RFC 3739
Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: Qualified Certificates Profile
RFC 3739 🎀
okay so this one is RFC 3739, titled Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: Qualified Certificates Profile 💖. It's a Standards Track doc from the Network Working Group, dated March 2004. The authors are S. Santesson from Microsoft, M. Nystrom from RSA Security, and T. Polk from NIST. It obsoletes RFC 3039 and doesn't update anything else ✨.
Status of this Memo 🧚
bestie, this doc specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the Internet community, and it's asking for discussion and suggestions for improvements 💅. If you want to know where this protocol stands in terms of standardization, check the current edition of the "Internet Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1). Distribution of this memo is unlimited 🌈.
Copyright Notice 💜
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004). All Rights Reserved.
Abstract 🦋
this doc forms a certificate profile, based on RFC 3280, for identity certificates issued to natural persons 🫶.
The profile sets specific conventions for certificates that are qualified inside a defined legal framework, called Qualified Certificates. BUT (and this is important) the profile does NOT define any legal requirements for those Qualified Certificates 😭.
The goal is to define a certificate profile that supports issuing Qualified Certificates no matter what the local legal requirements are. The profile isn't limited to Qualified Certificates, and further profiling may help meet specific local needs 🌸.
Table of Contents 📋
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Changes since RFC 3039 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. Definitions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Requirements and Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1. Properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2. Statement of Purpose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.3. Policy Issues. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.4. Uniqueness of Names. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3. Certificate and Certificate Extensions Profile . . . . . . . . 6
3.1. Basic Certificate Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1.1. Issuer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1.2. Subject. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.2. Certificate Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.2.1. Subject Alternative Name . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.2.2. Subject Directory Attributes . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.2.3. Certificate Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.2.4. Key Usage. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.2.5. Biometric Information. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.2.6. Qualified Certificate Statements . . . . . . . . 13
4. Security Considerations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
A. ASN.1 Definitions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
A.1. 1988 ASN.1 Module (Normative). . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
A.2. 1997 ASN.1 Module (Informative). . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
B. A Note on Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
C. Example Certificate. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
C.1. ASN.1 Structure. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
C.1.1. Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
C.1.2. The Certificate. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
C.2. ASN.1 Dump . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
C.3. DER-encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
C.4. CA's Public Key. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Full Copyright Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 341. Introduction ✨
this spec is one piece of a whole family of standards for the X.509 Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) for the Internet 🌸. It's based on [X.509] and [RFC 3280], which define the underlying certificate formats and semantics you need for a full implementation of this standard.
this profile includes specific mechanisms meant for use with Qualified Certificates. The term Qualified Certificates, plus the assumptions that shape this doc's scope, get covered in Section 2 💅.
Section 3 defines requirements on certificate information content. This spec gives profiles for two certificate fields: issuer and subject. It also profiles four certificate extensions from RFC 3280 (subject alternate name, subject directory attributes, certificate policies, and key usage), and it defines two extra extensions: biometric information and qualified certificate statements 🦋. The extensions are written in the 1997 Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1) [X.680]. BUT to stay in line with RFC 3280, the 1988 ASN.1 module in Appendix A holds all the normative definitions (the 1997 module in Appendix A is informative) 🤓.
In Section 4, we go over some security considerations so you can see the security context this standard might get used in 🔥.
Appendix A has all the relevant ASN.1 structures that aren't already defined in RFC 3280. Appendix B is a note on attributes. Appendix C has an example certificate 🍓.
The appendices are followed by the References, Authors' Addresses, and the Full Copyright Statement ✨.
1.1. Changes since RFC 3039 🌈
This specification obsoletes RFC 3039. Here's how it differs from RFC 3039 in the basic areas:
- Some editorial clarifications were made to the intro sections, so it's clear this profile works for a broad range of certificates, even though its main purpose is making Qualified Certificates easier to issue 🧚.
- To line up with RFC 3280, support for domainComponent and title attributes in subject names is included, and postalAddress is no longer supported 💖.
- To match actual usage, support for the title attribute in the subject directory attributes extension is no longer supported 🙈.
- To make this profile more broadly applicable, some constraints on key usage settings in the key usage extension have been removed 🫶.
- A new qc-Statement reflecting this second version of the profile is defined in Section 3.2.6.1. This profile obsoletes RFC 3039, but the qc-statement reflecting compliance with RFC 3039 is also defined for backwards compatibility 👑.
1.2. Definitions 💜
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14, [RFC 2119] 📖.
2. Requirements and Assumptions 🎀
The term "Qualified Certificate" is used by the European Directive on Electronic Signature [EU-ESDIR] to mean a specific type of certificate, one that shows up in European electronic signature legislation 🇪🇺. This specification is meant to support this class of certificates, but its scope isn't limited to that application ✨.
Within this standard, "Qualified Certificate" gets used more generally. It describes a certificate whose main purpose is to identify a person with a high level of assurance, where the certificate meets some qualification requirements set by an applicable legal framework, like the European Directive on Electronic Signature [EU-ESDIR]. The actual mechanisms that decide whether a certificate should or should not count as a "Qualified Certificate" under any legislation are outside this standard's scope 😤.
Harmonization in the field of identity certificates issued to natural persons (especially Qualified Certificates) is essential across several aspects that fall outside the scope of RFC 3280. The biggest ones that affect this specification's scope are:
- Defining names and identity information so the associated subject gets identified in a uniform way 🪪.
- Defining information that identifies the CA and the jurisdiction the CA operates under when it issues a particular certificate 🗺️.
- Defining key usage extension usage for Qualified Certificates 🔑.
- Defining an information structure for storing biometric information 🧬.
- Defining a standardized way to store predefined statements that matter for Qualified Certificates 📜.
- Requirements for critical extensions ⭐.
2.1. Properties 🦋
This profile accommodates profiling needs for Qualified Certificates, based on these assumptions:
- Qualified Certificates are issued by a CA that makes a statement that the certificate serves the purpose of a Qualified Certificate, as discussed in Section 2.2 🫶.
- The Qualified Certificate indicates a certificate policy consistent with the liabilities, practices, and procedures the CA undertakes, as discussed in Section 2.3 💅.
- The Qualified Certificate is issued to a natural person (a living human being) 🧍♀️.
- The Qualified Certificate contains a name that may be based on the subject's real name or on a pseudonym 🎭.
2.2. Statement of Purpose 🌸
This profile defines conventions for declaring, inside a certificate, that it serves the purpose of being a Qualified Certificate. This lets the CA explicitly define that intent 🧚.
The point of this declaration is to help any concerned entity evaluate the risk of creating or accepting signatures that are based on a Qualified Certificate 🔍.
