RFC 3039
Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Qualified Certificates Profile
RFC 3039: Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Qualified Certificates Profile 🎀
okay bestie, this is RFC 3039, and it's titled Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Qualified Certificates Profile 💅 It's a Standards Track document from the Network Working Group, dated January 2001. The authors are S. Santesson (AddTrust), W. Polk (NIST), P. Barzin (SECUDE), and M. Nystrom (RSA Security). The header doesn't list anything it obsoletes or updates, so there's no lineage drama here 🌸
Status of This Memo ✨
This doc specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the Internet community, and it's asking for discussion and suggestions for improvements 🦋 For the standardization state and status of this protocol, check the current edition of the "Internet Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1). Distribution of this memo is unlimited.
Copyright Notice 💜
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2001). All Rights Reserved.
Abstract 🧚
This document is a certificate profile for Qualified Certificates. It's based on RFC 2459 and made for use on the Internet. "Qualified Certificate" is the name for a certificate that has a certain qualified status under applicable governing law. Also, Qualified Certificates are issued exclusively to physical persons 🫶
The goal is a general syntax that doesn't depend on local legal requirements. The profile is still designed so that it can be profiled further to meet specific local needs 🌈
It's really important to know that this profile does not define any legal requirements for Qualified Certificates 💀
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 🔥
Table of Contents 🍓
1 Introduction ................................................ 2
2 Requirements and Assumptions ................................ 3
2.1 Properties ................................................ 4
2.2 Statement of Purpose ...................................... 5
2.3 Policy Issues ............................................. 5
2.4 Uniqueness of names ....................................... 5
3 Certificate and Certificate Extensions Profile .............. 6
3.1 Basic Certificate Fields .................................. 6
3.1.1 Issuer .................................................. 6
3.1.2 Subject ................................................. 6
3.2 Certificate Extensions .................................... 9
3.2.1 Subject Directory Attributes ............................ 9
3.2.2 Certificate Policies .................................... 10
3.2.3 Key Usage ............................................... 10
3.2.4 Biometric Information ................................... 11
3.2.5 Qualified Certificate Statements ........................ 12
4 Security Considerations ..................................... 14
5 References .................................................. 15
6 Intellectual Property Rights ................................ 16
A ASN.1 definitions ........................................... 17
A.1 1988 ASN.1 Module ......................................... 17
A.2 1993 ASN.1 Module ......................................... 19
B A Note on Attributes ........................................ 24
C. Example Certificate ........................................ 24
C.1 ASN.1 Structure ........................................... 25
C.1.1 Extensions ............................................... 25
C.1.2 The certificate .......................................... 27
C.2 ASN.1 Dump ................................................ 29
C.3 DER-encoding .............................................. 32
C.4 CA's public key ........................................... 33
Authors' Addresses ............................................. 34
Full Copyright Statement ....................................... 351. Introduction 🦋
This spec is one part of a family of standards for the X.509 Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) for the Internet. It's based on RFC 2459, which defines the underlying certificate formats and semantics you need for a full implementation of this standard 💖
The standard profiles the format for one specific type of certificate, called Qualified Certificates. The term Qualified Certificates, plus the assumptions that shape the scope of this document, are covered in Section 2 📚
Section 3 defines requirements on the information content in Qualified Certificates. This profile addresses two fields in the basic certificate and five certificate extensions. The certificate fields are the subject and issuer fields. The certificate extensions are subject directory attributes, certificate policies, key usage, a private extension for storing biometric data, and a private extension for storing statements related to Qualified Certificates. The private extensions are presented in the 1993 Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1). But in conformance with RFC 2459, the 1988 ASN.1 module in Appendix A contains all normative definitions (the 1993 module in Appendix A is informative) 🧠
In Section 4, some security considerations are discussed so we can clarify the security context in which Qualified Certificates are assumed to be used. Section 5 has the references 🔐
Appendix A contains all relevant ASN.1 [X.680] structures that aren't already defined in RFC 2459. Appendix B has a note on attributes. Appendix C has an example certificate. Appendix D has the authors' addresses, and Appendix E has the IETF Copyright Statement ✨
It should be noted that this specification does not define the specific semantics of Qualified Certificates, and it does not define the policies that should be used with them. Basically, this document says what information should go into Qualified Certificates, but not what that information means. A system that uses Qualified Certificates must define its own semantics for the information in them. It's expected that laws and corporate policies will make these definitions 💅
2. Requirements and Assumptions 🌸
The term "Qualified Certificate" has been used by the European Commission to describe a certain type of certificate with specific relevance for European legislation. This specification is meant to support this class of certificates, but its scope is not limited to that one application 🇪🇺
Within this standard, "Qualified Certificate" is used more generally, to describe the format for a certificate whose primary purpose is identifying a person with a high level of assurance in public non-repudiation services. The actual mechanisms that decide whether a certificate should or should not be considered a "Qualified Certificate" under any legislation are outside the scope of this standard 🫠
Harmonization in the field of Qualified Certificates is essential in several aspects that fall outside the scope of RFC 2459. The most important aspects that affect the scope of this specification are:
- Definition of names and identity information, so the associated subject can be identified in a uniform way.
- Definition of information which identifies the CA and the jurisdiction under which the CA operates when issuing a particular certificate.
- Definition of key usage extension usage for Qualified Certificates.
- Definition of information structure for storage of biometric information.
- Definition of a standardized way to store predefined statements with relevance for Qualified Certificates.
- Requirements for critical extensions.
2.1. Properties 🎀
A Qualified Certificate, as defined in this standard, is assumed to have the following properties:
- The certificate is issued by a CA that makes a public statement that the certificate serves the purpose of a Qualified Certificate, as discussed in Section 2.2.
- The certificate indicates a certificate policy consistent with the liabilities, practices, and procedures undertaken by the CA, as discussed in 2.3.
- The certificate is issued to a natural person (living human being).
- The certificate contains an identity based on a pseudonym or a real name of the subject.
2.2. Statement of Purpose 💜
For a certificate to serve the purpose of being a Qualified Certificate, this profile assumes that the CA will have to include information in the certificate that explicitly defines this intent.
The job of this information is to help any concerned entity evaluate the risk of creating or accepting signatures that are based on a Qualified Certificate 🔍
This profile defines two complementary ways to include this information:
- As information defined by a certificate policy included in the certificate policies extension, and
- As a statement included in the Qualified Certificates Statements extension.
