RFC 4491
Using the GOST R 34.10-94, GOST R 34.10-2001, and GOST R 34.11-94 Algorithms with the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and CRL Profile
RFC 4491 💖 Using the GOST R 34.10-94, GOST R 34.10-2001, and GOST R 34.11-94 Algorithms with the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and CRL Profile
okay so this RFC is literally about how to use three Russian crypto algorithms (GOST R 34.10-94, GOST R 34.10-2001, and GOST R 34.11-94) inside Internet X.509 certificates and CRLs 🔐✨ it's a Standards Track doc from May 2006, and it's giving main character energy because it UPDATES RFC 3279 🎀 (it doesn't list anything it obsoletes). the editors are S. Leontiev (CRYPTO-PRO) and D. Shefanovski (Mobile TeleSystems OJSC), both marked "Ed." so they're the ones who wrangled the whole thing 🫶
Status of This Memo 🦋
this doc specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the Internet community and asks for discussion and suggestions for improvements. for the official standardization state and status of this protocol, check the current edition of the "Internet Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) 📚 distribution of this memo is unlimited, so it's free to share bestie 🌸
Copyright Notice 🌈
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006).Abstract 🍓
this doc supplements RFC 3279 ✨ it describes the encoding formats, identifiers, and parameter formats for GOST R 34.10-94, GOST R 34.10-2001, and GOST R 34.11-94, so they can be used in the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) 🔐
Table of Contents 🧚
1. Introduction ....................................................2
1.1. Requirement Words ..........................................3
2. Algorithm Support ...............................................3
2.1. One-Way Hash Function ......................................3
2.1.1. One-Way Hash Function GOST R 34.11-94 ...............3
2.2. Signature Algorithms .......................................4
2.2.1. Signature Algorithm GOST R 34.10-94 .................4
2.2.2. Signature Algorithm GOST R 34.10-2001 ...............5
2.3. Subject Public Key Algorithms ..............................5
2.3.1. GOST R 34.10-94 Keys ................................6
2.3.2. GOST R 34.10-2001 Keys ..............................8
3. Security Considerations .........................................9
4. Examples .......................................................10
4.1. GOST R 34.10-94 Certificate ...............................10
4.2. GOST R 34.10-2001 Certificate .............................12
5. Acknowledgements ...............................................15
6. References .....................................................16
6.1. Normative References ......................................16
6.2. Informative References ....................................171. Introduction ✨
okay so this doc is a supplement to RFC 3279 [PKALGS] 💅 it explains how to use the GOST R 34.10-94 [GOST3431095, GOSTR341094] and GOST R 34.10-2001 [GOST3431004, GOSTR341001] signature algorithms, the VKO GOST R 34.10-94 and VKO GOST R 34.10-2001 key derivation algorithms, and the GOST R 34.11-94 [GOST3431195, GOSTR341194] one-way hash function in the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) [PROFILE] 🔥
this doc gives extra info and specs that the "Russian Cryptographic Software Compatibility Agreement" community needs 🫶
the algorithm identifiers and their parameters are defined for subject public keys that use GOST R 34.10-94 [GOSTR341094]/VKO GOST R 34.10-94 [CPALGS] or GOST R 34.10-2001 [GOSTR341001]/VKO GOST R 34.10-2001 [CPALGS], and so is the encoding format for the signatures those algorithms make. the algorithm identifiers for using the GOST R 34.11-94 one-way hash function with GOST R 34.10-94 and GOST R 34.10-2001 signatures are in here too 🦋
this spec defines what goes in the signatureAlgorithm, signatureValue, signature, and subjectPublicKeyInfo fields inside X.509 Certificates and CRLs. for each algorithm, the right options for the keyUsage certificate extension are also given 💜
the ASN.1 modules, with every definition this doc uses, live in [CPALGS] 📚
1.1. Requirement Words 🎀
the key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this doc are to be read as described in [RFC2119] 🙈
2. Algorithm Support 🧚
