RFC 9215
Using GOST R 34.10-2012 and GOST R 34.11-2012 Algorithms with the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
RFC 9215: Using GOST R 34.10-2012 and GOST R 34.11-2012 Algorithms with the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure 🎀
Part 1 of 5 💖
Who wrote it: D. Baryshkov, Ed. of Linaro Ltd., V. Nikolaev of CryptoPro, and A. Chelpanov of InfoTeCS JSC 💜
Stream and category: Independent Submission, Category Informational 🦋
Number and date: RFC 9215, ISSN 2070-1721, March 2022 🌸
Obsoletes or updates: the header doesn't list any, so this one doesn't obsolete or update anything 🙈
Abstract ✨
Okay so this doc explains how to write down GOST R 34.10-2012 signatures and GOST R 34.11-2012 hashes so they work in the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) 🔐. It covers the encoding formats, the identifiers, and the parameter formats, all in one place. It's written so that anyone who wants to support the GOST algorithms can actually build it 🛠️. Just so we're clear, publishing this does not mean the IETF endorses the cryptographic algorithms in here 🙅♀️.
Status of This Memo 📜
This doc is not an Internet Standards Track spec. It's published for informational purposes, so it's more of a reference than a rulebook 📚.
It's a contribution to the RFC Series, independent of any other RFC stream 🌈. The RFC Editor picked this one to publish at their discretion, and they don't make any claims about how useful it is for implementing or deploying anything 🤷♀️. Docs the RFC Editor approves aren't candidates for any level of Internet Standard, which you can read more about in Section 2 of RFC 7841 ✨.
Want the latest status, any errata, or a way to send feedback? Check out https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9215 💌.
Copyright Notice 🎀
Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved ©️.
This doc is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) as they stand on the publication date. Please read those carefully, because they spell out your rights and restrictions for this doc 📖.
Table of Contents 🗂️
1. Introduction
1.1. Requirements Language
2. Signature Algorithm Support
3. Hash Function Support
4. Subject Public Keys Information Fields
4.1. Public Key Identifiers
4.2. Public Key Parameters
4.3. Public Key Encoding
4.4. Key Usage Extension
5. Qualified Certificate Extensions
5.1. Distinguished Name Additions
5.2. Certificate Policies
5.3. Subject Sign Tool
5.4. Issuer Sign Tool
6. Historical Considerations
7. IANA Considerations
8. Security Considerations
9. References
9.1. Normative References
9.2. Informative References
Appendix A. GostR3410-2012-PKISyntax
Appendix B. GostR3410-2012-RuStrongCertsSyntax
Appendix C. Public Key Parameters
Appendix D. Test Examples
D.1. GOST R 34.10-2001 Test Parameters (256-Bit Private Key
Length)
D.1.1. Certificate Request
D.1.2. Certificate
D.1.3. Certificate Revocation List
D.2. GOST R 34.10-2012 TC26-256-A Parameters (256-Bit Private
Key Length)
D.2.1. Certificate Request
D.2.2. Certificate
D.2.3. Certificate Revocation List
D.3. GOST R 34.10-2012 Test Parameters (512-Bit Private Key
Length)
D.3.1. Certificate Request
D.3.2. Certificate
D.3.3. Certificate Revocation List
Appendix E. GOST R 34.10-2012 Test Parameters (Curve Definition)
E.1. Elliptic Curve Modulus
E.2. Elliptic Curve Coefficients
E.3. Elliptic Curve Points Group Order
E.4. Order of Cyclic Subgroup of Elliptic Curve Points Group
E.5. Elliptic Curve Point Coordinates
Contributors
Authors' Addresses1. Introduction 🌸
So this doc is about how to use the GOST R 34.10-2012 signature algorithm [GOSTR3410-2012] [RFC7091] and the GOST R 34.11-2012 hash function [GOSTR3411-2012] [RFC6986] inside the Internet X.509 PKI [RFC5280] 🔏.
It defines what goes into the signatureAlgorithm, signatureValue, signature, and subjectPublicKeyInfo fields of X.509 Certificates and Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) 📋. For each algorithm, it also gives the right options for the keyUsage certificate extension ✅.
Same vibe as the abstract: this is built to help people who want GOST support, and it does not imply IETF endorsement of the cryptographic algorithms used here 🙏.
1.1. Requirements Language 💅
Here's the deal with the key words. The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this doc get read the way BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] describes, but ONLY when they show up in all capitals, exactly like that 🧐. Lowercase versions are just regular words, so no drama ✨.
2. Signature Algorithm Support 🦋
Conforming Certificate Authorities (CAs) MAY use the GOST R 34.10-2012 signature algorithm to sign certificates and CRLs 📜. This signature algorithm MUST always be used with the GOST R 34.11-2012 hash function, no exceptions 🙅♀️. It may use a key length of either 256 bits or 512 bits 🔑.
The ASN.1 object identifier (OID) for the GOST R 34.10-2012 signature algorithm with a 256-bit key length, paired with the GOST R 34.11-2012 hash function with a 256-bit hash code, looks like this 👀:
id-tc26-signwithdigest-gost3410-12-256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) ru(643) rosstandart(7) tc26(1)
algorithms(1) signwithdigest(3) gost3410-12-256(2)}This 256-bit version makes a digital signature out of two 256-bit integers, r and s 🔢. The octet string form is 64 octets long. The first 32 octets hold the big-endian representation of s, and the next 32 octets hold the big-endian representation of r 💜.
The ASN.1 OID for the GOST R 34.10-2012 signature algorithm with a 512-bit key length, paired with the GOST R 34.11-2012 hash function with a 512-bit hash code, is next 🌈:
id-tc26-signwithdigest-gost3410-12-512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) ru(643) rosstandart(7) tc26(1)
algorithms(1) signwithdigest(3) gost3410-12-512(3)}The 512-bit version makes a signature out of two 512-bit integers, r and s 🧮. Its octet string form is 128 octets long. The first 64 octets are the big-endian representation of s, and the second 64 octets are the big-endian representation of r ✨.
When either of these OIDs is used as the algorithm field in an AlgorithmIdentifier structure, the encoding MUST omit the parameters field 🙈. Don't skip that part!
The signature value defined here can be used directly in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [RFC5652], where values are stored as octet strings 📦. Certificates and CRLs [RFC5280] are different, though. They store signature values as bit strings, so you have to convert the octet string first 🔄.
To do that conversion, the most significant bit of the first octet of the signature value SHALL become the first bit of the bit string, and so on, all the way through to the least significant bit of the last octet of the signature value, which SHALL become the last bit of the bit string 🪄.
3. Hash Function Support 🎀
The ASN.1 OID for the GOST R 34.11-2012 hash function with a 256-bit hash code is 💖:
id-tc26-gost3411-12-256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) ru(643) rosstandart(7) tc26(1)
algorithms(1) digest(2) gost3411-12-256(2)}The ASN.1 OID for the GOST R 34.11-2012 hash function with a 512-bit hash code is 💜:
id-tc26-gost3411-12-512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) ru(643) rosstandart(7) tc26(1)
algorithms(1) digest(2) gost3411-12-512(3)}When either of these OIDs is used as the algorithm field in an AlgorithmIdentifier structure, the encoding MUST omit the parameters field 🙅♀️.