2.3. Policy Issues 🌈
Certain policy aspects define the context in which this profile is to be understood and used. It's outside the scope of this profile to specify any policies or legal aspects that will govern services that issue or use certificates according to this profile.
It is assumed, though, that the issuing CA will undertake to follow a publicly available certificate policy that is consistent with its liabilities, practices, and procedures 📜
2.4. Uniqueness of names 🪞
"Distinguished name" is originally defined in X.501 [X.501] as a representation of a directory name. It's defined as a construct that identifies a particular object from among the set of all objects. An object can be assigned a distinguished name without being represented by an entry in the Directory, but this name is then the name its object entry could have had if it were represented in the Directory. In the context of qualified certificates, a distinguished name denotes a set of attribute values [X.501] that forms a name which is unambiguous within a certain domain. That domain is either a real or a virtual DIT (Directory Information Tree) [X.501]. For subject names, the domain is assumed to be at least the issuing domain of the CA. The distinguished name MUST be unique for each subject entity certified by the one CA, as defined by the issuer name field, during the whole life time of the CA 🚨
3. Certificate and Certificate Extensions Profile 🧚♀️
This section defines a profile for Qualified Certificates. The profile is based on the Internet certificate profile RFC 2459, which in turn is based on the X.509 version 3 format. For a full implementation of this section, implementers are REQUIRED to consult the underlying formats and semantics defined in RFC 2459 🫶
ASN.1 definitions relevant for this section that aren't supplied by RFC 2459 are supplied in Appendix A.
3.1. Basic Certificate Fields ✨
This specification gives extra details about the contents of two fields in the basic certificate. These fields are the issuer and subject fields 💖
3.1.1. Issuer ✨
okay so the issuer field is basically the ID card of whoever issued the certificate 🪪 It SHALL identify the organization responsible for issuing the certificate. The name SHOULD be an officially registered name of the organization 💅
The identity of the issuer SHALL be specified using an appropriate subset of these attributes:
domainComponent;
countryName;
stateOrProvinceName;
organizationName;
localityName; and
serialNumber.Additional attributes MAY be present, but they SHOULD NOT be necessary to identify the issuing organization 🙈
Attributes in the issuer field SHOULD be consistent with the laws under which the issuer operates ⚖️
A relying party MAY have to consult the associated certificate policies and/or the issuer's CPS to figure out what the name fields mean and which laws the issuer operates under 🧐
3.1.2. Subject 🎀
The subject field of a certificate compliant with this profile SHALL contain a distinguished name of the subject (see 2.4 for definition of distinguished name). This is the subject's main identity info, bestie 🫶
The subject field SHALL contain an appropriate subset of the following attributes:
countryName;
commonName;
surname;
givenName;
pseudonym;
serialNumber;
organizationName;
organizationalUnitName;
stateOrProvinceName
localityName and
postalAddress.Other attributes may be present but MUST NOT be necessary to distinguish the subject name from other subject names within the issuer domain 🔍
Of these attributes, the subject field SHALL include at least one of the following:
Choice I: commonName
Choice II: givenName
Choice III: pseudonymThe countryName attribute value sets a general context in which the other attributes are to be understood 🌍 The country attribute does not necessarily indicate the subject's country of citizenship or country of residence, and it does not have to indicate the country of issuance. Not the same thing, periodt 💅
Note: Many X.500 implementations require the presence of countryName in the DIT. In cases where the subject name, as specified in the subject field, specifies a public X.500 directory entry, the countryName attribute SHOULD always be present.
The commonName attribute value SHALL, when present, contain a name of the subject. This MAY be in the subject's preferred presentation format, a format preferred by the CA, or some other format. Pseudonyms, nicknames, and names with spelling other than the registered name MAY be used. To understand the nature of the name presented in commonName, complying applications MAY have to examine the present values of the givenName and surname attributes, or the pseudonym attribute 🧩
Note: Many client implementations presuppose the presence of the commonName attribute value in the subject field and use this value to display the subject's name, regardless of any givenName, surname, or pseudonym attribute values present. Main character energy for commonName 👑
The surname and givenName attribute types SHALL, if present, contain the registered name of the subject, in accordance with the laws under which the CA prepares the certificate 📜 These attributes SHALL be used in the subject field if the commonName attribute is not present. If the subject only has a single registered name, the givenName attribute SHALL be used and the surname attribute SHALL be omitted 🌸
The pseudonym attribute type SHALL, if present, contain a pseudonym of the subject. Use of the pseudonym attribute MUST NOT be combined with use of any of the attributes surname and/or givenName 🦋
The serialNumber attribute type SHALL, when present, be used to differentiate between names where the subject field would otherwise be identical. This attribute has no defined semantics beyond ensuring uniqueness of subject names. It MAY contain a number or code assigned by the CA, or an identifier assigned by a government or civil authority. It is the CA's responsibility to make sure the serialNumber is enough to resolve any subject name collisions 🔢
The organizationName and the organizationalUnitName attribute types SHALL, when present, be used to store the name and relevant information of an organization the subject is associated with. The type of association between the organization and the subject is beyond the scope of this document 🏢
The postalAddress, the stateOrProvinceName, and the localityName attribute types SHALL, when present, be used to store address and geographical information the subject is associated with. If an organizationName value is also present, then the postalAddress, stateOrProvinceName, and localityName attribute values SHALL be associated with the specified organization 📍 The type of association between those address fields and either the subject or the organizationName is beyond the scope of this document.
Compliant implementations SHALL be able to interpret the attributes named in this section 🤓
3.2. Certificate Extensions 🌈
This specification gives extra details about the contents of five certificate extensions. These extensions are the subject directory attributes, certificate policies, key usage, the private extension for biometric information, and the private extension for Qualified Certificate statements 🧚
3.2.1. Subject Directory Attributes 📚
The subjectDirectoryAttributes extension MAY contain additional attributes associated with the subject, as a complement to the information already in the subject field and the subject alternative name extension 💜
Attributes suitable for this extension are attributes that are not part of the subject's distinguished name, but that MAY still be useful for other purposes (e.g., authorization) 🔑
This extension MUST NOT be marked critical. Don't mess with that one, bestie 🙅♀️
Compliant implementations SHALL be able to interpret the following attributes:
title;
dateOfBirth;
placeOfBirth;
gender;
countryOfCitizenship; and
countryOfResidence.Other attributes MAY be included according to local definitions 🌏
The title attribute type SHALL, when present, be used to store a designated position or function of the subject within the organization specified by the present organizational attributes in the subject field 💼 The association between the title, the subject, and the organization is beyond the scope of this document.