this section is basically an overview of the crypto algorithms that may be used in the Internet X.509 certificates and CRL profile [PROFILE] 👑 it covers the one-way hash functions and digital signature algorithms that can be used to sign certificates and CRLs, and it names the object identifiers (OIDs) and the ASN.1 encoding for the public keys in a certificate 💅
Certification authorities (CAs) and/or applications conforming to this standard MUST support at least one of the specified public key and signature algorithms. 🔥
2.1. One-Way Hash Function 🌸
this part describes using the one-way, collision-free hash function GOST R 34.11-94. it's the only one that can be used with the GOST R 34.10-94/2001 digital signature algorithm. the data that gets hashed for certificate and CRL signing is fully described in RFC 3280 [PROFILE] ✨
2.1.1. One-Way Hash Function GOST R 34.11-94 🍓
GOST R 34.11-94 was developed by "GUBS of Federal Agency Government Communication and Information" and "All-Russian Scientific and Research Institute of Standardization" 🌈 it takes an arbitrary finite bit length input and spits out a 256-bit hash value. this doc doesn't have the full GOST R 34.11-94 spec, which you can find in [GOSTR341194] (it's in Russian 🇷🇺). [Schneier95], ch. 18.11, p. 454, has a short technical description in English 📖
this function MUST always be used with the parameter set identified by id-GostR3411-94-CryptoProParamSet (see Section 8.2 of [CPALGS]) 🔒
2.2. Signature Algorithms 💖
conforming CAs may use the GOST R 34.10-94 or GOST R 34.10-2001 signature algorithms to sign certificates and CRLs ✨
these signature algorithms MUST always be used with a one-way hash function GOST R 34.11-94, as indicated in [GOSTR341094] and [GOSTR341001] 🔐
this section defines the algorithm identifiers and parameters to be used in the signatureAlgorithm field of a Certificate or CertificateList 🦋
2.2.1. Signature Algorithm GOST R 34.10-94 🎀
GOST R 34.10-94 was developed by "GUBS of Federal Agency Government Communication and Information" and "All-Russian Scientific and Research Institute of Standardization". this doc doesn't contain the full GOST R 34.10-94 spec, which is in [GOSTR341094] (in Russian 🇷🇺). [Schneier95], ch. 20.3, p. 495, has a brief technical description in English 📖
the ASN.1 object identifier for this signature algorithm is:
id-GostR3411-94-with-GostR3410-94 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) ru(643) rans(2) cryptopro(2)
gostR3411-94-with-gostR3410-94(4) }when the id-GostR3411-94-with-GostR3410-94 algorithm identifier shows up as the algorithm field in an AlgorithmIdentifier, the encoding SHALL omit the parameters field. so the AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one component: the OBJECT IDENTIFIER id-GostR3411-94-with-GostR3410-94 🫶
the GOST R 34.10-94 signature algorithm makes a digital signature out of two 256-bit numbers, r' and s. its octet string representation is 64 octets. the first 32 octets hold the big-endian representation of s, and the second 32 octets hold the big-endian representation of r' 💅
this definition of a signature value can be used directly in CMS [CMS], where these values are represented as octet strings. but signature values in certificates and CRLs [PROFILE] are represented as bit strings, so the octet string representation has to be converted 🔥
to convert an octet string signature value to a bit string, the most significant bit of the first octet of the signature value SHALL become the first bit of the bit string, and so on, through the least significant bit of the last octet of the signature value, which SHALL become the last bit of the bit string 🌸
2.2.2. Signature Algorithm GOST R 34.10-2001 🍓
GOST R 34.10-2001 was developed by "GUBS of Federal Agency Government Communication and Information" and "All-Russian Scientific and Research Institute of Standardization". this doc doesn't contain the full GOST R 34.10-2001 spec, which can be found in [GOSTR341001] (in Russian 🇷🇺) 🌈
the ASN.1 object identifier for this signature algorithm is:
id-GostR3411-94-with-GostR3410-2001 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) ru(643) rans(2) cryptopro(2)
gostR3411-94-with-gostR3410-2001(3) }when the id-GostR3411-94-with-GostR3410-2001 algorithm identifier shows up as the algorithm field in an AlgorithmIdentifier, the encoding SHALL omit the parameters field. so the AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one component: the OBJECT IDENTIFIER id-GostR3411-94-with-GostR3410-2001 ✨