4. Subject Public Keys Information Fields 🧚
4.1. Public Key Identifiers 🔑
GOST R 34.10-2012 public keys with a 256-bit private key length are identified by this OID 🪪:
id-tc26-gost3410-12-256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) ru(643) rosstandart(7) tc26(1)
algorithms(1) sign(1) gost3410-12-256(1)}GOST R 34.10-2012 public keys with a 512-bit private key length are identified by this OID 🪪:
id-tc26-gost3410-12-512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) ru(643) rosstandart(7) tc26(1)
algorithms(1) sign(1) gost3410-12-512(2)}4.2. Public Key Parameters 🌷
When either of these identifiers appears as the algorithm field in the SubjectPublicKeyInfo.algorithm.algorithm field, the parameters field MUST have the following structure 🏗️:
GostR3410-2012-PublicKeyParameters ::= SEQUENCE
{
publicKeyParamSet OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
digestParamSet OBJECT IDENTIFIER OPTIONAL
}Here's what the pieces mean 👇:
publicKeyParamSetis the public key parameters identifier for GOST R 34.10-2012 parameters (see Sections 5.1.1 and 5.2.1 of [RFC7836] or Appendix C), or for GOST R 34.10-2001 parameters (see Section 8.4 of [RFC4357]) 🧩.digestParamSetis the parameters identifier for the matching GOST R 34.11-2012 parameters (see Section 3) 💫.
Heads up: the values below are test public key parameter sets, so they MUST NOT be used outside of testing scenarios 🚫🧪:
id-GostR3410-2001-TestParamSetid-tc26-gost-3410-2012-512-paramSetTest
Now the digestParamSet field has its own rules 📋:
- SHOULD be omitted if the GOST R 34.10-2012 signature algorithm is used with a 512-bit key length 🙃.
- MUST be present, and must be equal to
id-tc26-digest-gost3411-12-256, if one of the following values is used aspublicKeyParamSet:id-GostR3410-2001-TestParamSetid-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-A-ParamSetid-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-B-ParamSetid-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-C-ParamSetid-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-XchA-ParamSetid-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-XchB-ParamSet
- SHOULD be omitted if
publicKeyParamSetis equal to:id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-256-paramSetA
- MUST be omitted if one of the following values is used as
publicKeyParamSet:id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-256-paramSetBid-tc26-gost-3410-2012-256-paramSetCid-tc26-gost-3410-2012-256-paramSetD
4.3. Public Key Encoding 🫶
The GOST R 34.10-2012 public key MUST be ASN.1 DER encoded as an OCTET STRING 🧁. This encoding SHALL be used as the content (i.e., the value) of the subjectPublicKey field (a BIT STRING) of the SubjectPublicKeyInfo structure 💌.
GostR3410-2012-256-PublicKey ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(64))
GostR3410-2012-512-PublicKey ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE (128))For the 256-bit key, GostR3410-2012-256-PublicKey MUST contain 64 octets. The first 32 octets hold the little-endian representation of the x coordinate of the public key, and the second 32 octets hold the little-endian representation of the y coordinate 🌟.
For the 512-bit key, GostR3410-2012-512-PublicKey MUST contain 128 octets. The first 64 octets hold the little-endian representation of the x coordinate of the public key, and the second 64 octets hold the little-endian representation of the y coordinate 👑.
4.4. Key Usage Extension
okay so if the KeyUsage extension shows up in a certificate with a GOST R 34.10-2012 public key, these values MAY be there 💅✨:
digitalSignature (0)contentCommitment (1)keyEncipherment (2)dataEncipherment (3)keyAgreement (4)keyCertSign (5)cRLSign (6)encipherOnly (7)decipherOnly (8)
bestie, note that contentCommitment used to be called nonRepudiation in older versions of X.509 🤓📜
If the key is going to be used for key agreement, the keyAgreement flag MUST be present in the KeyUsage extension 🔑, with the encipherOnly and decipherOnly flags being optional. BUT (and this is a big but 😭) the encipherOnly and decipherOnly flags MUST NOT be present at the same time. not me reading that and going "absolutely not" 🙅♀️
5. Qualified Certificate Extensions
this section adds some extra OIDs for qualified certificates that are used for checking digital signatures. these are the cute little extras that make the whole thing work 🎀
5.1. Distinguished Name Additions
OGRN is the main state registration number of juridical entities 🏢
OGRN ::= NUMERIC STRING (SIZE(13))The corresponding OID is 1.2.643.100.1.
SNILS is the individual insurance account number 🧾
SNILS ::= NUMERIC STRING (SIZE(11))The corresponding OID is 1.2.643.100.3.
INNLE is the individual taxpayer number (ITN) of the legal entity 💼
INNLE ::= NUMERIC STRING (SIZE(10))The corresponding OID is 1.2.643.100.4.
OGRNIP is the main state registration number of individual entrepreneurs (sole traders) 🧁
OGRNIP ::= NUMERIC STRING (SIZE(15))The corresponding OID is 1.2.643.100.5.
IdentificationKind represents the way the receiver of the certificate was identified by the CA 🪪
IdentificationKind ::= INTEGER { personal(0), remote-cert(1),
remote-passport(2), remote-system(3) }The corresponding OID is 1.2.643.100.114.
INN is the individual taxpayer number (ITN) 🌸
INN ::= NUMERIC STRING (SIZE(12))The corresponding OID is 1.2.643.3.131.1.1.
5.2. Certificate Policies
the Russian national regulation body for cryptography defines a bunch of security levels for cryptographic tools, and it's giving very organised energy 📋💅. depending on the class of cryptographic token the certificate owner uses, the following OIDs must be included in certificate policies. certificates should include OIDs, starting from the lowest (KC1) up to the strongest applicable 🪜
1.2.643.100.113.1- class KC11.2.643.100.113.2- class KC21.2.643.100.113.3- class KC31.2.643.100.113.4- class KB11.2.643.100.113.5- class KB21.2.643.100.113.6- class KA1
5.3. Subject Sign Tool
to show the token or software type the certificate owner used, you should add the non-critical SubjectSignTool extension with OID 1.2.643.100.111 ✍️. it's defined as:
SubjectSignTool ::= UTF8String(SIZE(1..200))5.4. Issuer Sign Tool
to show the tools used to generate key pairs and the tools the CA used to sign certificates, you should add the non-critical IssuerSignTool extension with OID 1.2.643.100.112 🛠️. it's defined as:
IssuerSignTool ::= SEQUENCE {
signTool UTF8String(SIZE(1..200)),
cATool UTF8String(SIZE(1..200)),
signToolCert UTF8String(SIZE(1..100)),
cAToolCert UTF8String(SIZE(1..100)) }where:
signToolidentifies tools used to create key pairs.cAToolidentifies tools used by the CA.signToolCertandcAToolCertcontain the notice of the conformance of respective tools to Russian federal law on digital signatures 📜🇷🇺
6. Historical Considerations
okay, a little history moment 🕰️. for a significant period of time there were no documents describing GostR3410-2012-PublicKeyParameters, so several old implementations used GostR3410-2001-PublicKeyParameters instead 🦕. those implementations will return an error if the digestParamSet field is not included in the public key parameters. so an implementation that wants to play nicely with the old ones might want to include digestParamSet equal to id-tc26-digest-gost3411-12-512 if one of the following values is used as publicKeyParamSet:
id-tc26-gost-3410-12-512-paramSetAid-tc26-gost-3410-12-512-paramSetB
lowkey important: the usage of keyEncipherment and dataEncipherment values for the KeyUsage extension is not fully defined for GOST R 34.10-2012 public keys, so they SHOULD be used with additional care 🧐⚠️
7. IANA Considerations
no IANA actions for this one! 🌈 this document has no IANA actions.