The dateOfBirth attribute SHALL, when present, contain the value of the subject's date of birth. The manner in which the date of birth is associated with the subject is outside the scope of this document 🎂
The placeOfBirth attribute SHALL, when present, contain the value of the subject's place of birth. The manner in which the place of birth is associated with the subject is outside the scope of this document 🗺️
The gender attribute SHALL, when present, contain the value of the subject's gender. For females the value "F" (or "f") and for males the value "M" (or "m") have to be used. The manner in which the gender is associated with the subject is outside the scope of this document 🚺🚹
The countryOfCitizenship attribute SHALL, when present, contain the identifier of at least one of the subject's claimed countries of citizenship at the time the certificate was issued. If the subject is a citizen of more than one country, more than one country MAY be present. Determining citizenship is a matter of law and is outside the scope of this document 🛂
The countryOfResidence attribute SHALL, when present, contain the value of at least one country in which the subject is resident. If the subject is a resident of more than one country, more than one country MAY be present. Determining residence is a matter of law and is outside the scope of this document 🏡
3.2.2. Certificate Policies 📋
The certificate policies extension SHALL contain the identifier of at least one certificate policy that reflects the practices and procedures the CA follows 🛠️ The certificate policy extension MAY be marked critical.
Information from the issuer stating the purpose of the certificate, as discussed in Section 2.2, SHOULD be evident through the indicated policies 🎯
The certificate policies extension SHOULD include all the policy information needed for validation of the certificate. If policy information is included in the QCStatements extension (see 3.2.5), then this information SHOULD also be defined by the indicated policies ✅
Certificate policies MAY be combined with any qualifier defined in RFC 2459 💅
3.2.3. Key Usage 🔐
The key usage extension SHALL be present. If the key usage nonRepudiation bit is asserted, then it SHOULD NOT be combined with any other key usage , i.e., if set, the key usage non-repudiation SHOULD be set exclusively. Solo stan moment for nonRepudiation 🙌
The key usage extension MAY be marked critical.
3.2.4. Biometric Information 👀
This section defines an extension for storing biometric information. Biometric information is stored in the form of a hash of a biometric template 🧬
The purpose of this extension is to provide a way to authenticate biometric information. The biometric information that corresponds to the stored hash is NOT stored in this extension, but the extension MAY include a URI pointing to a location where this information can be obtained. If it is included, this URI does not imply that it is the only way to access this information 🔗
It is RECOMMENDED that biometric information in this extension is limited to information types suitable for human verification, i.e., where the decision of whether the information accurately represents the subject is naturally made by a person. This implies a usage where the biometric information is represented by, for example, a graphical image displayed to the relying party, which MAY be used by the relying party to enhance identification of the subject 🖼️
This extension MUST NOT be marked critical. Seriously, leave it non-critical 😭
biometricInfo EXTENSION ::= {
SYNTAX BiometricSyntax
IDENTIFIED BY id-pe-biometricInfo }
id-pe-biometricInfo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pe 2}
BiometricSyntax ::= SEQUENCE OF BiometricData
BiometricData ::= SEQUENCE {
typeOfBiometricData TypeOfBiometricData,
hashAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
biometricDataHash OCTET STRING,
sourceDataUri IA5String OPTIONAL }
TypeOfBiometricData ::= CHOICE {
predefinedBiometricType PredefinedBiometricType,
biometricDataID OBJECT IDENTIFIER }
PredefinedBiometricType ::= INTEGER { picture(0),
handwritten-signature(1)} (picture|handwritten-signature,...)The predefined biometric type picture, when present, SHALL identify that the source picture is in the form of a displayable graphical image of the subject. The hash of the graphical image SHALL only be calculated over the image data, excluding any labels defining the image type 📸
The predefined biometric type handwritten-signature, when present, SHALL identify that the source data is in the form of a displayable graphical image of the subject's handwritten signature ✍️ The hash of the graphical image SHALL only be calculated over the image data, excluding any labels defining the image type.
3.2.5 Qualified Certificate Statements ✨
okay so this section defines an extension for stuffing in defined statements about Qualified Certificates 🎀
a typical statement that fits in this extension MAY be a statement from the issuer saying the certificate was issued as a Qualified Certificate under a particular legal system (we already talked about this in Section 2.2) 💅
other statements that fit MAY be about the legal jurisdiction where the certificate was issued 🌸 for example, this MAY include a maximum reliance limit, which shows the restrictions on CA's liability 🙈
each statement SHALL include an object identifier for the statement and MAY also include optional qualifying data in the statementInfo parameter 🧚
if the statementInfo parameter is included, then the object identifier of the statement SHALL define the syntax and SHOULD define the semantics of this parameter 🫶 if the object identifier doesn't define the semantics, a relying party may have to check a relevant certificate policy or CPS to figure out the exact semantics 🔍
this extension may be critical or non-critical 🦋 if the extension is critical, that means all the statements inside it are treated as critical 🔥
qcStatements EXTENSION ::= {
SYNTAX QCStatements
IDENTIFIED BY id-pe-qcStatements }
id-pe-qcStatements OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe 3 }
QCStatements ::= SEQUENCE OF QCStatement
QCStatement ::= SEQUENCE {
statementId QC-STATEMENT.&Id({SupportedStatements}),
statementInfo QC-STATEMENT.&Type
({SupportedStatements}{@statementId}) OPTIONAL }
SupportedStatements QC-STATEMENT ::= { qcStatement-1,...}3.2.5.1 Predefined Statements 💖
this profile includes one predefined object identifier (id-qcs-pkixQCSyntax-v1), which identifies conformance with the syntax and semantics defined in this profile 🎀 this Qualified Certificate profile is referred to as version 1 👑
qcStatement-1 QC-STATEMENT ::= { SYNTAX SemanticsInformation
IDENTIFIED BY id-qcs-pkixQCSyntax-v1 }
-- This statement identifies conformance with syntax and
-- semantics defined in this Qualified Certificate profile
-- (Version 1). The SemanticsInformation may optionally contain
-- additional semantics information as specified.
