RFC 6268
Additional New ASN.1 Modules for the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) and the Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)
RFC 6268: Additional New ASN.1 Modules for the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) and the Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX) 🎀
Okay bestie, let's start with the basics. This RFC came out in July 2011 ✨ and it's written by J. Schaad from Soaring Hawk Consulting and S. Turner from IECA, Inc. 💅 It's Informational, so it's not a Standards Track spec, and it's catalogued as ISSN 2070-1721. It also updates RFC 5911 🦋, which matters because it builds on that one.
Abstract 🌸
CMS and a bunch of formats connected to it are written in ASN.1, and right now the modules are on the 1988 version. This doc updates some of the side modules to the 2008 version of ASN.1 💖 The 1988 modules are still the official normative ones, though. And the good news is that nothing changes on the wire. It's just a syntax glow-up, not a protocol change 🧚
Status of This Memo 🔥
This one isn't a Standards Track spec. It's just published for info, so no pressure 🍓
This is an IETF product, which means it reflects consensus from the IETF community. It went through public review and got approved by the IESG. But not every IESG-approved doc is a candidate for an Internet Standard, so check Section 2 of RFC 5741 if you're curious 🤓
For the current status, errata, and where to send feedback, head to http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6268 🌈
Copyright Notice 💜
Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. 🫶
This doc is under BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info), as they stood when it was published. Please actually read those, because they spell out your rights and restrictions. Any code pulled out of this doc has to include the Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions, and it comes with no warranty, as the Simplified BSD License says 💀
This doc may include material from IETF Documents or IETF Contributions published before November 10, 2008. Some of that material's copyright holders might not have given the IETF Trust permission to allow changes outside the IETF Standards Process. So unless you get a proper license from them, this doc can't be modified outside the IETF Standards Process, and you can't make derivative works outside it either. The only exceptions are formatting it for RFC publication or translating it into languages other than English 🙈
Table of Contents 🧚
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. ASN.1 Updates (2002 to 2008) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2. Requirements Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. ASN.1 Module RFC 3274 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. ASN.1 Module RFC 3779 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4. ASN.1 Module RFC 6019 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5. ASN.1 Module RFC 4073 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6. ASN.1 Module RFC 4231 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7. ASN.1 Module RFC 4334 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
8. ASN.1 Module RFC 5083 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
9. ASN.1 Module RFC 5652 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
10. ASN.1 Module RFC 5752 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
11. Module Identifiers in ASN.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
12. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
13. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
13.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
13.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 331. Introduction ✨
Okay so some devs want the IETF to switch to the newest ASN.1 in its standards. Most security-protocol RFCs still use the 1988 ASN.1, which is basically deprecated now 😭 This is especially true for PKIX, CMS, and S/MIME (Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions) 💅
Here, we either moved the syntax to the 2008 ASN.1 standard or did some updates on earlier conversions. The ASN.1 modules we updated came from these RFCs:
- RFC 3274, Compressed Data Content Type for Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [RFC3274].
- RFC 3779, X.509 Extensions for IP Addresses and AS Identifiers [RFC3779].
- RFC 6019, BinaryTime: An Alternate Format for Representing Date and Time in ASN.1 [RFC6019].
- RFC 4073, Protecting Multiple Contents with the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [RFC4073].
- RFC 4231, Identifiers and Test Vectors for HMAC-SHA-224, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, and HMAC-SHA-512 [RFC4231].
- RFC 4334, Certificate Extensions and Attributes Supporting Authentication in Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP) and Wireless Local Area Networks (WLAN) [RFC4334].
- RFC 5083, Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) Authenticated-Enveloped-Data Content Type [RFC5083].
- RFC 5652, Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [RFC5652].
- RFC 5752, Multiple Signatures in Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [RFC5752].
Some modules here pull their definitions from different places than the modules in the original RFCs did. The goal is that these modules, together with the ones in [RFC5911] and [RFC5912], can stand on their own without importing stuff from anywhere else 🧚
This doc doesn't explicitly update the RFCs the ASN.1 modules came from. That's because the original 1988 ASN.1 syntax is still the normative version, and the modules here (plus the ones in [RFC5911] and [RFC5912]) are informative annexes. Hopefully they're useful, though 🌸
1.1. ASN.1 Updates (2002 to 2008)
The modules in this doc are compatible with the latest ASN.1 spec, published in 2008 (see [ASN1-2008]). The big changes between the 2002 and 2008 specs include new pre-defined types (DATE, DATE-TIME, DURATION, NOT-A-NUMBER, OID-IRI, RELATIVE-OID-IRI, TIME, TIME-OF-DAY) and the ability to define different encoding rules (ENCODING-CONTROL, INSTRUCTIONS). None of the newly defined tokens are used in any of the ASN.1 specs published here 🦋
If you want the 1988-to-2002 changes, those are in [RFC6025] 💜
1.2. Requirements Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. These are the official key words, so read them exactly as written 👑
2. ASN.1 Module RFC 3274 🎀
We updated the ASN.1 module tied to RFC 3274 so it's 2008 compliant and uses the set of classes previously defined in [RFC5911]. Here it is in all its glory:
CompressedDataContent-2010
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-compressedDataContent(54) }
DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN
IMPORTS
CMSVersion, ContentSet,
CONTENT-TYPE
FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax-2010
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-2009(58) }
AlgorithmIdentifier{}, SMIME-CAPS, ParamOptions
FROM AlgorithmInformation-2009
{iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-algorithmInformation-02(58)}
;
--
-- ContentTypes contains the set of content types that are
-- defined in this module.
--
-- The contents of ContentTypes should be added to
-- ContentSet defined in [RFC5652]
--
ContentTypes CONTENT-TYPE ::= {ct-compressedData}
--
-- SMimeCaps contains the set of S/MIME capabilities that
-- are associated with the algorithms defined in this
-- document.