This profile defines two ways to include this information:
- As information defined by a certificate policy included in the certificate policies extension, and 📋
- As a statement included in the Qualified Certificates Statements extension 🍓.
2.3. Policy Issues 💖
Certain policy aspects define the context in which this profile is to be understood and used. It is, however, outside the scope of this profile to specify any policies or legal aspects that will govern services which issue or utilize certificates under this profile 🙈.
That said, this profile assumes that a responsible issuing CA will undertake to follow a certificate policy consistent with its liabilities, practices, and procedures 🤝.
2.4. Uniqueness of names 👑
The distinguished name was originally defined in X.501 [X.501] as a representation of a directory name. It's a construct that identifies a particular object from among a set of all objects 🌈. The distinguished name MUST be unique for each subject entity certified by the one CA, as defined by the issuer name field, for the whole lifetime of the CA 💜.
Part 1 of 6 is done! 💖 Five more parts to go, so stay tuned, bestie 🧚
3. Certificate and Certificate Extensions Profile ✨
okay bestie, this is where we get into the certificate profile 🎀 it's built on RFC 3280, which is itself built on the X.509 version 3 format, so if you're actually implementing this you are REQUIRED to go read the underlying formats and semantics in RFC 3280 🤓 no skipping!!
ASN.1 definitions that RFC 3280 doesn't already cover live in Appendix A 🧚
3.1. Basic Certificate Fields
this bit adds extra details about the contents of two fields in the basic certificate: the issuer and the subject 💖
3.1.1. Issuer
the issuer field SHALL identify the organization responsible for issuing the certificate 🏢 the name SHOULD be an officially registered name of the organization, so no made-up company names pls 💅
the distinguished name of the issuer SHALL be specified using an appropriate subset of these attributes:
domainComponent;countryName;stateOrProvinceName;organizationName;localityName;andserialNumber.
domainComponent comes from [RFC 2247], and all the other attributes come from [RFC 3280] and [X.520] 📚
additional attributes MAY be present, but they SHOULD NOT be necessary to identify the issuing organization 🙈
a relying party MAY have to consult the associated certificate policies and/or the issuer's CPS to figure out what the name fields actually mean 🔍 it's giving detective era ✨
3.1.2. Subject
the subject field of a certificate that follows this profile SHALL contain a distinguished name of the subject (see 2.4 for the definition of distinguished name) 🦋
the subject field SHALL contain an appropriate subset of these attributes:
domainComponent;countryName;commonName;surname;givenName;pseudonym;serialNumber;title;organizationName;organizationalUnitName;stateOrProvinceName;andlocalityName.
again, domainComponent is from [RFC 2247] and everything else is from [RFC 3280] and [X.520] 💜
other attributes MAY also be present, but using them MUST NOT be necessary to tell one subject name apart from another 🫶 the attributes listed above are enough to keep subject names unique, so we're good!
of these attributes, the subject field SHALL include at least one of the following:
Choice I: commonName
Choice II: givenName
Choice III: pseudonymthe countryName attribute value sets the general context that the other attributes get read in. it does NOT have to mean the subject's country of citizenship or residence, and it doesn't have to be the country of issuance either 🌍 the vibes are about context, not passports 🛂
Note: many X.500 implementations need countryName to be present in the DIT. when the subject name points to a public X.500 directory entry, countryName SHOULD always be there 📌
the commonName attribute value SHALL, when present, contain a name of the subject. it MAY be in the subject's preferred presentation format, a format the CA prefers, or some other format entirely ✨ pseudonyms, nicknames, and names spelled differently from the registered name MAY be used too 🎭 to make sense of what's in commonName, complying applications MAY have to check the current givenName and surname values, or the pseudonym value 🔎
Note: a lot of client implementations just assume commonName is there in the subject field and use it to show the subject's name, no matter what givenName, surname, or pseudonym say 😭 so yeah, it's kinda important
the surname and givenName attribute types SHALL be used in the subject field if neither commonName nor pseudonym is present 🧸 and if the subject only has a givenName, then surname SHALL be omitted 🙅♀️
the pseudonym attribute type SHALL, if present, contain a pseudonym of the subject 🦄 and using pseudonym MUST NOT be combined with surname and/or givenName. no mixing, periodt 💅
the serialNumber attribute type SHALL, when present, be used to tell apart names that would otherwise look identical 👯 it has no defined meaning beyond keeping subject names unique 🔐 it MAY contain a number or code the CA assigned, or an identifier from a government or civil authority 🏛️ and it's the CA's job to make sure serialNumber is enough to sort out any subject name collisions 🫡
the title attribute type SHALL, when present, be used to store a designated position or function of the subject inside the organization named by the organizational attributes in the subject field 💼 how title connects to the subject and the organization is beyond this document's scope, so that's a different tea ☕
the organizationName and organizationalUnitName attribute types SHALL, when present, store the name and relevant info of an organization the subject is associated with 🏫 what kind of association that is also sits outside this document 🙃
the stateOrProvinceName and localityName attribute types SHALL, when present, store geographical info associated with the subject 🗺️ if an organizationName value is also present, then stateOrProvinceName and localityName SHALL be associated with that specified organization 📍 how they link up with the subject or the organizationName is beyond this document too 🌸
compliant implementations SHALL be able to interpret the attributes named in this section 💖 no ghosting these!
3.2. Certificate Extensions
this section adds extra details about four certificate extensions that RFC 3280 defines: Subject Alternative Name, Subject directory attributes, Certificate policies, and Key usage 🌈 it also defines two brand-new extensions: biometric information and qualified certificate statements ✨
3.2.1. Subject Alternative Name
if the subjectAltName extension is present and it contains a directoryName name, then the directoryName MUST follow the conventions in section 3.1.2 of this profile 🧩 no freestyling the directoryName!