SemanticsInformation ::= SEQUENCE {
semanticsIdentifier OBJECT IDENTIFIER OPTIONAL,
nameRegistrationAuthorities NameRegistrationAuthorities
OPTIONAL }
(WITH COMPONENTS {..., semanticsIdentifier PRESENT}|
WITH COMPONENTS {..., nameRegistrationAuthorities PRESENT})
NameRegistrationAuthorities ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
GeneralNamethe SementicsInformation component identified by id-qcs-pkixQCSyntax-v1 MAY contain a semantics identifier and MAY identify one or more name registration authorities 🌈
the semanticsIdentifier component, if present, SHALL contain an OID that defines semantics for attributes and names in basic certificate fields and certificate extensions 🧁 the OID may define semantics for all of the present attributes and/or names, or just a subgroup of them 🍓
the NameRegistrationAuthorities component, if present, SHALL contain a name of one or more name registration authorities, which are responsible for registering the attributes or names associated with the subject 📜 the link between an identified name registration authority and the present attributes MAY be defined by a semantics identifier OID, by a certificate policy (or CPS), or by some other implicit factors 🦋
if a value of type SemanticsInformation is present in a QCStatement, then at least one of the fields semanticsIdentifier and nameRegistrationAuthorities must be present, as indicated 💅
4 Security Considerations 🔐
the legal value of a digital signature that gets validated with a Qualified Certificate is going to depend a LOT on the policy that governs use of the associated private key 😭 both the private key holder and the relying party should make sure the private key only gets used with the consent of the legitimate key holder 🫶
since public keys are for public use with legal implications for everyone involved, certain conditions should exist before CAs issue certificates as Qualified Certificates 🚨 the associated private keys must be unique to the subject and must be kept under the subject's sole control 🔑 so a CA should not issue a qualified certificate if the means to use the private key isn't protected against unintended usage 💀 this means the CA has to have some knowledge about the subject's cryptographic module 🧠
the CA must also verify that the public key in the certificate is legitimately representing the subject ✅
CAs should not issue CA certificates with policy mapping extensions that indicate acceptance of another CA's policy, unless these conditions are met 🙅♀️
combining the nonRepudiation bit in the keyUsage certificate extension with other keyUsage bits may have security implications, so this specification recommends against such practices ⚠️
the ability to compare two qualified certificates and figure out whether they represent the same physical entity depends on the semantics of the subjects' names 👀 the semantics of a particular attribute may be different for different issuers, and comparing names without knowing the semantics of the names in these particular certificates may give you misleading results 😵💫
this specification is a profile of RFC 2459 📚 the security considerations section of that document applies to this specification as well 🛡️
5 References 📖
[RFC 2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC 2247] Kille, S., Wahl, M., Grimstad, A., Huber, R. and S. Sataluri, "Using Domains in LDAP/X.500 Distinguished Names", RFC 2247, January 1998.
[RFC 2459] Housley, R., Ford, W., Polk, W. and D. Solo, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: Certificate and CRL Profile", RFC 2459, January 1999.
[RFC 2985] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #9: Selected Object Classes and Attribute Types Version 2.0", RFC 2985, November 2000.
[X.501] ITU-T Recommendation X.501: Information Technology - Open Systems Interconnection - The Directory: Models, June 1993.
[X.509] ITU-T Recommendation X.509: Information Technology - Open Systems Interconnection - The Directory: Authentication Framework, June 1997.
[X.520] ITU-T Recommendation X.520: Information Technology - Open Systems Interconnection - The Directory: Selected Attribute Types, June 1993.
[X.680] ITU-T Recommendation X.680: Information Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One, 1997.
[ISO 3166] ISO Standard 3166: Codes for the representation of names of countries, 1993.
6 Intellectual Property Rights 🎀
the IETF doesn't take a position on whether any intellectual property or other rights that someone might claim about the implementation or use of the technology in this document are valid or in scope 🤷♀️ it also doesn't say whether any license under those rights might or might not be available, and it doesn't claim to have tried to find any such rights 🕵️ info on the IETF's procedures for rights in standards-track and standards-related documents is in BCP-11 📝 copies of claimed rights filed for publication, any promised licenses, or the result of an attempt to get a general license or permission for implementers or users of this spec to use those proprietary rights can all be requested from the IETF Secretariat 📬
the IETF also invites any interested party to bring to its attention any copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary rights that might cover technology required to practice this standard 💌 send that info to the IETF Executive Director 💜
A. ASN.1 definitions 🧚
this is the same as RFC 2459: the ASN.1 modules come in two different variants of the ASN.1 syntax 🌈
Appendix A.1 uses the 1988 syntax and doesn't use macros 🍓 but since the module imports type definitions from modules in RFC 2459 that aren't completely in the 1988 syntax, the same comments as in RFC 2459 about its use apply here too 🙃 in other words, Appendix A.1 may be parsed by a 1988 ASN.1 parser once you remove the definitions for the UNIVERSAL types and all references to them in RFC 2459's 1988 modules 🧩
Appendix A.2 is in the 1993 syntax 💫 but again, since the module imports type definitions from modules in RFC 2459 that aren't completely in the 1993 syntax, the same comments as in RFC 2459 about its use apply here as well 🫠 so Appendix A.2 may be parsed by a 1993 ASN.1 parser once you remove the UTF8String choice from the definition of DirectoryString in the module PKIX1Explicit93 in RFC 2459 🛠️ Appendix A.2 may be parsed "as is" by a 1997 ASN.1 parser, however ✨
in case of discrepancies between these modules, the 1988 module is the normative one 👑
A.1 1988 ASN.1 Module 🎀
PKIXqualified88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-qualified-cert-88(10) }
DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN
-- EXPORTS ALL --
IMPORTS
GeneralName
FROM PKIX1Implicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-pkix1-implicit-88(2)}
AlgorithmIdentifier, DirectoryString, Attribute, AttributeType,
id-pkix, id-pe, id-at
FROM PKIX1Explicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-pkix1-explicit-88(1)};
