RFC 1122

Requirements for Internet Hosts - Communication Layers

๐Ÿ“… published October 1989, from ietf

RFC 1122: Requirements for Internet Hosts -- Communication Layers ๐ŸŽ€

  • Series: Network Working Group, Internet Engineering Task Force ๐ŸŒธ
  • Editor: R. Braden, Editor ๐Ÿ’…
  • Date: October 1989 ๐Ÿ“…
  • Status: official specification for the Internet community โœจ
  • Obsoletes/Updates: the title block doesn't list anything this RFC obsoletes or updates ๐Ÿฆ‹

Status of This Memo

okay so this one is an official specification for the whole Internet community ๐Ÿ‘‘ It bundles in, amends, corrects, and supplements the main protocol standards docs that are about hosts, so it's basically the glow-up for those. Distribution of this document is unlimited, so share it with everyone ๐Ÿ’–

Summary

this is one half of a pair ๐Ÿงš Together they lay out what Internet host software needs to do. This RFC handles the communication protocol layers: link layer, IP layer, and transport layer. Its bestie, RFC-1123, handles the application and support protocols ๐Ÿซถ


Table of Contents โœจ

   1.  INTRODUCTION .............................................    5
      1.1  The Internet Architecture ..............................    6
         1.1.1  Internet Hosts ....................................    6
         1.1.2  Architectural Assumptions .........................    7
         1.1.3  Internet Protocol Suite ...........................    8
         1.1.4  Embedded Gateway Code .............................   10
      1.2  General Considerations .................................   12
         1.2.1  Continuing Internet Evolution .....................   12
         1.2.2  Robustness Principle ..............................   12
         1.2.3  Error Logging .....................................   13
         1.2.4  Configuration .....................................   14
      1.3  Reading this Document ..................................   15
         1.3.1  Organization ......................................   15
         1.3.2  Requirements ......................................   16
         1.3.3  Terminology .......................................   17
      1.4  Acknowledgments ........................................   20

   2. LINK LAYER ..................................................   21
      2.1  INTRODUCTION ...........................................   21
      2.2  PROTOCOL WALK-THROUGH ..................................   21
      2.3  SPECIFIC ISSUES ........................................   21
         2.3.1  Trailer Protocol Negotiation ......................   21
         2.3.2  Address Resolution Protocol -- ARP ................   22
            2.3.2.1  ARP Cache Validation .........................   22
            2.3.2.2  ARP Packet Queue .............................   24
         2.3.3  Ethernet and IEEE 802 Encapsulation ...............   24
      2.4  LINK/INTERNET LAYER INTERFACE ..........................   25
      2.5  LINK LAYER REQUIREMENTS SUMMARY ........................   26

   3. INTERNET LAYER PROTOCOLS ....................................   27
      3.1 INTRODUCTION ............................................   27
      3.2  PROTOCOL WALK-THROUGH ..................................   29
         3.2.1 Internet Protocol -- IP ............................   29
            3.2.1.1  Version Number ...............................   29
            3.2.1.2  Checksum .....................................   29
            3.2.1.3  Addressing ...................................   29
            3.2.1.4  Fragmentation and Reassembly .................   32
            3.2.1.5  Identification ...............................   32
            3.2.1.6  Type-of-Service ..............................   33
            3.2.1.7  Time-to-Live .................................   34
            3.2.1.8  Options ......................................   35
         3.2.2 Internet Control Message Protocol -- ICMP ..........   38
            3.2.2.1  Destination Unreachable ......................   39
            3.2.2.2  Redirect .....................................   40
            3.2.2.3  Source Quench ................................   41
            3.2.2.4  Time Exceeded ................................   41
            3.2.2.5  Parameter Problem ............................   42
            3.2.2.6  Echo Request/Reply ...........................   42
            3.2.2.7  Information Request/Reply ....................   43
            3.2.2.8  Timestamp and Timestamp Reply ................   43
            3.2.2.9  Address Mask Request/Reply ...................   45
         3.2.3  Internet Group Management Protocol IGMP ...........   47
      3.3  SPECIFIC ISSUES ........................................   47
         3.3.1  Routing Outbound Datagrams ........................   47
            3.3.1.1  Local/Remote Decision ........................   47
            3.3.1.2  Gateway Selection ............................   48
            3.3.1.3  Route Cache ..................................   49
            3.3.1.4  Dead Gateway Detection .......................   51
            3.3.1.5  New Gateway Selection ........................   55
            3.3.1.6  Initialization ...............................   56
         3.3.2  Reassembly ........................................   56
         3.3.3  Fragmentation .....................................   58
         3.3.4  Local Multihoming .................................   60
            3.3.4.1  Introduction .................................   60
            3.3.4.2  Multihoming Requirements .....................   61
            3.3.4.3  Choosing a Source Address ....................   64
         3.3.5  Source Route Forwarding ...........................   65
         3.3.6  Broadcasts ........................................   66
         3.3.7  IP Multicasting ...................................   67
         3.3.8  Error Reporting ...................................   69
      3.4  INTERNET/TRANSPORT LAYER INTERFACE .....................   69
      3.5  INTERNET LAYER REQUIREMENTS SUMMARY ....................   72

   4. TRANSPORT PROTOCOLS .........................................   77
      4.1  USER DATAGRAM PROTOCOL -- UDP ..........................   77
         4.1.1  INTRODUCTION ......................................   77
         4.1.2  PROTOCOL WALK-THROUGH .............................   77
         4.1.3  SPECIFIC ISSUES ...................................   77
            4.1.3.1  Ports ........................................   77
            4.1.3.2  IP Options ...................................   77
            4.1.3.3  ICMP Messages ................................   78
            4.1.3.4  UDP Checksums ................................   78
            4.1.3.5  UDP Multihoming ..............................   79
            4.1.3.6  Invalid Addresses ............................   79
         4.1.4  UDP/APPLICATION LAYER INTERFACE ...................   79
         4.1.5  UDP REQUIREMENTS SUMMARY ..........................   80
      4.2  TRANSMISSION CONTROL PROTOCOL -- TCP ...................   82
         4.2.1  INTRODUCTION ......................................   82
         4.2.2  PROTOCOL WALK-THROUGH .............................   82
            4.2.2.1  Well-Known Ports .............................   82
            4.2.2.2  Use of Push ..................................   82
            4.2.2.3  Window Size ..................................   83
            4.2.2.4  Urgent Pointer ...............................   84
            4.2.2.5  TCP Options ..................................   85
            4.2.2.6  Maximum Segment Size Option ..................   85
            4.2.2.7  TCP Checksum .................................   86
            4.2.2.8  TCP Connection State Diagram .................   86
            4.2.2.9  Initial Sequence Number Selection ............   87
            4.2.2.10  Simultaneous Open Attempts ..................   87
            4.2.2.11  Recovery from Old Duplicate SYN .............   87
            4.2.2.12  RST Segment .................................   87
            4.2.2.13  Closing a Connection ........................   87
            4.2.2.14  Data Communication ..........................   89
            4.2.2.15  Retransmission Timeout ......................   90
            4.2.2.16  Managing the Window .........................   91
            4.2.2.17  Probing Zero Windows ........................   92
            4.2.2.18  Passive OPEN Calls ..........................   92
            4.2.2.19  Time to Live ................................   93
            4.2.2.20  Event Processing ............................   93
            4.2.2.21  Acknowledging Queued Segments ...............   94
         4.2.3  SPECIFIC ISSUES ...................................   95
            4.2.3.1  Retransmission Timeout Calculation ...........   95
            4.2.3.2  When to Send an ACK Segment ..................   96
            4.2.3.3  When to Send a Window Update .................   97
            4.2.3.4  When to Send Data ............................   98
            4.2.3.5  TCP Connection Failures ......................  100
            4.2.3.6  TCP Keep-Alives ..............................  101
            4.2.3.7  TCP Multihoming ..............................  103
            4.2.3.8  IP Options ...................................  103
            4.2.3.9  ICMP Messages ................................  103
            4.2.3.10  Remote Address Validation ...................  104
            4.2.3.11  TCP Traffic Patterns ........................  104
            4.2.3.12  Efficiency ..................................  105
         4.2.4  TCP/APPLICATION LAYER INTERFACE ...................  106
            4.2.4.1  Asynchronous Reports .........................  106
            4.2.4.2  Type-of-Service ..............................  107
            4.2.4.3  Flush Call ...................................  107
            4.2.4.4  Multihoming ..................................  108
         4.2.5  TCP REQUIREMENT SUMMARY ...........................  108

   5.  REFERENCES .................................................  112

1. Introduction โœจ

okay so this document is one of a pair that spells out what host systems need to do to implement the Internet protocol suite ๐ŸŽ€ This RFC is all about the communication protocol layers: link layer, IP layer, and transport layer. Its companion, "Requirements for Internet Hosts -- Application and Support" [INTRO:1], covers the application layer protocols. You should also read this alongside "Requirements for Internet Gateways" [INTRO:2] ๐Ÿ“š

These docs are meant to guide vendors, implementors, and users of Internet communication software ๐Ÿ’… They're basically the consensus of a huge pile of technical experience and wisdom, contributed by folks in the Internet research and vendor communities. Main character energy ๐Ÿ‘‘

This RFC lists the standard protocols that a host connected to the Internet must use. It also pulls in the RFCs and other docs that describe the current specs for those protocols by reference. Where those docs have errors, this RFC fixes them, and it adds extra discussion and guidance for implementors ๐Ÿฆ‹

For every protocol, this document also gives an explicit set of requirements, recommendations, and options ๐ŸŒˆ The reader has to understand that the requirements listed here are not the full picture on their own ๐Ÿ™ˆ The complete set of requirements for an Internet host lives mainly in the standard protocol spec documents, with the corrections, amendments, and supplements from this RFC layered on top. So read both, bestie ๐Ÿซถ


to be continued in part 2 ๐Ÿ’–

A good-faith implementation, one that comes from careful reading of the RFCs and some back-and-forth with the Internet technical community, and that follows solid communications software engineering practices, SHOULD differ from the requirements of this document in only minor ways. โœจ So in lots of cases, the "requirements" here are already stated or implied in the standard protocol docs, and including them is kind of redundant ๐Ÿ™ƒ. They're here anyway because some past implementation made the wrong call and caused problems with interoperability, performance, and/or robustness ๐Ÿ’€.

This document has a lot of discussion and explanation about the requirements and recommendations, and that's on purpose ๐ŸŽ€. A plain list of requirements would be risky, because:

  • Some required features matter more than others, and some features are optional ๐ŸŒธ.
  • There may be valid reasons why particular vendor products designed for restricted contexts choose to use different specifications ๐Ÿงš.

Still, the specifications in this document MUST be followed to reach the big goal of arbitrary host interoperation across the diversity and complexity of the Internet system ๐Ÿ‘‘. Yes, most current implementations miss these requirements in various ways, some small and some big, but this spec is the ideal we're all working toward ๐Ÿ’–.

These requirements are based on the current level of Internet architecture. This document will get updated as needed to add clarifications or information in areas where the specs are still evolving ๐Ÿฆ‹.

This intro section starts with a quick overview of the Internet architecture as it relates to hosts, then gives some general advice to host software vendors ๐Ÿ’…. After that, there's some guidance on reading the rest of the document, plus some terminology ๐Ÿ“š.

1.1. The Internet Architecture โœจ

General background and discussion on the Internet architecture and supporting protocol suite can be found in the DDN Protocol Handbook [INTRO:3]. For background, see for example [INTRO:9], [INTRO:10], and [INTRO:11] ๐Ÿง . Reference [INTRO:5] describes the procedure for getting Internet protocol documents, and [INTRO:6] has a list of the numbers assigned within Internet protocols ๐Ÿ”ข.

1.1.1. Internet Hosts

A host computer, or just "host," is the ultimate consumer of communication services ๐Ÿ–ฅ๏ธ. A host usually runs application programs for users, and uses network and/or Internet communication services to make that happen ๐Ÿ’ป. An Internet host matches up with the "End-System" concept from the OSI protocol suite [INTRO:13] ๐Ÿซถ.

An Internet communication system is made of interconnected packet networks that let host computers talk to each other using the Internet protocols ๐ŸŒ. The networks are connected using packet-switching computers. The Internet community calls these "gateways" or "IP routers," and the OSI world calls them "Intermediate Systems" [INTRO:13] ๐Ÿฆ‹. The RFC "Requirements for Internet Gateways" [INTRO:2] has the official specs for Internet gateways ๐Ÿ“œ. That RFC, together with this document and its companion [INTRO:1], defines the rules for how the Internet architecture is realized right now ๐Ÿ‘‘.

Internet hosts come in a huge range of sizes, speeds, and functions ๐ŸŒˆ. Size-wise they go from tiny microprocessors up through workstations to mainframes and supercomputers ๐Ÿ’ช. Function-wise they go from single-purpose hosts (like terminal servers) to full-service hosts that run all sorts of online network services, usually including remote login, file transfer, and electronic mail ๐Ÿ“ฌ.

A host is generally called multihomed if it has more than one interface to the same network or to different networks ๐Ÿ“. See Section 1.1.3 on "Terminology" for more ๐Ÿ”.

1.1.2. Architectural Assumptions

The current Internet architecture rests on a set of assumptions about the communication system ๐Ÿงฉ. The ones most relevant to hosts are these:

  • (a) The Internet is a network of networks.

Each host is directly connected to some particular network(s), so its connection to the Internet is only conceptual ๐ŸŒธ. Two hosts on the same network talk to each other using the same set of protocols they'd use to talk to hosts on distant networks ๐Ÿ’œ.

  • (b) Gateways don't keep connection state information.

To make the communication system more robust, gateways are designed to be stateless. They forward each IP datagram on its own, separate from the other datagrams ๐Ÿซง. Because of that, redundant paths can be used to keep service running even when gateways or networks in the middle fail ๐Ÿ›ก๏ธ.

