RFC 2463

Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMPv6) for the Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Specification

๐Ÿ“… published December 1998, from ietf

RFC 2463: Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMPv6) for the Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Specification ๐ŸŽ€

Okay bestie, this one is the ICMPv6 spec ๐Ÿซถ It was written by A. Conta (Lucent) and S. Deering (Cisco Systems) in December 1998. It's a Standards Track doc, and it obsoletes RFC 1885 (so 1885 is the old version). It doesn't say it updates anything.


Status of this Memo ๐Ÿ“œ

This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited.

Copyright (C) The Internet Society (1998). All Rights Reserved.

Abstract ๐ŸŒธ

This doc defines a bunch of Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) messages to use with version 6 of the Internet Protocol (IPv6). Main character energy โœจ

Table of Contents ๐Ÿ—‚๏ธ

   1. Introduction........................................2
   2. ICMPv6 (ICMP for IPv6)..............................2
         2.1 Message General Format.......................2
         2.2 Message Source Address Determination.........3
         2.3 Message Checksum Calculation.................4
         2.4 Message Processing Rules.....................4
   3. ICMPv6 Error Messages...............................6
         3.1 Destination Unreachable Message..............6
         3.2 Packet Too Big Message...................... 8
         3.3 Time Exceeded Message....................... 9
         3.4 Parameter Problem Message...................10
   4. ICMPv6 Informational Messages......................11
         4.1 Echo Request Message........................11
         4.2 Echo Reply Message..........................12
   5. Security Considerations............................13
   6. References.........................................14
   7. Acknowledgments....................................15
   8. Authors' Addresses.................................16
   Appendix A - Changes since RFC 1885...................17
   Full Copyright Statement..............................18

1. Introduction ๐Ÿ’–

Okay so IPv6 is the new version of IP ๐Ÿฆ‹ It uses ICMP, the same Internet Control Message Protocol that IPv4 uses (see [RFC-792]), but with a bunch of changes. The result is called ICMPv6, and its IPv6 Next Header value is 58. Iconic ๐Ÿ‘‘

This doc describes the format of a set of control messages used in ICMPv6. It does not explain how to use those messages for stuff like Path MTU discovery. Those procedures live in other docs (e.g., [PMTU]). Other docs might add more ICMPv6 message types too, like Neighbor Discovery messages [IPv6-DISC], but they still have to follow the general ICMPv6 rules from section 2 of this doc ๐Ÿงš

Terminology from the IPv6 spec [IPv6] and the IPv6 Routing and Addressing spec [IPv6-ADDR] applies here too โœจ

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this doc get interpreted the way [RFC-2119] says ๐Ÿ’…

2. ICMPv6 (ICMP for IPv6) ๐ŸŒˆ

ICMPv6 is how IPv6 nodes report errors they run into while processing packets, and it also handles other internet-layer stuff, like diagnostics (ICMPv6 "ping") ๐Ÿ“ ICMPv6 is an integral part of IPv6, so it MUST be fully implemented by every IPv6 node. No skipping ๐Ÿ˜ญ

2.1 Message General Format ๐ŸŽ€

ICMPv6 messages come in two classes: error messages and informational messages. Error messages are the ones with a zero in the high-order bit of their message Type field values. So error messages have Types from 0 to 127, and informational messages have Types from 128 to 255 ๐ŸŒธ

This doc defines the message formats for these ICMPv6 messages:

     ICMPv6 error messages:

          1    Destination Unreachable      (see section 3.1)
          2    Packet Too Big               (see section 3.2)
          3    Time Exceeded                (see section 3.3)
          4    Parameter Problem            (see section 3.4)

     ICMPv6 informational messages:

          128  Echo Request                 (see section 4.1)
          129  Echo Reply                   (see section 4.2)

Every ICMPv6 message is preceded by an IPv6 header and zero or more IPv6 extension headers. The ICMPv6 header is identified by a Next Header value of 58 in the header right before it. (NOTE: this is different than the value used to identify ICMP for IPv4.) ๐Ÿ™ˆ

The ICMPv6 messages have this general format:

    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |     Type      |     Code      |          Checksum             |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                                                               |
   +                         Message Body                          +
   |                                                               |

The Type field tells you what kind of message it is. Its value decides the format of the rest of the data ๐Ÿงš

The Code field depends on the message type. It's used to add an extra level of message granularity ๐Ÿ’œ