3.2.2. Subject Directory Attributes
the subjectDirectoryAttributes extension MAY be present, and it MAY contain extra attributes tied to the subject 🎀 it's a complement to whatever's already in the subject field and the subject alternative name extension, so they work as a team 👯♀️
attributes that belong in this extension are the ones that are NOT part of the subject's distinguished name, but that MAY still be useful for other stuff, like authorization 🔑
this extension MUST NOT be marked critical. 🚫 real rule, no exceptions
compliant implementations SHALL be able to interpret these attributes:
dateOfBirth;placeOfBirth;gender;countryOfCitizenship;andcountryOfResidence.
other attributes MAY be included according to local definitions 🌸
the dateOfBirth attribute SHALL, when present, contain the subject's date of birth 🎂 how that date gets tied to the subject is outside this document's scope 🙆♀️ the date is defined in the GeneralizedTime format and SHOULD specify GMT 12.00.00 (noon) down to the granularity of seconds, so a time zone shift can't accidentally change the date 🕛 for example, a birth date of September 27, 1959 is encoded as "19590927120000Z" 🍓 compliant certificate parsing applications SHOULD ignore any time data and just show the date they contain, no time zone adjustments 🫶
the placeOfBirth attribute SHALL, when present, contain the subject's place of birth 📍 how that place gets associated with the subject is outside this document's scope ✨
the gender attribute SHALL, when present, contain the subject's gender value 🌈 for females the value "F" (or "f") has to be used, and for males the value "M" (or "m") has to be used 💜 how gender gets associated with the subject is outside this document's scope 🙏
the countryOfCitizenship attribute SHALL, when present, contain the identifier of at least one of the subject's claimed countries of citizenship at the time the certificate was issued 🛂 if more than one country of citizenship is specified, each one SHOULD get its own separate, single-valued countryOfCitizenship attribute 🗂️ deciding citizenship is a matter of law and is outside this document's scope ⚖️
the countryOfResidence attribute SHALL, when present, contain the value of at least one country where the subject is resident 🏡 if more than one country of residence is specified, each one SHOULD get its own separate, single-valued countryOfResidence attribute 📦 deciding residence is a matter of law and is outside this document's scope 🧾
3.2.3. Certificate Policies
the certificate policies extension SHALL be present, and it SHALL contain the identifier of at least one certificate policy that reflects the practices and procedures the CA follows 📜 the certificate policies extension MAY be marked critical 🦋
info from the issuer about what the certificate is for, as discussed in Section 2.2, SHOULD be evident through the indicated policies 💅
the certificate policies extension MUST include all the policy info needed for certification path validation 🛤️ if policy-related statements show up in the QCStatements extension (see 3.2.6), then those statements SHOULD also be contained in the identified policies 🔗
certificate policies MAY be combined with any qualifier defined in RFC 3280 🎀
3.2.4. Key Usage
the key usage extension SHALL be present 🔑 key usage settings SHALL be set in accordance with the RFC 3280 definitions 📖 further requirements on key usage settings MAY be defined by local policy and/or local legal requirements 🏛️
the key usage extension SHOULD be marked critical 💫
3.2.5. Biometric Information 🔐
okay so this section is about an OPTIONAL extension for storing biometric info 👀 and the way it works is that the info gets stored as a hash of a biometric template 🦋. the whole point is to let you authenticate biometric info, which is lowkey iconic.
the actual biometric info that matches the stored hash is NOT stored in this extension 🙈 but the extension MAY include a URI (sourceDataUri) that points to a file containing that info 📁.
if you include it, the URI MUST use the HTTP scheme (http://) [HTTP/1.1] or the HTTPS scheme (https://) [RFC 2818] 🔒. and bestie, the fact that identifying data is getting checked can be sensitive too 😭, so people deploying this might wanna think about using URIs that outsiders can't easily link back to the people whose info is being fetched 🫶.
using the URI option assumes the file's data encoding format is figured out through means outside the scope of this spec, like file naming conventions and metadata inside the file 🗂️. and using the URI option doesn't mean it's the only way to access the info ✨.
it is RECOMMENDED that biometric info in this extension stick to types that humans can verify, meaning the "is this an accurate representation of the subject?" call is naturally made by a person 🧑🤝🧑💅. like a graphical image shown to the relying party, which MAY be used by the relying party to make identification of the subject even better 🌸.
this extension MUST NOT be marked critical 🚫. no exceptions, periodt 💀.
biometricInfo EXTENSION ::= {
SYNTAX BiometricSyntax
IDENTIFIED BY id-pe-biometricInfo }
id-pe-biometricInfo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pe 2}
BiometricSyntax ::= SEQUENCE OF BiometricData
BiometricData ::= SEQUENCE {
typeOfBiometricData TypeOfBiometricData,
hashAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
biometricDataHash OCTET STRING,
sourceDataUri IA5String OPTIONAL }
TypeOfBiometricData ::= CHOICE {
predefinedBiometricType PredefinedBiometricType,
biometricDataID OBJECT IDENTIFIER }
PredefinedBiometricType ::= INTEGER { picture(0),
handwritten-signature(1)} (picture|handwritten-signature,...)when the predefined biometric type picture is present, it SHALL identify that the source picture is a displayable graphical image of the subject 🖼️✨. the hash of that graphical image SHALL be calculated over the whole referenced image file 🧮.
when the predefined biometric type handwritten-signature is present, it SHALL identify that the source data is a displayable graphical image of the subject's handwritten signature ✍️💜. the hash of that graphical image SHALL be calculated over the whole referenced image file too 🎀.
3.2.6. Qualified Certificate Statements 📜
this section defines an OPTIONAL extension for including statements that spell out explicit properties of the certificate 💅. these are giving "receipts" for the cert 🧾✨.
each statement SHALL include an object identifier for the statement, and it MAY also include optional qualifying data in the statementInfo parameter 🔖.
if the statementInfo parameter is included, then the object identifier of the statement SHALL define the syntax, and it SHOULD define the semantics of this parameter 🤓. if the object identifier doesn't define the semantics, a relying party may have to check a relevant certificate policy or CPS to figure out the exact semantics 🔍. (the detective energy is real 🕵️♀️).
this extension may be critical or non-critical 🌈. if the extension is critical, that means all the statements included in it are regarded as critical 🚨.
qcStatements EXTENSION ::= {
SYNTAX QCStatements
IDENTIFIED BY id-pe-qcStatements }
-- NOTE: This extension does not allow to mix critical and
-- non-critical Qualified Certificate Statements. Either all
-- statements must be critical or all statements must be
-- non-critical.
id-pe-qcStatements OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe 3 }
QCStatements ::= SEQUENCE OF QCStatement
QCStatement ::= SEQUENCE {
statementId QC-STATEMENT.&Id({SupportedStatements}),
statementInfo QC-STATEMENT.&Type
({SupportedStatements}{@statementId}) OPTIONAL }
SupportedStatements QC-STATEMENT ::= { qcStatement-1,...}a statement that fits in this extension MAY be a statement by the issuer that the certificate is issued as a Qualified Certificate under a particular legal system (as discussed in Section 2.2) 🏛️💖.
other statements that fit in here MAY be about the legal jurisdiction the certificate is issued in 🌍. as an example, this MAY include a maximum reliance limit for the certificate that shows restrictions on the CA's liability 💸🙃.