8. Security Considerations
okay bestie, this part is SERIOUS 😤🔐 no skipping!!
it is RECOMMENDED that applications verify signature values and subject public keys to conform to the GOST R 34.10-2012 standard [GOSTR3410-2012] [RFC7091] prior to their use 🔍
it is RECOMMENDED that CAs and applications make sure that the private key for creating signatures is not used for more than its allowed validity period (typically 15 months for the GOST R 34.10-2012 algorithm) ⏳💀
the test parameter sets (id-GostR3410-2001-TestParamSet and id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-512-paramSetTest) MUST NOT be used outside of testing scenarios 🚫🧪. the use of parameter sets not described herein is NOT RECOMMENDED 🙅♀️. when different parameters are used, it is RECOMMENDED that they be examined by an authorized agency with approved methods of cryptographic analysis 🕵️♀️🔬
for security discussions about the use of algorithm parameters, see [ANS17] and the Security Considerations sections in [RFC4357] and [RFC7836] 📚🦋
9. References
9.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC4357] Popov, V., Kurepkin, I., and S. Leontiev, "Additional
Cryptographic Algorithms for Use with GOST 28147-89, GOST
R 34.10-94, GOST R 34.10-2001, and GOST R 34.11-94
Algorithms", RFC 4357, DOI 10.17487/RFC4357, January 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4357>.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
[RFC5652] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70,
RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5652>.
[RFC6986] Dolmatov, V., Ed. and A. Degtyarev, "GOST R 34.11-2012:
Hash Function", RFC 6986, DOI 10.17487/RFC6986, August
2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6986>.
[RFC7091] Dolmatov, V., Ed. and A. Degtyarev, "GOST R 34.10-2012:
Digital Signature Algorithm", RFC 7091,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7091, December 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7091>.
[RFC7836] Smyshlyaev, S., Ed., Alekseev, E., Oshkin, I., Popov, V.,
Leontiev, S., Podobaev, V., and D. Belyavsky, "Guidelines
on the Cryptographic Algorithms to Accompany the Usage of
Standards GOST R 34.10-2012 and GOST R 34.11-2012",
RFC 7836, DOI 10.17487/RFC7836, March 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7836>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.9.2. Informative References
[ANS17] Alekseev, E.K., Nikolaev, V.D., and S.V. Smyshlyaev, "On
the security properties of Russian standardized elliptic
curves", Mathematical Aspects of Cryptography, 9:3, P.
5-32, DOI 10.4213/mvk260, 2018,
<https://doi.org/10.4213/mvk260>.
[GOSTR3410-2012]
"Information technology. Cryptographic data security.
Signature and verification processes of [electronic]
digital signature", GOST R 34.10-2012, Federal Agency on
Technical Regulating and Metrology, 2012.
[GOSTR3411-2012]
"Information technology. Cryptographic Data Security.
Hashing function", GOST R 34.11-2012, Federal Agency on
Technical Regulating and Metrology, 2012.Appendix A. GostR3410-2012-PKISyntax ✨
okay bestie, this is the ASN.1 module where all the OIDs live 🧚 it's giving very structured, very organized, and I'm obsessed 💜
GostR3410-2012-PKISyntax
{ iso(1) member-body(2) ru(643) rosstandart(7)
tc26(1) modules(0) gostR3410-2012-PKISyntax(2) }
DEFINITIONS ::=
BEGIN
-- EXPORTS All --
-- ASN.1 TC 26 root
id-tc26 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) ru(643) rosstandart(7) tc26(1) }
-- Signature algorithm
id-tc26-sign OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ id-tc26 algorithms(1) sign(1) }
-- Hash algorithm
id-tc26-digest OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ id-tc26 algorithms(1) digest(2) }
-- Public key identifiers
id-tc26-sign-constants OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ id-tc26 constants(2) sign(1) }
-- Public key algorithm GOST R 34.10-2012 / 256-bit identifiers
id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-256-constants OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ id-tc26-sign-constants gost-3410-2012-256(1) }
-- Public key algorithm GOST R 34.10-2012 / 512-bit identifiers
id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-512-constants OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ id-tc26-sign-constants gost-3410-2012-512(2) }
-- GOST R 34.10-2012 / 256-bit signature algorithm
id-tc26-gost3410-12-256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ id-tc26-sign gost3410-12-256(1) }
-- GOST R 34.10-2012 / 512-bit signature algorithm
id-tc26-gost3410-12-512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ id-tc26-sign gost3410-12-512(2) }
-- GOST R 34.11-2012 / 256-bit hash algorithm
id-tc26-gost3411-12-256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ id-tc26-digest gost3411-12-256(2)}
-- GOST R 34.11-2012 / 512-bit hash algorithm
id-tc26-gost3411-12-512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ id-tc26-digest gost3411-12-512(3)}
-- GOST R 34.10-2012 / GOST R 34.11-2012 sign/hash algorithm
id-tc26-signwithdigest OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ id-tc26 algorithms(1) signwithdigest(3) }
-- Signature & hash algorithm GOST R 34.10-2012 / 256 bits
-- with GOST R 34.11-2012
id-tc26-signwithdigest-gost3410-12-256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ id-tc26-signwithdigest gost3410-12-256(2) }
-- Signature & hash algorithm GOST R 34.10-2012 / 512 bits
-- with GOST R 34.11-2012
id-tc26-signwithdigest-gost3410-12-512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ id-tc26-signwithdigest gost3410-12-512(3) }
-- GOST R 34.10-2012 / 256-bit signature algorithm
-- parameters identifier: "Set A"
id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-256-paramSetA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-256-constants paramSetA(1) }
-- GOST R 34.10-2012 / 256-bit signature algorithm
-- parameters identifier: "Set B"
id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-256-paramSetB OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-256-constants paramSetB(2) }
-- GOST R 34.10-2012 / 256-bit signature algorithm
-- parameters identifier: "Set C"
id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-256-paramSetC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-256-constants paramSetC(3) }
-- GOST R 34.10-2012 / 256-bit signature algorithm
-- parameters identifier: "Set D"
id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-256-paramSetD OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-256-constants paramSetD(4) }
-- GOST R 34.10-2012 / 512-bit signature algorithm
-- parameters identifier: "Test set"
id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-512-paramSetTest OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-512-constants paramSetTest(0) }
-- GOST R 34.10-2012 / 512-bit signature algorithm
-- parameters identifier: "Set A"
id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-512-paramSetA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-512-constants paramSetA(1) }
-- GOST R 34.10-2012 / 512-bit signature algorithm
-- parameters identifier: "Set B"
id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-512-paramSetB OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-512-constants paramSetB(2) }
-- GOST R 34.10-2012 / 512-bit signature algorithm
-- parameters identifier: "Set C"
id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-512-paramSetC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-512-constants paramSetC(3) }
-- Public key GOST R 34.10-2012 / 256 bits
GostR3410-2012-256-PublicKey ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE (64))
-- Public key GOST R 34.10-2012 / 512 bits
GostR3410-2012-512-PublicKey ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE (128))
-- Public key GOST R 34.10-2012
GostR3410-2012-PublicKey ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE (64 | 128))
-- Public key parameters GOST R 34.10-2012
GostR3410-2012-PublicKeyParameters ::=
SEQUENCE {
publicKeyParamSet OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
digestParamSet OBJECT IDENTIFIER OPTIONAL
}
END -- GostR3410-2012-PKISyntaxAppendix B. GostR3410-2012-RuStrongCertsSyntax
this one is the RuStrongCerts module, and it's a whole collection of identifiers and string types, so get comfy 🎀
RuStrongCertsSyntax
{ iso(1) member-body(2) ru(643) rosstandart(7)
tc26(1) modules(0) ruStrongCertsSyntax(6) }
DEFINITIONS ::=
BEGIN
-- EXPORTS All --
id-ca OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) ru(643) ca(3) }
id-fss OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) ru(643) fss(100) }
id-fns OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ id-ca fns(131) }
-- The main state registration number of juridical entities.