The Checksum field is used to detect data corruption in the ICMPv6 message and parts of the IPv6 header ๐Ÿ”ฅ

2.2 Message Source Address Determination ๐Ÿฆ‹

A node that sends an ICMPv6 message has to figure out both the Source and Destination IPv6 Addresses in the IPv6 header before it calculates the checksum. If the node has more than one unicast address, it must pick the Source Address of the message like this:

  • (a) If the message is a response to a message sent to one of the node's unicast addresses, the Source Address of the reply must be that same address.
  • (b) If the message is a response to a message sent to a multicast or anycast group in which the node is a member, the Source Address of the reply must be a unicast address belonging to the interface on which the multicast or anycast packet was received.
  • (c) If the message is a response to a message sent to an address that does not belong to the node, the Source Address should be that unicast address belonging to the node that will be most helpful in diagnosing the error. For example, if the message is a response to a packet forwarding action that cannot complete successfully, the Source Address should be a unicast address belonging to the interface on which the packet forwarding failed. ๐Ÿ•ต๏ธโ€โ™€๏ธ
  • (d) Otherwise, the node's routing table must be examined to determine which interface will be used to transmit the message to its destination, and a unicast address belonging to that interface must be used as the Source Address of the message. ๐Ÿ—บ๏ธ

2.3 Message Checksum Calculation ๐Ÿงฎ

The checksum is the 16-bit one's complement of the one's complement sum of the entire ICMPv6 message, starting with the ICMPv6 message type field. It gets prepended with a "pseudo-header" of IPv6 header fields, as specified in [IPv6, section 8.1]. The Next Header value used in the pseudo-header is 58. (NOTE: putting a pseudo-header in the ICMPv6 checksum is a change from IPv4; see [IPv6] for the reasoning behind it.) ๐Ÿซถ

For computing the checksum, the checksum field is set to zero. โœจ

2.4 Message Processing Rules ๐Ÿ’…

Implementations MUST follow these rules when they process ICMPv6 messages (from [RFC-1122]):

  • (a) If an ICMPv6 error message of unknown type is received, it MUST be passed to the upper layer.
  • (b) If an ICMPv6 informational message of unknown type is received, it MUST be silently discarded.
  • (c) Every ICMPv6 error message (type < 128) includes as much of the IPv6 offending (invoking) packet (the packet that caused the error) as will fit without making the error message packet exceed the minimum IPv6 MTU [IPv6].
  • (d) In those cases where the internet-layer protocol is required to pass an ICMPv6 error message to the upper-layer process, the upper-layer protocol type is extracted from the original packet (contained in the body of the ICMPv6 error message) and used to select the appropriate upper-layer process to handle the error.

If the original packet had an unusually large amount of extension headers, the upper-layer protocol type might not be present in the ICMPv6 message, because the original packet got truncated to meet the minimum IPv6 MTU [IPv6] limit. In that case, the error message is silently dropped after any IPv6-layer processing. ๐Ÿ˜ฌ

  • (e) An ICMPv6 error message MUST NOT be sent as a result of receiving:
    • (e.1) an ICMPv6 error message, or
    • (e.2) a packet destined to an IPv6 multicast address (there are two exceptions to this rule: (1) the Packet Too Big Message - Section 3.2 - to allow Path MTU discovery to work for IPv6 multicast, and (2) the Parameter Problem Message, Code 2 - Section 3.4 - reporting an unrecognized IPv6 option that has the Option Type highest-order two bits set to 10), or
    • (e.3) a packet sent as a link-layer multicast, (the exception from e.2 applies to this case too), or
    • (e.4) a packet sent as a link-layer broadcast, (the exception from e.2 applies to this case too), or
    • (e.5) a packet whose source address does not uniquely identify a single node -- e.g., the IPv6 Unspecified Address, an IPv6 multicast address, or an address known by the ICMP message sender to be an IPv6 anycast address.
  • (f) Finally, to limit the bandwidth and forwarding costs of sending ICMPv6 error messages, an IPv6 node MUST limit the rate of ICMPv6 error messages it sends. This can happen when a source sending a stream of erroneous packets doesn't listen to the ICMPv6 error messages it gets back. There are a bunch of ways to do the rate-limiting, for example:
    • (f.1) Timer-based - for example, limiting the rate of transmission of error messages to a given source, or to any source, to at most once every T milliseconds.
    • (f.2) Bandwidth-based - for example, limiting the rate at which error messages are sent from a particular interface to some fraction F of the attached link's bandwidth.