3.2.6.1. Predefined Statements 🧚
the certificate statement (id-qcs-pkixQCSyntax-v1) identifies conformance with requirements defined in the obsoleted RFC 3039 (Version 1) 🕰️. so this statement is basically there to identify old certs that were issued following RFC 3039 🗃️. this statement MUST NOT be included in certificates issued under this profile 🚫💀.
this profile includes a NEW qualified certificate statement (identified by the OID id-qcs-pkixQCSyntax-v2) that identifies conformance with requirements defined in this profile 🆕✨. this Qualified Certificate profile is called version 2, while RFC 3039 is called version 1 💜.
qcStatement-1 QC-STATEMENT ::= { SYNTAX SemanticsInformation
IDENTIFIED BY id-qcs-pkixQCSyntax-v1 }
-- This statement identifies conformance with requirements
-- defined in RFC 3039 (Version 1). This statement may
-- optionally contain additional semantics information as
-- specified below.
qcStatement-2 QC-STATEMENT ::= { SYNTAX SemanticsInformation
IDENTIFIED BY id-qcs-pkixQCSyntax-v2 }
-- This statement identifies conformance with requirements
-- defined in this Qualified Certificate profile
-- (Version 2). This statement may optionally contain
-- additional semantics information as specified below.
SemanticsInformation ::= SEQUENCE {
semanticsIdentifier OBJECT IDENTIFIER OPTIONAL,
nameRegistrationAuthorities NameRegistrationAuthorities
OPTIONAL }
(WITH COMPONENTS {..., semanticsIdentifier PRESENT}|
WITH COMPONENTS {..., nameRegistrationAuthorities PRESENT})
NameRegistrationAuthorities ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
GeneralNamethe SementicsInformation component identified by id-qcs-pkixQCSyntax-v1 MAY contain a semantics identifier, and it MAY identify one or more name registration authorities 🏷️.
the semanticsIdentifier component, if present, SHALL contain an OID that defines semantics for attributes and names in basic certificate fields and certificate extensions 🧠. the OID may define semantics for all of the attributes and/or names, or just for a subgroup of them 🎯.
the NameRegistrationAuthorities component, if present, SHALL contain a name of one or more name registration authorities, which are responsible for registering attributes or names associated with the subject 📋✨. the link between an identified name registration authority and the present attributes MAY be defined by a semantics identifier OID, by a certificate policy (or CPS), or by some other implicit factors 🔗.
if a value of type SemanticsInformation is present in a QCStatement where the statementID component is set to id-qcs-pkix-QCSyntax-v1 or id-qcs-pkix-QCSyntax-v2, then at least one of the semanticsIdentifier or nameRegistrationAuthorities fields must be present, as indicated 🫠. note that the statementInfo component doesn't need to be present in a QCStatement value, even if the statementID component is set to id-qcs-pkix-QCSyntax-v1 or id-qcs-pkix-QCSyntax-v2 💁♀️.
4. Security Considerations 🚨🔐
okay this section is SERIOUS bestie 😭. the legal value of a digital signature that gets validated with a Qualified Certificate is going to depend a LOT on the policy governing the use of the associated private key ⚖️. both the private key holder AND the relying party should make sure that the private key is used only with the consent of the legitimate key holder 🙅♀️🔑.
since the public keys are for public use with legal implications for the parties involved, certain conditions should exist before CAs issue certificates as Qualified Certificates 🫢. the associated private keys must be unique for the subject, and they must be maintained under the subject's sole control 👑. so a CA should not issue a qualified certificate if the means to use the private key isn't protected against unintended usage 🛑. this implies that the CA has some knowledge about the subject's cryptographic module 🧩.
the CA must further verify that the public key in the certificate is legitimately representing the subject ✅.
CAs should not issue CA certificates with policy mapping extensions that indicate acceptance of another CA's policy, unless these conditions are met 🙅.
combining the nonRepudiation bit in the keyUsage certificate extension with other keyUsage bits may have security implications, depending on the context the certificate is used in 🤔. applications validating electronic signatures based on such certificates should determine whether the present key usage combination is appropriate for their use 🧐.
the ability to compare two qualified certificates to figure out if they represent the same physical entity depends on the semantics of the subjects' names 🪪. the semantics of a particular attribute may be different for different issuers 🌀. comparing names without knowing the semantics of names in those particular certificates may give misleading results 😵💫💀.
this specification is a profile of RFC 3280 📚. the security considerations section of that document applies to this specification as well 💖.
A. ASN.1 Definitions 🧬
as in RFC 3280, ASN.1 modules are supplied in two different variants of the ASN.1 syntax 💫.
Appendix A.1 is in the 1988 syntax, and it does not use macros 📜. however, since the module imports type definitions from modules in RFC 3280 that aren't completely in the 1988 syntax, the same comments as in RFC 3280 about its use apply here as well 🔁. that means Appendix A.1 may be parsed by a 1988 ASN.1-parser by removing the definitions for the UNIVERSAL types and all references to them in RFC 3280's 1988 modules 🪄. i.e., it's a whole process, but it works 💅.
Appendix A.2 is in the 1997 syntax 🆕.
in case of discrepancies between these modules, the 1988 module is the normative one 👑🌸.
A.1. 1988 ASN.1 Module (Normative) 💖
okay bestie, this is the normative module, so it's the one implementers actually compile against 🧚 every OID and type is copied exactly below.
PKIXqualified88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-qualified-cert(31) }
DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN
-- EXPORTS ALL --
IMPORTS
GeneralName
FROM PKIX1Implicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-pkix1-implicit(19)}
AlgorithmIdentifier, DirectoryString, AttributeType, id-pkix, id-pe
FROM PKIX1Explicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-pkix1-explicit(18)};
-- Locally defined OIDs
-- Arc for QC personal data attributes
id-pda OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 9 }
-- Arc for QC statements
id-qcs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 11 }
-- Personal data attributes
id-pda-dateOfBirth AttributeType ::= { id-pda 1 }
DateOfBirth ::= GeneralizedTime
id-pda-placeOfBirth AttributeType ::= { id-pda 2 }
PlaceOfBirth ::= DirectoryString
id-pda-gender AttributeType ::= { id-pda 3 }
Gender ::= PrintableString (SIZE(1))
-- "M", "F", "m" or "f"
id-pda-countryOfCitizenship AttributeType ::= { id-pda 4 }
CountryOfCitizenship ::= PrintableString (SIZE (2))
-- ISO 3166 Country Code
id-pda-countryOfResidence AttributeType ::= { id-pda 5 }
CountryOfResidence ::= PrintableString (SIZE (2))
-- ISO 3166 Country Code
-- Certificate extensions
-- Biometric info extension
id-pe-biometricInfo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pe 2}
BiometricSyntax ::= SEQUENCE OF BiometricData
BiometricData ::= SEQUENCE {
typeOfBiometricData TypeOfBiometricData,
hashAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
biometricDataHash OCTET STRING,
sourceDataUri IA5String OPTIONAL }
TypeOfBiometricData ::= CHOICE {
predefinedBiometricType PredefinedBiometricType,
biometricDataOid OBJECT IDENTIFIER }
PredefinedBiometricType ::= INTEGER {
picture(0), handwritten-signature(1)}
(picture|handwritten-signature)
-- QC Statements Extension
-- NOTE: This extension does not allow to mix critical and
-- non-critical Qualified Certificate Statements. Either all
-- statements must be critical or all statements must be
-- non-critical.