OGRN ::= NumericString(SIZE (13))
id-OGRN OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ id-fss ogrn(1) }
-- The individual insurance account number.
SNILS ::= NumericString(SIZE (11))
id-SNILS OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ id-fss snils(3) }
-- The main state registration number of
-- individual entrepreneurs (sole traders).
OGRNIP ::= NumericString(SIZE (15))
id-OGRNIP OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ id-fss ogrnip(5) }
id-class OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ id-fss class(113) }
id-class-kc1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ id-class kc1(1) }
id-class-kc2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ id-class kc2(2) }
id-class-kc3 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ id-class kc3(3) }
id-class-kb1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ id-class kb1(4) }
id-class-kb2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ id-class kb2(5) }
id-class-ka OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ id-class ka(6) }
-- The individual taxpayer number (ITN).
INN ::= NumericString(SIZE (12))
id-INN OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ id-fns ids(1) inn(1) }
-- The organization taxpayer number (OTN).
INNLE ::= NumericString(SIZE (10))
id-INNLE OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ id-fss innle(4) }
-- The token or software type used by the certificate owner.
SubjectSignTool ::= UTF8String(SIZE(1..200))
id-SubjectSignTool OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ id-fss subjectSignTool(111) }
-- The tools used to generate key pairs and tools used by
-- the CA to sign certificates.
IssuerSignTool ::= SEQUENCE {
signTool UTF8String(SIZE(1..200)),
cATool UTF8String(SIZE(1..200)),
signToolCert UTF8String(SIZE(1..100)),
cAToolCert UTF8String(SIZE(1..100)) }
id-IssuerSignTool OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ id-fss issuerSignTool(112) }
-- The method of identifying the owner, when it applies/receives
-- the certificate in the CA.
IdentificationKind ::= INTEGER { personal(0), remote-cert(1),
remote-passport(2), remote-system(3) }
id-IdentificationKind OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ id-fss identificationKind(114) }
END -- RuStrongCertsSyntaxAppendix C. Public Key Parameters
okay so here we're defining three brand new OIDs for three public key parameter sets that already exist over in [RFC4357] 💅 the big rule is that these OIDs MUST be used with GOST R 34.10-2012 public keys only, no exceptions, no cap 🙅
id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-256-paramSetB OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) ru(643) rosstandart(7) tc26(1)
constants(2) sign-constants(1) gost-3410-12-256-constants(1)
paramSetB(2)}the elliptic curve for this one is the same as id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-A-ParamSet (and id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-XchA-ParamSet), which you can find in [RFC4357] 🦋
id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-256-paramSetC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) ru(643) rosstandart(7) tc26(1)
constants(2) sign-constants(1) gost-3410-12-256-constants(1)
paramSetC(3)}this one shares its curve with id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-B-ParamSet, also found in [RFC4357] 🌸
id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-256-paramSetD OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) ru(643) rosstandart(7) tc26(1)
constants(2) sign-constants(1) gost-3410-12-256-constants(1)
paramSetD(4)}and this last one matches the curve of id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-C-ParamSet (and id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-XchB-ParamSet), which is in [RFC4357] too ✨
Appendix D. Test Examples
ooh, the test examples. this is where we get to see real numbers, bestie 🍓
D.1. GOST R 34.10-2001 Test Parameters (256-Bit Private Key Length)
this example uses the curve defined in Section 7.1 of [RFC7091] 🎀
the private key is:
d = 0x7A929ADE789BB9BE10ED359DD39A72C1\\
1B60961F49397EEE1D19CE9891EC3B28and the public key is:
x = 0x7F2B49E270DB6D90D8595BEC458B50C5\\
8585BA1D4E9B788F6689DBD8E56FD80B
y = 0x26F1B489D6701DD185C8413A977B3CBB\\
AF64D1C593D26627DFFB101A87FF77DAD.1.1. Certificate Request
here's the certificate request in PEM form, and right under it is the ASN.1 breakdown so you can see every piece 🔍
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----
MIHTMIGBAgEAMBIxEDAOBgNVBAMTB0V4YW1wbGUwZjAfBggqhQMHAQEBATATBgcq
hQMCAiMABggqhQMHAQECAgNDAARAC9hv5djbiWaPeJtOHbqFhcVQi0XsW1nYkG3b
cOJJK3/ad/+HGhD73ydm0pPF0WSvuzx7lzpByIXRHXDWibTxJqAAMAoGCCqFAwcB
AQMCA0EAaqqzjjXUqqUXlAMBeZEi2FVIT1efTLuW1jzf3zrMQypBqijS8asUgoDN
ntVv7aQZdAU1VKQnZ7g60EP9OdwEkw==