the GOST R 34.10-2001 signature algorithm makes a digital signature out of two 256-bit numbers, r and s. its octet string representation is 64 octets. the first 32 octets hold the big-endian representation of s, and the second 32 octets hold the big-endian representation of r 🦋
the process described above (Section 2.2.1) MUST be used to convert this octet string representation to a bit string for use in certificates and CRLs 💜
2.3. Subject Public Key Algorithms 👑
this section defines OIDs and public key parameters for public keys that use GOST R 34.10-94 [GOSTR341094]/VKO GOST R 34.10-94 [CPALGS] or GOST R 34.10-2001 [GOSTR341001]/VKO GOST R 34.10-2001 [CPALGS] 💅
using the same key for both signature and key derivation is NOT RECOMMENDED. the intended application for the key MAY be indicated in the keyUsage certificate extension (see [PROFILE], Section 4.2.1.3) 🔥✨
2.3.1. GOST R 34.10-94 Keys 🔐
okay so GOST R 34.10-94 public keys are sooo versatile, bestie 💖 they can be used for the signature algorithm GOST R 34.10-94 [GOSTR341094] AND for the key derivation algorithm VKO GOST R 34.10-94 [CPALGS] 🦋
these keys get identified by this OID (it's giving very official, I know 🙈):
id-GostR3410-94 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) ru(643) rans(2) cryptopro(2)
gostR3410-94(20) }the SubjectPublicKeyInfo.algorithm.algorithm field (see RFC 3280 [PROFILE]) for GOST R 34.10-94 keys MUST be set to id-GostR3410-94. no exceptions, periodt 💅
now the parameters part. when id-GostR3410-94 shows up as the algorithm field in an AlgorithmIdentifier, the encoding MAY omit the parameters field or set it to NULL. otherwise, this field MUST have this structure:
GostR3410-94-PublicKeyParameters ::=
SEQUENCE {
publicKeyParamSet
OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
digestParamSet
OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
encryptionParamSet
OBJECT IDENTIFIER DEFAULT
id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-A-ParamSet
}where:
publicKeyParamSetis the public key parameters identifier for GOST R 34.10-94 (see Section 8.3 of [CPALGS])digestParamSetis the parameters identifier for GOST R 34.11-94 (see Section 8.2 of [CPALGS])encryptionParamSetis the parameters identifier for GOST 28147-89 [GOST28147] (see Section 8.1 of [CPALGS])
if the parameters are absent, they SHALL be processed as described in RFC 3280 [PROFILE], Section 6.1. basically that means the parameters get inherited from the issuer certificate 🧚 and if working_public_key_parameters is set to null, the certificate and any signature verifiable on this certificate SHALL be rejected. yikes, no thank you 💀
the GOST R 34.10-94 public key MUST be ASN.1 DER encoded as an OCTET STRING, and this encoding SHALL be used as the contents (i.e., the value) of the subjectPublicKey component (a BIT STRING) of the SubjectPublicKeyInfo data element ✨
GostR3410-94-PublicKey ::= OCTET STRING -- public key, YGostR3410-94-PublicKey MUST contain 128 octets of the little-endian representation of the public key Y = a^x (mod p), where a and p are public key parameters, and x is a private key. 🌸
⚠️ bestie, listen: some erroneous applications throw away the zero bits at the end of the BIT STRING holding the public key. so it is RECOMMENDED to pad the bit string with zeroes up to 1048 bits (131 octets) on decoding, so you can decode the encapsulated OCTET STRING. that's the fix, iykyk 🙈
now the keyUsage stuff, which is giving very "choose your fighter" energy 🎀
if the keyUsage extension is present in an end-entity certificate that contains a GOST R 34.10-94 public key, the following values MAY be present:
digitalSignature;nonRepudiation;keyEncipherment; andkeyAgreement.
if the keyAgreement or keyEnchiperment extension is present in a certificate GOST R 34.10-94 public key, the following values MAY be present as well:
encipherOnly; anddecipherOnly.
the keyUsage extension MUST NOT assert both encipherOnly and decipherOnly. no cap, that's a hard no 🙅
if the keyUsage extension is present in a CA or CRL signer certificate that contains a GOST R 34.10-94 public key, the following values MAY be present:
digitalSignature;nonRepudiation;keyCertSign; andcRLSign.