id-pe-qcStatements OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe 3}
QCStatements ::= SEQUENCE OF QCStatement
QCStatement ::= SEQUENCE {
statementId OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
statementInfo ANY DEFINED BY statementId OPTIONAL}
-- QC statements
id-qcs-pkixQCSyntax-v1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-qcs 1 }
-- This statement identifies conformance with requirements
-- defined in RFC 3039 (Version 1). This statement may
-- optionally contain additional semantics information as specified
-- below.
id-qcs-pkixQCSyntax-v2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-qcs 2 }
-- This statement identifies conformance with requirements
-- defined in this Qualified Certificate profile
-- (Version 2). This statement may optionally contain
-- additional semantics information as specified below.
SemanticsInformation ::= SEQUENCE {
semanticsIndentifier OBJECT IDENTIFIER OPTIONAL,
nameRegistrationAuthorities NameRegistrationAuthorities OPTIONAL
} -- At least one field shall be present
NameRegistrationAuthorities ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GeneralName
ENDA.2. 1997 ASN.1 Module (Informative) 🦋
this one's informative, so it's more of a reference vibe, but it's still super useful for seeing how the same stuff gets written in the newer ASN.1 style ✨
PKIXqualified97 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-qualified-cert-97(35) }
DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN
-- EXPORTS ALL --
IMPORTS
informationFramework, certificateExtensions, selectedAttributeTypes,
authenticationFramework, upperBounds, id-at
FROM UsefulDefinitions {joint-iso-itu-t(2) ds(5) module(1)
usefulDefinitions(0) 3 }
ub-name
FROM UpperBounds upperBounds
GeneralName
FROM CertificateExtensions certificateExtensions
ATTRIBUTE, AttributeType
FROM InformationFramework informationFramework
DirectoryString
FROM SelectedAttributeTypes selectedAttributeTypes
AlgorithmIdentifier, Extension, EXTENSION
FROM AuthenticationFramework authenticationFramework
id-pkix, id-pe
FROM PKIX1Explicit88 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-pkix1-explicit(18) };
-- Locally defined OIDs
-- Arc for QC personal data attributes
id-pda OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 9 }
-- Arc for QC statements
id-qcs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 11 }
-- Personal data attributes
id-pda-dateOfBirth AttributeType ::= { id-pda 1 }
id-pda-placeOfBirth AttributeType ::= { id-pda 2 }
id-pda-gender AttributeType ::= { id-pda 3 }
id-pda-countryOfCitizenship AttributeType ::= { id-pda 4 }
id-pda-countryOfResidence AttributeType ::= { id-pda 5 }
-- Certificate extensions
id-pe-biometricInfo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe 2 }
id-pe-qcStatements OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe 3 }
-- QC statements
id-qcs-pkixQCSyntax-v1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-qcs 1 }
id-qcs-pkixQCSyntax-v2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-qcs 2 }
-- Personal data attributes
dateOfBirth ATTRIBUTE ::= {
WITH SYNTAX GeneralizedTime
ID id-pda-dateOfBirth }
placeOfBirth ATTRIBUTE ::= {
WITH SYNTAX DirectoryString {ub-name}
ID id-pda-placeOfBirth }
gender ATTRIBUTE ::= {
WITH SYNTAX PrintableString (SIZE(1) ^ FROM("M"|"F"|"m"|"f"))
ID id-pda-gender }
countryOfCitizenship ATTRIBUTE ::= {
WITH SYNTAX PrintableString (SIZE (2))
(CONSTRAINED BY { -- ISO 3166 codes only -- })
ID id-pda-countryOfCitizenship }
countryOfResidence ATTRIBUTE ::= {
WITH SYNTAX PrintableString (SIZE (2))
(CONSTRAINED BY { -- ISO 3166 codes only -- })
ID id-pda-countryOfResidence }
-- Certificate extensions
-- Biometric info extension
biometricInfo EXTENSION ::= {
SYNTAX BiometricSyntax
IDENTIFIED BY id-pe-biometricInfo }
BiometricSyntax ::= SEQUENCE OF BiometricData
BiometricData ::= SEQUENCE {
typeOfBiometricData TypeOfBiometricData,
hashAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
biometricDataHash OCTET STRING,
sourceDataUri IA5String OPTIONAL,
... -- For future extensions -- }
TypeOfBiometricData ::= CHOICE {
predefinedBiometricType PredefinedBiometricType,
biometricDataOid OBJECT IDENTIFIER }
PredefinedBiometricType ::= INTEGER {
picture(0), handwritten-signature(1)}
(picture|handwritten-signature,...)
-- QC Statements Extension
-- NOTE: This extension does not allow to mix critical and
-- non-critical Qualified Certificate Statements. Either all
-- statements must be critical or all statements must be
-- non-critical.
qcStatements EXTENSION ::= {
SYNTAX QCStatements
IDENTIFIED BY id-pe-qcStatements }
QCStatements ::= SEQUENCE OF QCStatement
QCStatement ::= SEQUENCE {
statementId QC-STATEMENT.&id({SupportedStatements}),
statementInfo QC-STATEMENT.&Type
({SupportedStatements}{@statementId}) OPTIONAL }
QC-STATEMENT ::= CLASS {
&id OBJECT IDENTIFIER UNIQUE,
&Type OPTIONAL }
WITH SYNTAX {
[SYNTAX &Type] IDENTIFIED BY &id }
qcStatement-1 QC-STATEMENT ::= { SYNTAX SemanticsInformation
IDENTIFIED BY id-qcs-pkixQCSyntax-v1}
-- This statement identifies conformance with requirements
-- defined in RFC 3039 (Version 1). This statement
-- may optionally contain additional semantics information
-- as specified below.
qcStatement-2 QC-STATEMENT ::= { SYNTAX SemanticsInformation
IDENTIFIED BY id-qcs-pkixQCSyntax-v2}
-- This statement identifies conformance with requirements
-- defined in this Qualified Certificate profile
-- (Version 2). This statement may optionally contain
-- additional semantics information as specified below.