All state information needed for end-to-end flow control and reliability lives in the hosts, either in the transport layer or in application programs ๐Ÿง . That means all connection control information sits right at the end points of the communication, so it only gets lost if an end point fails ๐Ÿ˜ญ.

  • (c) Routing complexity should be in the gateways.

Routing is complicated and hard, so it SHOULD be handled by the gateways, not the hosts ๐Ÿ—บ๏ธ. A big goal here is to shield host software from the changes that the inevitable evolution of Internet routing architecture brings ๐Ÿ›ก๏ธ.

  • (d) The System MUST tolerate wide network variation.

A basic goal of the Internet design is to handle a wide range of network characteristics, like bandwidth, delay, packet loss, packet reordering, and maximum packet size ๐ŸŒŠ. Another goal is robustness against failures of individual networks, gateways, and hosts, using whatever bandwidth is still available ๐Ÿ’ช. Finally, the aim is full "open system interconnection": an Internet host MUST be able to interoperate robustly and effectively with any other Internet host, across diverse Internet paths ๐ŸŒ.

Sometimes host implementors have designed for less ambitious goals ๐Ÿ™ˆ. For example, a LAN is usually way more chill than the Internet as a whole, since LANs have low packet loss and delay and don't reorder packets ๐Ÿ˜Œ. Some vendors have shipped host implementations that are fine for a simple LAN but work badly for general interoperation ๐Ÿ˜ฌ. The vendor says the product makes sense economically inside the restricted LAN market ๐Ÿ’ผ. But isolated LANs rarely stay isolated for long. They get gatewayed to each other, then to organization-wide internets, and eventually to the global Internet system ๐ŸŒ. In the end, neither the customer nor the vendor wins with incomplete or substandard Internet host software ๐Ÿ’€.

The requirements in this document are designed for a full-function Internet host, one that's capable of full interoperation over any Internet path ๐Ÿ‘‘.

1.1.3. Internet Protocol Suite

To communicate over the Internet system, a host MUST implement the layered set of protocols that make up the Internet protocol suite ๐Ÿฐ. A host typically MUST implement at least one protocol from each layer ๐Ÿง.

Here are the protocol layers used in the Internet architecture [INTRO:4] ๐ŸŽ€:

  • Application Layer

The application layer is the top layer of the Internet protocol suite ๐ŸŒˆ. The Internet suite doesn't split the application layer any further, though some Internet application layer protocols do have some internal sub-layering ๐Ÿญ. The application layer basically combines the functions of the top two OSI reference model layers, Presentation and Application ๐Ÿ’–.

We split application layer protocols into two categories: user protocols, which give service directly to users, and support protocols, which provide common system functions ๐Ÿซถ. Requirements for user and support protocols are in the companion RFC [INTRO:1] ๐Ÿ“œ.

The most common Internet user protocols are:

  • Telnet (remote login) ๐Ÿ–ฅ๏ธ
  • FTP (file transfer) ๐Ÿ“
  • SMTP (electronic mail delivery) ๐Ÿ“ง

There are a bunch of other standardized user protocols [INTRO:4], plus lots of private user protocols ๐Ÿงฉ.

Support protocols, used for host name mapping, booting, and management, include SNMP, BOOTP, RARP, and the Domain Name System (DNS) protocols ๐Ÿ› ๏ธ.

  • Transport Layer

The transport layer gives application programs end-to-end communication services ๐Ÿš€. There are two main transport layer protocols right now ๐Ÿ’…:

  • Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) ๐ŸŽ€
  • User Datagram Protocol (UDP) ๐ŸŒธ

TCP is a reliable, connection-oriented transport service. It gives end-to-end reliability, resequencing, and flow control ๐Ÿ”’. UDP is a connectionless ("datagram") transport service ๐Ÿ“ฆ.

Other transport protocols have been developed by the research community, and the official set of Internet transport protocols may grow in the future ๐Ÿ”ญ.

Transport layer protocols are discussed in Chapter 4 ๐Ÿงš.

  • Internet Layer

Every Internet transport protocol uses the Internet Protocol (IP) to carry data from source host to destination host ๐Ÿšš. IP is a connectionless, datagram internetwork service, and it gives NO end-to-end delivery guarantees ๐Ÿ˜ฌ. So IP datagrams can arrive at the destination host damaged, duplicated, out of order, or not at all ๐Ÿ™ƒ. The layers above IP are responsible for reliable delivery when it's needed ๐Ÿซก. The IP protocol includes stuff for addressing, type-of-service specification, fragmentation and reassembly, and security information ๐Ÿ”.

The datagram, or connectionless, nature of IP is a fundamental and defining feature of the Internet architecture ๐Ÿ’œ. Internet IP was the model for the OSI Connectionless Network Protocol [INTRO:12] ๐Ÿ‘‘.

ICMP is a control protocol that's considered an integral part of IP, even though it sits architecturally on top of IP. That means it uses IP to carry its data end-to-end, the same way a transport protocol like TCP or UDP does ๐Ÿงƒ. ICMP provides error reporting, congestion reporting, and first-hop gateway redirection ๐Ÿšฆ.

IGMP is an Internet layer protocol used for setting up dynamic host groups for IP multicasting ๐Ÿ“ฃ ๐Ÿฆ‹.

The Internet layer protocols IP, ICMP, and IGMP are discussed in Chapter 3. ๐Ÿงš Those are the Internet layer babes, and they get a whole chapter ๐Ÿ’…

  • Link Layer ๐Ÿ”—

To communicate on its directly-connected network, a host MUST implement the communication protocol used to interface to that network. We call this a link layer or media-access layer protocol.

There is a wide variety of link layer protocols, corresponding to the many different types of networks. See Chapter 2.

1.1.4. Embedded Gateway Code ๐ŸŽ€

Some Internet host software includes embedded gateway functionality, so these hosts can forward packets like a gateway would, while still doing the application layer stuff a host does. It's giving dual-purpose energy ๐Ÿ™ˆ

Such dual-purpose systems MUST follow the Gateway Requirements RFC [INTRO:2] for their gateway functions, and MUST follow this document for their host functions. In all overlapping cases, the two specifications SHOULD be in agreement. โœจ

There are varying opinions in the Internet community about embedded gateway functionality. The main arguments are:

  • Pro: In a local network environment where networking is informal, or in isolated internets, it may be convenient and economical to use existing host systems as gateways. ๐Ÿ“

There's also an architectural argument for embedded gateway functionality: multihoming is way more common than originally foreseen, and multihoming forces a host to make routing decisions as if it were a gateway. If the multihomed host contains an embedded gateway, it will have full routing knowledge and, as a result, will be able to make more optimal routing decisions. ๐Ÿง 

  • Con: Gateway algorithms and protocols are still changing, and they will keep changing as the Internet grows larger. Trying to include a general gateway function within the host IP layer will force host system maintainers to track these (more frequent) changes. Also, a larger pool of gateway implementations will make coordinating the changes harder. Finally, the complexity of a gateway IP layer is somewhat greater than that of a host, which makes the implementation and operation tasks more complex. ๐Ÿ˜ฉ

In addition, the style of operation of some hosts is not appropriate for providing stable and robust gateway service. ๐Ÿ™…โ€โ™€๏ธ

There is considerable merit in both of these viewpoints. One conclusion can be drawn: a host administrator MUST have conscious control over whether or not a given host acts as a gateway. See Section 3.1 for the detailed requirements. ๐Ÿ‘‘

1.2. General Considerations ๐Ÿ’…

There are two important lessons that vendors of Internet host software have learned, and a new vendor should consider them seriously. Take notes bestie ๐Ÿ“

1.2.1. Continuing Internet Evolution ๐Ÿฆ‹

The enormous growth of the Internet has revealed problems of management and scaling in a large datagram-based packet communication system. These problems are being addressed, so there will be continuing evolution of the specifications described in this document. These changes will be carefully planned and controlled, since vendors and the organizations responsible for operating the networks take an extensive part in that planning. ๐Ÿ—“๏ธ

Development, evolution, and revision are characteristic of computer network protocols today, and this situation will persist for some years. A vendor who develops computer communication software for the Internet protocol suite (or any other protocol suite!) and then fails to maintain and update that software for changing specifications is going to leave a trail of unhappy customers ๐Ÿ’€ The Internet is a large communication network, and users are in constant contact through it. Experience has shown that knowledge of deficiencies in vendor software spreads quickly through the Internet technical community. Word travels fast, periodt ๐Ÿ“ฃ

1.2.2. Robustness Principle ๐Ÿ‘‘

At every layer of the protocols, there is a general rule whose application can lead to enormous benefits in robustness and interoperability [IP:1]:

"Be liberal in what you accept, and conservative in what you send"

Software SHOULD be written to deal with every conceivable error, no matter how unlikely. Sooner or later a packet will come in with that particular combination of errors and attributes, and unless the software is prepared, chaos can ensue ๐Ÿ˜ฑ In general, it is best to assume that the network is filled with malevolent entities that will send in packets designed to have the worst possible effect. This assumption will lead to suitable protective design, although the most serious problems in the Internet have been caused by unenvisaged mechanisms triggered by low-probability events. Mere human malice would never have taken so devious a course! ๐Ÿ•ต๏ธโ€โ™€๏ธ

Adaptability to change MUST be designed into all levels of Internet host software. As a simple example, consider a protocol specification that contains an enumeration of values for a particular header field -- e.g., a type field, a port number, or an error code. This enumeration MUST be assumed to be incomplete. So, if a protocol specification defines four possible error codes, the software MUST NOT break when a fifth code shows up. An undefined code might be logged (see below), but it MUST NOT cause a failure. ๐Ÿงฉ

The second part of the principle is almost as important: software on other hosts may contain deficiencies that make it unwise to exploit legal but obscure protocol features. It is unwise to stray far from the obvious and simple, lest untoward effects result elsewhere. A corollary of this is "watch out for misbehaving hosts". Host software SHOULD be prepared not just to survive other misbehaving hosts, but also to cooperate to limit the amount of disruption such hosts can cause to the shared communication facility. ๐Ÿ›ก๏ธ

1.2.3. Error Logging ๐Ÿซถ

The Internet includes a great variety of host and gateway systems, each implementing many protocols and protocol layers, and some of these contain bugs and mis-features in their Internet protocol software. Because of the complexity, diversity, and distribution of function, diagnosing Internet problems is often very difficult. ๐Ÿฅฒ

Problem diagnosis will be aided if host implementations include a carefully designed facility for logging erroneous or "strange" protocol events. It is important to include as much diagnostic information as possible when an error is logged. In particular, it is often useful to record the header(s) of a packet that caused an error. However, care MUST be taken to ensure that error logging does not consume prohibitive amounts of resources or otherwise interfere with the operation of the host. ๐Ÿ”

There is a tendency for abnormal but harmless protocol events to overflow error logging files. This can be avoided by using a "circular" log, or by enabling logging only while diagnosing a known failure. It may be useful to filter and count duplicate successive messages. One strategy that seems to work well is: (1) always count abnormalities and make such counts accessible through the management protocol (see [INTRO:1]); and (2) allow the logging of a great variety of events to be selectively enabled. For example, it might useful to be able to "log everything" or to "log everything for host X". ๐Ÿ“Š

Note that different managements may have differing policies about the amount of error logging they want normally enabled in a host. Some will say, "if it doesn't hurt me, I don't want to know about it", while others will want to take a more watchful and aggressive attitude about detecting and removing protocol abnormalities. Everyone's got their own logging vibe ๐Ÿ˜Œ

1.2.4. Configuration ๐ŸŒธ

It would be ideal if a host implementation of the Internet protocol suite could be entirely self-configuring. That would allow the whole suite to be implemented in ROM or cast into silicon, it would simplify diskless workstations, and it would be an immense boon to harried LAN administrators as well as system vendors. We have not reached this ideal; in fact, we are not even close ๐Ÿฅน

At many points in this document, you will find a requirement that a parameter be a configurable option. There are several different reasons behind such requirements. In a few cases, there is current uncertainty or disagreement about the best value, and it may be necessary to update the recommended value in the future. In other cases, the value really depends on external factors -- e.g., the size of the host and the distribution of its communication load, or the speeds and topology of nearby networks -- and self-tuning algorithms are unavailable and may be insufficient. In some cases, configurability is needed because of administrative requirements. ๐ŸŽ›๏ธ

Finally, some configuration options are required to communicate with obsolete or incorrect implementations of the protocols, distributed without sources, that unfortunately persist in many parts of the Internet. To make correct systems coexist with these faulty systems, administrators often have to "mis-configure" the correct systems. This problem will correct itself gradually as the faulty systems are retired, but it cannot be ignored by vendors. Ugh, legacy bugs ๐Ÿ˜ค

When we say that a parameter must be configurable, we do not intend to require that its value be explicitly read from a configuration file at every boot time. We recommend that implementors set up a default for each parameter, so a configuration file is only necessary to override those defaults that are inappropriate in a particular installation. Thus, the configurability requirement is an assurance that it will be POSSIBLE to override the default when necessary, even in a binary-only or ROM-based product. ๐Ÿ”ง

This document requires a particular value for such defaults in some cases. The choice of default is a sensitive issue when the configuration item controls the accommodation to existing faulty systems. If the Internet is to converge successfully to complete interoperability, the default values built into implementations MUST implement the official protocol, not "mis-configurations" to accommodate faulty implementations. Although marketing considerations have led some vendors to choose mis-configuration defaults, we urge vendors to choose defaults that will conform to the standard. Defaults with receipts, no mis-configs ๐Ÿงพ๐Ÿ’œ

Okay and one last thing, bestie ๐Ÿ’… a vendor needs to provide adequate documentation on every configuration parameter, its limits, and its effects. Every knob, every limit, every side effect. No vibes-based docs allowed ๐Ÿ“šโœจ