2.3.2. GOST R 34.10-2001 Keys 🌈
ok, the 2001 version is giving sequel energy 👑 GOST R 34.10-2001 public keys can be used for the signature algorithm GOST R 34.10-2001 [GOSTR341001] and for the key derivation algorithm VKO GOST R 34.10-2001 [CPALGS] 💜
these ones are identified by this OID:
id-GostR3410-2001 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) ru(643) rans(2) cryptopro(2)
gostR3410-2001(19) }the SubjectPublicKeyInfo.algorithm.algorithm field (see RFC 3280 [PROFILE]) for GOST R 34.10-2001 keys MUST be set to id-GostR3410-2001. same rule as the 94 keys, no drama 🫶
when id-GostR3410-2001 appears as the algorithm field in an AlgorithmIdentifier, the encoding MAY omit the parameters field or set it to NULL. otherwise, this field MUST have this structure:
GostR3410-2001-PublicKeyParameters ::=
SEQUENCE {
publicKeyParamSet
OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
digestParamSet
OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
encryptionParamSet
OBJECT IDENTIFIER DEFAULT
id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-A-ParamSet
}where:
publicKeyParamSetis the public key parameters identifier for GOST R 34.10-2001 (see Section 8.4 of [CPALGS])digestParamSetis the parameters identifier for GOST R 34.11-94 (see Section 8.2 of [CPALGS])encryptionParamSetis the parameters identifier for GOST 28147-89 [GOST28147] (see Section 8.1 of [CPALGS])
absent parameters SHALL be processed as described in RFC 3280 [PROFILE], Section 6.1, which is the inherit-from-the-issuer-certificate thing again. and if working_public_key_parameters is set to null, the certificate and any signature verifiable on this certificate SHALL be rejected 🚫
the GOST R 34.10-2001 public key MUST be ASN.1 DER encoded as an OCTET STRING, and that encoding SHALL be used as the contents (i.e., the value) of the subjectPublicKey component (a BIT STRING) of the SubjectPublicKeyInfo data element ✨
GostR3410-2001-PublicKey ::= OCTET STRING -- public key vector, Qaccording to [GOSTR341001], a public key is a point on the elliptic curve Q = (x,y). the elliptic curve energy is real 🦋
GostR3410-2001-PublicKey MUST contain 64 octets. the first 32 octets hold the little-endian representation of x, and the second 32 octets hold the little-endian representation of y. this matches the binary representation of (<y>256||<x>256) from [GOSTR341001], ch. 5.3 🌸
⚠️ same zero-bit drama as before: some erroneous applications discard zero bits at the end of the BIT STRING holding the public key. so it is RECOMMENDED to pad the bit string with zeroes up to 528 bits (66 octets) on decoding, so you can decode the encapsulated OCTET STRING 💅
the same keyUsage constraints apply to GOST R 34.10-2001 keys as the ones in Section 2.3.1 for GOST R 34.10-94 keys. copy, paste, slay 🎀
3. Security Considerations 🚨
this section is serious business, bestie, so pay attention 🙏
it is RECOMMENDED that applications verify signature values and subject public keys to conform to [GOSTR341001, GOSTR341094] standards before they use them. check before you trust, always ✨