SemanticsInformation ::= SEQUENCE {
semanticsIdentifier OBJECT IDENTIFIER OPTIONAL,
nameRegistrationAuthorities NameRegistrationAuthorities OPTIONAL
}(WITH COMPONENTS {..., semanticsIdentifier PRESENT}|
WITH COMPONENTS {..., nameRegistrationAuthorities PRESENT})
NameRegistrationAuthorities ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GeneralName
-- The following information object set is defined to constrain the
-- set of attributes applications are required to recognize as QCSs.
SupportedStatements QC-STATEMENT ::= {
qcStatement-1 |
qcStatement-2 , ... -- For future extensions -- }
ENDB. A Note on Attributes 🌸
okay so this bit is basically the heads-up that this doc defines a bunch of brand-new attributes 👀 they're meant for the subject field of issued certificates AND the subjectDirectoryAttributes extension. the full definitions (matching rules included) plus the object classes for LDAP-accessible directories live over in PKCS 9 [RFC 2985] 💜
C. Example Certificate 🎀
this section is the ASN.1 structure, an ASN.1 dump, and the DER-encoding of a certificate that follows this profile 💅 it was made with the help of the OSS ASN.1 compiler, and it's giving very real-world vibes. here's what this cert is actually about:
- The certificate is signed with RSA and the SHA-1 hash algorithm
- The issuer's distinguished name is (using the syntax specified in [RFC 2253]): O=GMD - Forschungszentrum Informationstechnik GmbH, C=DE
- The subject's distinguished name is (using the syntax specified in [RFC 2253]): GN=Petra+SN=Barzin, O=GMD - Forschungszentrum Informationstechnik GmbH, C=DE
- The certificate was issued on 1 February, 2004 and will expire on 1 February, 2008
- The certificate contains a 1024 bit RSA key
- The certificate includes a critical key usage extension exclusively indicating non-repudiation
- The certificate includes a certificate policy identifier extension indicating the practices and procedures undertaken by the issuing CA (object identifier 1.3.36.8.1.1). The certificate policy object identifier is defined by TeleTrust, Germany.
- The certificate includes a subject directory attributes extension containing the following attributes:
date of birth: October, 14th 1971
place of birth: Darmstadt
country of citizenship:Germany
gender: Female- The certificate includes a qualified statement certificate extension indicating that the naming registration authority's name is "municipality@darmstadt.de".
- The certificate includes, in conformance with RFC 3280, an authority key identifier extension.
C.1. ASN.1 Structure 🦋
C.1.1. Extensions 💖
okay so extensions are already DER-encoded by the time they get placed in the structure to be signed 🧚 for clarity, they're shown here in the value notation defined in [X.680] ✨
C.1.1.1. The subjectDirectoryAttributes Extension
okay bestie, this is where the subject's personal details live 🎀 country of citizenship, gender, date of birth and place of birth, all tucked into one extension 🌸
certSubjDirAttrs AttributesSyntax ::= {
{
type id-pda-countryOfCitizenship,
values {
PrintableString : "DE"
}
},
{
type id-pda-gender,
values {
PrintableString : "F"
}
},
{
type id-pda-dateOfBirth,
values {
GeneralizedTime : "197110141200Z"
}
},
{
type id-pda-placeOfBirth,
values {
DirectoryString : utf8String : "Darmstadt"
}
}
}C.1.1.2. The keyUsage Extension
the keyUsage extension is giving minimalism 💅 it only sets nonRepudiation and nothing else, no notes 🙈
certKeyUsage KeyUsage ::= {nonRepudiation}C.1.1.3. The certificatePolicies Extension
here's the certificatePolicies extension, and it's serving one policy identifier, {1 3 36 8 1 1} 🍓 simple and iconic ✨
certCertificatePolicies CertificatePoliciesSyntax ::= {
{
policyIdentifier {1 3 36 8 1 1}
}
}C.1.1.4. The qcStatements Extension
the qcStatements extension is where it gets a little extra 🦋 it carries a statement ID of id-qcs-pkixQCSyntax-v2 plus a name registration authority with the rfc822Name municipality@darmstadt.de 🌈 the vibes are very official but still cute 🫶
certQCStatement QCStatements ::= {
{
statementId id-qcs-pkixQCSyntax-v2,
statementInfo SemanticsInformation : {
nameRegistrationAuthorities {
rfc822Name : "municipality@darmstadt.de"
}
}
}
}C.1.1.5. The authorityKeyIdentifier Extension
last extension, and it's the authorityKeyIdentifier 🔑 its keyIdentifier is the hex value 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0FFEDCBA98 🧚 very pattern-y, very on brand 😭
certAKI AuthorityKeyIdentifier ::= {
keyIdentifier '000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0FFEDCBA98'H
}C.1.2. The Certificate
okay so now we see the whole signed part of the certificate 👑 it's written in the value notation from [X.680], which is the ASN.1 notation, so it looks very formal but it's actually so readable once you squint 👀 two things to keep in mind, bestie: the extension values are already DER encoded in this structure 💜 and some values got truncated so the page doesn't explode 💀
certCertInfo CertificateInfo ::= {
version v3,
serialNumber 1234567890,
signature
{
algorithm { 1 2 840 113549 1 1 5 },
parameters RSAParams : NULL
},
issuer rdnSequence :
{
{
{
type { 2 5 4 6 },
value PrintableString : "DE"
}
},
{
{
type { 2 5 4 10 },
value UTF8String :
}
}
},
validity
{
notBefore utcTime : "040201100000Z",
notAfter utcTime : "080201100000Z"