1.3. Reading this Document ๐Ÿฆ‹

1.3.1. Organization

Protocol layering is the usual way people organize network software, so this document uses it too ๐Ÿงฑ. We assume that an implementation strictly mirrors the layering of the protocols. That means the next three major sections cover the requirements for the link layer, the internet layer, and the transport layer, in that order. A companion RFC [INTRO:1] covers application-level software. This layerist organization was picked for simplicity and clarity ๐Ÿ’–

Ngl, strict layering is kind of an imperfect model, both for the protocol suite and for the implementation approaches we recommend ๐Ÿ™ˆ Protocols in different layers interact in complex and sometimes sneaky ways, and a single function often involves several layers at once. There are lots of design choices in an implementation, and many of them involve creatively "breaking" strict layering. Every implementor is urged to read references [INTRO:7] and [INTRO:8] ๐Ÿ“–๐Ÿซถ

This document describes the conceptual service interface between layers using a functional ("procedure call") notation, the same style used in the TCP specification [TCP:1] ๐ŸŽ€. A host implementation must support the logical information flow implied by these calls, but it does not have to literally implement the calls themselves. For example, many implementations show the coupling between the transport layer and the IP layer by giving them shared access to common data structures. Those data structures, rather than explicit procedure calls, are then how much of the required information gets passed around ๐Ÿงš

In general, each major section of this document is organized into the following subsections:

  1. Introduction
  2. Protocol Walk-Through: looks at the protocol specification documents section by section, fixing errors, stating requirements that may be ambiguous or ill-defined, and giving further clarification or explanation ๐Ÿ”
  3. Specific Issues: discusses protocol design and implementation issues that were not included in the walk-through ๐Ÿงฉ
  4. Interfaces: discusses the service interface to the next higher layer ๐ŸชŸ
  5. Summary: contains a summary of the requirements of the section ๐Ÿ“

Under many of the individual topics in this document, there is parenthetical material labeled "DISCUSSION" or "IMPLEMENTATION". This material clarifies and explains the requirements text right before it. It also includes some suggestions for possible future directions or developments. The implementation material contains suggested approaches that an implementor may want to consider ๐Ÿ’œ

The summary sections are guides and indexes to the text, but they are necessarily cryptic and incomplete ๐Ÿ˜ญ The summaries should never be used or referenced separately from the complete RFC. Read the whole thing, bestie!!

1.3.2. Requirements ๐Ÿ‘‘

In this document, the words that define the significance of each requirement are capitalized. These words are:

  • MUST: This word or the adjective REQUIRED means that the item is an absolute requirement of the specification ๐Ÿšจ
  • SHOULD: This word or the adjective RECOMMENDED means that there may exist valid reasons in particular circumstances to ignore this item. But the full implications should be understood and the case carefully weighed before choosing a different course ๐Ÿค”
  • MAY: This word or the adjective OPTIONAL means that this item is truly optional. One vendor may choose to include the item because a particular marketplace requires it or because it enhances the product, for example. Another vendor may omit the same item ๐ŸŒˆ

An implementation is not compliant if it fails to satisfy one or more of the MUST requirements for the protocols it implements. An implementation that satisfies all the MUST and all the SHOULD requirements for its protocols is said to be "unconditionally compliant". One that satisfies all the MUST requirements but not all the SHOULD requirements for its protocols is said to be "conditionally compliant" โœ…

1.3.3. Terminology ๐Ÿ“š

This document uses the following technical terms:

Segment: A segment is the unit of end-to-end transmission in the TCP protocol. A segment consists of a TCP header followed by application data. A segment is transmitted by encapsulation inside an IP datagram ๐Ÿ“

Message: In this description of the lower-layer protocols, a message is the unit of transmission in a transport layer protocol. In particular, a TCP segment is a message. A message consists of a transport protocol header followed by application protocol data. To be transmitted end-to-end through the Internet, a message must be encapsulated inside a datagram โœ‰๏ธ

IP Datagram: An IP datagram is the unit of end-to-end transmission in the IP protocol. An IP datagram consists of an IP header followed by transport layer data, i.e., an IP header followed by a message ๐ŸŒธ

In the description of the internet layer (Section 3), the unqualified term "datagram" should be understood to refer to an IP datagram ๐Ÿง 

Packet: A packet is the unit of data passed across the interface between the internet layer and the link layer. It includes an IP header and data. A packet may be a complete IP datagram or a fragment of an IP datagram ๐Ÿ“ฆ

Frame: A frame is the unit of transmission in a link layer protocol, and it consists of a link-layer header followed by a packet ๐Ÿ–ผ๏ธ

Connected Network: A network to which a host is interfaced is often known as the "local network" or the "subnetwork" relative to that host. But these terms can cause confusion, so this document uses the term "connected network" instead ๐Ÿ”Œ

Multihomed: A host is said to be multihomed if it has multiple IP addresses. For a discussion of multihoming, see Section 3.3.4 below ๐Ÿ ๐Ÿ 

Physical network interface: This is a physical interface to a connected network, and it has a (possibly unique) link-layer address. Multiple physical network interfaces on a single host may share the same link-layer address, but the address must be unique for different hosts on the same physical network ๐Ÿชช

Logical [network] interface: We define a logical [network] interface to be a logical path, distinguished by a unique IP address, to a connected network. See Section 3.3.4 ๐Ÿ›ค๏ธ

Specific-destination address: This is the effective destination address of a datagram, even if it is broadcast or multicast. See Section 3.2.1.3 ๐ŸŽฏ

Path: At a given moment, all the IP datagrams from a particular source host to a particular destination host will typically traverse the same sequence of gateways. We use the term "path" for this sequence. Note that a path is uni-directional. It is not unusual to have different paths in the two directions between a given host pair ๐Ÿ”„

MTU: The maximum transmission unit, i.e., the size of the largest packet that can be transmitted ๐Ÿ“

The terms frame, packet, datagram, message, and segment are illustrated by the following schematic diagrams ๐ŸŽจ

A. Transmission on connected network:

         A. Transmission on connected network:
           _______________________________________________
          | LL hdr | IP hdr |         (data)              |
          |________|________|_____________________________|

           <---------- Frame ----------------------------->
                    <----------Packet -------------------->

B. Before IP fragmentation or after IP reassembly:

         B. Before IP fragmentation or after IP reassembly:
                    ______________________________________
                   | IP hdr | transport| Application Data |
                   |________|____hdr___|__________________|

                    <--------  Datagram ------------------>
                             <-------- Message ----------->
           or, for TCP:
                    ______________________________________
                   | IP hdr |  TCP hdr | Application Data |
                   |________|__________|__________________|

                    <--------  Datagram ------------------>
                             <-------- Segment ----------->

1.4. Acknowledgments ๐Ÿซถ

This document incorporates contributions and comments from a large group of Internet protocol experts, including representatives of university and research labs, vendors, and government agencies. It was assembled primarily by the Host Requirements Working Group of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) ๐ŸŒ

The Editor would especially like to acknowledge the tireless dedication of the following people, who attended many long meetings and generated 3 million bytes of electronic mail over the past 18 months in pursuit of this document ๐Ÿฅน๐Ÿ’Œ: Philip Almquist, Dave Borman (Cray Research), Noel Chiappa, Dave Crocker (DEC), Steve Deering (Stanford), Mike Karels (Berkeley), Phil Karn (Bellcore), John Lekashman (NASA), Charles Lynn (BBN), Keith McCloghrie (TWG), Paul Mockapetris (ISI), Thomas Narten (Purdue), Craig Partridge (BBN), Drew Perkins (CMU), and James Van Bokkelen (FTP Software) ๐Ÿ‘‘

In addition, the following people made major contributions to the effort: Bill Barns (Mitre), Steve Bellovin (AT&T), Mike Brescia (BBN), Ed Cain (DCA), Annette DeSchon (ISI), Martin Gross (DCA), Phill Gross (NRI), Charles Hedrick (Rutgers), Van Jacobson (LBL), John Klensin (MIT), Mark Lottor (SRI), Milo Medin (NASA), Bill Melohn (Sun Microsystems), Greg Minshall (Kinetics), Jeff Mogul (DEC), John Mullen (CMC), Jon Postel (ISI), John Romkey (Epilogue Technology), and Mike StJohns (DCA) โœจ

The following also made significant contributions to particular areas: Eric Allman (Berkeley), Rob Austein (MIT), Art Berggreen (ACC), Keith Bostic (Berkeley), Vint Cerf (NRI), Wayne Hathaway (NASA), Matt Korn (IBM), Erik Naggum (Naggum Software, Norway), Robert Ullmann (Prime Computer), David Waitzman (BBN), Frank Wancho (USA), Arun Welch (Ohio State), Bill Westfield (Cisco), and Rayan Zachariassen (Toronto) ๐ŸŒท

We are grateful to all, including any contributors who may have been inadvertently omitted from this list ๐Ÿ’•


2.1. INTRODUCTION โœจ

okay bestie, every Internet system needs the same link layer rules, whether it's a host or a gateway ๐ŸŒธ ๐Ÿซถ Those rules live in Chapter 3 of "Requirements for Internet Gateways" [INTRO:2], and this section adds extra stuff on top.

2.2. PROTOCOL WALK-THROUGH ๐Ÿฆ‹

None. Nothing to walk through here, so we're good ๐Ÿ’…

2.3. SPECIFIC ISSUES ๐Ÿ’–

2.3.1. Trailer Protocol Negotiation ๐ŸŽ€

so the trailer protocol [LINK:1] for link-layer encapsulation MAY be used, but ONLY once you've verified that both systems (host or gateway) in the link-layer conversation actually implement trailers ๐Ÿ™ˆ If the system doesn't dynamically negotiate trailer use on a per-destination basis, the default configuration MUST disable the protocol. no exceptions, periodt ๐Ÿ’…

DISCUSSION:

the trailer protocol is a link-layer encapsulation trick that rearranges the data inside packets sent over the physical network. in some cases it boosts higher-layer throughput by cutting down on data copying inside the operating system โœจ Higher-layer protocols don't even know trailers are happening, but both the sending and receiving host MUST understand the protocol if it's used. bestie, this part is serious.

Improper trailer use is SO confusing ๐Ÿ˜ญ Only packets with specific size attributes get trailer-encapsulated, and usually only a tiny fraction of the packets being swapped have those attributes. So if a trailer-using system talks to one that doesn't, some packets vanish into a black hole while others get delivered just fine. main character energy for the wrong reasons ๐Ÿ’€

IMPLEMENTATION:

on an Ethernet, trailer-encapsulated packets use a separate Ethernet type [LINK:1], and trailer negotiation happens during the ARP exchange used to discover the link-layer address of a destination system ๐Ÿฆ‹

here's the flow. the ARP exchange finishes in the usual way with the normal IP protocol type, but a host that wants to speak trailers also sends an extra "trailer ARP reply" packet. that's an ARP reply which names the trailer encapsulation protocol type but otherwise looks exactly like a normal ARP reply ๐ŸŒˆ If a host configured to use trailers gets a trailer ARP reply from a remote machine, it can add that machine to its list of trailer-understanding machines, for example by marking the matching entry in the ARP cache ๐Ÿงš

hosts that want to receive trailer encapsulations send trailer ARP replies whenever they finish a normal ARP exchange for IP. so a host that got an ARP request for its IP protocol address would send a trailer ARP reply alongside its normal IP ARP reply. and a host that sent the IP ARP request would send a trailer ARP reply once it received the matching IP ARP reply ๐Ÿ’œ That means either the requesting or the responding host in an IP ARP exchange can ask to receive trailer encapsulations. iconic teamwork ๐Ÿ‘‘

Why use extra trailer ARP replies instead of sending an ARP request for the trailer protocol type? Because this scheme was designed to dodge a nonstop ARP ping-pong with a misbehaving host that, against any spec or common sense, answers a trailer ARP reply with another ARP reply for IP ๐Ÿ™ˆ To avoid that, a trailer ARP reply goes out in response to an IP ARP reply ONLY when that IP ARP reply answers an outstanding request. This is true when the host's hardware address is still unknown at the moment the IP ARP reply arrives. A trailer ARP reply MAY always be sent along with an IP ARP reply that responds to an IP ARP request โœจ

2.3.2. Address Resolution Protocol -- ARP ๐ŸŒธ

2.3.2.1. ARP Cache Validation ๐Ÿงน

An implementation of the Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) [LINK:2] MUST provide a mechanism to flush out-of-date cache entries. If this mechanism involves a timeout, it SHOULD be possible to configure the timeout value. ok so the stale-entry cleanup is non-negotiable, but the timeout tuning is a nice-to-have ๐Ÿ’…

It's also a must that a mechanism to prevent ARP flooding (repeatedly sending an ARP Request for the same IP address, at a high rate) MUST be included ๐Ÿšซ The recommended maximum rate is 1 per second per destination. chill, ARP ๐Ÿซถ

DISCUSSION:

the ARP spec [LINK:2] suggests a timeout mechanism to invalidate cache entries when hosts change their Ethernet addresses, but it doesn't require one ๐Ÿคทโ€โ™€๏ธ Proxy ARP (see Section 2.4 of [INTRO:2]) is everywhere now, and that has made it way more likely that cache entries in hosts go stale. so some ARP-cache invalidation mechanism is now required for hosts. Even without proxy ARP, a long-period cache timeout is handy for automatically fixing any bad ARP data that got cached ๐Ÿ“

IMPLEMENTATION:

four mechanisms have been used, sometimes mixed together, to flush out-of-date cache entries ๐ŸŽ€

(1) Timeout -- periodically time out cache entries, even ones that are in use. Note that this timeout should restart whenever the cache entry is "refreshed" (by seeing the source fields, regardless of target address, of an ARP broadcast from the system in question). For proxy ARP situations, the timeout needs to be on the order of a minute โฐ