-- Locally defined OIDs
-- Arc for QC personal data attributes
id-pda OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 9 }
-- Arc for QC statements
id-qcs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 11 }
-- Attributes
id-at-serialNumber AttributeType ::= { id-at 5 }
SerialNumber ::= PrintableString (SIZE(1..64))
id-at-postalAddress AttributeType ::= { id-at 16 }
PostalAddress ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..6) OF DirectoryString
id-at-pseudonym AttributeType ::= { id-at 65 }
Pseudonym ::= DirectoryString
domainComponent AttributeType ::=
{ 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 25 }
DomainComponent ::= IA5String
id-pda-dateOfBirth AttributeType ::= { id-pda 1 }
DateOfBirth ::= GeneralizedTime
id-pda-placeOfBirth AttributeType ::= { id-pda 2 }
PlaceOfBirth ::= DirectoryString
id-pda-gender AttributeType ::= { id-pda 3 }
Gender ::= PrintableString (SIZE(1))
-- "M", "F", "m" or "f"
id-pda-countryOfCitizenship AttributeType ::= { id-pda 4 }
CountryOfCitizenship ::= PrintableString (SIZE (2))
-- ISO 3166 Country Code
id-pda-countryOfResidence AttributeType ::= { id-pda 5 }
CountryOfResidence ::= PrintableString (SIZE (2))
-- ISO 3166 Country Code
-- Private extensions
-- Biometric info extension
id-pe-biometricInfo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pe 2}
BiometricSyntax ::= SEQUENCE OF BiometricDataBiometricData ::= SEQUENCE {
typeOfBiometricData TypeOfBiometricData,
hashAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
biometricDataHash OCTET STRING,
sourceDataUri IA5String OPTIONAL }
TypeOfBiometricData ::= CHOICE {
predefinedBiometricType PredefinedBiometricType,
biometricDataOid OBJECT IDENTIFIER }
PredefinedBiometricType ::= INTEGER {
picture(0),handwritten-signature(1)}
(picture|handwritten-signature)
-- QC Statements Extension
id-pe-qcStatements OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe 3}
QCStatements ::= SEQUENCE OF QCStatement
QCStatement ::= SEQUENCE {
statementId OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
statementInfo ANY DEFINED BY statementId OPTIONAL}
-- QC statements
id-qcs-pkixQCSyntax-v1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-qcs 1 }
-- This statement identifies conformance with syntax and
-- semantics defined in this Qualified Certificate profile
-- (Version 1). This statement may optionally contain
-- additional semantics information as specified below.
SemanticsInformation ::= SEQUENCE {
semanticsIndentifier OBJECT IDENTIFIER OPTIONAL,
nameRegistrationAuthorities NameRegistrationAuthorities OPTIONAL
} -- At least one field shall be present
NameRegistrationAuthorities ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GeneralName
ENDA.2 1993 ASN.1 Module ✨
Okay, now we're going back in time to the 1993 module, and honestly it's giving vintage vibes 🎀 Everything is still wrapped up nice and tight. 💅
PKIXqualified93 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-qualified-cert-93(11) }
DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN
-- EXPORTS ALL --
IMPORTS
authorityKeyIdentifier, subjectKeyIdentifier, keyUsage,
extendedKeyUsage, privateKeyUsagePeriod, certificatePolicies,
policyMappings, subjectAltName, issuerAltName, basicConstraints,
nameConstraints, policyConstraints, cRLDistributionPoints,
subjectDirectoryAttributes, authorityInfoAccess, GeneralName,
OTHER-NAME
FROM PKIX1Implicit93 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-pkix1-implicit-93(4)}
id-pkix, AlgorithmIdentifier, ATTRIBUTE, Extension, EXTENSION,
DirectoryString{}, ub-name, id-pe, id-at, id-at-commonName,
id-at-surname, id-at-countryName, id-at-localityName,
id-at-stateOrProvinceName, id-at-organizationName,
id-at-organizationalUnitName, id-at-givenName, id-at-dnQualifier,
pkcs9email, title, organizationName, organizationalUnitName,
stateOrProvinceName, localityName, countryName,
generationQualifier, dnQualifier, initials, givenName, surname,
commonName, name
FROM PKIX1Explicit93 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-pkix1-explicit-93(3)};
-- Object Identifiers
-- Externally defined OIDs
id-at-serialNumber OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-at 5}
id-at-postalAddress OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-at 16 }
id-at-pseudonym OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-at 65 }
id-domainComponent OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 25 }
-- Locally defined OIDs
-- Arc for QC personal data attributes
id-pda OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 9 }
-- Arc for QC statements
id-qcs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 11 }
-- Private extensions
id-pe-biometricInfo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe 2 }
id-pe-qcStatements OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe 3 }
-- Personal data attributes
id-pda-dateOfBirth OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pda 1 }
id-pda-placeOfBirth OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pda 2 }
id-pda-gender OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pda 3 }
id-pda-countryOfCitizenship OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pda 4 }
id-pda-countryOfResidence OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pda 5 }
-- QC statements
id-qcs-pkixQCSyntax-v1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-qcs 1 }
-- Object Sets
-- The following information object set is defined to constrain the
-- set of legal certificate extensions. Note that this set is an
-- extension of the ExtensionSet defined in RFC 2459.
ExtensionSet EXTENSION ::= {
authorityKeyIdentifier |
subjectKeyIdentifier |
keyUsage |
extendedKeyUsage |
privateKeyUsagePeriod |
certificatePolicies |
policyMappings |
subjectAltName |
issuerAltName |
basicConstraints |
nameConstraints |
policyConstraints |
cRLDistributionPoints |
subjectDirectoryAttributes |
authorityInfoAccess |
biometricInfo |
qcStatements, ... }
-- The following information object set is defined to constrain the
-- set of attributes applications are required to recognize in
-- distinguished names. The set may of course be augmented to meet
-- local requirements. Note that deleting members of the set may
-- prevent interoperability with conforming implementations, and that
-- this set is an extension of the SupportedAttributes set in RFC 2459.
SupportedAttributes ATTRIBUTE ::= {
countryName | commonName | surname | givenName | pseudonym |
serialNumber | organizationName | organizationalUnitName |
stateOrProvinceName | localityName | postalAddress |
pkcs9email | domainComponent | dnQualifier,
... -- For future extensions -- }
-- The following information object set is defined to constrain the
-- set of attributes applications are required to recognize in
-- subjectDirectoryAttribute extensions. The set may be augmented to
-- meet local requirements. Note that deleting members of the set
-- may prevent interoperability with conforming implementations.