},
subject rdnSequence :
{
{
{
type { 2 5 4 6 },
value PrintableString : "DE"
}
},
{
{
type { 2 5 4 10 },
value UTF8String :
"GMD Forschungszentrum Informationstechnik GmbH"
}
},
{
{
type { 2 5 4 4 },
value UTF8String : "Barzin"
},
{
type { 2 5 4 42 },
value UTF8String : "Petra"
}
}
},
subjectPublicKeyInfo
{
algorithm
{
algorithm { 1 2 840 113549 1 1 1 },
parameters RSAParams : NULL
},
subjectPublicKey '30818902818100DCE74CD5...0203010001'H
},
extensions
{
{
extnId { 2 5 29 9 }, -- subjectDirectoryAttributes
extnValue '305B301006082B0601050507090...7374616474'H
},
{
extnId { 2 5 29 15 }, -- keyUsage
critical TRUE,
extnValue '03020640'H
},
{
extnId { 2 5 29 32 }, -- certificatePolicies
extnValue '3009300706052B24080101'H
},
{
extnId { 2 5 29 35 }, -- authorityKeyIdentifier
extnValue '30168014000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0FFEDCBA98'H
},
{
extnId { 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 3 }, -- qcStatements
extnValue '302B302906082B06010505070B0...4742E6465 'H
}
}
}C.2. ASN.1 Dump
this section is the ASN.1 dump of the signed part of the certificate 🌸 same deal as before, some values got truncated so it stays readable ✨
CertificateInfo SEQUENCE: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16] constructed; length = 633
version : tag = [0] constructed; length = 3
Version INTEGER: tag = [UNIVERSAL 2] primitive; length = 1
2
serialNumber CertificateSerialNumber INTEGER: tag = [UNIVERSAL 2]
primitive; length = 4
1234567890
signature AlgorithmIdentifier SEQUENCE: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16]
constructed; length = 13
algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER: tag = [UNIVERSAL 6]
primitive; length = 9
{ 1 2 840 113549 1 1 5 }
parameters OpenType
NULL
issuer Name CHOICE
rdnSequence RDNSequence SEQUENCE OF: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16]
constructed; length = 72
RelativeDistinguishedName SET OF: tag = [UNIVERSAL 17]
constructed; length = 11
AttributeTypeAndValue SEQUENCE: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16]
constructed; length = 9
type OBJECT IDENTIFIER: tag = [UNIVERSAL 6]
primitive; length = 3
{ 2 5 4 6 } -- id-at-countryName
value PrintableString
"DE"
RelativeDistinguishedName SET OF: tag = [UNIVERSAL 17]
constructed; length = 57
AttributeTypeAndValue SEQUENCE: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16]
constructed; length = 55
type OBJECT IDENTIFIER: tag = [UNIVERSAL 6]
primitive; length = 3
{ 2 5 4 10 } -- id-at-organizationName
value UTF8String
"GMD Forschungszentrum Informationstechnik GmbH"
validity Validity SEQUENCE: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16]
constructed; length = 30
notBefore Time CHOICE
utcTime UTCTime: tag = [UNIVERSAL 23] primitive; length = 13
040201100000Z
notAfter Time CHOICE
utcTime UTCTime: tag = [UNIVERSAL 23] primitive; length = 13
080201100000Z
subject Name CHOICE
rdnSequence RDNSequence SEQUENCE OF: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16]
constructed; length = 101
RelativeDistinguishedName SET OF: tag = [UNIVERSAL 17]
constructed; length = 11
AttributeTypeAndValue SEQUENCE: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16]
constructed; length = 9
type OBJECT IDENTIFIER: tag = [UNIVERSAL 6]
primitive; length = 3
{ 2 5 4 6 } -- id-at-countryName
value PrintableString
"DE"
RelativeDistinguishedName SET OF: tag = [UNIVERSAL 17]
constructed; length = 55
AttributeTypeAndValue SEQUENCE: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16]
constructed; length = 53
type OBJECT IDENTIFIER: tag = [UNIVERSAL 6]
primitive; length = 3
{ 2 5 4 10 } -- id-at-organizationName
value UTF8String
"GMD Forschungszentrum Informationstechnik GmbH"
RelativeDistinguishedName SET OF: tag = [UNIVERSAL 17]
constructed; length = 29
AttributeTypeAndValue SEQUENCE: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16]
constructed; length = 13
type OBJECT IDENTIFIER: tag = [UNIVERSAL 6]
primitive; length = 3
{ 2 5 4 4 } -- id-at-surname
value UTF8String
"Barzin"
AttributeTypeAndValue SEQUENCE: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16]
constructed; length = 12
type OBJECT IDENTIFIER: tag = [UNIVERSAL 6]
primitive; length = 3
{ 2 5 4 42 } -- id-at-givenName
value UTF8String
"Petra"
subjectPublicKeyInfo SubjectPublicKeyInfo SEQUENCE:
tag = [UNIVERSAL 16] constructed; length = 159
algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier SEQUENCE: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16]
constructed; length = 13
algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER: tag = [UNIVERSAL 6]
primitive; length = 9
{ 1 2 840 113549 1 1 1 } -- rsaEncryption
parameters OpenType
NULL
subjectPublicKey BIT STRING: tag = [UNIVERSAL 3]
primitive; length = 141
0x0030818902818100dce74cd5a1d55aeb01cf5ecc20f3c3fca787...
extensions : tag = [3] constructed; length = 233
Extensions SEQUENCE OF: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16]
constructed; length = 230
Extension SEQUENCE: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16]
constructed; length = 100
extnId OBJECT IDENTIFIER: tag = [UNIVERSAL 6]
primitive; length = 3
{ 2 5 29 9 } -- id-ce-subjectDirectoryAttributes
extnValue OCTET STRING: tag = [UNIVERSAL 4]
primitive; length = 93
0x305b301006082b06010505070904310413024445300f06082...