The limit parameters (e.g., T or F in the above examples) MUST be configurable for the node, with a conservative default value (e.g., T = 1 second, NOT 0 seconds, or F = 2 percent, NOT 100 percent). ๐Ÿข

The following sections describe the message formats for the above ICMPv6 messages. ๐Ÿญ

3. ICMPv6 Error Messages ๐Ÿšจ

(to be continued in part 2 ๐Ÿงš๐Ÿ’œ)

3.1 Destination Unreachable Message โœˆ๏ธ

okay so this is the message a router (or the sending node's own IPv6 layer) sends back when a packet just can't get where it's going ๐Ÿ™ˆ ๐Ÿ’Œ

       0                   1                   2                   3
       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |     Type      |     Code      |          Checksum             |
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |                             Unused                            |
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |                    As much of invoking packet                 |
      +                as will fit without the ICMPv6 packet          +
      |                exceeding the minimum IPv6 MTU [IPv6]          |

IPv6 Fields:

  • Destination Address ๐ŸŒธ is copied from the Source Address field of the invoking packet. โœจ

ICMPv6 Fields:

  • Type is 1 ๐Ÿ’–
  • Code tells you why it failed ๐Ÿง:
    • 0 - no route to destination
    • 1 - communication with destination administratively prohibited
    • 2 - (not assigned)
    • 3 - address unreachable
    • 4 - port unreachable
  • Unused ๐Ÿซฅ is unused for all code values. It must be initialized to zero by the sender and ignored by the receiver.

Description ๐Ÿ’…

okay so a Destination Unreachable message SHOULD be generated by a router, or by the IPv6 layer in the originating node, when a packet can't be delivered to its destination address for reasons other than congestion. ๐Ÿšฆ congestion is the one drama that doesn't get an error message, so an ICMPv6 message MUST NOT be generated if a packet is dropped due to congestion. no cap, that's the rule ๐Ÿ™…โ€โ™€๏ธ

  • if the packet fails because the forwarding node has no matching entry in its routing table, the Code is 0 ๐Ÿ—บ๏ธ (NOTE: this error can only happen in nodes that don't have a "default route" in their routing tables, so it's a very specific vibe)
  • if it's blocked on purpose by administrative prohibition, like a "firewall filter", the Code is 1 ๐Ÿ”ฅ
  • if it fails for any other reason, like not being able to resolve the IPv6 destination address into a link address, or some link-specific problem, the Code is 3 ๐Ÿซ 

a destination node SHOULD send a Destination Unreachable message with Code 4 when a packet arrives for a transport protocol (like UDP) that has no listener, if that transport protocol has no other way to tell the sender ๐Ÿ“ฎ

Upper layer notification ๐Ÿ“ฃ

a node that receives the ICMPv6 Destination Unreachable message MUST notify the upper-layer process. no skipping that step, bestie ๐Ÿซถ


3.2 Packet Too Big Message ๐Ÿ“ฆ

this one is the MTU messenger ๐Ÿงš it tells the sender how big the next hop can actually handle

       0                   1                   2                   3
       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |     Type      |     Code      |          Checksum             |
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |                             MTU                               |
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |                    As much of invoking packet                 |
      +               as will fit without the ICMPv6 packet           +
      |               exceeding the minimum IPv6 MTU [IPv6]           |

IPv6 Fields:

  • Destination Address ๐ŸŒธ is copied from the Source Address field of the invoking packet. โœจ

ICMPv6 Fields:

  • Type is 2 ๐Ÿ’–
  • Code is set to 0 (zero) by the sender and ignored by the receiver ๐Ÿซฅ
  • MTU is the Maximum Transmission Unit of the next-hop link. ๐Ÿ“

Description ๐Ÿ’…

a Packet Too Big MUST be sent by a router when it can't forward a packet because that packet is larger than the MTU of the outgoing link. ๐Ÿ™…โ€โ™€๏ธ no exceptions unless you're doing something really specific. the info in this message gets used as part of the Path MTU Discovery process [PMTU] ๐Ÿ”

this message is kind of a rule-breaker ๐Ÿ˜ค it's the one ICMPv6 error message that is sent in response to a packet received with an IPv6 multicast destination address, or a link-layer multicast or link-layer broadcast address. main character behavior, honestly ๐Ÿ‘‘