PersonalDataAttributeSet ATTRIBUTE ::= {
title | dateOfBirth | placeOfBirth | gender | countryOfCitizenship |
countryOfResidence, ... }
-- Attributes
-- serialNumber from X.520
serialNumber ATTRIBUTE ::= {
WITH SYNTAX PrintableString (SIZE(1..64))
ID id-at-serialNumber }
-- postalAddress from X.520
postalAddress ATTRIBUTE ::= {
WITH SYNTAX SEQUENCE SIZE (1..6) OF DirectoryString { 30 }
ID id-at-postalAddress }
-- pseudonym from (forthcoming) X.520)
pseudonym ATTRIBUTE ::= {
WITH SYNTAX DirectoryString { ub-name }
ID id-at-pseudonym }
-- domainComponent from RFC 2247
domainComponent ATTRIBUTE ::= {
WITH SYNTAX IA5String
ID id-domainComponent }
dateOfBirth ATTRIBUTE ::= {
WITH SYNTAX GeneralizedTime
ID id-pda-dateOfBirth }
placeOfBirth ATTRIBUTE ::= {
WITH SYNTAX DirectoryString { ub-name }
ID id-pda-placeOfBirth }
gender ATTRIBUTE ::= {
WITH SYNTAX PrintableString (SIZE(1) ^ FROM("M"|"F"|"m"|"f"))
ID id-pda-gender }
countryOfCitizenship ATTRIBUTE ::= {
WITH SYNTAX PrintableString (SIZE (2))
(CONSTRAINED BY { -- ISO 3166 codes only -- })
ID id-pda-countryOfCitizenship }
countryOfResidence ATTRIBUTE ::= {
WITH SYNTAX PrintableString (SIZE (2))
(CONSTRAINED BY { -- ISO 3166 codes only -- })
ID id-pda-countryOfResidence }
-- Private extensions
-- Biometric info extension
biometricInfo EXTENSION ::= {
SYNTAX BiometricSyntax
IDENTIFIED BY id-pe-biometricInfo }
BiometricSyntax ::= SEQUENCE OF BiometricData
BiometricData ::= SEQUENCE {
typeOfBiometricData TypeOfBiometricData,
hashAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
biometricDataHash OCTET STRING,
sourceDataUri IA5String OPTIONAL,
... -- For future extensions -- }
TypeOfBiometricData ::= CHOICE {
predefinedBiometricType PredefinedBiometricType,
biometricDataOid OBJECT IDENTIFIER }
PredefinedBiometricType ::= INTEGER { picture(0),
handwritten-signature(1)} (picture|handwritten-signature,...)
-- QC Statements Extension
qcStatements EXTENSION ::= {
SYNTAX QCStatements
IDENTIFIED BY id-pe-qcStatements }
QCStatements ::= SEQUENCE OF QCStatement
QCStatement ::= SEQUENCE {
statementId QC-STATEMENT.&id({SupportedStatements}),
statementInfo QC-STATEMENT.&Type
({SupportedStatements}{@statementId}) OPTIONAL }
QC-STATEMENT ::= CLASS {
&id OBJECT IDENTIFIER UNIQUE,
&Type OPTIONAL }
WITH SYNTAX {
[SYNTAX &Type] IDENTIFIED BY &id }
qcStatement-1 QC-STATEMENT ::= { SYNTAX SemanticsInformation
IDENTIFIED BY id-qcs-pkixQCSyntax-v1}
-- This statement identifies conformance with syntax and
-- semantics defined in this Qualified Certificate profile
-- (Version 1). The SemanticsInformation may optionally contain
-- additional semantics information as specified.
SemanticsInformation ::= SEQUENCE {
semanticsIdentifier OBJECT IDENTIFIER OPTIONAL,
nameRegistrationAuthorities NameRegistrationAuthorities OPTIONAL
}(WITH COMPONENTS {..., semanticsIdentifier PRESENT}|
WITH COMPONENTS {..., nameRegistrationAuthorities PRESENT})
NameRegistrationAuthorities ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GeneralName
-- The following information object set is defined to constrain the
-- set of attributes applications are required to recognize as QCSs.
SupportedStatements QC-STATEMENT ::= {
qcStatement-1, ... -- For future extensions -- }
ENDB. A Note on Attributes 🌸
This document defines several new attributes, both for use in the subject field of issued certificates and in the subjectDirectoryAttributes extension. 🦋 To keep everything conformant, they're defined here using the ASN.1 ATTRIBUTE definition from RFC 2459. That one is totally enough for this document, but it's way simpler than the ISO/ITU version, so no cap, it's a lighter lift. ✨
If you want the full deal, including matching rules and the object classes that help these attributes show up in LDAP-accessible directories, go check [PKCS 9]. 💜
C. Example Certificate 🎀
Okay this section is the main event 🔥 It has the ASN.1 structure, an ASN.1 dump, and the DER-encoding of a certificate that follows this profile. The example was built with help from the OSS ASN.1 compiler. Here are the vibes of this certificate:
- The certificate is signed with RSA and the SHA-1 hash algorithm 🔐
- The issuer's distinguished name is O=GMD - Forschungszentrum Informationstechnik GmbH; C=DE 🏢
- The subject's distinguished name is CN=Petra M. Barzin, O=GMD - Forschungszentrum Informationstechnik GmbH, C=DE 💖
- The certificate was issued on May 1, 2000 and will expire on November 1, 2000 📅
- The certificate contains a 1024 bit RSA key 🗝️
- The certificate includes a critical key usage extension exclusively indicating non-repudiation 🙈
- The certificate includes a certificate policy identifier extension indicating the practices and procedures undertaken by the issuing CA (object identifier 1.3.36.8.1.1). The certificate policy object identifier is defined by TeleTrust, Germany. It is required to be set in a certificate conformant to the German digital signature law. 🇩🇪👑
- The certificate includes a subject directory attributes extension containing the following attributes: 🧚
surname: Barzin
given name: Petra
date of birth: October, 14th 1971
place of birth: Darmstadt
country of citizenship:Germany
gender: Female- The certificate includes a qualified statement private extension indicating that the naming registration authority's name as "municipality@darmstadt.de". 🌈
- The certificate includes, in conformance with RFC 2459, an authority key identifier extension. 🫶
C.1 ASN.1 Structure 🦋
C.1.1 Extensions 💅
Since extensions are already DER-encoded when they're placed in the structure to be signed, they're shown here in the value notation defined in [X.680] for clarity. Literally so clean 🧁 ✨
C.1.1.1 The subjectDirectoryAttributes extension 🎀
Okay bestie, this is basically Petra's little profile card 🦋. It holds four attributes: country of citizenship, gender, date of birth, and place of birth 💖.