Extension SEQUENCE: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16]
constructed; length = 14
extnId OBJECT IDENTIFIER: tag = [UNIVERSAL 6]
primitive; length = 3
{ 2 5 29 15 } -- id-ce-keyUsage
critical BOOLEAN: tag = [UNIVERSAL 1] primitive; length = 1
TRUE
extnValue OCTET STRING: tag = [UNIVERSAL 4]
primitive; length = 4
0x03020640
Extension SEQUENCE: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16]
constructed; length = 18
extnId OBJECT IDENTIFIER: tag = [UNIVERSAL 6]
primitive; length = 3
{ 2 5 29 32 } -- id-ce-certificatePolicies
extnValue OCTET STRING: tag = [UNIVERSAL 4]
primitive; length = 11
0x3009300706052b24080101
Extension SEQUENCE: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16]
constructed; length = 31
extnId OBJECT IDENTIFIER: tag = [UNIVERSAL 6]
primitive; length = 3
{ 2 5 29 35 } -- id-ce-authorityKeyIdentifier
extnValue OCTET STRING: tag = [UNIVERSAL 4]
primitive; length = 24
0x30168014000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0ffedcba98
Extension SEQUENCE: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16]
constructed; length = 57
extnId OBJECT IDENTIFIER: tag = [UNIVERSAL 6]
primitive; length = 8
{ 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 3 } -- id-pe-qcStatements
extnValue OCTET STRING: tag = [UNIVERSAL 4]
primitive; length = 45
0x302b302906082b06010505070b02301d301b81196d756e696...C.3 DER-encoding
this section is the whole DER-encoded certificate in hex, so grab your favourite hex decoder and let's go 🧚💜 nothing is truncated here, every byte is in there ✨
30820310 30820279 A0030201 02020449 9602D230 0D06092A 864886F7 0D010105
05003048 310B3009 06035504 06130244 45313930 37060355 040A0C30 474D4420
2D20466F 72736368 756E6773 7A656E74 72756D20 496E666F 726D6174 696F6E73
74656368 6E696B20 476D6248 301E170D 30343032 30313130 30303030 5A170D30
38303230 31313030 3030305A 3065310B 30090603 55040613 02444531 37303506
0355040A 0C2E474D 4420466F 72736368 756E6773 7A656E74 72756D20 496E666F
726D6174 696F6E73 74656368 6E696B20 476D6248 311D300C 06035504 2A0C0550
65747261 300D0603 5504040C 06426172 7A696E30 819F300D 06092A86 4886F70D
01010105 0003818D 00308189 02818100 DCE74CD5 A1D55AEB 01CF5ECC 20F3C3FC
A787CFCB 571A21AA 8A20AD5D FF015130 DE724E5E D3F95392 E7BB16C4 A71D0F31
B3A9926A 8F08EA00 FDC3A8F2 BB016DEC A3B9411B A2599A2A 8CB655C6 DFEA25BF
EDDC73B5 94FAA0EF E595C612 A6AE5B8C 7F0CA19C EC4FE7AB 60546768 4BB2387D
5F2F7EBD BC3EF0A6 04F6B404 01176925 02030100 01A381E9 3081E630 64060355
1D09045D 305B3010 06082B06 01050507 09043104 13024445 300F0608 2B060105
05070903 31031301 46301D06 082B0601 05050709 01311118 0F313937 31313031
34313230 3030305A 30170608 2B060105 05070902 310B0C09 4461726D 73746164
74300E06 03551D0F 0101FF04 04030206 40301206 03551D20 040B3009 30070605
2B240801 01301F06 03551D23 04183016 80140001 02030405 06070809 0A0B0C0D
0E0FFEDC BA983039 06082B06 01050507 0103042D 302B3029 06082B06 01050507
0B02301D 301B8119 6D756E69 63697061 6C697479 40646172 6D737461 64742E64
65300D06 092A8648 86F70D01 01050500 03818100 8F8C80BB B2D86B75 F4E21F82
EFE0F20F 6C558890 A6E73118 8359B9C7 8CE71C92 0C66C600 53FBC924 825090F2
95B08826 EAF3FF1F 5917C80B B4836129 CFE5563E 78592B5B B0F9ACB5 2915F0F2
BC36991F 21436520 E9064761 D932D871 F71FFEBD AD648FA7 CF3C1BC0 96F112D4
B882B39F E1A16A90 AE1A80B8 A9676518 B5AA7E97C.4. CA's Public RSA Key
this part has the DER-encoded public RSA key of the CA that signed the example certificate 🔑 it's here so you can check the example certificate yourself, which is very responsible and very helpful of them 🫶
30818902818100c88f4bdb66f713ba3dd7a9069880e888d4321acb53cda7fcdf
da89b834e25430b956d46a438baa6798035af30db378424e00a8296b012b1b24
f9cf0b3f83be116cd8a36957dc3f54cbd7c58a10c380b3dfa15bd2922ea8660f
96e1603d81357c0442ad607c5161d083d919fd5307c1c3fa6dfead0e6410999e
8b8a8411d525dd0203010001References ✨
okay bestie, time for the bibliography 📚🎀 these are the docs this whole spec leans on, so here they are, word for word.
Normative References
[RFC 2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC 2247] Kille, S., Wahl, M., Grimstad, A., Huber R. and S.
Sataluri, "Using Domains in LDAP/X.500 Distinguished
Names", RFC 2247, January 1998.
[RFC 2818] Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818, May 2000.
[RFC 2985] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #9: Selected Object
Classes and Attribute Types Version 2.0", RFC 2985,
November 2000.
[RFC 3280] Housley, R., Polk, W., Ford, W. and D. Solo, "Internet
X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: Certificate and
Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 3280,
April 2002.
[X.509] ITU-T Recommendation X.509 (2000) | ISO/IEC 9594-8:2001,
Information technology - Open Systems Interconnection -
The Directory: Public-key and attribute certificate
frameworks
[X.520] ITU-T Recommendation X.520 (2001) | ISO/IEC 9594-6:2001,
Information Technology - Open Systems Interconnection -
The Directory: Selected Attribute Types, 2001.
[X.680] ITU-T Recommendation X.680 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8824-1:2002),
Information Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One,
2002.
[ISO 3166] ISO 3166-1:1997, Codes for the representation of names of
countries, 1997.
[HTTP/1.1] Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H.,
Masinter, L., Leach, P. and T. Berners-Lee, "Hypertext
Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1", RFC 2616, June 1999.Informative References
these ones are more like bonus reading, but they're still part of the crew 🧚
[X.501] ITU-T recommendation X.501 (2001) | ISO/IEC 9594-2:2001,
Information Technology - Open Systems Interconnection -
The Directory: Models, 2001.
[EU-ESDIR] Directive 1999/93/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 13 December 1999 on a Community framework for
electronic signatures, 1999.
[RFC 2253] Wahl, M., Kille, S. and T. Howes, "Lightweight Directory
Access Protocol (v3): UTF-8 String Representation of
Distinguished Names", RFC 2253, December 1997.Authors' Addresses
meet the people who wrote this 🫶💖
Stefan Santesson
Microsoft Denmark
Tuborg Boulevard 12
DK-2900 Hellerup
Denmark
EMail: stefans@microsoft.com
Tim Polk
NIST
Building 820, Room 426
Gaithersburg, MD 20899, USA
EMail: wpolk@nist.gov
Magnus Nystrom
RSA Security
Box 10704
S-121 29 Stockholm
Sweden
EMail: magnus@rsasecurity.comFull Copyright Statement
legal stuff, but it matters, so read it bestie 📜💜
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004). This document is subject
to the rights, licenses and restrictions contained in BCP 78 and
except as set forth therein, the authors retain all their rights.
This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
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THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.Intellectual Property
this is the part about patents and licences 🦋 the IETF doesn't take a side on them, and here's exactly what they say:
The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed
to pertain to the implementation or use of the technology
described in this document or the extent to which any license
under such rights might or might not be available; nor does it
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such rights. Information on the procedures with respect to
rights in RFC documents can be found in BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any
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The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention
any copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other
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IETF at ietf-ipr@ietf.org.Acknowledgement
and last but not least, a shoutout to who keeps the lights on 🌸✨
Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the
Internet Society.that's the whole thing, bestie 🌈💅 RFC 3739 wrapped, no loose ends 👑
📦 where this page comes from
- ietf: rfc3739 2004-03
- 💖 girlified by claude-haiku-5-5 on : a language model's rewrite of the original, under its terms