-----END CERTIFICATE REQUEST----- 0 211: SEQUENCE {
3 129: SEQUENCE {
6 1: INTEGER 0
9 18: SEQUENCE {
11 16: SET {
13 14: SEQUENCE {
15 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3)
20 7: PrintableString 'Example'
: }
: }
: }
29 102: SEQUENCE {
31 31: SEQUENCE {
33 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER '1 2 643 7 1 1 1 1'
43 19: SEQUENCE {
45 7: OBJECT IDENTIFIER '1 2 643 2 2 35 0'
54 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER '1 2 643 7 1 1 2 2'
: }
: }
64 67: BIT STRING, encapsulates {
67 64: OCTET STRING
: 0B D8 6F E5 D8 DB 89 66 8F 78 9B 4E 1D BA 85 85
: C5 50 8B 45 EC 5B 59 D8 90 6D DB 70 E2 49 2B 7F
: DA 77 FF 87 1A 10 FB DF 27 66 D2 93 C5 D1 64 AF
: BB 3C 7B 97 3A 41 C8 85 D1 1D 70 D6 89 B4 F1 26
: }
: }
133 0: [0] {}
: }
135 10: SEQUENCE {
137 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER '1 2 643 7 1 1 3 2'
: }
147 65: BIT STRING
: 6A AA B3 8E 35 D4 AA A5 17 94 03 01 79 91 22 D8
: 55 48 4F 57 9F 4C BB 96 D6 3C DF DF 3A CC 43 2A
: 41 AA 28 D2 F1 AB 14 82 80 CD 9E D5 6F ED A4 19
: 74 05 35 54 A4 27 67 B8 3A D0 43 FD 39 DC 04 93
: }D.1.2. Certificate ✨
Okay bestie, this is the actual certificate, all wrapped up in PEM 🎀
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
MIIBLTCB26ADAgECAgEKMAoGCCqFAwcBAQMCMBIxEDAOBgNVBAMTB0V4YW1wbGUw
IBcNMDEwMTAxMDAwMDAwWhgPMjA1MDEyMzEwMDAwMDBaMBIxEDAOBgNVBAMTB0V4
YW1wbGUwZjAfBggqhQMHAQEBATATBgcqhQMCAiMABggqhQMHAQECAgNDAARAC9hv
5djbiWaPeJtOHbqFhcVQi0XsW1nYkG3bcOJJK3/ad/+HGhD73ydm0pPF0WSvuzx7
lzpByIXRHXDWibTxJqMTMBEwDwYDVR0TAQH/BAUwAwEB/zAKBggqhQMHAQEDAgNB
AE1T8BL+CBd2UH1Nm7gfAO/bTu/Uq4O6xLrPc1Fzz6gcQaoo0vGrFIKAzZ7Vb+2k
GXQFNVSkJ2e4OtBD/TncBJM=
-----END CERTIFICATE-----And here's the breakdown, so you can see every single byte of it 🤓
0 301: SEQUENCE {
4 219: SEQUENCE {
7 3: [0] {
9 1: INTEGER 2
: }
12 1: INTEGER 10
15 10: SEQUENCE {
17 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER '1 2 643 7 1 1 3 2'
: }
27 18: SEQUENCE {
29 16: SET {
31 14: SEQUENCE {
33 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3)
38 7: PrintableString 'Example'
: }
: }
: }
47 32: SEQUENCE {
49 13: UTCTime 01/01/2001 00:00:00 GMT
64 15: GeneralizedTime 31/12/2050 00:00:00 GMT
: }
81 18: SEQUENCE {
83 16: SET {
85 14: SEQUENCE {
87 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3)
92 7: PrintableString 'Example'
: }
: }
: }
101 102: SEQUENCE {
103 31: SEQUENCE {
105 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER '1 2 643 7 1 1 1 1'
115 19: SEQUENCE {
117 7: OBJECT IDENTIFIER '1 2 643 2 2 35 0'
126 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER '1 2 643 7 1 1 2 2'
: }
: }
136 67: BIT STRING, encapsulates {
139 64: OCTET STRING
: 0B D8 6F E5 D8 DB 89 66 8F 78 9B 4E 1D BA 85 85
: C5 50 8B 45 EC 5B 59 D8 90 6D DB 70 E2 49 2B 7F
: DA 77 FF 87 1A 10 FB DF 27 66 D2 93 C5 D1 64 AF
: BB 3C 7B 97 3A 41 C8 85 D1 1D 70 D6 89 B4 F1 26
: }
: }
205 19: [3] {
207 17: SEQUENCE {
209 15: SEQUENCE {
211 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER basicConstraints (2 5 29 19)
216 1: BOOLEAN TRUE
219 5: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
221 3: SEQUENCE {
223 1: BOOLEAN TRUE
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
226 10: SEQUENCE {
228 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER '1 2 643 7 1 1 3 2'
: }
238 65: BIT STRING
: 4D 53 F0 12 FE 08 17 76 50 7D 4D 9B B8 1F 00 EF
: DB 4E EF D4 AB 83 BA C4 BA CF 73 51 73 CF A8 1C
: 41 AA 28 D2 F1 AB 14 82 80 CD 9E D5 6F ED A4 19
: 74 05 35 54 A4 27 67 B8 3A D0 43 FD 39 DC 04 93
: }D.1.3. Certificate Revocation List 🦋
Next up is the revocation list, aka the "oops, never mind about that one" file 💅
-----BEGIN X509 CRL-----
MIGSMEECAQEwCgYIKoUDBwEBAwIwEjEQMA4GA1UEAxMHRXhhbXBsZRcNMTQwMTAx
MDAwMDAwWhcNMTQwMTAyMDAwMDAwWjAKBggqhQMHAQEDAgNBAEK/OSoU0+vpV68+
RstQv19CIaADrT0XJ1PJSpw3ox0gQaoo0vGrFIKAzZ7Vb+2kGXQFNVSkJ2e4OtBD
/TncBJM=
-----END X509 CRL-----Here's the decoded version 🌸
0 146: SEQUENCE {
3 65: SEQUENCE {
5 1: INTEGER 1
8 10: SEQUENCE {
10 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER '1 2 643 7 1 1 3 2'
: }
20 18: SEQUENCE {
22 16: SET {
24 14: SEQUENCE {
26 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3)
31 7: PrintableString 'Example'
: }
: }
: }
40 13: UTCTime 01/01/2014 00:00:00 GMT
55 13: UTCTime 02/01/2014 00:00:00 GMT
: }
70 10: SEQUENCE {
72 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER '1 2 643 7 1 1 3 2'
: }
82 65: BIT STRING
: 42 BF 39 2A 14 D3 EB E9 57 AF 3E 46 CB 50 BF 5F
: 42 21 A0 03 AD 3D 17 27 53 C9 4A 9C 37 A3 1D 20
: 41 AA 28 D2 F1 AB 14 82 80 CD 9E D5 6F ED A4 19
: 74 05 35 54 A4 27 67 B8 3A D0 43 FD 39 DC 04 93
: }D.2. GOST R 34.10-2012 TC26-256-A Parameters (256-Bit Private Key Length) 🧚
Okay, this one's a whole new vibe 💜 It uses the curve from Appendix A.2 of [RFC7836], so go check that out if you want the backstory.