petrasSubjDirAttrs AttributesSyntax ::= {
{
type id-pda-countryOfCitizenship,
values {
PrintableString : "DE"
}
},
{
type id-pda-gender,
values {
PrintableString : "F"
}
},
{
type id-pda-dateOfBirth,
values {
GeneralizedTime : "197110140000Z"
}
},
{
type id-pda-placeOfBirth,
values {
DirectoryString : utf8String : "Darmstadt"
}
}
}C.1.1.2 The keyUsage extension ✨
The key usage here is just nonRepudiation, and that's it 🔐.
petrasKeyUsage KeyUsage ::= {nonRepudiation}C.1.1.3 The certificatePolicies extension 📜
This one points at a single policy identifier, 1 3 36 8 1 1 🌸.
petrasCertificatePolicies CertificatePoliciesSyntax ::= {
{
policyIdentifier {1 3 36 8 1 1}
}
}C.1.1.4 The qcStatements extension 💜
Here we get a qcStatement with the id-qcs-pkixQCSyntax-v1 statement ID. Its semantics say the name registration authority is the email address municipality@darmstadt.de 🧚.
petrasQCStatement QCStatements ::= {
{
statementId id-qcs-pkixQCSyntax-v1,
statementInfo SemanticsInformation : {
nameRegistrationAuthorities {
rfc822Name : "municipality@darmstadt.de"
}
}
}
}C.1.1.5 The authorityKeyIdentifier extension 🦋
The key identifier is the hex value 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0FFEDCBA98 🔑.
petrasAKI AuthorityKeyIdentifier ::= {
keyIdentifier '000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0FFEDCBA98'H
}C.1.2 The certificate 👑
Here's the signed part of the certificate, written in the value notation from [X.680] 🎀. Quick heads up: the extension values are already DER encoded in this structure 🧚. Some values got chopped short so it's easier to read 💅.
{
version v3,
serialNumber 1234567890,
signature
{
algorithm { 1 2 840 113549 1 1 5 },
parameters RSAParams : NULL
},
issuer rdnSequence :
{
{
{
type { 2 5 4 6 },
value PrintableString : "DE"
}
},
{
{
type { 2 5 4 10 },
value UTF8String :
"GMD - Forschungszentrum Informationstechnik GmbH"
}
}
},
validity
{
notBefore utcTime : "000501100000Z",
notAfter utcTime : "001101100000Z"
},
subject rdnSequence :
{
{
{
type { 2 5 4 6 },
value PrintableString : "DE"
}
},
{
{
type { 2 5 4 10 },
value UTF8String :
"GMD Forschungszentrum Informationstechnik GmbH"
}
},
{
{
type { 2 5 4 4 },
value UTF8String : "Barzin"
},
{
type { 2 5 4 42 },
value UTF8String : "Petra"
}
}
},
subjectPublicKeyInfo
{
algorithm
{
algorithm { 1 2 840 113549 1 1 1 },
parameters RSAParams : NULL
},
subjectPublicKey '00110000 10000001 10000111 00000010 1000 ...'B
},
extensions
{
{
extnId { 2 5 29 9 }, -- subjectDirectoryAttributes
extnValue '305B301006082B06010505070904310413024445300F0 ...'H
},
{
extnId { 2 5 29 15 }, -- keyUsage
critical TRUE,
extnValue '03020640'H
},
{
extnId { 2 5 29 32 }, -- certificatePolicies
extnValue '3009300706052B24080101'H
},
{
extnId { 2 5 29 35 }, -- authorityKeyIdentifier
extnValue '30168014000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0FFEDCBA98'H
},
{
extnId { 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 3 }, -- qcStatements
extnValue '302B302906082B06010505070B01301D301B81196D756 ...'H
}
}
}C.2 ASN.1 dump 🔍
Okay, this bit is an ASN.1 dump of the signed part of the certificate 🫶. Some values got truncated so your eyes don't melt 😭.
TBSCertificate SEQUENCE: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16] constructed;
length = 631
version : tag = [0] constructed; length = 3
Version INTEGER: tag = [UNIVERSAL 2] primitive; length = 1
2
serialNumber CertificateSerialNumber INTEGER: tag = [UNIVERSAL 2]
primitive; length = 4
1234567890
signature AlgorithmIdentifier SEQUENCE: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16]
constructed; length = 13
algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER: tag = [UNIVERSAL 6] primitive;
length = 9
{ 1 2 840 113549 1 1 5 }
parameters OpenType: NULL: tag = [UNIVERSAL 5] primitive;
length = 0
NULL
issuer Name CHOICE
rdnSequence RDNSequence SEQUENCE OF: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16]
constructed; length = 72
RelativeDistinguishedName SET OF: tag = [UNIVERSAL 17]
constructed; length = 11
AttributeTypeAndValue SEQUENCE: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16]
constructed; length = 9
type OBJECT IDENTIFIER: tag = [UNIVERSAL 6] primitive;
length = 3
{ 2 5 4 6 }
value OpenType: PrintableString: tag = [UNIVERSAL 19]
primitive; length = 2
"DE"
RelativeDistinguishedName SET OF: tag = [UNIVERSAL 17]
constructed; length = 57
AttributeTypeAndValue SEQUENCE: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16]
constructed; length = 55
type OBJECT IDENTIFIER: tag = [UNIVERSAL 6] primitive;
length = 3
{ 2 5 4 10 }
value OpenType : UTF8String: tag = [UNIVERSAL 12]
primitive; length = 48
0x474d44202d20466f72736368756e67737a656e7472756d2049...