--
-- SMimeCaps are added to the SMimeCapsSet defined in
-- [RFC5751] as updated by [RFC5911].
SMimeCaps SMIME-CAPS ::= {cpa-zlibCompress.&smimeCaps, ...}
--
-- Define the compressed data content type
--
ct-compressedData CONTENT-TYPE ::= {
TYPE CompressedData IDENTIFIED BY id-ct-compressedData
}
CompressedData ::= SEQUENCE {
version CMSVersion (v0), -- Always set to 0
compressionAlgorithm CompressionAlgorithmIdentifier,
encapContentInfo EncapsulatedContentInfo
}
EncapsulatedContentInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
eContentType CONTENT-TYPE.&id({ContentSet}),
eContent [0] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL }
CompressionAlgorithmIdentifier ::=
AlgorithmIdentifier{COMPRESS-ALGORITHM, {CompressAlgorithmSet}}
CompressAlgorithmSet COMPRESS-ALGORITHM ::= {
cpa-zlibCompress, ...
}
-- Algorithm Identifiers
id-alg-zlibCompress OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) alg(3) 8 }
cpa-zlibCompress COMPRESS-ALGORITHM ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-alg-zlibCompress
PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE preferredAbsent
SMIME-CAPS {IDENTIFIED BY id-alg-zlibCompress}
}
-- Content Type Object Identifiers
id-ct-compressedData OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) ct(1) 9 }
--
-- Class defined for compression algorithms
--
COMPRESS-ALGORITHM ::= CLASS {
&id OBJECT IDENTIFIER UNIQUE,
&Params OPTIONAL,
¶mPresence ParamOptions DEFAULT absent,
&smimeCaps SMIME-CAPS OPTIONAL
}
WITH SYNTAX {
IDENTIFIER &id
[PARAMS [TYPE &Params] ARE ¶mPresence]
[SMIME-CAPS &smimeCaps]
}
END3. ASN.1 Module RFC 3779 ✨
okay so the ASN.1 module for RFC 3779 got a full glow-up 💅 it's now ASN.1 2008 compliant and it borrows the set of classes that [RFC5912] already defined. main character energy 👑
IPAddrAndASCertExtn-2010 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) mod(0)
id-mod-ip-addr-and-as-ident-2(72) }
DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN
EXPORTS ALL;
IMPORTS
-- PKIX specific OIDs and arcs --
id-pe
FROM PKIX1Explicit-2009
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-pkix1-explicit-02(51)}
EXTENSION
FROM PKIX-CommonTypes-2009
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-pkixCommon-02(57)}
;
--
-- Extensions contains the set of extensions defined in this
-- module
--
-- These are intended to be placed in public key certificates
-- and thus should be added to the CertExtensions extension
-- set in PKIXImplicit-2009 defined for [RFC5280]
--
Extensions EXTENSION ::= {
ext-pe-ipAddrBlocks | ext-pe-autonomousSysIds
}
-- IP Address Delegation Extension OID --
ext-pe-ipAddrBlocks EXTENSION ::= {
SYNTAX IPAddrBlocks
IDENTIFIED BY id-pe-ipAddrBlocks
}
id-pe-ipAddrBlocks OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe 7 }
-- IP Address Delegation Extension Syntax --
IPAddrBlocks ::= SEQUENCE OF IPAddressFamily
IPAddressFamily ::= SEQUENCE { -- AFI & opt SAFI --
addressFamily OCTET STRING (SIZE (2..3)),
ipAddressChoice IPAddressChoice }
IPAddressChoice ::= CHOICE {
inherit NULL, -- inherit from issuer --
addressesOrRanges SEQUENCE OF IPAddressOrRange }
IPAddressOrRange ::= CHOICE {
addressPrefix IPAddress,
addressRange IPAddressRange }
IPAddressRange ::= SEQUENCE {
min IPAddress,
max IPAddress }
IPAddress ::= BIT STRING
-- Autonomous System Identifier Delegation Extension OID --
ext-pe-autonomousSysIds EXTENSION ::= {
SYNTAX ASIdentifiers
IDENTIFIED BY id-pe-autonomousSysIds
}
id-pe-autonomousSysIds OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe 8 }
-- Autonomous System Identifier Delegation Extension Syntax --
ASIdentifiers ::= SEQUENCE {
asnum [0] ASIdentifierChoice OPTIONAL,
rdi [1] ASIdentifierChoice OPTIONAL }
(WITH COMPONENTS {..., asnum PRESENT} |
WITH COMPONENTS {..., rdi PRESENT})
ASIdentifierChoice ::= CHOICE {
inherit NULL, -- inherit from issuer --
asIdsOrRanges SEQUENCE OF ASIdOrRange }
ASIdOrRange ::= CHOICE {
id ASId,
range ASRange }
ASRange ::= SEQUENCE {
min ASId,
max ASId }
ASId ::= INTEGER
END4. ASN.1 Module RFC 6019 🦋
same vibe here, bestie 🫶 this module got the 2008 compliant treatment too, and it uses the set of classes that [RFC5911] already defined 🌸
BinarySigningTimeModule-2010
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0)
id-mod-binSigningTime-2009(55) }
DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN
IMPORTS
-- From PKIX-CommonTypes-2009 [RFC5912]
ATTRIBUTE
FROM PKIX-CommonTypes-2009
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-pkixCommon-02(57) }
;
--
-- BinaryTime Definition
--
-- BinaryTime contains the number seconds since
-- midnight Jan 1, 1970 UTC.
-- Leap seconds are EXCLUDED from the computation.
