this is the part where we get to see a real ROA eContent, all wrapped up and ready to go 🎁 the stuff after the "#" is just my notes for you, bestie ✨

   $ echo 16i 301802030100003011300F040200023009300703050020010DB8 P \
     | dc | openssl asn1parse -inform DER -i -dump
    0:d=0  hl=2 l=  24 cons: SEQUENCE           # RouteOriginAttestation
    2:d=1  hl=2 l=   3 prim:  INTEGER  :010000  #  asID 65536
    7:d=1  hl=2 l=  17 cons:  SEQUENCE          #  ipAddrBlocks
    9:d=2  hl=2 l=  15 cons:   SEQUENCE         #   ROAIPAddressFamily
   11:d=3  hl=2 l=   2 prim:    OCTET STRING    #    addressFamily
      0000 - 00 02                              #     IPv6
   15:d=3  hl=2 l=   9 cons:    SEQUENCE        #    addresses
   17:d=4  hl=2 l=   7 cons:     SEQUENCE       #     ROAIPAddress
   19:d=5  hl=2 l=   5 prim:      BIT STRING    #      2001:db8::/32
       0000 - 00 20 01 0d b8                     #

Okay wait, I need to be careful about that last line, so here is the exact original line from the source, copied verbatim:

       0000 - 00 20 01 0d b8

Next up, the whole thing is a complete RPKI ROA signed object, Base64 encoded per [RFC4648] 🍓 it's a big one, so get comfy 🧸
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rkhag8CQYi2CBJZLrkpCRha8doBW4PbrL36waWG55A/TdLKvWzAf66/v3iL5QcXo
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wnw1+GqSyDhqu0Rsr0m3XUbivkc+h0ZZBBS9SxPM+GfgdzEDV51VcK1SeMa3G3Ca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The object in this appendix has the following properties 💅

  • Object size: 1668 octets
  • Object SHA256 message digest:
     3a39e0b652e79ddf6efdd178ad5e3b29e0121b1e593b89f1e0ac18f3ba60d5e7
  • CMS signing time: Wed 01 May 2024 00:34:13 +0000
  • X.509 end-entity certificate
    • Subject key id: DE145B193FB320B25A744355298C8BF7C2523D22
    • Authority key id: D67208EA470E9D6DD6654022F553ADC1389AB434
    • Issuer: CN=86525cd5-44d7-4df9-8079-4a9dcdf26944
    • Serial: 3
    • Not before: Wed 01 May 2024 00:34:13 +0000
    • Not after: Thu 01 May 2025 00:34:13 +0000
    • IP address delegation: 2001:db8::/32
  • ROA eContent
    • asID: 65536
    • addresses: 2001:db8::/32

Acknowledgements 💖

the authors gave a huge shoutout to Theo Buehler, Ties de Kock, Martin Hoffmann, Charles Gardiner, Russ Housley, Jeffrey Haas, Bob Beck, and Tom Harrison for their help and contributions 🫶 they also thanked Jim Fenton, Vijay Gurbani, Haoyu Song, Rob Austein, Roque Gagliano, Danny McPherson, Sam Weiler, Jasdip Singh, and Murray S. Kucherawy for their careful reviews and helpful comments 👑

Authors' Addresses 🦋

Job Snijders
Fastly
Amsterdam
The Netherlands
Email: job@fastly.com

Ben Maddison
Workonline
Cape Town
South Africa
Email: benm@workonline.africa

Matthew Lepinski
Carleton College
Email: mlepinski@carleton.edu

Derrick Kong
Raytheon
Email: derrick.kong@raytheon.com

Stephen Kent
Independent
Email: kent@alum.mit.edu
📦 where this page comes from