when a certificate is used to support digital signatures as an analogue to manual ("wet") signatures, in the context of the Russian Federal Electronic Digital Signature Law [RFEDSL], the certificate MUST contain a keyUsage extension, it MUST be critical, and keyUsage MUST NOT include keyEncipherment and keyAgreement. this is not a drill 🚨
it is RECOMMENDED that CAs and applications make sure that the private key used for creating signatures is not used for more than its allowed validity period. the typical allowed validity period is 15 months, for both the GOST R 34.10-94 and GOST R 34.10-2001 algorithms 🗓️
for security discussion about the use of algorithm parameters, see the Security Considerations section in [CPALGS]. go read that one too, it's the lore 📚
4. Examples ✨
4.1. GOST R 34.10-94 Certificate 📜
here's the example certificate, PEM-encoded and everything. it's giving "real world" vibes 🌈
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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=
-----END CERTIFICATE-----and here's the decoded breakdown, the ASN.1 tree in all its glory 🧚
0 30 523: SEQUENCE {
4 30 442: SEQUENCE {
8 02 16: INTEGER
: 23 0E E3 60 46 95 24 CE C7 0B E4 94 18 2E 7E EB
26 30 8: SEQUENCE {
28 06 6: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: id-GostR3411-94-with-GostR3410-94 (1 2 643 2 2 4)
: }
36 30 105: SEQUENCE {
38 31 29: SET {
40 30 27: SEQUENCE {
42 06 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3)
47 0C 20: UTF8String 'GostR3410-94 example'
: }
: }
69 31 18: SET {
71 30 16: SEQUENCE {
73 06 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER organizationName (2 5 4 10)
78 0C 9: UTF8String 'CryptoPro'
: }
: }
89 31 11: SET {
91 30 9: SEQUENCE {
93 06 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER countryName (2 5 4 6)
98 13 2: PrintableString 'RU'
: }
: }
102 31 39: SET {
104 30 37: SEQUENCE {
106 06 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER emailAddress (1 2 840 113549 1 9 1)
117 16 24: IA5String 'GostR3410-94@example.com'
: }
: }
: }
143 30 30: SEQUENCE {
145 17 13: UTCTime '050816123250Z'
160 17 13: UTCTime '150816123250Z'
: }
175 30 105: SEQUENCE {
177 31 29: SET {
179 30 27: SEQUENCE {
181 06 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3)
186 0C 20: UTF8String 'GostR3410-94 example'
: }
: }
208 31 18: SET {
210 30 16: SEQUENCE {
212 06 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER organizationName (2 5 4 10)
217 0C 9: UTF8String 'CryptoPro'
: }
: }
228 31 11: SET {
230 30 9: SEQUENCE {
232 06 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER countryName (2 5 4 6)
237 13 2: PrintableString 'RU'
: }
: }
241 31 39: SET {
243 30 37: SEQUENCE {
245 06 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER emailAddress (1 2 840 113549 1 9 1)
256 16 24: IA5String 'GostR3410-94@example.com'
: }
: }
: }
282 30 165: SEQUENCE {
285 30 28: SEQUENCE {
287 06 6: OBJECT IDENTIFIER id-GostR3410-94 (1 2 643 2 2 20)
295 30 18: SEQUENCE {