--
BinaryTime ::= INTEGER (0..MAX)
--
-- Signing Binary Time Attribute
--
-- The binary signing time should be added to
-- SignedAttributeSet and AuthAttributeSet in CMS [RFC5652]
-- and to AuthEnvDataAttributeSet in [RFC5083] with the
-- new modules in this document, RFC 6268.
--
aa-binarySigningTime ATTRIBUTE ::= {
TYPE BinarySigningTime
IDENTIFIED BY id-aa-binarySigningTime }
id-aa-binarySigningTime OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)
smime(16) aa(2) 46 }
BinarySigningTime ::= BinaryTime
END5. ASN.1 Module RFC 4073 🌈
and the same glow-up for this one! ✨ it's 2008 compliant and pulls in the set of classes that [RFC5911] already defined. the consistency is giving 💖
ContentCollectionModule-2010
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-context-Collect-2009(56) }
DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN
IMPORTS
-- From CryptographicMessageSyntax-2010 [RFC6268]
CONTENT-TYPE, ContentInfo
FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax-2010
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-2009(58) }
AttributeSet{}, ATTRIBUTE
FROM PKIX-CommonTypes-2009
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-pkixCommon-02(57) }
;
--
-- An object set of all content types defined by this module.
-- This is to be added to ContentSet in the CMS module
--
ContentSet CONTENT-TYPE ::= {
ct-ContentCollection | ct-ContentWithAttributes, ...
}
--
-- Content Collection Content Type and Object Identifier
--
ct-ContentCollection CONTENT-TYPE ::= {
TYPE ContentCollection IDENTIFIED BY id-ct-contentCollection }
id-ct-contentCollection OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) ct(1) 19 }
ContentCollection ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF ContentInfo
--
-- Content With Attributes Content Type and Object Identifier
--
ct-ContentWithAttributes CONTENT-TYPE ::= {
TYPE ContentWithAttributes IDENTIFIED BY id-ct-contentWithAttrs }
id-ct-contentWithAttrs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) ct(1) 20 }
ContentWithAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
content ContentInfo,
attrs SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF AttributeSet
{{ ContentAttributeSet }}
}
ContentAttributeSet ATTRIBUTE ::= { ... }
END6. ASN.1 Module RFC 4231 👑
okay so RFC 4231 doesn't actually come with an ASN.1 module 😭 so we wrote one from scratch to represent the ASN.1 that's in the document 💅
heads up, bestie: the parameters here are defined as expecting a parameter for the algorithm identifiers in this module. that's different from most of the algorithms used in PKIX and S/MIME 👀
also, there's no concept of truncating the MAC (Message Authentication Code) value in the ASN.1, unlike the XML definitions. that's why there's no minimum MAC length defined in the ASN.1 🙈 it's giving minimalism 🫶
HMAC-2010 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) mod(0) id-mod-hmac(74) }
DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN
EXPORTS ALL;
IMPORTS
MAC-ALGORITHM, SMIME-CAPS
FROM AlgorithmInformation-2009
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-algorithmInformation-02(58)};
--
-- This object set contains all of the MAC algorithms that are
-- defined in this module.
-- One would add it to a constraining set of objects such as the
-- MessageAuthenticationCodeAlgorithmSet in [RFC5652]
--
MessageAuthAlgs MAC-ALGORITHM ::= {
maca-hMAC-SHA224 |
maca-hMAC-SHA256 |
maca-hMAC-SHA384 |
maca-hMAC-SHA512
}
--
-- This object set contains all of the S/MIME capabilities that
-- have been defined for all the MAC algorithms in this module.
-- One would add this to an object set that is used to restrict
-- S/MIME capabilities such as the SMimeCapsSet variable in
-- RFC 3851 (obsoleted by RFC 5751) as modified in RFC 5911.
--
SMimeCaps SMIME-CAPS ::= {
maca-hMAC-SHA224.&smimeCaps |
maca-hMAC-SHA256.&smimeCaps |
maca-hMAC-SHA384.&smimeCaps |
maca-hMAC-SHA512.&smimeCaps
}
--
-- Define the base OID for the algorithm identifiers
--
rsadsi OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)}
digestAlgorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {rsadsi 2}
--
-- Define the necessary algorithm identifiers
--
id-hmacWithSHA224 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {digestAlgorithm 8}
id-hmacWithSHA256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {digestAlgorithm 9}
id-hmacWithSHA384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {digestAlgorithm 10}
id-hmacWithSHA512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {digestAlgorithm 11}
--
-- Define each of the MAC-ALGORITHM objects to describe the
-- algorithms defined
--
maca-hMAC-SHA224 MAC-ALGORITHM ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-hmacWithSHA224
PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE preferredPresent
IS-KEYED-MAC TRUE
SMIME-CAPS {IDENTIFIED BY id-hmacWithSHA224}
}
maca-hMAC-SHA256 MAC-ALGORITHM ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-hmacWithSHA256
PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE preferredPresent
IS-KEYED-MAC TRUE
SMIME-CAPS {IDENTIFIED BY id-hmacWithSHA256}
}
maca-hMAC-SHA384 MAC-ALGORITHM ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-hmacWithSHA384
PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE preferredPresent
IS-KEYED-MAC TRUE
SMIME-CAPS {IDENTIFIED BY id-hmacWithSHA384}
}
maca-hMAC-SHA512 MAC-ALGORITHM ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-hmacWithSHA512
PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE preferredPresent
IS-KEYED-MAC TRUE
SMIME-CAPS {IDENTIFIED BY id-hmacWithSHA512}
}
END7. ASN.1 Module RFC 4334 ✨
okay so bestie, we glowed up the ASN.1 module for RFC 4334 🎀 It's now ASN.1 2008 compliant, and it uses the set of classes already defined in [RFC5912]. Main character energy 💅
WLANCertExtn-2010
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-wlan-extns-2(73) }
DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN
EXPORTS ALL;
IMPORTS
EXTENSION, ATTRIBUTE
FROM PKIX-CommonTypes-2009
{iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkixCommon-02(57)}
id-pe, id-kp
FROM PKIX1Explicit-2009
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-explicit-02(51)}
id-aca
FROM PKIXAttributeCertificate-2009
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-attribute-cert-02(47)}
;
-- Extended Key Usage Values
KeyUsageValues OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
id-kp-eapOverPPP | id-kp-eapOverLAN
}
id-kp-eapOverPPP OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 13 }
id-kp-eapOverLAN OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 14 }
-- Wireless LAN SSID Extension
ext-pe-wlanSSID EXTENSION ::= {
SYNTAX SSIDList
IDENTIFIED BY id-pe-wlanSSID
CRITICALITY {FALSE}
}
id-pe-wlanSSID OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe 13 }
SSIDList ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF SSID
SSID ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE (1..32))
-- Wireless LAN SSID Attribute Certificate Attribute
-- Uses same syntax as the certificate extension: SSIDList
at-aca-wlanSSID ATTRIBUTE ::= {
TYPE SSIDList
IDENTIFIED BY id-aca-wlanSSID
}
id-aca-wlanSSID OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-aca 7 }
END8. ASN.1 Module RFC 5083 💖
this one got updated from [RFC5911] (RFC 5911 🫶) with two big changes:
- We split out separate attribute sets for the unprotected attributes used in EnvelopedData, EncryptedData, and AuthenticatedEnvelopedData (RFC 5083).