The private key is 🔑
d = 0x3A929ADE789BB9BE10ED359DD39A72C1\\
0B87C83F80BE18B85C041F4325B62EC1The public key is 🌈
x = 0x99C3DF265EA59350640BA69D1DE04418\\
AF3FEA03EC0F85F2DD84E8BED4952774
y = 0xE218631A69C47C122E2D516DA1C09E6B\\
D19344D94389D1F16C0C4D4DCF96F578D.2.1. Certificate Request 💖
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----
MIHKMHkCAQAwEjEQMA4GA1UEAxMHRXhhbXBsZTBeMBcGCCqFAwcBAQEBMAsGCSqF
AwcBAgEBAQNDAARAdCeV1L7ohN3yhQ/sA+o/rxhE4B2dpgtkUJOlXibfw5l49ZbP
TU0MbPHRiUPZRJPRa57AoW1RLS4SfMRpGmMY4qAAMAoGCCqFAwcBAQMCA0EAG9wq
Exdnm2YjL2PqFv98ZMyqua2FX8bhgJFmHbedSBIdDh2lvjR8bxtSVseurCAK1krH
em9bOg4Jcxjnrm7naQ==
-----END CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----The breakdown ✨
0 202: SEQUENCE {
3 121: SEQUENCE {
5 1: INTEGER 0
8 18: SEQUENCE {
10 16: SET {
12 14: SEQUENCE {
14 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3)
19 7: PrintableString 'Example'
: }
: }
: }
28 94: SEQUENCE {
30 23: SEQUENCE {
32 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER '1 2 643 7 1 1 1 1'
42 11: SEQUENCE {
44 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER '1 2 643 7 1 2 1 1 1'
: }
: }
55 67: BIT STRING, encapsulates {
58 64: OCTET STRING
: 74 27 95 D4 BE E8 84 DD F2 85 0F EC 03 EA 3F AF
: 18 44 E0 1D 9D A6 0B 64 50 93 A5 5E 26 DF C3 99
: 78 F5 96 CF 4D 4D 0C 6C F1 D1 89 43 D9 44 93 D1
: 6B 9E C0 A1 6D 51 2D 2E 12 7C C4 69 1A 63 18 E2
: }
: }
124 0: [0] {}
: }
126 10: SEQUENCE {
128 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER '1 2 643 7 1 1 3 2'
: }
138 65: BIT STRING
: 1B DC 2A 13 17 67 9B 66 23 2F 63 EA 16 FF 7C 64
: CC AA B9 AD 85 5F C6 E1 80 91 66 1D B7 9D 48 12
: 1D 0E 1D A5 BE 34 7C 6F 1B 52 56 C7 AE AC 20 0A
: D6 4A C7 7A 6F 5B 3A 0E 09 73 18 E7 AE 6E E7 69
: }D.2.2. Certificate 🎀
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
MIIBJTCB06ADAgECAgEKMAoGCCqFAwcBAQMCMBIxEDAOBgNVBAMTB0V4YW1wbGUw
IBcNMDEwMTAxMDAwMDAwWhgPMjA1MDEyMzEwMDAwMDBaMBIxEDAOBgNVBAMTB0V4
YW1wbGUwXjAXBggqhQMHAQEBATALBgkqhQMHAQIBAQEDQwAEQHQnldS+6ITd8oUP
7APqP68YROAdnaYLZFCTpV4m38OZePWWz01NDGzx0YlD2UST0WuewKFtUS0uEnzE
aRpjGOKjEzARMA8GA1UdEwEB/wQFMAMBAf8wCgYIKoUDBwEBAwIDQQAUC02pEksJ
yw1c6Sjuh0JzoxASlJLsDik2njt5EkhXjB0OHaW+NHxvG1JWx66sIArWSsd6b1s6
DglzGOeubudp
-----END CERTIFICATE-----The breakdown 🙈
0 293: SEQUENCE {
4 211: SEQUENCE {
7 3: [0] {
9 1: INTEGER 2
: }
12 1: INTEGER 10
15 10: SEQUENCE {
17 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER '1 2 643 7 1 1 3 2'
: }
27 18: SEQUENCE {
29 16: SET {
31 14: SEQUENCE {
33 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3)
38 7: PrintableString 'Example'
: }
: }
: }
47 32: SEQUENCE {
49 13: UTCTime 01/01/2001 00:00:00 GMT
64 15: GeneralizedTime 31/12/2050 00:00:00 GMT
: }
81 18: SEQUENCE {
83 16: SET {
85 14: SEQUENCE {
87 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3)
92 7: PrintableString 'Example'
: }
: }
: }
101 94: SEQUENCE {
103 23: SEQUENCE {
105 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER '1 2 643 7 1 1 1 1'
115 11: SEQUENCE {
117 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER '1 2 643 7 1 2 1 1 1'
: }
: }
128 67: BIT STRING, encapsulates {
131 64: OCTET STRING
: 74 27 95 D4 BE E8 84 DD F2 85 0F EC 03 EA 3F AF
: 18 44 E0 1D 9D A6 0B 64 50 93 A5 5E 26 DF C3 99
: 78 F5 96 CF 4D 4D 0C 6C F1 D1 89 43 D9 44 93 D1
: 6B 9E C0 A1 6D 51 2D 2E 12 7C C4 69 1A 63 18 E2
: }
: }
197 19: [3] {
199 17: SEQUENCE {
201 15: SEQUENCE {
203 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER basicConstraints (2 5 29 19)
208 1: BOOLEAN TRUE
211 5: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
213 3: SEQUENCE {
215 1: BOOLEAN TRUE
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
218 10: SEQUENCE {
220 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER '1 2 643 7 1 1 3 2'
: }
230 65: BIT STRING
: 14 0B 4D A9 12 4B 09 CB 0D 5C E9 28 EE 87 42 73
: A3 10 12 94 92 EC 0E 29 36 9E 3B 79 12 48 57 8C
: 1D 0E 1D A5 BE 34 7C 6F 1B 52 56 C7 AE AC 20 0A
: D6 4A C7 7A 6F 5B 3A 0E 09 73 18 E7 AE 6E E7 69
: }D.2.3. Certificate Revocation List 🌸
-----BEGIN X509 CRL-----
MIGSMEECAQEwCgYIKoUDBwEBAwIwEjEQMA4GA1UEAxMHRXhhbXBsZRcNMTQwMTAx
MDAwMDAwWhcNMTQwMTAyMDAwMDAwWjAKBggqhQMHAQEDAgNBABS9aAh8O5A8eqKL
B/6y571v4JY/VjJnNZ9c2Oq0UFmtHQ4dpb40fG8bUlbHrqwgCtZKx3pvWzoOCXMY
565u52k=
-----END X509 CRL----- 0 146: SEQUENCE {
3 65: SEQUENCE {
5 1: INTEGER 1
8 10: SEQUENCE {
10 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER '1 2 643 7 1 1 3 2'
: }
20 18: SEQUENCE {
22 16: SET {
24 14: SEQUENCE {
26 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3)
31 7: PrintableString 'Example'
: }
: }
: }
40 13: UTCTime 01/01/2014 00:00:00 GMT
55 13: UTCTime 02/01/2014 00:00:00 GMT
: }
70 10: SEQUENCE {
72 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER '1 2 643 7 1 1 3 2'
: }
82 65: BIT STRING
: 14 BD 68 08 7C 3B 90 3C 7A A2 8B 07 FE B2 E7 BD
: 6F E0 96 3F 56 32 67 35 9F 5C D8 EA B4 50 59 AD
: 1D 0E 1D A5 BE 34 7C 6F 1B 52 56 C7 AE AC 20 0A
: D6 4A C7 7A 6F 5B 3A 0E 09 73 18 E7 AE 6E E7 69
: }D.3. GOST R 34.10-2012 Test Parameters (512-Bit Private Key Length) 🌈