297 06 7: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-A-ParamSet
: (1 2 643 2 2 32 2)
306 06 7: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: id-GostR3411-94-CryptoProParamSet
: (1 2 643 2 2 30 1)
: }
: }
315 03 132: BIT STRING 0 unused bits, encapsulates {
319 04 128: OCTET STRING
: BB 84 66 E1 79 9E 5B 34 D8 2C 80 7F 13 A8 19 66
: 71 57 FE 8C 54 25 21 47 6F 30 0B 27 77 46 98 C6
: FB 47 55 BE B7 B2 F3 93 6C 39 B5 42 37 26 84 E2
: 0D 10 8A 24 0E 1F 0C 42 4D 2B 3B 11 2B A8 BF 66
: 39 32 5C 94 8B C1 A8 FE 1B 63 12 F6 09 25 87 CC
: 75 1B F4 E5 89 8A 09 82 68 D3 5C 77 A6 0F B6 90
: 10 13 8D E3 3E 7C 9C 91 D6 AC 0D 08 2C 3E 78 C1
: B5 C2 B6 B7 1A A8 2A 8B 45 81 93 32 32 76 FA 7B
: }
: }
: }
450 30 8: SEQUENCE {
452 06 6: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: id-GostR3411-94-with-GostR3410-94 (1 2 643 2 2 4)
: }
460 03 65: BIT STRING 0 unused bits
: 11 C7 08 7E 12 DC 02 F1 02 23 29 47 76 8F 47 2A
: 81 83 50 E3 07 CC F2 E4 31 23 89 42 C8 73 E1 DE
: 22 F7 85 F3 55 BD 94 EC 46 91 9C 67 AC 58 D7 05
: 2A A7 8C B7 85 2A 01 75 85 F7 D7 38 03 FB CD 43
: }and last but not least, the signature numbers. in the signature of the above certificate, r' equals 0x22F785F355BD94EC46919C67AC58D7052AA78CB7852A017585F7D73803FBCD43 and s equals 0x11C7087E12DC02F102232947768F472A818350E307CCF2E431238942C873E1DE ✨🔥
4.2. GOST R 34.10-2001 Certificate 🎀
okay this one is the GOST R 34.10-2001 version, and it's giving very pretty PEM vibes 🦋
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----Now the ASN.1 breakdown, which is where the real fun is 🤓✨
0 30 464: SEQUENCE {
4 30 383: SEQUENCE {
8 02 16: INTEGER
: 2B F5 C6 1E C2 11 BD 17 C7 DC D4 62 66 B4 2E 21
26 30 8: SEQUENCE {
28 06 6: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: id-GostR3411-94-with-GostR3410-2001 (1 2 643 2 2 3)
: }
36 30 109: SEQUENCE {
38 31 31: SET {
40 30 29: SEQUENCE {
42 06 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3)
47 0C 22: UTF8String 'GostR3410-2001 example'
: }
: }
71 31 18: SET {
73 30 16: SEQUENCE {
75 06 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER organizationName (2 5 4 10)
80 0C 9: UTF8String 'CryptoPro'
: }
: }
91 31 11: SET {
93 30 9: SEQUENCE {
95 06 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER countryName (2 5 4 6)
100 13 2: PrintableString 'RU'
: }
: }
104 31 41: SET {
106 30 39: SEQUENCE {
108 06 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER emailAddress (1 2 840 113549 1 9 1)
119 16 26: IA5String 'GostR3410-2001@example.com'
: }
: }
: }
147 30 30: SEQUENCE {
149 17 13: UTCTime '050816141820Z'
164 17 13: UTCTime '150816141820Z'
: }
179 30 109: SEQUENCE {
181 31 31: SET {
183 30 29: SEQUENCE {
185 06 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3)
190 0C 22: UTF8String 'GostR3410-2001 example'
: }
: }
214 31 18: SET {
216 30 16: SEQUENCE {
218 06 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER organizationName (2 5 4 10)
223 0C 9: UTF8String 'CryptoPro'
: }
: }
234 31 11: SET {
236 30 9: SEQUENCE {
238 06 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER countryName (2 5 4 6)