- We made a parameterized type called EncryptedContentInfoType, so the basic type can work with different algorithm sets (used for EnvelopedData, EncryptedData, and AuthenticatedEnvelopedData (RFC 5083)). That parameterized type gets assigned to an unparameterized EncryptedContentInfo, so the output doesn't change much from earlier versions 🧚
Protocol designers can now use the '08 ASN.1 constraints to define different attribute sets for EncryptedData and EnvelopedData, and for AuthenticatedData and AuthEnvelopedData. Before this, attributes could only be constrained by whether they were in the clear or unauthenticated, and NOT by the content type that wrapped them. Iconic growth 📈✨
CMS-AuthEnvelopedData-2010
{iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cmsAuthEnvData-2009(57) }
DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN
IMPORTS
CMSVersion, EncryptedContentInfoType{},
MessageAuthenticationCode, OriginatorInfo, RecipientInfos,
CONTENT-TYPE, Attributes{}, ATTRIBUTE, CONTENT-ENCRYPTION,
AlgorithmIdentifier{},
aa-signingTime, aa-messageDigest, aa-contentType
FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax-2010
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-2009(58) }
ContentEncryptionAlgs
FROM CMS-AES-CCM-and-AES-GCM-2009
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-aes-ccm-gcm-02(44) }
;
ContentTypes CONTENT-TYPE ::= {ct-authEnvelopedData, ... }
ct-authEnvelopedData CONTENT-TYPE ::= {
TYPE AuthEnvelopedData IDENTIFIED BY id-ct-authEnvelopedData
}
id-ct-authEnvelopedData OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) ct(1) 23}
AuthEnvelopedData ::= SEQUENCE {
version CMSVersion,
originatorInfo [0] IMPLICIT OriginatorInfo OPTIONAL,
recipientInfos RecipientInfos,
authEncryptedContentInfo EncryptedContentInfo,
authAttrs [1] IMPLICIT AuthAttributes OPTIONAL,
mac MessageAuthenticationCode,
unauthAttrs [2] IMPLICIT UnauthAttributes OPTIONAL
}
EncryptedContentInfo ::=
EncryptedContentInfoType { AuthContentEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier }
AuthContentEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier ::= AlgorithmIdentifier
{CONTENT-ENCRYPTION, {AuthContentEncryptionAlgorithmSet}}
AuthContentEncryptionAlgorithmSet CONTENT-ENCRYPTION ::= {
ContentEncryptionAlgs, ...}
AuthAttributes ::= Attributes{{AuthEnvDataAttributeSet}}
UnauthAttributes ::= Attributes{{UnauthEnvDataAttributeSet}}
AuthEnvDataAttributeSet ATTRIBUTE ::= {
aa-contentType | aa-messageDigest | aa-signingTime, ... }
UnauthEnvDataAttributeSet ATTRIBUTE ::= {...}
END9. ASN.1 Module RFC 5652 🦋
this module is also updated from [RFC5911] (RFC 5911 again, we love consistency 🌸), with the same two changes as the last section:
- Separate attribute sets for the unprotected attributes used in EnvelopedData, EncryptedData, and AuthenticatedEnvelopedData (RFC 5083).
- A parameterized type called EncryptedContentInfoType, so the basic type can use algorithm sets (used for EnvelopedData, EncryptedData, and AuthenticatedEnvelopedData (RFC 5083)). It gets assigned to an unparameterized EncryptedContentInfo, again to keep the output changes small compared with previous versions 🍓
We're anticipating attributes that will only be allowed for EnvelopedData, so we split the attribute sets up. That way, protocol designers who need this can define attributes that work for EnvelopedData but NOT for EncryptedData 👀 The same split is also applied to AuthenticatedData and AuthEnvelopedData.