(2) Unicast Poll -- actively poll the remote host by periodically sending it a point-to-point ARP Request, and delete the entry if no ARP Reply comes back after N successive polls. Again, the timeout should be on the order of a minute, and typically N is 2 ๐Ÿ’–

(3) Link-Layer Advice -- if the link-layer driver detects a delivery problem, flush the matching ARP cache entry ๐Ÿ”ฅ

(4) Higher-layer Advice -- provide a call from the Internet layer to the link layer to signal a delivery problem. The effect of this call would be to invalidate the matching cache entry. This call would be analogous to the ADVISE_DELIVPROB() call from the transport layer to the Internet layer (see Section 3.4), and in fact the ADVISE_DELIVPROB routine might in turn call the link-layer advice routine to invalidate the ARP cache entry ๐Ÿงš

approaches (1) and (2) involve ARP cache timeouts on the order of a minute or less. Without proxy ARP, a timeout that short could create noticeable overhead traffic on a very large Ethernet ๐Ÿ˜ฌ So it MAY be necessary to configure a host to lengthen the ARP cache timeout ๐ŸŒˆ

2.3.2.2. ARP Packet Queue ๐Ÿ“ฆ

The link layer SHOULD save (rather than discard) at least one (the latest) packet of each set of packets destined to the same unresolved IP address, and transmit the saved packet once the address has been resolved. yes, save that packet, it's giving reliability ๐Ÿ’…

DISCUSSION:

failing to follow this causes the first packet of every exchange to get lost ๐Ÿ˜ญ Higher-layer protocols can usually cope with loss through retransmission, but packet loss still hurts performance. For example, losing a TCP open request inflates the initial round-trip time estimate. UDP-based apps like the Domain Name System get hit even harder ๐Ÿซ 

2.3.3. Ethernet and IEEE 802 Encapsulation ๐ŸŒŠ

the IP encapsulation for Ethernets is described in RFC-894 [LINK:3], and RFC-1042 [LINK:4] describes the IP encapsulation for IEEE 802 networks. RFC-1042 elaborates on and replaces the discussion in Section 3.4 of [INTRO:2] โœจ

every Internet host connected to a 10Mbps Ethernet cable:

  • MUST be able to send and receive packets using RFC-894 encapsulation;
  • SHOULD be able to receive RFC-1042 packets, intermixed with RFC-894 packets; and
  • MAY be able to send packets using RFC-1042 encapsulation.

an Internet host that implements sending both the RFC-894 and the RFC-1042 encapsulations MUST provide a configuration switch to select which one is sent, and this switch MUST default to RFC-894. default is 894, bestie, remember that ๐ŸŽ€

heads up: the standard IP encapsulation in RFC-1042 does NOT use the protocol id value (K1=6) that IEEE reserved for IP. Instead, it uses a value (K1=170) that implies an extension (the "SNAP") which can hold the Ether-Type field ๐Ÿงฉ An Internet system MUST NOT send 802 packets using K1=6. never ever ๐Ÿ™…โ€โ™€๏ธ

address translation from Internet addresses to link-layer addresses on Ethernet and IEEE 802 networks MUST be managed by the Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) ๐Ÿ—บ๏ธ

The MTU for an Ethernet is 1500 and for 802.3 is 1492. ๐Ÿ“

DISCUSSION:

the IEEE 802.3 spec covers operation over a 10Mbps Ethernet cable, where Ethernet and 802.3 frames can physically be mixed together ๐ŸŒˆ A receiver can tell them apart by the value of the 802.3 Length field. That two-octet field sits in the same header spot as the Ether-Type field of an Ethernet frame. In particular, the 802.3 Length field must be less than or equal to 1500, while every valid Ether-Type value is greater than 1500. the number line does the sorting for us ๐Ÿง 

another compatibility headache: link-layer broadcasts. A broadcast sent with one framing won't be seen by hosts that can only receive the other framing ๐Ÿ™ˆ

the provisions in this section were designed to let 894-capable and 1042-capable systems talk directly on the same cable, as much as possible. It's meant to support today's situation, where 894-only systems dominate, while leaving an easy path to a possible future where 1042-capable systems are common ๐Ÿฆ‹๐Ÿ”ฎ

okay so the receive interface between the IP layer and the link layer MUST include a flag that tells IP whether the incoming packet was addressed to a link-layer broadcast address ๐Ÿ“ก the IP layer usually doesn't know link-layer addresses, because every network medium has its own address format ๐Ÿ™ˆ but broadcast addresses on a broadcast-capable medium are a special case that matters a lot

DISCUSSION The broadcast special case is the reason for this flag. See Section 3.2.2, especially the DISCUSSION about broadcast storms ๐ŸŒช๏ธ

The send interface between IP and the link layer MUST include the 5-bit TOS field (see Section 3.2.1.6) ๐Ÿ’…

The link layer MUST NOT report a Destination Unreachable error to IP just because there is no ARP cache entry for a destination. no cache entry is not the same as unreachable, bestie ๐Ÿšซ

this is the cheat sheet for everything in Section 2 ๐Ÿง the checkmarks show which requirement belongs to which group

                                                  |       | | | |S| |
                                                  |       | | | |H| |F
                                                  |       | | | |O|M|o
                                                  |       | |S| |U|U|o
                                                  |       | |H| |L|S|t
                                                  |       |M|O| |D|T|n
                                                  |       |U|U|M| | |o
                                                  |       |S|L|A|N|N|t
                                                  |       |T|D|Y|O|O|t
FEATURE                                           |SECTION| | | |T|T|e
--------------------------------------------------|-------|-|-|-|-|-|--
                                                  |       | | | | | |
Trailer encapsulation                             |2.3.1  | | |x| | |
Send Trailers by default without negotiation      |2.3.1  | | | | |x|
ARP                                               |2.3.2  | | | | | |
  Flush out-of-date ARP cache entries             |2.3.2.1|x| | | | |
  Prevent ARP floods                              |2.3.2.1|x| | | | |
  Cache timeout configurable                      |2.3.2.1| |x| | | |
  Save at least one (latest) unresolved pkt       |2.3.2.2| |x| | | |
Ethernet and IEEE 802 Encapsulation               |2.3.3  | | | | | |
  Host able to:                                   |2.3.3  | | | | | |
    Send & receive RFC-894 encapsulation          |2.3.3  |x| | | | |
    Receive RFC-1042 encapsulation                |2.3.3  | |x| | | |
    Send RFC-1042 encapsulation                   |2.3.3  | | |x| | |
      Then config. sw. to select, RFC-894 dflt    |2.3.3  |x| | | | |
  Send K1=6 encapsulation                         |2.3.3  | | | | |x|
  Use ARP on Ethernet and IEEE 802 nets           |2.3.3  |x| | | | |
Link layer report b'casts to IP layer             |2.4    |x| | | | |
IP layer pass TOS to link layer                   |2.4    |x| | | | |
No ARP cache entry treated as Dest. Unreach.      |2.4    | | | | |x|

3. INTERNET LAYER PROTOCOLS ๐ŸŒ

3.1 INTRODUCTION ๐ŸŽ€

the Robustness Principle is the big one here: "Be liberal in what you accept, and conservative in what you send" ๐Ÿซถ it matters extra in the Internet layer, because one misbehaving host can cut off Internet service for a bunch of other hosts ๐Ÿ˜ญ

the protocol standards for the Internet layer are:

  • RFC-791 [IP:1] defines the IP protocol and gives an introduction to the architecture of the Internet. ๐Ÿฆ‹
  • RFC-792 [IP:2] defines ICMP, which handles routing, diagnostic and error functionality for IP. ICMP messages are wrapped inside IP datagrams, but ICMP processing is considered (and typically implemented) as part of the IP layer. See Section 3.2.2. ๐Ÿงš
  • RFC-950 [IP:3] defines the mandatory subnet extension to the addressing architecture. ๐Ÿ“
  • RFC-1112 [IP:4] defines the Internet Group Management Protocol IGMP. It's part of a recommended extension to hosts and to the host-gateway interface that supports Internet-wide multicasting at the IP level. See Section 3.2.3. ๐Ÿ’œ
    • the target of an IP multicast can be an arbitrary group of Internet hosts. IP multicasting is designed as a natural extension of the link-layer multicasting facilities some networks already have, and it gives a standard way to get local access to those link-layer facilities โœจ

other important references are listed in Section 5 of this document ๐Ÿ“š

the Internet layer of host software MUST implement both IP and ICMP ๐Ÿ’– for IGMP support requirements, see Section 3.3.7 ๐ŸŒธ

the host IP layer has two basic jobs: (1) choose the "next hop" gateway or host for outgoing IP datagrams and (2) reassemble incoming IP datagrams. it may also (3) do intentional fragmentation of outgoing datagrams. and it must (4) provide diagnostic and error functionality ๐Ÿ‘‘ IP layer functions will probably grow over time as more Internet control and management facilities get built ๐Ÿ”ฅ

for normal datagrams the processing is pretty straightforward ๐Ÿ™Œ for incoming datagrams, the IP layer:

  1. verifies that the datagram is correctly formatted;
  2. verifies that it is destined to the local host;
  3. processes options;
  4. reassembles the datagram if necessary; and
  5. passes the encapsulated message to the appropriate transport-layer protocol module.

for outgoing datagrams, the IP layer:

  1. sets any fields not set by the transport layer;
  2. selects the correct first hop on the connected network (a process called "routing");
  3. fragments the datagram if necessary and if intentional fragmentation is implemented (see Section 3.3.3); and
  4. passes the packet(s) to the appropriate link-layer driver.

a host is multihomed if it has multiple IP addresses ๐Ÿฆ‹ multihoming adds a lot of confusion and complexity to the protocol suite, and it's an area where the Internet architecture seriously falls short of solving every problem ๐Ÿ˜ญ there are two separate problem areas:

  1. Local multihoming -- the host itself is multihomed; or
  2. Remote multihoming -- the local host needs to talk to a remote multihomed host.

right now, remote multihoming MUST be handled at the application layer, as discussed in the companion RFC [INTRO:1] ๐Ÿ’… a host MAY support local multihoming, which this document covers, especially in Section 3.3.4 โœจ

any host that forwards datagrams generated by another host is acting as a gateway, and it MUST also meet the specs in the gateway requirements RFC [INTRO:2] ๐Ÿšจ an Internet host with embedded gateway code MUST have a configuration switch to turn the gateway function off, and that switch MUST default to non-gateway mode. in that mode, a datagram arriving through one interface won't be forwarded to another host or gateway (unless it's source-routed), no matter whether the host is single-homed or multihomed ๐Ÿ™ˆ the host software MUST NOT automatically switch into gateway mode just because it has more than one interface, since the machine's operator might not want that service or be able to run it ๐Ÿซ 

in the rules below, the action for certain cases is to "silently discard" a received datagram. that means the datagram gets dropped without further processing, and the host won't send any ICMP error message (see Section 3.2.2) because of it ๐Ÿคซ but for diagnosing problems, a host SHOULD provide the ability to log the error (see Section 1.2.3), including the contents of the silently-discarded datagram, and SHOULD record the event in a statistics counter ๐Ÿ“Š

DISCUSSION: silently discarding bad datagrams is mainly meant to prevent "broadcast storms" ๐ŸŒช๏ธ

3.2 PROTOCOL WALK-THROUGH ๐Ÿ”

3.2.1 Internet Protocol -- IP ๐Ÿ’ซ

3.2.1.1 Version Number: RFC-791 Section 3.1 ๐Ÿ”ข

a datagram whose version number is not 4 MUST be silently discarded. no version 4, no entry ๐Ÿšช

3.2.1.2 Checksum: RFC-791 Section 3.1 โœ…

a host MUST verify the IP header checksum on every received datagram, and silently discard every datagram with a bad checksum ๐Ÿ™…โ€โ™€๏ธ

3.2.1.3 Addressing: RFC-791 Section 3.2 ๐Ÿ 

there are now five classes of IP addresses, Class A through Class E ๐ŸŒˆ Class D addresses are used for IP multicasting [IP:4], and Class E addresses are reserved for experimental use ๐Ÿงช

a multicast (Class D) address is a 28-bit logical address that stands for a group of hosts, and it may be permanent or transient ๐Ÿ’œ permanent multicast addresses are allocated by the Internet Assigned Number Authority [INTRO:6], while transient addresses may be allocated dynamically to transient groups. group membership is decided dynamically using IGMP [IP:4] ๐Ÿงš

we're about to summarize the important special cases for Class A, B, and C IP addresses, using this notation for an IP address:

{ <Network-number>, <Host-number> }

or

{ <Network-number>, <Subnet-number>, <Host-number> }

and the notation "-1" stands for a field that contains all 1 bits ๐Ÿ”ฅ this notation doesn't mean the 1-bits in an address mask have to be contiguous ๐Ÿ™ƒ

(a) { 0, 0 }

this host on this network. it MUST NOT be sent, except as a source address during an initialization procedure where the host learns its own IP address ๐Ÿฃ

see also Section 3.3.6 for a non-standard use of {0,0} ๐Ÿ‘€

(b) { 0, <Host-number> }

specified host on this network. it MUST NOT be sent, except as a source address during an initialization procedure where the host learns its full IP address ๐ŸŒฑ

(c) { -1, -1 }

limited broadcast. it MUST NOT be used as a source address ๐Ÿ“ฃ

a datagram with this destination address gets received by every host on the connected physical network, but it won't be forwarded outside that network ๐Ÿ›‘

(d) { <Network-number>, -1 }

directed broadcast to the specified network. it MUST NOT be used as a source address ๐Ÿ“ก

(e) { <Network-number>, <Subnet-number>, -1 }

directed broadcast to the specified subnet. it MUST NOT be used as a source address ๐ŸŽฏ

(f) { <Network-number>, -1, -1 }

Directed broadcast to all subnets of the specified subnetted network. It MUST NOT be used as a source address. ๐Ÿ’…

(g) { 127, <any> } ๐ŸŒˆ

Internal host loopback address. Addresses of this form MUST NOT appear outside a host. ๐Ÿ”’

The <Network-number> is administratively assigned so that its value will be unique in the entire world. ๐ŸŒโœจ

IP addresses are not permitted to have the value 0 or -1 for any of the <Host-number>, <Network-number>, or <Subnet-number> fields (except in the special cases listed above). This implies that each of these fields will be at least two bits long. ๐Ÿ”ข

For further discussion of broadcast addresses, see Section 3.3.6. ๐Ÿ“ฃ

A host MUST support the subnet extensions to IP [IP:3]. As a result, there will be an address mask of the form {-1, -1, 0} associated with each of the host's local IP addresses; see Sections 3.2.2.9 and 3.3.1.1. ๐ŸŽญ

When a host sends any datagram, the IP source address MUST be one of its own IP addresses (but not a broadcast or multicast address). ๐Ÿ“ค

A host MUST silently discard an incoming datagram that is not destined for the host. An incoming datagram is destined for the host if the datagram's destination address field is:

  1. (one of) the host's IP address(es); or
  2. an IP broadcast address valid for the connected network; or
  3. the address for a multicast group of which the host is a member on the incoming physical interface.