243 13 2: PrintableString 'RU'
: }
: }
247 31 41: SET {
249 30 39: SEQUENCE {
251 06 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER emailAddress (1 2 840 113549 1 9 1)
262 16 26: IA5String 'GostR3410-2001@example.com'
: }
: }
: }
290 30 99: SEQUENCE {
292 30 28: SEQUENCE {
294 06 6: OBJECT IDENTIFIER id-GostR3410-2001 (1 2 643 2 2 19)
302 30 18: SEQUENCE {
304 06 7: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-XchA-ParamSet
: (1 2 643 2 2 36 0)
313 06 7: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: id-GostR3411-94-CryptoProParamSet
: (1 2 643 2 2 30 1)
: }
: }
322 03 67: BIT STRING 0 unused bits, encapsulates {
325 04 64: OCTET STRING
: 84 95 68 75 60 02 1A 40 75 08 CD 13 8C 31 89 2C
: FD E5 05 03 7A 43 5C F4 6D 2B 0F E7 4F 32 7E 57
: 8F EB CC 16 B9 95 88 03 D0 9A 7C 85 AE 0F E4 8D
: EA A6 BB 7E 56 C7 CB B0 DF 0F 66 BC CA EA 1A 60
: }
: }
: }
391 30 8: SEQUENCE {
393 06 6: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: id-GostR3411-94-with-GostR3410-2001 (1 2 643 2 2 3)
: }
401 03 65: BIT STRING 0 unused bits
: 3C 2F C9 09 44 B7 27 A9 EC A7 D5 E9 FB 53 6D D2
: C3 AA 64 7C 44 2E DE ED 31 16 45 4F BC 54 3F DD
: C1 DE 17 6E 8D 1B EC 71 B5 93 F3 DD 36 93 55 77
: 68 89 89 17 62 20 F4 DA B1 31 D5 B5 1C 33 DE E2
: }The key material is next 🔑 In the public key of the above certificate, x is 0x577E324FE70F2B6DF45C437A0305E5FD2C89318C13CD0875401A026075689584 and y is 0x601AEACABC660FDFB0CBC7567EBBA6EA8DE40FAE857C9AD0038895B916CCEB8F. The matching private key d is 0x0B293BE050D0082BDAE785631A6BAB68F35B42786D6DDA56AFAF169891040F77. For the signature on the certificate, r is 0xC1DE176E8D1BEC71B593F3DD36935577688989176220F4DAB131D5B51C33DEE2 and s is 0x3C2FC90944B727A9ECA7D5E9FB536DD2C3AA647C442EDEED3116454FBC543FDD 🥹
5. Acknowledgements 🫶
okay so this document was made under the "Russian Cryptographic Software Compatibility Agreement" 🤝 It was signed by FGUE STC "Atlas", CRYPTO-PRO, Factor-TS, MD PREI, Infotecs GmbH, SPRCIS (SPbRCZI), Cryptocom, and R-Alpha. The whole goal is to get everyone's products playing nicely together, which is honestly so iconic 💅
The authors also want to give a shoutout to these folks:
- Microsoft Corporation Russia 💻 for sharing info about their company's products and solutions, and for technical consulting in PKI.
- RSA Security Russia and Demos Co Ltd 🌸 for being super active collaborators and giving critical help in making this document happen.
- RSA Security Inc 🔐 for compatibility testing of the proposed data formats while they were being built into the RSA Keon product.
- Baltimore Technology plc 🦋 for compatibility testing of the proposed data formats while they were being built into their UniCERT product.
- Peter Gutmann 🧚 for his super helpful "dumpasn1" program.
- Russ Housley (Vigil Security, LLC, housley@vigilsec.com) and Vasilij Sakharov (DEMOS Co Ltd, svp@dol.ru) 💜 for encouraging the authors to create this document.
- Grigorij Chudov 🗺️ for navigating the IETF process for this document.