The module below is the full CryptographicMessageSyntax-2010 definition, so read the comments too. They're where the version history lives 🙈
CryptographicMessageSyntax-2010
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-2009(58) }
DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN
IMPORTS
ParamOptions, DIGEST-ALGORITHM, SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM,
PUBLIC-KEY, KEY-DERIVATION, KEY-WRAP, MAC-ALGORITHM,
KEY-AGREE, KEY-TRANSPORT, CONTENT-ENCRYPTION, ALGORITHM,
AlgorithmIdentifier{}
FROM AlgorithmInformation-2009
{iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-algorithmInformation-02(58)}
SignatureAlgs, MessageDigestAlgs, KeyAgreementAlgs,
MessageAuthAlgs, KeyWrapAlgs, ContentEncryptionAlgs,
KeyTransportAlgs, KeyDerivationAlgs, KeyAgreePublicKeys
FROM CryptographicMessageSyntaxAlgorithms-2009
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cmsalg-2001-02(37) }
Certificate, CertificateList, CertificateSerialNumber,
Name, ATTRIBUTE
FROM PKIX1Explicit-2009
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-pkix1-explicit-02(51) }
AttributeCertificate
FROM PKIXAttributeCertificate-2009
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-attribute-cert-02(47) }
AttributeCertificateV1
FROM AttributeCertificateVersion1-2009
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-v1AttrCert-02(49) } ;
-- Cryptographic Message Syntax
-- The following are used for version numbers using the ASN.1
-- NOTE: The document reference represents where the versioned
-- feature was introduced to the module.
--
-- idiom "[[n:"
-- Version 1 = PKCS #7
-- Version 2 = S/MIME V2
-- Version 3 = RFC 2630
-- Version 4 = RFC 3369
-- Version 5 = RFC 3852
CONTENT-TYPE ::= CLASS {
&id OBJECT IDENTIFIER UNIQUE,
&Type OPTIONAL
} WITH SYNTAX {
[TYPE &Type] IDENTIFIED BY &id
}
ContentType ::= CONTENT-TYPE.&id
ContentInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
contentType CONTENT-TYPE.
&id({ContentSet}),
content [0] EXPLICIT CONTENT-TYPE.
&Type({ContentSet}{@contentType})}
ContentSet CONTENT-TYPE ::= {
-- Define the set of content types to be recognized.
ct-Data | ct-SignedData | ct-EncryptedData | ct-EnvelopedData |
ct-AuthenticatedData | ct-DigestedData, ... }
SignedData ::= SEQUENCE {
version CMSVersion,
digestAlgorithms SET OF DigestAlgorithmIdentifier,
encapContentInfo EncapsulatedContentInfo,
certificates [0] IMPLICIT CertificateSet OPTIONAL,
crls [1] IMPLICIT RevocationInfoChoices OPTIONAL,
signerInfos SignerInfos }
SignerInfos ::= SET OF SignerInfo
EncapsulatedContentInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
eContentType CONTENT-TYPE.&id({ContentSet}),
eContent [0] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING
( CONTAINING CONTENT-TYPE.
&Type({ContentSet}{@eContentType})) OPTIONAL }
SignerInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
version CMSVersion,
sid SignerIdentifier,
digestAlgorithm DigestAlgorithmIdentifier,
signedAttrs [0] IMPLICIT SignedAttributes OPTIONAL,
signatureAlgorithm SignatureAlgorithmIdentifier,
signature SignatureValue,
unsignedAttrs [1] IMPLICIT Attributes
{{UnsignedAttributes}} OPTIONAL }
SignedAttributes ::= Attributes {{ SignedAttributesSet }}
SignerIdentifier ::= CHOICE {
issuerAndSerialNumber IssuerAndSerialNumber,
...,
[[3: subjectKeyIdentifier [0] SubjectKeyIdentifier ]] }
SignedAttributesSet ATTRIBUTE ::=
{ aa-signingTime | aa-messageDigest | aa-contentType, ... }
UnsignedAttributes ATTRIBUTE ::= { aa-countersignature, ... }
SignatureValue ::= OCTET STRING
EnvelopedData ::= SEQUENCE {
version CMSVersion,
originatorInfo [0] IMPLICIT OriginatorInfo OPTIONAL,
recipientInfos RecipientInfos,
encryptedContentInfo EncryptedContentInfo,
...,
[[2: unprotectedAttrs [1] IMPLICIT Attributes
{{ UnprotectedEnvAttributes }} OPTIONAL ]] }
OriginatorInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
certs [0] IMPLICIT CertificateSet OPTIONAL,
crls [1] IMPLICIT RevocationInfoChoices OPTIONAL }
RecipientInfos ::= SET SIZE (1..MAX) OF RecipientInfo
EncryptedContentInfo ::=
EncryptedContentInfoType { ContentEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier }
EncryptedContentInfoType { AlgorithmIdentifierType } ::= SEQUENCE {
contentType CONTENT-TYPE.&id({ContentSet}),
contentEncryptionAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifierType,
encryptedContent [0] IMPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL }
-- If you want to do constraints, you might use:
-- EncryptedContentInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
-- contentType CONTENT-TYPE.&id({ContentSet}),
-- contentEncryptionAlgorithm ContentEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier,
-- encryptedContent [0] IMPLICIT ENCRYPTED {CONTENT-TYPE.