Upper layer notification ๐Ÿ“ฃ

an incoming Packet Too Big message MUST be passed to the upper-layer process. โœจ


3.3 Time Exceeded Message โณ

this is the "you've been running around too long" message ๐Ÿƒโ€โ™€๏ธ๐Ÿ’จ

       0                   1                   2                   3
       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |     Type      |     Code      |          Checksum             |
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |                             Unused                            |
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |                    As much of invoking packet                 |
      +               as will fit without the ICMPv6 packet           +
      |               exceeding the minimum IPv6 MTU [IPv6]           |

IPv6 Fields:

  • Destination Address ๐ŸŒธ is copied from the Source Address field of the invoking packet. โœจ

ICMPv6 Fields:

  • Type is 3 ๐Ÿ’–
  • Code tells you which timeout happened โฑ๏ธ:
    • 0 - hop limit exceeded in transit
    • 1 - fragment reassembly time exceeded
  • Unused ๐Ÿซฅ is unused for all code values. It must be initialized to zero by the sender and ignored by the receiver.

Description ๐Ÿ’…

if a router gets a packet with a Hop Limit of zero, or it decrements a packet's Hop Limit to zero, it MUST discard the packet and send an ICMPv6 Time Exceeded message with Code 0 to the source of the packet. ๐Ÿ” this basically means either there's a routing loop going on, or the initial Hop Limit value was too small. yikes ๐Ÿ˜ญ

the rules for picking the Source Address of this message are defined in section 2.2. ๐Ÿงญ

Upper layer notification ๐Ÿ“ฃ

an incoming Time Exceeded message MUST be passed to the upper-layer process. ๐Ÿซถ


3.4 Parameter Problem Message ๐Ÿงฉ

this one's for when something inside the packet is wrong, like a header field that makes no sense ๐Ÿคจ

       0                   1                   2                   3
       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |     Type      |     Code      |          Checksum             |
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |                            Pointer                            |
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |                    As much of invoking packet                 |
      +               as will fit without the ICMPv6 packet           +
      |               exceeding the minimum IPv6 MTU [IPv6]           |

IPv6 Fields:

  • Destination Address ๐ŸŒธ is copied from the Source Address field of the invoking packet. โœจ

ICMPv6 Fields:

  • Type is 4 ๐Ÿ’–
  • Code tells you what kind of problem it was ๐Ÿ•ต๏ธโ€โ™€๏ธ:
    • 0 - erroneous header field encountered
    • 1 - unrecognized Next Header type encountered
    • 2 - unrecognized IPv6 option encountered
  • Pointer identifies the octet offset within the invoking packet where the error was detected. ๐Ÿ“

the Pointer will point beyond the end of the ICMPv6 packet if the field in error is beyond what can fit in the maximum size of an ICMPv6 error message. ๐Ÿซ 

Description ๐Ÿ’…

if an IPv6 node processing a packet finds a problem with a field in the IPv6 header or extension headers so that it can't finish processing the packet, it MUST discard the packet and SHOULD send an ICMPv6 Parameter Problem message to the packet's source, showing the type and location of the problem. ๐Ÿ—บ๏ธ it's like a little "here's exactly where it broke" note ๐Ÿ“

the pointer tells you which octet of the original packet's header had the error. for example, an ICMPv6 message with Type field = 4, Code field = 1, and Pointer field = 40 would mean the IPv6 extension header following the IPv6 header of the original packet has an unrecognized Next Header field value. ๐Ÿค“ 40 octets in, the drama is right there ๐ŸŽญ

Upper layer notification ๐Ÿ“ฃ

a node that receives this ICMPv6 message MUST notify the upper-layer process. ๐Ÿ’–


4. ICMPv6 Informational Messages ๐Ÿงšโ€โ™€๏ธ

informational messages are the chill ones ๐ŸŒˆ they're not about errors, they're about checking in and saying hi ๐Ÿ‘‹

4.1 Echo Request Message ๐Ÿ“

this is the classic "ping" ๐Ÿ“ and I'm obsessed with how simple it is

       0                   1                   2                   3
       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |     Type      |     Code      |          Checksum             |
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |           Identifier          |        Sequence Number        |
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |     Data ...
      +-+-+-+-+-

IPv6 Fields:

  • Destination Address ๐ŸŒธ can be any legal IPv6 address. ๐Ÿ’Œ

ICMPv6 Fields:

  • Type is 128 ๐Ÿ’–
  • Code is 0 ๐Ÿซฅ
  • Identifier is an identifier to help match Echo Replies to this Echo Request. It may be zero. ๐Ÿท๏ธ
  • Sequence Number is a sequence number to help match Echo Replies to this Echo Request. It may be zero. ๐Ÿ”ข
  • Data is zero or more octets of arbitrary data. ๐ŸŽ

Description ๐Ÿ’…

every node MUST implement an ICMPv6 Echo responder function that receives Echo Requests and sends the matching Echo Replies. no excuses, that's the baseline ๐Ÿซถ a node SHOULD also implement an application-layer interface for sending Echo Requests and receiving Echo Replies, for diagnostic purposes. ๐Ÿ”ง very helpful, very iconic ๐ŸŒŸ

Upper layer notification ๐Ÿ“ฃ

Echo Request messages MAY be passed to processes receiving ICMP messages. ๐Ÿฆ‹

4.2 Echo Reply Message ๐Ÿฆ‹

okay so the Echo Reply is the bestie who answers when you ping them ๐Ÿ’–. here's what it looks like on the wire:

       0                   1                   2                   3
       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |     Type      |     Code      |          Checksum             |
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |           Identifier          |        Sequence Number        |
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |     Data ...
      +-+-+-+-+-

IPv6 Fields: the one that matters most here is the Destination Address ๐ŸŽ€. it gets copied from the Source Address field of the invoking Echo Request packet.

ICMPv6 Fields: ๐Ÿ’…

Type           129
Code           0
Identifier     The identifier from the invoking Echo Request message.
Sequence       The sequence number from the invoking Echo Request
Number         message.
Data           The data from the invoking Echo Request message.

Description โœจ

okay so every single node MUST implement an ICMPv6 Echo responder function. that's the part that catches Echo Requests and sends back the matching Echo Replies ๐Ÿซถ. on top of that, a node SHOULD also implement an application-layer interface for sending Echo Requests and receiving Echo Replies, for diagnostic purposes ๐Ÿ”. it's giving "troubleshooting queen" energy.

when an Echo Reply answers a unicast Echo Request message, its source address MUST be the same as the destination address of that Echo Request message. no cap, it has to match ๐Ÿ’œ.

an Echo Reply SHOULD be sent when the Echo Request was sent to an IPv6 multicast address ๐Ÿ“ฃ. but here's the twist: the reply's source MUST be a unicast address that belongs to the interface where the multicast Echo Request came in ๐ŸŒธ. main character energy, fr fr.

the data in the ICMPv6 Echo Request MUST come back entirely and unmodified in the ICMPv6 Echo Reply ๐Ÿ“. no edits, no glow-ups, just the same data back to sender ๐Ÿ˜ญ.

Upper layer notification ๐Ÿ“ฌ

Echo Reply messages MUST be passed to the process that originated an Echo Request message. it may be passed to processes that did not originate the Echo Request message too ๐Ÿงš.


5. Security Considerations ๐Ÿ”

5.1 Authentication and Encryption of ICMP messages ๐Ÿ›ก๏ธ

ICMP packet exchanges can be authenticated using the IP Authentication Header [IPv6-AUTH]. a node SHOULD include an Authentication Header when sending ICMP messages if a security association for use with the IP Authentication Header exists for the destination address. those security associations may have been created through manual configuration or through the operation of some key management protocol ๐Ÿ—๏ธ.

any Authentication Headers on received ICMP packets MUST be verified for correctness, and packets with incorrect authentication MUST be ignored and discarded ๐Ÿšซ.

it SHOULD be possible for the system administrator to configure a node to ignore any ICMP messages that are not authenticated using either the Authentication Header or Encapsulating Security Payload. such a switch SHOULD default to allowing unauthenticated messages ๐Ÿ™ˆ.

confidentiality is handled by the IP Security Architecture and the IP Encapsulating Security Payload documents [IPv6-SA, IPv6-ESP] ๐Ÿ”’.