For most purposes, a datagram addressed to a broadcast or multicast destination is processed as if it had been addressed to one of the host's IP addresses; we use the term "specific-destination address" for the equivalent local IP address of the host. The specific-destination address is defined to be the destination address in the IP header unless the header contains a broadcast or multicast address, in which case the specific-destination is an IP address assigned to the physical interface on which the datagram arrived. ๐ŸŽฏ

A host MUST silently discard an incoming datagram containing an IP source address that is invalid by the rules of this section. This validation could be done in either the IP layer or by each protocol in the transport layer. ๐Ÿ›ก๏ธ

DISCUSSION:

A mis-addressed datagram might be caused by a link-layer broadcast of a unicast datagram or by a gateway or host that is confused or mis-configured. ๐Ÿ™ˆ

An architectural goal for Internet hosts was to allow IP addresses to be featureless 32-bit numbers, avoiding algorithms that required a knowledge of the IP address format. Otherwise, any future change in the format or interpretation of IP addresses will require host software changes. However, validation of broadcast and multicast addresses violates this goal; a few other violations are described elsewhere in this document. ๐Ÿง 

Implementers should be aware that applications depending upon the all-subnets directed broadcast address (f) may be unusable on some networks. All-subnets broadcast is not widely implemented in vendor gateways at present, and even when it is implemented, a particular network administration may disable it in the gateway configuration. ๐Ÿ˜ฌ


3.2.1.4. Fragmentation and Reassembly: RFC-791 Section 3.2 ๐Ÿงฉ

The Internet model requires that every host support reassembly. See Sections 3.3.2 and 3.3.3 for the requirements on fragmentation and reassembly. ๐Ÿชก

3.2.1.5. Identification: RFC-791 Section 3.2 ๐Ÿ†”

When sending an identical copy of an earlier datagram, a host MAY optionally retain the same Identification field in the copy. ๐Ÿ“‹

DISCUSSION:

Some Internet protocol experts have maintained that when a host sends an identical copy of an earlier datagram, the new copy should contain the same Identification value as the original. There are two suggested advantages: (1) if the datagrams are fragmented and some of the fragments are lost, the receiver may be able to reconstruct a complete datagram from fragments of the original and the copies; (2) a congested gateway might use the IP Identification field (and Fragment Offset) to discard duplicate datagrams from the queue. ๐Ÿค“

However, the observed patterns of datagram loss in the Internet do not favor the probability of retransmitted fragments filling reassembly gaps, while other mechanisms (e.g., TCP repacketizing upon retransmission) tend to prevent retransmission of an identical datagram [IP:9]. Therefore, we believe that retransmitting the same Identification field is not useful. Also, a connectionless transport protocol like UDP would require the cooperation of the application programs to retain the same Identification value in identical datagrams. ๐Ÿ“‰

3.2.1.6. Type-of-Service: RFC-791 Section 3.2 ๐Ÿฐ

The "Type-of-Service" byte in the IP header is divided into two sections: the Precedence field (high-order 3 bits), and a field that is customarily called "Type-of-Service" or "TOS" (low-order 5 bits). In this document, all references to "TOS" or the "TOS field" refer to the low-order 5 bits only. ๐Ÿ”

The Precedence field is intended for Department of Defense applications of the Internet protocols. The use of non-zero values in this field is outside the scope of this document and the IP standard specification. Vendors should consult the Defense Communication Agency (DCA) for guidance on the IP Precedence field and its implications for other protocol layers. However, vendors should note that the use of precedence will most likely require that its value be passed between protocol layers in just the same way as the TOS field is passed. ๐Ÿ›๏ธ

The IP layer MUST provide a means for the transport layer to set the TOS field of every datagram that is sent; the default is all zero bits. The IP layer SHOULD pass received TOS values up to the transport layer. ๐Ÿš€

The particular link-layer mappings of TOS contained in RFC-795 SHOULD NOT be implemented. ๐Ÿšซ

DISCUSSION:

While the TOS field has been little used in the past, it is expected to play an increasing role in the near future. The TOS field is expected to be used to control two aspects of gateway operations: routing and queueing algorithms. See Section 2 of [INTRO:1] for the requirements on application programs to specify TOS values. ๐Ÿ“ˆ

The TOS field may also be mapped into link-layer service selectors. This has been applied to provide effective sharing of serial lines by different classes of TCP traffic, for example. However, the mappings suggested in RFC-795 for networks that were included in the Internet as of 1981 are now obsolete. ๐Ÿ•ฐ๏ธ

3.2.1.7. Time-to-Live: RFC-791 Section 3.2 โณ

A host MUST NOT send a datagram with a Time-to-Live (TTL) value of zero. ๐Ÿ™…

A host MUST NOT discard a datagram just because it was received with TTL less than 2. ๐Ÿ’›

The IP layer MUST provide a means for the transport layer to set the TTL field of every datagram that is sent. When a fixed TTL value is used, it MUST be configurable. The current suggested value will be published in the "Assigned Numbers" RFC. ๐Ÿ“–

DISCUSSION:

The TTL field has two functions: limit the lifetime of TCP segments (see RFC-793 [TCP:1], p. 28), and terminate Internet routing loops. Although TTL is a time in seconds, it also has some attributes of a hop-count, since each gateway is required to reduce the TTL field by at least one. โฑ๏ธ

The intent is that TTL expiration will cause a datagram to be discarded by a gateway but not by the destination host; however, hosts that act as gateways by forwarding datagrams must follow the gateway rules for TTL. ๐ŸŒ

A higher-layer protocol may want to set the TTL in order to implement an "expanding scope" search for some Internet resource. This is used by some diagnostic tools, and is expected to be useful for locating the "nearest" server of a given class using IP multicasting, for example. A particular transport protocol may also want to specify its own TTL bound on maximum datagram lifetime. ๐Ÿ”ญ

A fixed value must be at least big enough for the Internet "diameter," i.e., the longest possible path. A reasonable value is about twice the diameter, to allow for continued Internet growth. ๐Ÿ“โœจ

3.2.1.8. Options: RFC-791 Section 3.2 ๐ŸŽ

There MUST be a means for the transport layer to specify IP options to be included in transmitted IP datagrams (see Section 3.4). ๐ŸŽ€

All IP options (except NOP or END-OF-LIST) received in datagrams MUST be passed to the transport layer (or to ICMP processing when the datagram is an ICMP message). The IP and transport layer MUST each interpret those IP options that they understand and silently ignore the others. ๐Ÿ‘€

Later sections of this document discuss specific IP option support required by each of ICMP, TCP, and UDP. ๐Ÿ—‚๏ธ

DISCUSSION:

Passing all received IP options to the transport layer is a deliberate "violation of strict layering" that is designed to ease the introduction of new transport-relevant IP options in the future. Each layer must pick out any options that are relevant to its own processing and ignore the rest. For this purpose, every IP option except NOP and END-OF-LIST will include a specification of its own length. ๐Ÿงƒ

This document does not define the order in which a receiver must process multiple options in the same IP header. Hosts sending multiple options must be aware that this introduces an ambiguity in the meaning of certain options when combined with a source-route option. ๐Ÿงญ

(a) Security Option ๐Ÿ”

Some environments need the Security option in every datagram, but that's outside what this doc and the IP spec cover ๐Ÿ™…โ€โ™€๏ธ. Also, the security options from RFC-791 and RFC-1038 are obsolete, so don't go there ๐Ÿ’€. For DoD stuff, vendors should check out [IP:8] for guidance ๐Ÿซถ.

(b) Stream Identifier Option ๐Ÿšซ

This option is obsolete ๐Ÿฅ€. It SHOULD NOT be sent, and it MUST be silently ignored if received ๐Ÿคซ.

(c) Source Route Options ๐Ÿ—บ๏ธ

A host MUST support originating a source route and MUST be able to act as the final destination of a source route. Iconic behavior, no notes ๐Ÿ‘‘.

If a host gets a datagram with a completed source route (aka the pointer is past the last field), the datagram has reached its final destination ๐ŸŽ‰. The option as received (the recorded route) MUST be passed up to the transport layer (or to ICMP message processing) ๐Ÿ’…. That recorded route gets reversed and used to build a return source route for reply datagrams (see discussion of IP Options in Section 4) ๐Ÿ”„. When a return source route is built, it MUST be correctly formed, even if the recorded route included the source host (see case (B) in the discussion below) ๐Ÿ™ˆ.

An IP header with more than one Source Route option MUST NOT be sent ๐Ÿšซ. The routing effect of multiple Source Route options is implementation-specific, so it's up to each implementation ๐Ÿคทโ€โ™€๏ธ.

Section 3.3.5 has the rules for a host acting as an intermediate hop in a source route, aka forwarding a source-routed datagram ๐Ÿฆ‹.

DISCUSSION:

If a source-routed datagram gets fragmented, every fragment carries a copy of the source route ๐Ÿงฉ. Since processing IP options (including a source route) has to happen before reassembly, the original datagram won't get reassembled until it hits the final destination ๐Ÿ.

Okay so picture a source-routed datagram going from host S to host D through gateways G1, G2, ... Gn ๐ŸŒธ. The spec was ambiguous about whether S should send (A) or (B) as the source route option ๐Ÿ‘€:

(A):  {>>G2, G3, ... Gn, D}     <--- CORRECT

(B):  {S, >>G2, G3, ... Gn, D}  <---- WRONG

(where >> represents the pointer) โœจ. If (A) is sent, D gets the option {G1, G2, ... Gn >>}, with S and D as the IP source and destination addresses ๐Ÿ’œ. If (B) were sent, D would still see S and D as the IP source and destination, but the option would be {S, G1, ...Gn >>} ๐Ÿ˜ญ. That means the originating host would be the first hop in the route, which is so not it ๐Ÿ’€.

(d) Record Route Option ๐Ÿ›ค๏ธ

Originating and processing the Record Route option is OPTIONAL ๐ŸŒˆ.

(e) Timestamp Option โฐ

Originating and processing the Timestamp option is OPTIONAL ๐ŸŽ€. If you do implement it, these rules apply ๐Ÿ“:

  • The originating host MUST record a timestamp in a Timestamp option whose Internet address fields are not pre-specified, or whose first pre-specified address is the host's interface address ๐Ÿ’–.
  • The destination host MUST (if possible) add the current timestamp to a Timestamp option before passing the option to the transport layer or to ICMP for processing ๐Ÿซถ.
  • A timestamp value MUST follow the rules given in Section 3.2.2.8 for the ICMP Timestamp message ๐Ÿ•ฐ๏ธ.

3.2.2 Internet Control Message Protocol -- ICMP ๐Ÿงš

ICMP messages come in two classes ๐Ÿ’ซ.

  • ICMP error messages:
    • Destination Unreachable (see Section 3.2.2.1)
    • Redirect (see Section 3.2.2.2)
    • Source Quench (see Section 3.2.2.3)
    • Time Exceeded (see Section 3.2.2.4)
    • Parameter Problem (see Section 3.2.2.5)
  • ICMP query messages:
    • Echo (see Section 3.2.2.6)
    • Information (see Section 3.2.2.7)
    • Timestamp (see Section 3.2.2.8)
    • Address Mask (see Section 3.2.2.9)

If an ICMP message of unknown type is received, it MUST be silently discarded ๐Ÿ—‘๏ธ.

Every ICMP error message includes the Internet header and at least the first 8 data octets of the datagram that triggered the error ๐Ÿ”. More than 8 octets MAY be sent ๐ŸŒŸ. This header and data MUST be unchanged from the received datagram ๐Ÿ”’.

When the Internet layer has to pass an ICMP error message up to the transport layer, the IP protocol number MUST be pulled from the original header ๐Ÿงพ. That number is used to pick the right transport protocol entity to handle the error ๐ŸŽฏ.

An ICMP error message SHOULD be sent with normal (i.e., zero) TOS bits ๐Ÿ’….

An ICMP error message MUST NOT be sent as the result of receiving:

  • an ICMP error message, or
  • a datagram destined to an IP broadcast or IP multicast address, or
  • a datagram sent as a link-layer broadcast, or
  • a non-initial fragment, or
  • a datagram whose source address does not define a single host -- e.g., a zero address, a loopback address, a broadcast address, a multicast address, or a Class E address.
NOTE: THESE RESTRICTIONS TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER ANY REQUIREMENT ELSEWHERE IN THIS DOCUMENT FOR SENDING ICMP ERROR MESSAGES. ๐Ÿšจ
DISCUSSION:

These rules stop the "broadcast storms" that happened when hosts sent ICMP error messages back in response to broadcast datagrams ๐ŸŒฉ๏ธ. For example, a broadcast UDP segment to a non-existent port could set off a flood of ICMP Destination Unreachable datagrams from every machine without a client for that port ๐Ÿ˜ฑ. On a big Ethernet, the collisions can make the network useless for a second or more ๐Ÿ’€.