- Prikhodko Dmitriy (VSTU, PrikhodkoDV@volgablob.ru) 📚 for invaluable help proofreading this document and verifying the form and contents of the ASN.1 structures mentioned or used in it. Absolute legend 👑
6. References 📚
6.1. Normative References
- [GOST28147] "Cryptographic Protection for Data Processing System", GOST 28147-89, Gosudarstvennyi Standard of USSR, Government Committee of the USSR for Standards, 1989. (In Russian)
- [GOST3431195] "Information technology. Cryptographic Data Security. Cashing function.", GOST 34.311-95, Council for Standardization, Metrology and Certification of the Commonwealth of Independence States (EASC), Minsk, 1995. (In Russian)
- [GOST3431095] "Information technology. Cryptographic Data Security. Produce and check procedures of Electronic Digital Signature based on Asymmetric Cryptographic Algorithm.", GOST 34.310-95, Council for Standardization, Metrology and Certification of the Commonwealth of Independence States (EASC), Minsk, 1995. (In Russian)
- [GOST3431004] "Information technology. Cryptographic Data Security. Formation and verification processes of (electronic) digital signature based on Asymmetric Cryptographic Algorithm.", GOST 34.310-2004, Council for Standardization, Metrology and Certification of the Commonwealth of Independence States (EASC), Minsk, 2004. (In Russian)
- [GOSTR341094] "Information technology. Cryptographic Data Security. Produce and check procedures of Electronic Digital Signatures based on Asymmetric Cryptographic Algorithm.", GOST R 34.10-94, Gosudarstvennyi Standard of Russian Federation, Government Committee of the Russia for Standards, 1994. (In Russian)
- [GOSTR341001] "Information technology. Cryptographic data security. Signature and verification processes of [electronic] digital signature.", GOST R 34.10-2001, Gosudarstvennyi Standard of Russian Federation, Government Committee of the Russia for Standards, 2001. (In Russian)
- [GOSTR341194] "Information technology. Cryptographic Data Security. Hashing function.", GOST R 34.10-94, Gosudarstvennyi Standard of Russian Federation, Government Committee of the Russia for Standards, 1994. (In Russian)
- [CPALGS] Popov, V., Kurepkin, I., and S. Leontiev, "Additional Cryptographic Algorithms for Use with GOST 28147-89, GOST R 34.10-94, GOST R 34.10-2001, and GOST R 34.11-94 Algorithms", RFC 4357, January 2006.
- [PKALGS] Bassham, L., Polk, W., and R. Housley, "Algorithms and Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 3279, April 2002.
- [PROFILE] Housley, R., Polk, W., Ford, W., and D. Solo, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 3280, April 2002.
- [X.660] ITU-T Recommendation X.660 Information Technology - ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER), 1997.
- [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
6.2. Informative References
- [Schneier95] B. Schneier, Applied Cryptography, Second Edition, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1995.
- [RFEDSL] Russian Federal Electronic Digital Signature Law, 10 Jan 2002 N 1-FZ.
- [CMS] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", RFC 3852, July 2004.
Authors' Addresses 💌
Serguei Leontiev, Ed.
CRYPTO-PRO
38, Obraztsova,
Moscow, 127018, Russian Federation
EMail: lse@cryptopro.ru
Dennis Shefanovski, Ed.
Mobile TeleSystems OJSC
4, Marksistskaya Str.,
Moscow, 109147, Russian Federation
EMail: dbs@mts.ru
Grigorij Chudov
CRYPTO-PRO
38, Obraztsova,
Moscow, 127018, Russian Federation
EMail: chudov@cryptopro.ru
Alexandr Afanasiev
Factor-TS
office 711, 14, Presnenskij val,
Moscow, 123557, Russian Federation
EMail: afa1@factor-ts.ru
Nikolaj Nikishin
Infotecs GmbH
p/b 35, 80-5, Leningradskij prospekt,
Moscow, 125315, Russian Federation
EMail: nikishin@infotecs.ru
Boleslav Izotov
FGUE STC "Atlas"
38, Obraztsova,
Moscow, 127018, Russian Federation
EMail: izotov@nii.voskhod.ru
Elena Minaeva
MD PREI
build 3, 6A, Vtoroj Troitskij per.,
Moscow, Russian Federation
EMail: evminaeva@mail.ru
Igor Ovcharenko
MD PREI
Office 600, 14, B.Novodmitrovskaya,
Moscow, Russian Federation
EMail: igori@mo.msk.ru
Serguei Murugov
R-Alpha
4/1, Raspletina,
Moscow, 123060, Russian Federation
EMail: msm@top-cross.ru
Igor Ustinov
Cryptocom
office 239, 51, Leninskij prospekt,
Moscow, 119991, Russian Federation
EMail: igus@cryptocom.ru
Anatolij Erkin
SPRCIS (SPbRCZI)
1, Obrucheva,
St.Petersburg, 195220, Russian Federation
EMail: erkin@nevsky.netFull Copyright Statement 💖
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📦 where this page comes from
- ietf: rfc4491 2006-05
- 💖 girlified by claude-haiku-5-5 on : a language model's rewrite of the original, under its terms