5.2 ICMP Attacks ๐Ÿ’€

ICMP messages may be subject to various attacks. the full story lives in the IP Security Architecture [IPv6-SA], but here's a quick, brief rundown of the attacks and how to prevent them ๐Ÿ˜ค:

  1. ICMP messages may be subject to actions meant to make the receiver think the message came from a different source than the one that really sent it. you can protect against this by applying the IPv6 Authentication mechanism [IPv6-Auth] to the ICMP message ๐Ÿ•ต๏ธ.
  2. ICMP messages may be subject to actions meant to send the message, or the reply to it, to a destination other than the originator intended. the ICMP checksum calculation protects against a malicious interceptor changing the destination and source address of the IP packet carrying the message, as long as the ICMP checksum field is protected from change by authentication [IPv6-Auth] or encryption [IPv6-ESP] of the ICMP message ๐Ÿงท.
  3. ICMP messages may be subject to changes in the message fields or payload. authentication [IPv6-Auth] or encryption [IPv6-ESP] of the ICMP message protects against these actions ๐Ÿ›ก๏ธ.
  4. ICMP messages may be used in denial of service attacks by sending back-to-back erroneous IP packets. an implementation that correctly followed section 2.4, paragraph (f) of this specification would be protected by the ICMP error rate limiting mechanism ๐Ÿšฆ.

6. References ๐Ÿ“š

  • [IPv6] Deering, S. and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6, (IPv6) Specification", RFC 2460, December 1998.
  • [IPv6-ADDR] Hinden, R. and S. Deering, "IP Version 6 Addressing Architecture", RFC 2373, July 1998.
  • [IPv6-DISC] Narten, T., Nordmark, E. and W. Simpson, "Neighbor Discovery for IP Version 6 (IPv6)", RFC 2461, December 1998.
  • [RFC-792] Postel, J., "Internet Control Message Protocol", STD 5, RFC 792, September 1981.
  • [RFC-1122] Braden, R., "Requirements for Internet Hosts - Communication Layers", STD 5, RFC 1122, August 1989.
  • [PMTU] McCann, J., Deering, S. and J. Mogul, "Path MTU Discovery for IP version 6", RFC 1981, August 1996.
  • [RFC-2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
  • [IPv6-SA] Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, "Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol", RFC 2401, November 1998.
  • [IPv6-Auth] Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, "IP Authentication Header", RFC 2402, November 1998.
  • [IPv6-ESP] Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, "IP Encapsulating Security Protocol (ESP)", RFC 2406, November 1998.

7. Acknowledgments ๐Ÿซถ

the document is derived from previous ICMP drafts of the SIPP and IPng working group ๐ŸŒˆ.

the IPng working group, and especially Robert Elz, Jim Bound, Bill Simpson, Thomas Narten, Charlie Lynn, Bill Fink, Scott Bradner, Dimitri Haskin, and Bob Hinden (in chronological order), provided extensive review information and feedback. absolute legends ๐Ÿ‘‘.


8. Authors' Addresses โœ๏ธ

Alex Conta
Lucent Technologies Inc.
300 Baker Ave, Suite 100
Concord, MA 01742
USA

Phone: +1 978 287-2842
EMail: aconta@lucent.com
Stephen Deering
Cisco Systems, Inc.
170 West Tasman Drive
San Jose, CA 95134-1706
USA

Phone: +1 408 527-8213
EMail: deering@cisco.com

Appendix A - Changes from RFC 1885 ๐Ÿ—‚๏ธ

Version 2-02

  • Excluded mentioning informational replies from paragraph (f.2) of section 2.4.
  • In "Upper layer notification" sections, changed "upper-layer protocol" and "User Interface" to "process".
  • Changed section 5.2, items 2 and 3 to also refer to AH authentication.
  • Removed item 5. from section 5.2 on denial of service attacks.
  • Updated phone numbers and Email addresses in the "Authors' Addresses" section.

Version 2-01

  • Replaced all references to "576 octets" as the maximum for an ICMP message size with "minimum IPv6 MTU" as defined by the base IPv6 specification.
  • Removed rate control from informational messages.
  • Added requirement that receivers ignore Code value in Packet Too Big message.
  • Removed "Not a Neighbor" (code 2) from destination unreachable message.
  • Fixed typos and update references.

Version 2-00

  • Applied rate control to informational messages.
  • Removed section 2.4 on Group Management ICMP messages.
  • Removed references to IGMP in Abstract and Section 1.
  • Updated references to other IPv6 documents.
  • Removed references to RFC-1112 in Abstract, and Section 1, and to RFC-1191 in section 1, and section 3.2.
  • Added security section.
  • Added Appendix A - changes.

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