Every datagram broadcast on the connected network should have a valid IP broadcast address as its IP destination (see Section 3.3.6) ๐Ÿ“ก. But some hosts break this rule ๐Ÿ™ƒ. So, to be certain they catch broadcast datagrams, hosts are required to check for a link-layer broadcast as well as an IP-layer broadcast address ๐Ÿ”Ž.

IMPLEMENTATION:

This requires the link layer to tell the IP layer when a link-layer broadcast datagram has been received; see Section 2.4 ๐Ÿง .

3.2.2.1 Destination Unreachable: RFC-792 ๐Ÿšง

The following additional codes are hereby defined ๐Ÿ“‹:

        6 = destination network unknown
        7 = destination host unknown

        8 = source host isolated

        9 = communication with destination network
                administratively prohibited

       10 = communication with destination host
                administratively prohibited

       11 = network unreachable for type of service

       12 = host unreachable for type of service

A host SHOULD generate Destination Unreachable messages with code:

2    (Protocol Unreachable), when the designated transport
     protocol is not supported; or

3    (Port Unreachable), when the designated transport
     protocol (e.g., UDP) is unable to demultiplex the
     datagram but has no protocol mechanism to inform the
     sender.

A Destination Unreachable message that is received MUST be reported to the transport layer ๐Ÿ“จ. The transport layer SHOULD use the information appropriately; for example, see Sections 4.1.3.3, 4.2.3.9, and 4.2.4 below ๐Ÿง. A transport protocol that has its own way of telling the sender a port is unreachable (e.g., TCP, which sends RST segments) MUST nevertheless accept an ICMP Port Unreachable for the same purpose ๐Ÿ’โ€โ™€๏ธ.

A Destination Unreachable message received with code 0 (Net), 1 (Host), or 5 (Bad Source Route) may come from a routing transient ๐ŸŒŠ. So it MUST be interpreted as only a hint, not proof, that the specified destination is unreachable [IP:11] ๐Ÿซข. For example, it MUST NOT be used as proof of a dead gateway (see Section 3.3.1) โ˜ ๏ธ.

3.2.2.2 Redirect: RFC-792 โ†ช๏ธ

A host SHOULD NOT send an ICMP Redirect message; Redirects are only for gateways to send ๐Ÿšช.

A host receiving a Redirect message MUST update its routing information accordingly ๐Ÿ—บ๏ธ. Every host MUST be prepared to accept both Host and Network Redirects, and to process them as described in Section 3.3.1.2 below ๐Ÿ’ช.

A Redirect message SHOULD be silently discarded if the new gateway address it specifies is not on the same connected (sub-) net through which the Redirect arrived [INTRO:2, Appendix A] ๐Ÿšซ. It also SHOULD be discarded if the source of the Redirect is not the current first-hop gateway for the specified destination (see Section 3.3.1) ๐Ÿ™…โ€โ™€๏ธ.

3.2.2.3 Source Quench: RFC-792 ๐Ÿซง

A host MAY send a Source Quench message if it's approaching, or has reached, the point where it's forced to discard incoming datagrams because it's short on reassembly buffers or other resources ๐Ÿฅบ. See Section 2.2.3 of [INTRO:2] for suggestions on when to send Source Quench ๐Ÿ’ก.

3.2.2.3 Source Quench: RFC-792 (continued) ๐Ÿ’œ

If a Source Quench message shows up, the IP layer MUST pass it up to the transport layer (or ICMP processing). No skipping, bestie! ๐Ÿซถ In general, the transport or application layer SHOULD have some way to respond to Source Quench for any protocol that can send a bunch of datagrams to the same destination and can reasonably keep enough state to make that work. Check out Section 4 for how TCP and UDP handle it. ๐Ÿฆ‹

DISCUSSION: A Source Quench can come from the target host or from some gateway along the path of a datagram. The host that gets one should back off for a while, then slowly ramp its sending rate back up. ๐ŸŒธ The response can live in the transport layer (for connection-oriented stuff like TCP) or in the application layer (for protocols built on top of UDP). โœจ

There's a proposal [IP:14] for the IP layer to respond to Source Quench directly by controlling how fast datagrams get sent. BUT it's still experimental, so it's not currently recommended. ๐Ÿ™ˆ

3.2.2.4 Time Exceeded: RFC-792 ๐Ÿฆ‹

An incoming Time Exceeded message MUST be passed to the transport layer. ๐Ÿ’…

DISCUSSION: A gateway sends a Time Exceeded Code 0 (In Transit) message when it throws away a datagram because its TTL field expired. That means either there's a gateway routing loop or the initial TTL was too small. ๐Ÿ˜ญ

A host may get a Time Exceeded Code 1 (Reassembly Timeout) message from a destination host that timed out and discarded an incomplete datagram. See Section 3.3.2 below. ๐Ÿงš Down the road, getting this message might be part of some "MTU discovery" procedure, which would find the biggest datagram that can be sent along the path without fragmentation. Iconic! ๐Ÿ‘‘

3.2.2.5 Parameter Problem: RFC-792 ๐ŸŽ€

A host SHOULD generate Parameter Problem messages. An incoming Parameter Problem message MUST be passed to the transport layer, and it MAY be reported to the user. ๐Ÿ’–

DISCUSSION: The ICMP Parameter Problem message gets sent to the source host for any problem that isn't covered by another ICMP message. Getting one usually means there's some local or remote implementation error. ๐Ÿ™ˆ

A new variant of the Parameter Problem message is hereby defined:

Code 1 = required option is missing.

DISCUSSION: This variant is currently used by the military community for a missing security option. ๐Ÿซก

3.2.2.6 Echo Request/Reply: RFC-792 ๐Ÿ“

Every host MUST implement an ICMP Echo server function that receives Echo Requests and sends the matching Echo Replies. A host SHOULD also implement an application-layer interface for sending an Echo Request and receiving an Echo Reply, for diagnostic purposes. โœจ

An ICMP Echo Request sent to an IP broadcast or IP multicast address MAY be silently discarded. ๐ŸŒˆ

DISCUSSION: This neutral rule came out of a super heated debate. One side thinks ICMP Echo to a broadcast address is a valuable diagnostic tool. The other side is like, "ummm, misuse can totally create packet storms." ๐Ÿ’€

The IP source address in an ICMP Echo Reply MUST be the same as the specific-destination address (defined in Section 3.2.1.3) of the corresponding ICMP Echo Request message. ๐Ÿ’œ

Data received in an ICMP Echo Request MUST be entirely included in the resulting Echo Reply. However, if sending the Echo Reply requires intentional fragmentation that isn't implemented, the datagram MUST be truncated to the maximum transmission size (see Section 3.3.3) and then sent. โœ‚๏ธ

Echo Reply messages MUST be passed to the ICMP user interface, unless the corresponding Echo Request originated in the IP layer. ๐Ÿฆ‹

If a Record Route and/or Time Stamp option is received in an ICMP Echo Request, this option (these options) SHOULD be updated to include the current host and included in the IP header of the Echo Reply message, without "truncation". That way the recorded route covers the entire round trip. ๐Ÿ›ค๏ธ

If a Source Route option is received in an ICMP Echo Request, the return route MUST be reversed and used as a Source Route option for the Echo Reply message. ๐Ÿ”

3.2.2.7 Information Request/Reply: RFC-792 ๐Ÿ™ƒ

A host SHOULD NOT implement these messages. ๐Ÿšซ

DISCUSSION: The Information Request/Reply pair was meant to help self-configuring systems, like diskless workstations, find their IP network numbers at boot time. But RARP and BOOTP are way better at letting a host figure out its own IP address. ๐Ÿ‘‘

3.2.2.8 Timestamp and Timestamp Reply: RFC-792 โฐ

A host MAY implement Timestamp and Timestamp Reply. If they're implemented, the following rules MUST be followed. ๐Ÿ’…

  • The ICMP Timestamp server function returns a Timestamp Reply to every Timestamp message that is received. If this function is implemented, it SHOULD be designed for minimum variability in delay (for example, implemented in the kernel so it doesn't get stuck waiting to schedule a user process). โšก

The following cases for Timestamp are handled by the matching rules for ICMP Echo:

  • An ICMP Timestamp Request sent to an IP broadcast or IP multicast address MAY be silently discarded. ๐ŸŒธ
  • The IP source address in an ICMP Timestamp Reply MUST be the same as the specific-destination address of the corresponding Timestamp Request message. ๐Ÿ’–
  • If a Source Route option is received in an ICMP Echo Request, the return route MUST be reversed and used as a Source Route option for the Timestamp Reply message. ๐Ÿ”
  • If a Record Route and/or Timestamp option is received in a Timestamp Request, this (these) option(s) SHOULD be updated to include the current host and included in the IP header of the Timestamp Reply message. ๐Ÿ›ค๏ธ
  • Incoming Timestamp Reply messages MUST be passed up to the ICMP user interface. ๐Ÿฆ‹

The preferred form for a timestamp value (the "standard value") is in units of milliseconds since midnight Universal Time. Okay, but it can be kinda hard to get millisecond resolution, because lots of systems have clocks that only update at line frequency, like 50 or 60 times a second. So there's some wiggle room in a "standard value": โœจ

  • (a) A "standard value" MUST be updated at least 15 times per second (in other words, at most the six low-order bits of the value may be undefined). ๐Ÿงฎ
  • (b) The accuracy of a "standard value" MUST approximate that of operator-set CPU clocks, i.e., correct within a few minutes. โฑ๏ธ

3.2.2.9 Address Mask Request/Reply: RFC-950 ๐ŸŽญ

A host MUST support the first method, and it MAY implement all three, for determining the address mask(s) that match its IP address(es):

  • (1) static configuration information;
  • (2) obtaining the address mask(s) dynamically as a side effect of the system initialization process (see [INTRO:1]); and
  • (3) sending ICMP Address Mask Request(s) and receiving ICMP Address Mask Reply(s).

The choice of method used in a particular host MUST be configurable. ๐ŸŽ›๏ธ

When method (3), the use of Address Mask messages, is enabled, then: ๐ŸŒˆ

  • (a) When it initializes, the host MUST broadcast an Address Mask Request message on the connected network that corresponds to the IP address. It MUST retransmit this message a small number of times if it doesn't get an immediate Address Mask Reply. ๐Ÿ“ฃ
  • (b) Until it has received an Address Mask Reply, the host SHOULD assume a mask that fits the address class of the IP address, i.e., assume the connected network isn't subnetted. ๐Ÿงธ
  • (c) The first Address Mask Reply message received MUST be used to set the address mask for that particular local IP address. This is true even if that first reply is "unsolicited", in which case it was broadcast and may arrive after the host has stopped retransmitting Address Mask Requests. Once the mask has been set by an Address Mask Reply, later Address Mask Reply messages MUST be (silently) ignored. ๐Ÿ™ˆ

Conversely, if Address Mask messages are disabled, then no ICMP Address Mask Requests will be sent, and any ICMP Address Mask Replies received for that local IP address MUST be (silently) ignored. ๐Ÿšซ

A host SHOULD do some reasonableness check on any address mask it installs; see the IMPLEMENTATION section below. ๐Ÿง

A system MUST NOT send an Address Mask Reply unless it is an authoritative agent for address masks. An authoritative agent may be a host or a gateway, but it MUST be explicitly configured as an address mask agent. Receiving an address mask via an Address Mask Reply doesn't give the receiver authority, so it MUST NOT be used as the basis for issuing Address Mask Replies. ๐Ÿ‘‘

With a statically configured address mask, there SHOULD be an additional configuration flag that decides whether the host acts as an authoritative agent for this mask, i.e., whether it answers Address Mask Request messages using this mask. ๐Ÿšฉ

If it's configured as an agent, the host MUST broadcast an Address Mask Reply for the mask on the appropriate interface when it initializes. ๐Ÿ“ข

See "System Initialization" in [INTRO:1] for more information about how Address Mask Request/Reply messages are used. ๐Ÿงš

DISCUSSION: ๐Ÿ’… okay so hosts that casually send Address Mask Replies with invalid address masks have been a serious nuisance ๐Ÿ˜ญ. To stop that, Address Mask Replies ought to be sent only by authoritative agents that have been selected by explicit administrative action ๐ŸŽ€.

When an authoritative agent gets an Address Mask Request message, it sends a unicast Address Mask Reply to the source IP address โœจ. If the network part of this address is zero (see (a) and (b) in 3.2.1.3), the Reply gets broadcast ๐Ÿ“ฃ.

If a host gets no reply to its Address Mask Request messages, it assumes there's no agent and uses an unsubnetted mask ๐Ÿคทโ€โ™€๏ธ. But the agent may just be temporarily unreachable ๐Ÿฅบ. So an agent will broadcast an unsolicited Address Mask Reply whenever it initializes, to update the masks of all hosts that have initialized in the meantime ๐ŸŒˆ.

IMPLEMENTATION: The following reasonableness check on an address mask is suggested: the mask is not all 1 bits, and it is either zero or else the 8 highest-order bits are on ๐Ÿง.

3.2.3 Internet Group Management Protocol IGMP ๐Ÿงš

IGMP [IP:4] is a protocol used between hosts and gateways on a single network to establish hosts' membership in particular multicast groups ๐Ÿ’œ. The gateways use this info, together with a multicast routing protocol, to support IP multicasting across the Internet ๐ŸŒ.

At this time, implementation of IGMP is OPTIONAL; see Section 3.3.7 for more information. Without IGMP, a host can still take part in multicasting local to its connected networks ๐Ÿฆ‹.