-- &Type({ContentSet}{@contentType}) OPTIONAL }
-- ENCRYPTED {ToBeEncrypted} ::= OCTET STRING ( CONSTRAINED BY
-- { ToBeEncrypted } )
UnprotectedEnvAttributes ATTRIBUTE ::= { ... }
UnprotectedEncAttributes ATTRIBUTE ::= { ... }
RecipientInfo ::= CHOICE {
ktri KeyTransRecipientInfo,
...,
[[3: kari [1] KeyAgreeRecipientInfo ]],
[[4: kekri [2] KEKRecipientInfo]],
[[5: pwri [3] PasswordRecipientInfo,
ori [4] OtherRecipientInfo ]] }
EncryptedKey ::= OCTET STRING
KeyTransRecipientInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
version CMSVersion, -- always set to 0 or 2
rid RecipientIdentifier,
keyEncryptionAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier
{KEY-TRANSPORT, {KeyTransportAlgorithmSet}},
encryptedKey EncryptedKey }okay the CMS structures keep going, bestie 💅🎀
KeyTransportAlgorithmSet KEY-TRANSPORT ::= { KeyTransportAlgs, ... }
RecipientIdentifier ::= CHOICE {
issuerAndSerialNumber IssuerAndSerialNumber,
...,
[[2: subjectKeyIdentifier [0] SubjectKeyIdentifier ]] }
KeyAgreeRecipientInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
version CMSVersion, -- always set to 3
originator [0] EXPLICIT OriginatorIdentifierOrKey,
ukm [1] EXPLICIT UserKeyingMaterial OPTIONAL,
keyEncryptionAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier
{KEY-AGREE, {KeyAgreementAlgorithmSet}},
recipientEncryptedKeys RecipientEncryptedKeys }
KeyAgreementAlgorithmSet KEY-AGREE ::= { KeyAgreementAlgs, ... }
OriginatorIdentifierOrKey ::= CHOICE {
issuerAndSerialNumber IssuerAndSerialNumber,
subjectKeyIdentifier [0] SubjectKeyIdentifier,
originatorKey [1] OriginatorPublicKey }
OriginatorPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE {
algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier {PUBLIC-KEY, {OriginatorKeySet}},
publicKey BIT STRING }
OriginatorKeySet PUBLIC-KEY ::= { KeyAgreePublicKeys, ... }
RecipientEncryptedKeys ::= SEQUENCE OF RecipientEncryptedKey
RecipientEncryptedKey ::= SEQUENCE {
rid KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier,
encryptedKey EncryptedKey }
KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier ::= CHOICE {
issuerAndSerialNumber IssuerAndSerialNumber,
rKeyId [0] IMPLICIT RecipientKeyIdentifier }
RecipientKeyIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
subjectKeyIdentifier SubjectKeyIdentifier,
date GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL,
other OtherKeyAttribute OPTIONAL }
SubjectKeyIdentifier ::= OCTET STRING
KEKRecipientInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
version CMSVersion, -- always set to 4
kekid KEKIdentifier,
keyEncryptionAlgorithm KeyEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier,
encryptedKey EncryptedKey }
KEKIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
keyIdentifier OCTET STRING,
date GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL,
other OtherKeyAttribute OPTIONAL }
PasswordRecipientInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
version CMSVersion, -- always set to 0
keyDerivationAlgorithm [0] KeyDerivationAlgorithmIdentifier
OPTIONAL,
keyEncryptionAlgorithm KeyEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier,
encryptedKey EncryptedKey }
OTHER-RECIPIENT ::= TYPE-IDENTIFIER
OtherRecipientInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
oriType OTHER-RECIPIENT.
&id({SupportedOtherRecipInfo}),
oriValue OTHER-RECIPIENT.
&Type({SupportedOtherRecipInfo}{@oriType})}
SupportedOtherRecipInfo OTHER-RECIPIENT ::= { ... }
DigestedData ::= SEQUENCE {
version CMSVersion,
digestAlgorithm DigestAlgorithmIdentifier,
encapContentInfo EncapsulatedContentInfo,
digest Digest, ... }
Digest ::= OCTET STRING
EncryptedData ::= SEQUENCE {
version CMSVersion,
encryptedContentInfo EncryptedContentInfo,
...,
[[2: unprotectedAttrs [1] IMPLICIT Attributes
{{UnprotectedEncAttributes}} OPTIONAL ]] }
AuthenticatedData ::= SEQUENCE {
version CMSVersion,
originatorInfo [0] IMPLICIT OriginatorInfo OPTIONAL,
recipientInfos RecipientInfos,
macAlgorithm MessageAuthenticationCodeAlgorithm,
digestAlgorithm [1] DigestAlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,
encapContentInfo EncapsulatedContentInfo,
authAttrs [2] IMPLICIT AuthAttributes OPTIONAL,
mac MessageAuthenticationCode,
unauthAttrs [3] IMPLICIT UnauthAttributes OPTIONAL }
AuthAttributes ::= SET SIZE (1..MAX) OF Attribute
{{AuthAttributeSet}}
AuthAttributeSet ATTRIBUTE ::= { aa-contentType | aa-messageDigest
| aa-signingTime, ...}
MessageAuthenticationCode ::= OCTET STRING
UnauthAttributes ::= SET SIZE (1..MAX) OF Attribute
{{UnauthAttributeSet}}
UnauthAttributeSet ATTRIBUTE ::= {...}
--
-- General algorithm definitions
--
DigestAlgorithmIdentifier ::= AlgorithmIdentifier
{DIGEST-ALGORITHM, {DigestAlgorithmSet}}
DigestAlgorithmSet DIGEST-ALGORITHM ::= {
CryptographicMessageSyntaxAlgorithms-2009.MessageDigestAlgs, ... }
SignatureAlgorithmIdentifier ::= AlgorithmIdentifier
{SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, {SignatureAlgorithmSet}}
SignatureAlgorithmSet SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::=
{ SignatureAlgs, ... }
KeyEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier ::= AlgorithmIdentifier
{KEY-WRAP, {KeyEncryptionAlgorithmSet}}
KeyEncryptionAlgorithmSet KEY-WRAP ::= { KeyWrapAlgs, ... }
ContentEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier ::= AlgorithmIdentifier
{CONTENT-ENCRYPTION, {ContentEncryptionAlgorithmSet}}
ContentEncryptionAlgorithmSet CONTENT-ENCRYPTION ::=
{ ContentEncryptionAlgs, ... }
MessageAuthenticationCodeAlgorithm ::= AlgorithmIdentifier
{MAC-ALGORITHM, {MessageAuthenticationCodeAlgorithmSet}}
MessageAuthenticationCodeAlgorithmSet MAC-ALGORITHM ::=
{ MessageAuthAlgs, ... }
KeyDerivationAlgorithmIdentifier ::= AlgorithmIdentifier
{KEY-DERIVATION, {KeyDerivationAlgs, ...}}
RevocationInfoChoices ::= SET OF RevocationInfoChoice
RevocationInfoChoice ::= CHOICE {
crl CertificateList,
...,
[[5: other [1] IMPLICIT OtherRevocationInfoFormat ]] }
OTHER-REVOK-INFO ::= TYPE-IDENTIFIER
OtherRevocationInfoFormat ::= SEQUENCE {
otherRevInfoFormat OTHER-REVOK-INFO.