This one uses the curve from Appendix E, so keep an eye out for that when we get there 👑
The private key is 🔑
d = 0x0BA6048AADAE241BA40936D47756D7C9\\
3091A0E8514669700EE7508E508B1020\\
72E8123B2200A0563322DAD2827E2714\\
A2636B7BFD18AADFC62967821FA18DD4The public key is 🫶
x = 0x115DC5BC96760C7B48598D8AB9E740D4\\
C4A85A65BE33C1815B5C320C854621DD\\
5A515856D13314AF69BC5B924C8B4DDF\\
F75C45415C1D9DD9DD33612CD530EFE1
y = 0x37C7C90CD40B0F5621DC3AC1B751CFA0\\
E2634FA0503B3D52639F5D7FB72AFD61\\
EA199441D943FFE7F0C70A2759A3CDB8\\
4C114E1F9339FDF27F35ECA93677BEECD.3.1. Certificate Request
okay bestie, the 512-bit test certificate request is up next 🎀 it's the first piece of the set, so here's the PEM version first and then the decoded ASN.1 breakdown 🫶
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----
MIIBTzCBvAIBADASMRAwDgYDVQQDEwdFeGFtcGxlMIGgMBcGCCqFAwcBAQECMAsG
CSqFAwcBAgECAAOBhAAEgYDh7zDVLGEz3dmdHVxBRVz3302LTJJbvGmvFDPRVlhR
Wt0hRoUMMlxbgcEzvmVaqMTUQOe5io1ZSHsMdpa8xV0R7L53NqnsNX/y/TmTH04R
TLjNo1knCsfw5/9D2UGUGeph/Sq3f12fY1I9O1CgT2PioM9Rt8E63CFWDwvUDMnH
N6AAMAoGCCqFAwcBAQMDA4GBAEM7HWzkClHx5XN+sWqixoOCmkBbnZEn4hJg/J1q
wF2HvyTibEUnilwhkqdbqUmTq9YHTn/xvwP9L1OXr6HZRVgvhvpgoIEJGiPdeV4e
PGie5RKjyC7g3MJkPHjuqPys01SSVYSGsg8cnsGXyQaZhQJgyTvLzZxcMxfhk0Th
c642
-----END CERTIFICATE REQUEST----- 0 335: SEQUENCE {
4 188: SEQUENCE {
7 1: INTEGER 0
10 18: SEQUENCE {
12 16: SET {
14 14: SEQUENCE {
16 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3)
21 7: PrintableString 'Example'
: }
: }
: }
30 160: SEQUENCE {
33 23: SEQUENCE {
35 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER '1 2 643 7 1 1 1 2'
45 11: SEQUENCE {
47 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER '1 2 643 7 1 2 1 2 0'
: }
: }
58 132: BIT STRING, encapsulates {
62 128: OCTET STRING
: E1 EF 30 D5 2C 61 33 DD D9 9D 1D 5C 41 45 5C F7
: DF 4D 8B 4C 92 5B BC 69 AF 14 33 D1 56 58 51 5A
: DD 21 46 85 0C 32 5C 5B 81 C1 33 BE 65 5A A8 C4
: D4 40 E7 B9 8A 8D 59 48 7B 0C 76 96 BC C5 5D 11
: EC BE 77 36 A9 EC 35 7F F2 FD 39 93 1F 4E 11 4C
: B8 CD A3 59 27 0A C7 F0 E7 FF 43 D9 41 94 19 EA
: 61 FD 2A B7 7F 5D 9F 63 52 3D 3B 50 A0 4F 63 E2
: A0 CF 51 B7 C1 3A DC 21 56 0F 0B D4 0C C9 C7 37
: }
: }
193 0: [0] {}
: }
195 10: SEQUENCE {
197 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER '1 2 643 7 1 1 3 3'
: }
207 129: BIT STRING
: 43 3B 1D 6C E4 0A 51 F1 E5 73 7E B1 6A A2 C6 83
: 82 9A 40 5B 9D 91 27 E2 12 60 FC 9D 6A C0 5D 87
: BF 24 E2 6C 45 27 8A 5C 21 92 A7 5B A9 49 93 AB
: D6 07 4E 7F F1 BF 03 FD 2F 53 97 AF A1 D9 45 58
: 2F 86 FA 60 A0 81 09 1A 23 DD 79 5E 1E 3C 68 9E
: E5 12 A3 C8 2E E0 DC C2 64 3C 78 EE A8 FC AC D3
: 54 92 55 84 86 B2 0F 1C 9E C1 97 C9 06 99 85 02
: 60 C9 3B CB CD 9C 5C 33 17 E1 93 44 E1 73 AE 36
: }D.3.2. Certificate
next up is the certificate itself 💖 same 512-bit key family, now wrapped in a full cert with a validity window and a basicConstraints extension ✨
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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==
-----END CERTIFICATE----- 0 426: SEQUENCE {
4 278: SEQUENCE {
8 3: [0] {
10 1: INTEGER 2
: }
13 1: INTEGER 11
16 10: SEQUENCE {
18 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER '1 2 643 7 1 1 3 3'
: }
28 18: SEQUENCE {
30 16: SET {
32 14: SEQUENCE {
34 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3)
39 7: PrintableString 'Example'
: }
: }
: }
48 32: SEQUENCE {
50 13: UTCTime 01/01/2001 00:00:00 GMT
65 15: GeneralizedTime 31/12/2050 00:00:00 GMT
: }
82 18: SEQUENCE {
84 16: SET {
86 14: SEQUENCE {
88 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3)
93 7: PrintableString 'Example'
: }
: }
: }
102 160: SEQUENCE {
105 23: SEQUENCE {
107 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER '1 2 643 7 1 1 1 2'
117 11: SEQUENCE {
119 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER '1 2 643 7 1 2 1 2 0'
: }
: }
130 132: BIT STRING, encapsulates {
134 128: OCTET STRING
: E1 EF 30 D5 2C 61 33 DD D9 9D 1D 5C 41 45 5C F7
: DF 4D 8B 4C 92 5B BC 69 AF 14 33 D1 56 58 51 5A
: DD 21 46 85 0C 32 5C 5B 81 C1 33 BE 65 5A A8 C4
: D4 40 E7 B9 8A 8D 59 48 7B 0C 76 96 BC C5 5D 11
: EC BE 77 36 A9 EC 35 7F F2 FD 39 93 1F 4E 11 4C
: B8 CD A3 59 27 0A C7 F0 E7 FF 43 D9 41 94 19 EA
: 61 FD 2A B7 7F 5D 9F 63 52 3D 3B 50 A0 4F 63 E2
: A0 CF 51 B7 C1 3A DC 21 56 0F 0B D4 0C C9 C7 37
: }
: }
265 19: [3] {
267 17: SEQUENCE {
269 15: SEQUENCE {
271 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER basicConstraints (2 5 29 19)
276 1: BOOLEAN TRUE
279 5: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
281 3: SEQUENCE {
283 1: BOOLEAN TRUE
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
286 10: SEQUENCE {
288 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER '1 2 643 7 1 1 3 3'
: }
298 129: BIT STRING
: 41 57 03 D8 92 F1 A5 F3 F6 8C 43 53 18 9A 7E E2
: 07 B8 0B 56 31 EF 9D 49 52 9A 4D 6B 54 2C 2C FA
: 15 AA 2E AC F1 1F 47 0F DE 7D 95 48 56 90 3C 35
: FD 8F 95 5E F3 00 D9 5C 77 53 4A 72 4A 0E EE 70
: 2F 86 FA 60 A0 81 09 1A 23 DD 79 5E 1E 3C 68 9E
: E5 12 A3 C8 2E E0 DC C2 64 3C 78 EE A8 FC AC D3