3.3 SPECIFIC ISSUES ๐Ÿ“

3.3.1 Routing Outbound Datagrams ๐Ÿš—

The IP layer chooses the correct next hop for each datagram it sends. If the destination is on a connected network, the datagram is sent directly to the destination host. Otherwise, it has to be routed to a gateway on a connected network ๐Ÿ›ฃ๏ธ.

3.3.1.1 Local/Remote Decision

To decide if the destination is on a connected network, the following algorithm MUST be used [see IP:3]:

(a) The address mask (particular to a local IP address for a multihomed host) is a 32-bit mask that selects the network number and subnet number fields of the corresponding IP address.

(b) If the IP destination address bits extracted by the address mask match the IP source address bits extracted by the same mask, then the destination is on the corresponding connected network, and the datagram is to be transmitted directly to the destination host โœ….

(c) If not, then the destination is accessible only through a gateway. Selection of a gateway is described below (3.3.1.2) ๐Ÿ‘€.

A special-case destination address is handled as follows:

  • For a limited broadcast or a multicast address, simply pass the datagram to the link layer for the appropriate interface.
  • For a (network or subnet) directed broadcast, the datagram can use the standard routing algorithms.

The host IP layer MUST operate correctly in a minimal network environment, and in particular, when there are no gateways. For example, if the IP layer of a host insists on finding at least one gateway to initialize, the host will be unable to operate on a single isolated broadcast net ๐Ÿ™ƒ.

3.3.1.2 Gateway Selection

To efficiently route a series of datagrams to the same destination, the source host MUST keep a "route cache" of mappings to next-hop gateways ๐Ÿ—‚๏ธ. A host uses the following basic algorithm on this cache to route a datagram. This algorithm is designed to put the primary routing burden on the gateways [IP:11] ๐Ÿซถ.

(a) If the route cache contains no information for a particular destination, the host chooses a "default" gateway and sends the datagram to it. It also builds a corresponding Route Cache entry.

(b) If that gateway is not the best next hop to the destination, the gateway will forward the datagram to the best next-hop gateway and return an ICMP Redirect message to the source host.

(c) When it receives a Redirect, the host updates the next-hop gateway in the appropriate route cache entry, so later datagrams to the same destination will go directly to the best gateway ๐Ÿ.

Since the subnet mask appropriate to the destination address is generally not known, a Network Redirect message SHOULD be treated identically to a Host Redirect message. That means the cache entry for the destination host (only) would be updated (or created, if an entry for that host did not exist) for the new gateway ๐ŸŽฏ.

DISCUSSION: This recommendation is here to protect against gateways that erroneously send Network Redirects for a subnetted network, in violation of the gateway requirements [INTRO:2] ๐Ÿ›ก๏ธ.

When there is no route cache entry for the destination host address (and the destination is not on the connected network), the IP layer MUST pick a gateway from its list of "default" gateways. The IP layer MUST support multiple default gateways ๐Ÿ‘‘.

As an extra feature, a host IP layer MAY implement a table of "static routes". Each such static route MAY include a flag specifying whether it may be overridden by ICMP Redirects ๐ŸŽ€.

DISCUSSION: A host generally needs to know at least one default gateway to get started. This info can come from a configuration file, or else from the host startup sequence, e.g., the BOOTP protocol (see [INTRO:1]) ๐Ÿš€.

It has been suggested that a host can augment its list of default gateways by recording any new gateways it learns about. For example, it can record every gateway it is ever redirected to. Such a feature, while possibly useful in some circumstances, may cause problems in other cases (e.g., gateways are not all equal), and it is not recommended ๐Ÿ™…โ€โ™€๏ธ.

A static route is typically a particular preset mapping from destination host or network into a particular next-hop gateway. It might also depend on the Type-of-Service (see next section). Static routes would be set up by system administrators to override the normal automatic routing mechanism, to handle exceptional situations. However, any static routing information is a potential source of failure as configurations change or equipment fails ๐Ÿ’€.

3.3.1.3 Route Cache ๐Ÿ—ƒ๏ธ

Each route cache entry needs to include the following fields:

(1) Local IP address (for a multihomed host)

(2) Destination IP address

(3) Type(s)-of-Service

(4) Next-hop gateway IP address

Field (2) MAY be the full IP address of the destination host, or only the destination network number. Field (3), the TOS, SHOULD be included.

See Section 3.3.4.2 for a discussion of the implications of multihoming for the lookup procedure in this cache ๐Ÿ”.

DISCUSSION: Including the Type-of-Service field in the route cache and considering it in the host route algorithm will provide the necessary mechanism for the future, when Type-of-Service routing is commonly used in the Internet. See Section 3.2.1.6 โœจ.

Each route cache entry defines the endpoints of an Internet path. Although the connecting path may change dynamically in an arbitrary way, the transmission characteristics of the path tend to stay approximately constant over a time period longer than a single typical host-host transport connection. So a route cache entry is a natural place to cache data on the properties of the path. Examples of such properties might be the maximum unfragmented datagram size (see Section 3.3.3), or the average round-trip delay measured by a transport protocol. This data will generally be both gathered and used by a higher layer protocol, e.g., by TCP, or by an application using UDP. Experiments are currently in progress on caching path properties in this manner ๐Ÿงช.

There is no consensus on whether the route cache should be keyed on destination host addresses alone, or allow both host and network addresses ๐Ÿค”. Those who favor using only host addresses argue that:

(1) As required in Section 3.3.1.2, Redirect messages will generally result in entries keyed on destination host addresses. The simplest and most general scheme would be to use host addresses always.

(2) The IP layer may not always know the address mask for a network address in a complex subnetted environment.

(3) Using only host addresses allows the destination address to be used as a pure 32-bit number, which may allow the Internet architecture to be more easily extended in the future without any change to the hosts ๐ŸŒธ.

The opposing view is that allowing a mixture of destination hosts and networks in the route cache:

(1) Saves memory space.

(2) Leads to a simpler data structure, easily combining the cache with the tables of default and static routes (see below).

(3) Provides a more useful place to cache path properties, as discussed earlier.

IMPLEMENTATION: The cache needs to be large enough to include entries for the maximum number of destination hosts that may be in use at one time ๐Ÿ“ฆ.

A route cache entry may also include control information used to choose an entry for replacement. This might take the form of a "recently used" bit, a use count, or a last-used timestamp, for example. It is recommended that it include the time of last modification of the entry, for diagnostic purposes ๐Ÿง โœจ.

An implementation might want to cut down on the cost of scanning the route cache for every single datagram ๐Ÿ˜ญ That can be done with a hash table so lookups go faster, or by giving a connection-oriented transport protocol a "hint," which is a temporary handle on the right cache entry. The transport passes that handle down to the IP layer with each later datagram ๐Ÿฆ‹

We've been treating the route cache, the lists of default gateways, and the table of static routes as separate things conceptually ๐Ÿง  In practice, though, they can all be squished together into one "routing table" data structure, and honestly that's giving clean energy โœจ

3.3.1.4. Dead Gateway Detection

The IP layer MUST be able to detect when a "next-hop" gateway sitting in its route cache has died, and it MUST be able to pick an alternate gateway (see Section 3.3.1.5). This is a must-have, bestie ๐Ÿ’…

Dead gateway detection gets covered in a lot of detail in RFC-816 [IP:11]. Experience so far hasn't produced a complete algorithm that's totally satisfying ๐Ÿ˜ฉ It has, however, uncovered several forbidden paths and some promising techniques ๐ŸŒˆ

  • A particular gateway SHOULD NOT be used indefinitely when there are no positive signs that it's still working ๐Ÿ™ˆ
  • Active probes like "pinging" (meaning an ICMP Echo Request/Reply exchange) are expensive and don't scale well ๐Ÿ’€ So hosts MUST NOT actively check the status of a first-hop gateway by just pinging it nonstop ๐Ÿšซ
  • Even when pinging is the only real way to verify a gateway, pinging MUST be used only when traffic is actually being sent to the gateway AND there's no other positive indication that the gateway is functioning ๐ŸŽ€
  • To avoid pinging, the layers above and/or below the Internet layer SHOULD be able to give "advice" about route cache entries whenever they have positive (gateway OK) or negative (gateway dead) information ๐Ÿซถ

DISCUSSION:

If an implementation doesn't have a solid way to detect a dead gateway and reroute, a gateway failure can make datagrams just vanish into a "black hole" ๐Ÿ•ณ๏ธ That's super confusing for users and a nightmare for network folks trying to debug it ๐Ÿ˜ญ

The dead-gateway detection mechanism can't put unacceptable load on the host, on connected networks, or on the first-hop gateway(s) ๐Ÿ’œ How strict the timing and load limits are can change a bit depending on what the host is for. Generally though, a host needs to notice a failed first-hop gateway fast enough that transport-layer connections don't break before an alternate gateway can be chosen โฑ๏ธ

Passing advice up and down the stack makes the interfaces between layers more complicated, but it's the preferred approach to dead gateway detection ๐Ÿ‘‘ Advice can come from pretty much anywhere in the IP/TCP architecture, but it's expected to come mainly from the transport and link layers. Here are some possible sources of gateway advice:

  • TCP or any connection-oriented transport protocol should be able to give negative advice, for example when it's triggered by excessive retransmissions ๐Ÿ”
  • TCP may give positive advice when (new) data gets acknowledged. Even though the route might be asymmetric, an ACK for new data proves the acknowledged data must have been transmitted successfully โœ…
  • An ICMP Redirect message from a particular gateway should be used as positive advice about that gateway ๐Ÿงš
  • Link-layer information that reliably detects and reports host failures (for example, ARPANET Destination Dead messages) should be used as negative advice ๐Ÿ›ฐ๏ธ
  • Failure to ARP or to re-validate ARP mappings may be used as negative advice for the corresponding IP address ๐Ÿ™…
  • Packets arriving from a particular link-layer address are evidence that the system at that address is alive. But turning this into advice about gateways means mapping the link-layer address into an IP address and then checking that IP address against the gateways pointed to by the route cache. This is probably prohibitively inefficient ๐Ÿข

Keep in mind that positive advice given for every datagram received may cause unacceptable overhead in the implementation ๐Ÿ™ƒ

While advice could be passed using required arguments in all interfaces to the IP layer, some transport and application layer protocols can't work out the correct advice. So these interfaces must allow a neutral value for advice, because always-positive or always-negative advice both lead to incorrect behavior ๐ŸŒธ

There's another technique for dead gateway detection that's been used commonly, but it is not recommended ๐Ÿ™…โ€โ™€๏ธ

This technique depends on the host passively receiving ("wiretapping") the Interior Gateway Protocol (IGP) datagrams that the gateways broadcast to each other. The drawback is that a host needs to recognize all the interior gateway protocols gateways might use (see [INTRO:2]). Plus, it only works on a broadcast network ๐Ÿ“ก

Right now, pinging (meaning ICMP Echo messages) is the mechanism for gateway probing when it's absolutely required ๐Ÿ“ A successful ping guarantees that the addressed interface and its machine are up, but it doesn't guarantee the machine is a gateway rather than a host ๐Ÿค” The normal inference is that if a Redirect or other evidence showed a machine was a gateway, successful pings mean it's still up and therefore still a gateway. But a host silently discards packets that a gateway would forward or redirect, so that assumption could sometimes fail ๐Ÿ˜ฌ To fix this, a new ICMP message under development will ask "are you a gateway?" ๐Ÿ™‹

IMPLEMENTATION:

The following specific algorithm has been suggested ๐Ÿ“

  • Associate a "reroute timer" with each gateway pointed to by the route cache. Initialize the timer to a value Tr, which must be small enough to allow detection of a dead gateway before transport connections time out โฒ๏ธ
  • Positive advice would reset the reroute timer to Tr. Negative advice would reduce or zero the reroute timer ๐Ÿ”„
  • Whenever the IP layer used a particular gateway to route a datagram, it would check the corresponding reroute timer. If the timer had expired (reached zero), the IP layer would send a ping to the gateway, followed immediately by the datagram ๐Ÿƒโ€โ™€๏ธ
  • The ping (ICMP Echo) would be sent again if necessary, up to N times. If no ping reply was received in N tries, the gateway would be assumed to have failed, and a new first-hop gateway would be chosen for all cache entries pointing to the failed gateway ๐Ÿ’”

Note that the size of Tr is inversely related to the amount of advice available. Tr should be large enough to ensure that:

  • Any pinging will be at a low level (e.g., <10%) of all packets sent to a gateway from the host, AND
  • pinging is infrequent (e.g., every 3 minutes) ๐ŸŒ™

Since the recommended algorithm is concerned with the gateways pointed to by route cache entries, rather than the cache entries themselves, a two-level data structure (perhaps coordinated with ARP or similar caches) may be desirable for implementing a route cache ๐Ÿง

3.3.1.5. New Gateway Selection

If the failed gateway isn't the current default, the IP layer can immediately switch to a default gateway โšก If the current default is the one that failed, the IP layer MUST select a different default gateway (assuming more than one default is known) for the failed route and for establishing new routes ๐Ÿซก

DISCUSSION:

When a gateway does fail, the other gateways on the connected network will find out about it through some inter-gateway routing protocol. But that won't happen instantly, since gateway routing protocols typically have a settling time of 30-60 seconds โณ If the host switches to an alternative gateway before the gateways have agreed on the failure, the new target gateway will probably forward the datagram to the failed gateway and send a Redirect back to the host pointing to the failed gateway (!) ๐Ÿคฆโ€โ™€๏ธ The result is likely to be a rapid oscillation in the contents of the host's route cache during the gateway settling period ๐ŸŽข It's been proposed that the dead-gateway logic include some hysteresis mechanism to prevent these oscillations. However, experience hasn't shown any harm from such oscillations, since service can't be restored to the host until the gateways' routing information settles down ๐Ÿ’œ

IMPLEMENTATION: ๐ŸŽ€ Okay so, one way to pick a new default gateway is to just round-robin through the default gateways in the host's list. ๐Ÿ”„ Another way is to rank the gateways by priority. When the current default isn't the top-priority one, you "ping" the higher-priority gateways slowly so you can spot when they come back online. ๐Ÿฆ‹ That pinging can be super low-key, like 0.005 per second. ๐Ÿข

3.3.1.6. Initialization ๐ŸŒธ

The following information MUST be configurable:

(1) IP address(es).