&id({SupportedOtherRevokInfo}),
otherRevInfo OTHER-REVOK-INFO.
&Type({SupportedOtherRevokInfo}{@otherRevInfoFormat})}
SupportedOtherRevokInfo OTHER-REVOK-INFO ::= { ... }
CertificateChoices ::= CHOICE {
certificate Certificate,
extendedCertificate [0] IMPLICIT ExtendedCertificate,
-- Obsolete
...,
[[3: v1AttrCert [1] IMPLICIT AttributeCertificateV1]],
-- Obsolete
[[4: v2AttrCert [2] IMPLICIT AttributeCertificateV2]],
[[5: other [3] IMPLICIT OtherCertificateFormat]] }
AttributeCertificateV2 ::= AttributeCertificate
OTHER-CERT-FMT ::= TYPE-IDENTIFIER
OtherCertificateFormat ::= SEQUENCE {
otherCertFormat OTHER-CERT-FMT.
&id({SupportedCertFormats}),
otherCert OTHER-CERT-FMT.
&Type({SupportedCertFormats}{@otherCertFormat})}
SupportedCertFormats OTHER-CERT-FMT ::= { ... }
CertificateSet ::= SET OF CertificateChoices
IssuerAndSerialNumber ::= SEQUENCE {
issuer Name,
serialNumber CertificateSerialNumber }
CMSVersion ::= INTEGER { v0(0), v1(1), v2(2), v3(3), v4(4), v5(5) }
UserKeyingMaterial ::= OCTET STRING
KEY-ATTRIBUTE ::= TYPE-IDENTIFIER
OtherKeyAttribute ::= SEQUENCE {
keyAttrId KEY-ATTRIBUTE.
&id({SupportedKeyAttributes}),
keyAttr KEY-ATTRIBUTE.
&Type({SupportedKeyAttributes}{@keyAttrId})}
SupportedKeyAttributes KEY-ATTRIBUTE ::= { ... }
-- Content Type Object Identifiers
id-ct-contentInfo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) smime(16) ct(1) 6 }
ct-Data CONTENT-TYPE ::= { IDENTIFIED BY id-data }
id-data OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs7(7) 1 }
ct-SignedData CONTENT-TYPE ::=
{ TYPE SignedData IDENTIFIED BY id-signedData}
id-signedData OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs7(7) 2 }
ct-EnvelopedData CONTENT-TYPE ::=
{ TYPE EnvelopedData IDENTIFIED BY id-envelopedData}
id-envelopedData OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs7(7) 3 }
ct-DigestedData CONTENT-TYPE ::=
{ TYPE DigestedData IDENTIFIED BY id-digestedData}
id-digestedData OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs7(7) 5 }
ct-EncryptedData CONTENT-TYPE ::=
{ TYPE EncryptedData IDENTIFIED BY id-encryptedData}
id-encryptedData OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs7(7) 6 }
ct-AuthenticatedData CONTENT-TYPE ::=
{ TYPE AuthenticatedData IDENTIFIED BY id-ct-authData}
id-ct-authData OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) ct(1) 2 }
--
-- The CMS Attributes
--
MessageDigest ::= OCTET STRING
SigningTime ::= Time
Time ::= CHOICE {
utcTime UTCTime,
generalTime GeneralizedTime }
Countersignature ::= SignerInfo
-- Attribute Object Identifiers
aa-contentType ATTRIBUTE ::=
{ TYPE ContentType IDENTIFIED BY id-contentType }
id-contentType OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) 3 }
aa-messageDigest ATTRIBUTE ::=
{ TYPE MessageDigest IDENTIFIED BY id-messageDigest}
id-messageDigest OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) 4 }
aa-signingTime ATTRIBUTE ::=
{ TYPE SigningTime IDENTIFIED BY id-signingTime }
id-signingTime OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) 5 }
aa-countersignature ATTRIBUTE ::=
{ TYPE Countersignature IDENTIFIED BY id-countersignature }
id-countersignature OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) 6 }
--
-- Obsolete Extended Certificate syntax from PKCS#6
--
ExtendedCertificateOrCertificate ::= CHOICE {
certificate Certificate,
extendedCertificate [0] IMPLICIT ExtendedCertificate }
ExtendedCertificate ::= SEQUENCE {
extendedCertificateInfo ExtendedCertificateInfo,
signatureAlgorithm SignatureAlgorithmIdentifier,
signature Signature }
ExtendedCertificateInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
version CMSVersion,
certificate Certificate,
attributes UnauthAttributes }
Signature ::= BIT STRING
Attribute{ ATTRIBUTE:AttrList } ::= SEQUENCE {
attrType ATTRIBUTE.
&id({AttrList}),
attrValues SET OF ATTRIBUTE.