: 54 92 55 84 86 B2 0F 1C 9E C1 97 C9 06 99 85 02
: 60 C9 3B CB CD 9C 5C 33 17 E1 93 44 E1 73 AE 36
: }D.3.3. Certificate Revocation List
and last but not least, the CRL 🦋 it's the revocation list for this test set, with one entry and a short validity window, so you can see the whole structure in one place 🌸
-----BEGIN X509 CRL-----
MIHTMEECAQEwCgYIKoUDBwEBAwMwEjEQMA4GA1UEAxMHRXhhbXBsZRcNMTQwMTAx
MDAwMDAwWhcNMTQwMTAyMDAwMDAwWjAKBggqhQMHAQEDAwOBgQA6E/t67NtVYO72
E3z8XdZGkXMuv7NpCh/Ax+ik7uoIMH1kjU3AmGxGqHs/vkx69C6jQ1nHlZVMo5/z
q77ZBR9NL4b6YKCBCRoj3XleHjxonuUSo8gu4NzCZDx47qj8rNNUklWEhrIPHJ7B
l8kGmYUCYMk7y82cXDMX4ZNE4XOuNg==
-----END X509 CRL----- 0 211: SEQUENCE {
3 65: SEQUENCE {
5 1: INTEGER 1
8 10: SEQUENCE {
10 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER '1 2 643 7 1 1 3 3'
: }
20 18: SEQUENCE {
22 16: SET {
24 14: SEQUENCE {
26 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3)
31 7: PrintableString 'Example'
: }
: }
: }
40 13: UTCTime 01/01/2014 00:00:00 GMT
55 13: UTCTime 02/01/2014 00:00:00 GMT
: }
70 10: SEQUENCE {
72 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER '1 2 643 7 1 1 3 3'
: }
82 129: BIT STRING
: 3A 13 FB 7A EC DB 55 60 EE F6 13 7C FC 5D D6 46
: 91 73 2E BF B3 69 0A 1F C0 C7 E8 A4 EE EA 08 30
: 7D 64 8D 4D C0 98 6C 46 A8 7B 3F BE 4C 7A F4 2E
: A3 43 59 C7 95 95 4C A3 9F F3 AB BE D9 05 1F 4D
: 2F 86 FA 60 A0 81 09 1A 23 DD 79 5E 1E 3C 68 9E
: E5 12 A3 C8 2E E0 DC C2 64 3C 78 EE A8 FC AC D3
: 54 92 55 84 86 B2 0F 1C 9E C1 97 C9 06 99 85 02
: 60 C9 3B CB CD 9C 5C 33 17 E1 93 44 E1 73 AE 36
: }Appendix E. GOST R 34.10-2012 Test Parameters (Curve Definition)
okay this is the curve definition appendix, and it's the main event 👑 the numbers here are the actual elliptic curve parameters. they're the ones you use when generating and verifying digital signatures, so treat them like sacred text 💅
The following parameters must be used for digital signature generation and verification.
E.1. Elliptic Curve Modulus
Here's the value assigned to parameter p in this example 🌈
p = 36239861022290036359077887536838743060213209255346786050\\
86546150450856166624002482588482022271496854025090823603\\
058735163734263822371964987228582907372403
p = 0x4531ACD1FE0023C7550D267B6B2FEE80922B14B2FFB90F04D4EB7C\\
09B5D2D15DF1D852741AF4704A0458047E80E4546D35B8336FAC22\\
4DD81664BBF528BE6373E.2. Elliptic Curve Coefficients
In this example, parameters a and b take these values ✨
a = 7
a = 0x7
b = 15186550692108285345089500347140431549287475277402064361\\
94018823352809982443793732829756914785974674866041605397\\
883677596626326413990136959047435811826396
b = 0x1CFF0806A31116DA29D8CFA54E57EB748BC5F377E49400FDD788B6\\
49ECA1AC4361834013B2AD7322480A89CA58E0CF74BC9E540C2ADD\\
6897FAD0A3084F302ADCE.3. Elliptic Curve Points Group Order
Parameter m takes this value in the example 🍓
m = 36239861022290036359077887536838743060213209255346786050\\
86546150450856166623969164898305032863068499961404079437\\
936585455865192212970734808812618120619743
m = 0x4531ACD1FE0023C7550D267B6B2FEE80922B14B2FFB90F04D4EB7C\\
09B5D2D15DA82F2D7ECB1DBAC719905C5EECC423F1D86E25EDBE23\\
C595D644AAF187E6E6DFE.4. Order of Cyclic Subgroup of Elliptic Curve Points Group
Parameter q takes this value in the example 🧚
q = 36239861022290036359077887536838743060213209255346786050\\
86546150450856166623969164898305032863068499961404079437\\
936585455865192212970734808812618120619743
q = 0x4531ACD1FE0023C7550D267B6B2FEE80922B14B2FFB90F04D4EB7C\\
09B5D2D15DA82F2D7ECB1DBAC719905C5EECC423F1D86E25EDBE23\\
C595D644AAF187E6E6DFE.5. Elliptic Curve Point Coordinates
Point P's coordinates take these values in the example 📍
x = 19283569440670228493993094012431375989977866354595079743\\
57075491307766592685835441065557681003184874819658004903\\
212332884252335830250729527632383493573274
x = 0x24D19CC64572EE30F396BF6EBBFD7A6C5213B3B3D7057CC825F910\\
93A68CD762FD60611262CD838DC6B60AA7EEE804E28BC849977FAC\\
33B4B530F1B120248A9A
y = 22887286933719728599700121555294784163535623273295061803\\
14497425931102860301572814141997072271708807066593850650\\
334152381857347798885864807605098724013854
y = 0x2BB312A43BD2CE6E0D020613C857ACDDCFBF061E91E5F2C3F32447\\
C259F39B2C83AB156D77F1496BF7EB3351E1EE4E43DC1A18B91B24\\
640B6DBB92CB1ADD371EContributors
big thanks to these people who helped make this happen 🫶
Semen Pianov
InfoTeCS JSC
Email: Semen.Pianov@infotecs.ru
Ekaterina Karelina
InfoTeCS JSC
Email: Ekaterina.Karelina@infotecs.ru
Dmitry Belyavsky
Cryptocom
Email: beldmit@gmail.comAuthors' Addresses
and here are the authors' details 💜
Dmitry Baryshkov (editor)
Linaro Ltd.
Harston Mill Royston Rd
Harston, Cambridge
CB22 7GG
United Kingdom
Email: dbaryshkov@gmail.com
Vasily Nikolaev
CryptoPro
18, Suschevsky val
Moscow
127018
Russian Federation
Phone: +7 (495) 995-48-20
Email: nikolaev@cryptopro.ru
Alexander Chelpanov
InfoTeCS JSC
Email: Aleksandr.Chelpanov@infotecs.ru📦 where this page comes from
- ietf: rfc9215 2022-03
- 💖 girlified by claude-haiku-5-5 on : a language model's rewrite of the original, under its terms