validity Validity SEQUENCE: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16] constructed;
length = 30
notBefore Time CHOICE
utcTime UTCTime: tag = [UNIVERSAL 23] primitive; length = 13
000501100000Z
notAfter Time CHOICE
utcTime UTCTime: tag = [UNIVERSAL 23] primitive; length = 13
001101100000Z
subject Name CHOICE
rdnSequence RDNSequence SEQUENCE OF: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16]
constructed; length = 101
RelativeDistinguishedName SET OF: tag = [UNIVERSAL 17]
constructed; length = 11
AttributeTypeAndValue SEQUENCE: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16]
constructed; length = 9
type OBJECT IDENTIFIER: tag = [UNIVERSAL 6] primitive;
length = 3
{ 2 5 4 6 }
value OpenType: PrintableString: tag = [UNIVERSAL 19]
primitive; length = 2
"DE"
RelativeDistinguishedName SET OF: tag = [UNIVERSAL 17]
constructed; length = 55
AttributeTypeAndValue SEQUENCE: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16]
constructed; length = 53
type OBJECT IDENTIFIER: tag = [UNIVERSAL 6] primitive;
length = 3
{ 2 5 4 10 }
value OpenType: UTF8String: tag = [UNIVERSAL 12]
primitive; length = 46
0x474d4420466f72736368756e67737a656e7472756d20496e66...
RelativeDistinguishedName SET OF: tag = [UNIVERSAL 17]
constructed; length = 29
AttributeTypeAndValue SEQUENCE: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16]
constructed; length = 13
type OBJECT IDENTIFIER: tag = [UNIVERSAL 6] primitive;
length = 3
{ 2 5 4 4 }
value OpenType: UTF8String: tag = [UNIVERSAL 12]
primitive; length = 6
0x4261727a696e
AttributeTypeAndValue SEQUENCE: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16]
constructed; length = 12
type OBJECT IDENTIFIER: tag = [UNIVERSAL 6] primitive;
length = 3
{ 2 5 4 42 }
value OpenType: UTF8String: tag = [UNIVERSAL 12]
primitive; length = 5
0x5065747261
subjectPublicKeyInfo SubjectPublicKeyInfo SEQUENCE: tag =
[UNIVERSAL 16] constructed; length = 157
algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier SEQUENCE: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16]
constructed; length = 13
algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER: tag = [UNIVERSAL 6] primitive;
length = 9
{ 1 2 840 113549 1 1 1 }
parameters OpenType: NULL: tag = [UNIVERSAL 5] primitive;
length = 0
NULL
subjectPublicKey BIT STRING: tag = [UNIVERSAL 3] primitive;
length = 139
0x0030818702818100b8488400d4b6088be48ead459ca19ec717aaf3d1d...
extensions : tag = [3] constructed; length = 233
Extensions SEQUENCE OF: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16] constructed;
length = 230
Extension SEQUENCE: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16] constructed;
length = 100
extnId OBJECT IDENTIFIER: tag = [UNIVERSAL 6] primitive;
length = 3
{ 2 5 29 9 }
extnValue OCTET STRING: tag = [UNIVERSAL 4] primitive;
length = 93
0x305b301006082b06010505070904310413024445300f06082b060...
Extension SEQUENCE: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16] constructed;
length = 14
extnId OBJECT IDENTIFIER: tag = [UNIVERSAL 6] primitive;
length = 3
{ 2 5 29 15 }
critical BOOLEAN: tag = [UNIVERSAL 1] primitive; length = 1
TRUE
extnValue OCTET STRING: tag = [UNIVERSAL 4] primitive;
length = 4
0x03020640
Extension SEQUENCE: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16] constructed;
length = 18
extnId OBJECT IDENTIFIER: tag = [UNIVERSAL 6] primitive;
length = 3
{ 2 5 29 32 }
extnValue OCTET STRING: tag = [UNIVERSAL 4] primitive;
length = 11
0x3009300706052b24080101
Extension SEQUENCE: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16] constructed;
length = 31
extnId OBJECT IDENTIFIER: tag = [UNIVERSAL 6] primitive;
length = 3
{ 2 5 29 35 }
extnValue OCTET STRING: tag = [UNIVERSAL 4] primitive;
length = 24
0x30168014000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0ffedcba98
Extension SEQUENCE: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16] constructed;
length = 57
extnId OBJECT IDENTIFIER: tag = [UNIVERSAL 6] primitive;
length = 8
{ 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 3 }
extnValue OCTET STRING: tag = [UNIVERSAL 4] primitive;
length = 45
0x302b302906082b06010505070b01301d301b81196d756e6963697...C.3 DER-encoding ✨
okay so this section is the whole certificate, DER-encoded and written out in hex 💅 it's literally every byte, no cap 🫶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.4 CA's public RSA key 🔑
this one is the public RSA key of the CA that signed the example certificate, also DER-encoded. it's here so you can double-check the example cert without hunting for it elsewhere 🧚
30818902818100ad1f35964b3674c807b9f8a645d2c8174e514b69a4b46a7382
915abbc44eccede914dae8fcc023abcea9c53380e641795cb0dda664b872fc10
9f9bbb852bf42d994f634c681608e388dce240b558513e5b60027bd1a07cef9c
9b6db37c7e1f1abd238eed96e4b669056b260f55e83f14e6027127c9deb3ad18
afcd3f8a5f5bf50203010001Authors' Addresses 🎀
Stefan Santesson AddTrust AB P.O. Box 465 S-201 24 Malmo Sweden
EMail: stefan@addtrust.com
Tim Polk NIST Building 820, Room 426 Gaithersburg, MD 20899, USA
EMail: wpolk@nist.gov
Petra Barzin SECUDE - Sicherheitstechnologie Informationssysteme GmbH Landwehrstrasse 50a D-64293 Darmstadt Germany
EMail: barzin@secude.com
Magnus Nystrom RSA Security AB Box 10704 S-121 29 Stockholm Sweden
EMail: magnus@rsasecurity.com
Full Copyright Statement ⚖️
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2001). All Rights Reserved.
okay this part is legal stuff but it's still super important, so here's the whole thing, no skipping 🫶
This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than English.
The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns.
This document and the information contained herein is provided on an "AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
Acknowledgement 🌸
Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the Internet Society. 💜
📦 where this page comes from
- ietf: rfc3039 2001-01
- 💖 girlified by claude-haiku-5-5 on : a language model's rewrite of the original, under its terms