&Type({AttrList}{@attrType}) }
Attributes { ATTRIBUTE:AttrList } ::=
SET SIZE (1..MAX) OF Attribute {{ AttrList }}
END10. ASN.1 Module RFC 5752 💖
okay so we glowed up this module 💅 it's now 2008 compliant and it uses the set of classes from [RFC5911], which is giving very organized energy ✨
MultipleSignatures-2010
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)
smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-multipleSign-2009(59) }
DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN
-- EXPORTS All
-- The types and values defined in this module are exported for use
-- in the other ASN.1 modules. Other applications may use them for
-- their own purposes.
IMPORTS
-- Imports from PKIX-Common-Types-2009 [RFC5912]
ATTRIBUTE
FROM PKIX-CommonTypes-2009
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-pkixCommon-02(57)}
-- Imports from CryptographicMessageSyntax-2010 [RFC6268]
DigestAlgorithmIdentifier, SignatureAlgorithmIdentifier
FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax-2010
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-2009(58) }
-- Imports from ExtendedSecurityServices-2009 [RFC5911]
ESSCertIDv2
FROM ExtendedSecurityServices-2009
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-ess-2006-02(42) }
;
--
-- Section 3.0
--
-- at-multipleSignatures should be added ONLY to the
-- SignedAttributesSet defined in [RFC5652]
--
at-multipleSignatures ATTRIBUTE ::= {
TYPE MultipleSignatures
IDENTIFIED BY id-aa-multipleSignatures
}
id-aa-multipleSignatures OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)
id-aa(2) 51 }
MultipleSignatures ::= SEQUENCE {
bodyHashAlg DigestAlgorithmIdentifier,
signAlg SignatureAlgorithmIdentifier,
signAttrsHash SignAttrsHash,
cert ESSCertIDv2 OPTIONAL
}
SignAttrsHash ::= SEQUENCE {
algID DigestAlgorithmIdentifier,
hash OCTET STRING
}
END11. Module Identifiers in ASN.1 ✨
bestie, here's the thing 🙈 when you update a module, a LOT of other modules might need updating too if they import from it. This section shows one way to deal with that drama, but the modules in this document don't actually use the solution yet.
when you look at an import statement, there are three parts: the list of stuff being imported, a textual name for the module, and an object identifier (OID) for the module. Full ASN.1 implementations match modules by the OID first, and only if there isn't one do they fall back to the textual name. Some older implementations just matched on the textual name though, which is a whole mess 💀 In a full implementation, the name is scoped to the ASN.1 module it shows up in, which is why the importing module has to match the module it's importing from.
so the trick is to make a module that only holds the module number assignments, and then import those assignments from it. That way, when a module gets replaced, you swap out the old one, update the number assignment module, and recompile. You don't have to touch any of the other modules 🦋
here's a sample module assignment module:
ModuleNumbers
DEFINITIONS TAGS ::=
BEGIN
id-mod-CMS ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) 58 }
id-mod-AlgInfo ::=
{iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-algorithmInformation-02(58)}
ENDand this is how you'd use it in an import statement:
IMPORTS
id-mod-CMS, id-mod-AlgInfo
FROM ModuleNumbers -- Note it will match on the name since no
-- OID is provided
CMSVersion, EncapsulatedContentInfo, CONTENT-TYPE
FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax-2010
id-mod-CMS
AlgorithmIdentifier{}, SMIME-CAPS, ParamOptions
FROM AlgorithmInformation-2009 id-mod-AlgInfo
;12. Security Considerations 🫶
okay, serious moment 😭 this document itself doesn't have any security considerations. the ASN.1 modules keep the same bits-on-the-wire as the modules they replace, so nothing about what actually goes over the wire changes. no new attack surface, no new vibes to worry about 🔒
13. References 📚
13.1. Normative References
- [ASN1-2008] ITU-T, "ITU-T Recommendations X.680, X.681, X.682, and X.683", 2008.
- [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
- [RFC3274] Gutmann, P., "Compressed Data Content Type for Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", RFC 3274, June 2002.
- [RFC3779] Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779, June 2004.
- [RFC4073] Housley, R., "Protecting Multiple Contents with the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", RFC 4073, May 2005.
- [RFC4231] Nystrom, M., "Identifiers and Test Vectors for HMAC-SHA-224, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, and HMAC-SHA-512", RFC 4231, December 2005.
- [RFC4334] Housley, R. and T. Moore, "Certificate Extensions and Attributes Supporting Authentication in Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP) and Wireless Local Area Networks (WLAN)", RFC 4334, February 2006.
- [RFC5083] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) Authenticated-Enveloped-Data Content Type", RFC 5083, November 2007.
- [RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.
- [RFC5652] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70, RFC 5652, September 2009.
- [RFC5752] Turner, S. and J. Schaad, "Multiple Signatures in Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", RFC 5752, January 2010.
- [RFC5911] Hoffman, P. and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) and S/MIME", RFC 5911, June 2010.
- [RFC5912] Hoffman, P. and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for the Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)", RFC 5912, June 2010.
- [RFC6019] Housley, R., "BinaryTime: An Alternate Format for Representing Date and Time in ASN.1", RFC 6019, September 2010.
13.2. Informative References
- [RFC5751] Ramsdell, B. and S. Turner, "Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME) Version 3.2 Message Specification", RFC 5751, January 2010.
- [RFC6025] Wallace, C. and C. Gardiner, "ASN.1 Translation", RFC 6025, October 2010.
Authors' Addresses 🌸
- Jim Schaad, Soaring Hawk Consulting. EMail: ietf@augustcellars.com
- Sean Turner, IECA, Inc., 3057 Nutley Street, Suite 106, Fairfax, VA 22031. EMail: turners@ieca.com
that's the whole thing, bestie 🌈👑 we made it through the entire RFC!!
📦 where this page comes from
- ietf: rfc6268 2011-07
- 💖 girlified by claude-haiku-5-5 on : a language model's rewrite of the original, under its terms