(2) Address mask(s).

(3) A list of default gateways, with a preference level.

A manual way to enter this config MUST be provided. ๐Ÿ“ Also, there are a bunch of ways to figure this stuff out dynamically. Check the "Host Initialization" section in [INTRO:1] for those. โœจ

DISCUSSION: ๐Ÿ’ญ Some host implementations do "wiretapping" of gateway protocols on a broadcast network to learn which gateways exist. ๐Ÿ‘€ Okay, that's a bit sneaky, but it works. A standard way to do default gateway discovery is still being worked on. ๐Ÿ› ๏ธ


3.3.2. Reassembly ๐Ÿงฉ

The IP layer MUST implement reassembly of IP datagrams. ๐Ÿ’–

We call the biggest datagram size that can be reassembled EMTU_R ("Effective MTU to receive"). ๐Ÿ’œ People sometimes call this the "reassembly buffer size." EMTU_R MUST be greater than or equal to 576. It SHOULD be either configurable or indefinite, and it SHOULD be greater than or equal to the MTU of the connected network(s). ๐ŸŒˆ

DISCUSSION: ๐Ÿ™ˆ You should NOT build a fixed EMTU_R limit into the code, because some application layer protocols need EMTU_R values bigger than 576. Hard limits are a no-go, bestie. ๐Ÿ’…

IMPLEMENTATION: โญ An implementation can use a contiguous reassembly buffer for each datagram. Or it can use a fancier data structure with no definite limit on the reassembled datagram size. In that second case, EMTU_R is said to be "indefinite." ๐Ÿฆ‹

Logically, reassembly just means copying each fragment into the packet buffer at the correct offset. ๐Ÿงท Heads up: fragments can overlap if successive retransmissions use different packetizing but the same reassembly Id. ๐Ÿ‘€

The tricky part is the bookkeeping, figuring out when all the bytes of the datagram have been reassembled. ๐Ÿ˜ตโ€๐Ÿ’ซ We recommend Clark's algorithm [IP:10], which needs no extra data space for the bookkeeping. โœจ BUT, and this is important, unlike [IP:10], the first fragment header needs to be saved so it can be included in a possible ICMP Time Exceeded (Reassembly Timeout) message. ๐Ÿšจ

There MUST be a mechanism that lets the transport layer learn MMS_R, the maximum message size that can be received and reassembled in an IP datagram. ๐Ÿ“ฆ (See the GET_MAXSIZES calls in Section 3.4.) If EMTU_R is not indefinite, then MMS_R is given by:

MMS_R = EMTU_R - 20

That 20 is because 20 is the minimum size of an IP header. ๐Ÿงฎ

There MUST be a reassembly timeout. โฐ The reassembly timeout value SHOULD be a fixed value, NOT set from the remaining TTL. Ugh, the TTL thing is the trap here. โš ๏ธ The value should lie between 60 seconds and 120 seconds. If this timeout expires, the partially-reassembled datagram MUST be discarded, and an ICMP Time Exceeded message is sent to the source host (if fragment zero has been received). ๐Ÿ—‘๏ธ

Wait, I need to correct something: the SHOULD above should read as written in the original. The timeout value SHOULD be a fixed value, not set from the remaining TTL, and the value is recommended to lie between 60 seconds and 120 seconds. ๐Ÿ’…

DISCUSSION: ๐Ÿง  The IP spec says the reassembly timeout should be the remaining TTL from the IP header, but that doesn't work well, because gateways usually treat TTL as a simple hop count, not as elapsed time. ๐Ÿ™ƒ If the timeout is too small, datagrams get discarded for no reason, and communication can fail. ๐Ÿ’€ The timeout needs to be at least as big as the typical maximum delay across the Internet. A realistic minimum reassembly timeout would be 60 seconds. โณ

Someone suggested keeping a cache of round-trip times measured by transport protocols for different destinations, then using those values to figure out a reasonable reassembly timeout dynamically. ๐Ÿ”ฎ This approach requires further investigation. ๐Ÿ”

If the reassembly timeout is set too HIGH, buffer resources in the receiving host get tied up for too long, and the MSL (Maximum Segment Lifetime) [TCP:1] ends up bigger than it needs to be. ๐Ÿซ  The MSL controls how fast fragmented datagrams can be sent using distinct values of the 16-bit Ident field. A bigger MSL means a LOWER maximum rate. ๐ŸŒ The TCP specification [TCP:1] arbitrarily assumes an MSL of 2 minutes. ๐Ÿ•ฐ๏ธ That sets an upper limit on a reasonable reassembly timeout value. ๐ŸŽฏ


3.3.3. Fragmentation ๐Ÿช„

Optionally, the IP layer MAY implement a mechanism to fragment outgoing datagrams on purpose. โœ‚๏ธ

We call the maximum IP datagram size that may be sent EMTU_S ("Effective MTU for sending"). It applies to a particular combination of IP source and destination addresses, and perhaps TOS too. ๐Ÿ’ซ

A host MUST implement a mechanism that lets the transport layer learn MMS_S, the maximum transport-layer message size that may be sent for a given {source, destination, TOS} triplet. (See the GET_MAXSIZES call in Section 3.4.) If no local fragmentation is performed, MMS_S will be:

MMS_S = EMTU_S - <IP header size>

EMTU_S must be less than or equal to the MTU of the network interface that matches the source address of the datagram. ๐Ÿงญ Note that <IP header size> here will be 20, UNLESS the IP reserves space to insert IP options for its own purposes, on top of any options the transport layer inserts. ๐ŸŽ€

A host that does NOT implement local fragmentation MUST ensure that the transport layer (for TCP) or the application layer (for UDP) gets MMS_S from the IP layer, and that it never sends a datagram bigger than MMS_S. ๐Ÿ”’

It's generally desirable to avoid local fragmentation, and to choose an EMTU_S low enough to avoid fragmentation at any gateway along the path. ๐ŸŒท Without actual knowledge of the minimum MTU along the path, the IP layer SHOULD use EMTU_S <= 576 whenever the destination address is NOT on a connected network. Otherwise, it should use the connected network's MTU. ๐Ÿ›ฃ๏ธ

The MTU of each physical interface MUST be configurable. โš™๏ธ

A host IP layer implementation MAY have a configuration flag called "All-Subnets-MTU." This flag says the connected network's MTU is used for destinations on different subnets within the same network, but NOT for other networks. ๐ŸŒธ So the flag makes the network class mask, instead of the subnet address mask, decide which EMTU_S to use. For a multihomed host, every network interface needs its own "All-Subnets-MTU" flag. ๐Ÿงš

DISCUSSION: ๐Ÿ“ Picking the right datagram size is a complex topic [IP:9]. Let's break it down:

(a) In general, no host is required to accept an IP datagram bigger than 576 bytes (including header and data). So a host must not send a bigger datagram without explicit knowledge or a prior arrangement with the destination host. ๐Ÿ™…โ€โ™€๏ธ MMS_S is only an upper bound on the datagram size a transport protocol may send. Even when MMS_S is bigger than 556, the transport layer must limit its messages to 556 bytes, unless it knows something else about the destination host. ๐Ÿ“

(b) Some transport protocols (TCP, for example) can explicitly tell the sender the largest datagram the other end can receive and reassemble [IP:7]. The IP layer has no equivalent mechanism. ๐Ÿคทโ€โ™€๏ธ

A transport protocol that assumes an EMTU_R bigger than 576 (see Section 3.3.2) can send a datagram of that bigger size to another host that implements the same protocol. ๐Ÿ’ช

(c) Hosts should ideally limit their EMTU_S for a given destination to the minimum MTU of all the networks along the path, so there's no fragmentation at all. ๐Ÿ’Ž IP fragmentation is formally correct, but it can cause a serious transport protocol performance problem, because losing one fragment means ALL the fragments in the segment have to be retransmitted [IP:9]. ๐Ÿ˜ญ

Since nearly all networks on the Internet currently support an MTU of 576 or greater, we strongly recommend using 576 for datagrams sent to non-local networks. ๐Ÿฅฐ

Someone suggested a host could figure out the MTU over a given path by sending a zero-offset datagram fragment, then waiting for the receiver to time out the reassembly (which can't complete!) and return an ICMP Time Exceeded message. ๐Ÿ™ƒ That message would include the largest remaining fragment header in its body. More direct mechanisms are being experimented with, but they haven't been adopted yet (see e.g., RFC-1063). ๐Ÿงช


3.3.4. Local Multihoming ๐Ÿ 

3.3.4.1. Introduction ๐Ÿ’œ

A multihomed host has multiple IP addresses, which we can think of as "logical interfaces." ๐Ÿชช These logical interfaces may be associated with one or more physical interfaces, and those physical interfaces may connect to the same network or different networks. ๐ŸŒ

Here are some important cases of multihoming:

(a) Multiple Logical Networks ๐Ÿง

The Internet architects imagined that each physical network would have a single unique IP network (or subnet) number. ๐Ÿ“ But LAN administrators have sometimes found it useful to break that rule, running a LAN with multiple logical networks per physical connected network. ๐Ÿ˜…

If a host connected to such a physical network is set up to handle traffic for each of N different logical networks, then the host will have N logical interfaces. โœจ These could share a single physical interface, or they might use N physical interfaces to the same network. ๐Ÿ”Œ

(b) Multiple Logical Hosts ๐Ÿ‘‘

When a host has multiple IP addresses that all share the same <Network-number> part (and the same <Subnet-number> part, if any), those logical interfaces are known as "logical hosts" ๐ŸŽ€. They might share one physical interface, or they might use separate physical interfaces to the same physical network โœจ.

(c) Simple Multihoming ๐Ÿ’–

In this case, each logical interface is mapped into a separate physical interface, and each physical interface is connected to a different physical network. The term "multihoming" was originally used only for this case, but people now use it more generally ๐ŸŒธ.

A host with embedded gateway functionality will typically fall into the simple multihoming case. Here's the tea, though: a host can be simply multihomed without embedded gateway functionality, meaning it doesn't forward datagrams from one connected network to another ๐Ÿ™ˆ.

This case presents the most difficult routing problems ๐Ÿ˜ญ. The choice of interface (that is, the choice of first-hop network) may significantly affect performance or even reachability of remote parts of the Internet.

Finally, we note another possibility that is not multihoming ๐Ÿ’…: one logical interface may be bound to multiple physical interfaces, to increase reliability or throughput between directly connected machines by providing alternative physical paths between them. For instance, two systems might be connected by multiple point-to-point links. We call this "link-layer multiplexing". With link-layer multiplexing, the protocols above the link layer are unaware that multiple physical interfaces are present. The link-layer device driver is responsible for multiplexing and routing packets across the physical interfaces ๐Ÿงš.

In the Internet protocol architecture, a transport protocol instance ("entity") has no address of its own. Instead, it uses a single Internet Protocol (IP) address. This has implications for the IP, transport, and application layers, and for the interfaces between them ๐Ÿ‘‘. In particular, application software may have to be aware of the multiple IP addresses of a multihomed host. In other cases, the choice can be made within the network software.

3.3.4.2 Multihoming Requirements ๐Ÿฆ‹

The following general rules apply to choosing an IP source address for sending a datagram from a multihomed host.

(1) If the datagram is sent in response to a received datagram, the source address for the response SHOULD be the specific-destination address of the request. See Sections 4.1.3.5 and 4.2.3.7 and the "General Issues" section of [INTRO:1] for more specific requirements on higher layers.

Otherwise, a source address must be selected.

(2) An application MUST be able to explicitly specify the source address for initiating a connection or a request โœจ.

(3) In the absence of such a specification, the networking software MUST choose a source address. Rules for this choice are described below.

There are two key requirement issues related to multihoming ๐Ÿ”ฅ:

(A) A host MAY silently discard an incoming datagram whose destination address does not correspond to the physical interface through which it is received.

(B) A host MAY restrict itself to sending (non-source-routed) IP datagrams only through the physical interface that corresponds to the IP source address of the datagrams.

DISCUSSION:

Internet host implementors have used two different conceptual models for multihoming. They're briefly summarized in the following discussion. This document takes no stand on which model is preferred, because each seems to have a place ๐ŸŒˆ. This ambivalence is reflected in issues (A) and (B) being optional.

  • Strong ES Model ๐Ÿ‘‘

The Strong ES (End System, i.e., host) model emphasizes the host/gateway (ES/IS) distinction. It would therefore substitute MUST for MAY in issues (A) and (B) above. It tends to model a multihomed host as a set of logical hosts within the same physical host.

With respect to (A), proponents of the Strong ES model note that automatic Internet routing mechanisms could not route a datagram to a physical interface that did not correspond to the destination address.

Under the Strong ES model, the route computation for an outgoing datagram is the mapping:

                         route(src IP addr, dest IP addr, TOS)
                                                        -> gateway

Here the source address is included as a parameter, in order to select a gateway that is directly reachable on the corresponding physical interface. Note that this model logically requires that, in general, there be at least one default gateway for each IP source address, and preferably multiple defaults ๐Ÿ’–.

  • Weak ES Model ๐Ÿง

This view de-emphasizes the ES/IS distinction. It would therefore substitute MUST NOT for MAY in issues (A) and (B). This model may be the more natural one for hosts that wiretap gateway routing protocols, and it is necessary for hosts that have embedded gateway functionality ๐Ÿซถ.

The Weak ES Model may cause the Redirect mechanism to fail ๐Ÿ’€. If a datagram is sent out a physical interface that does not correspond to the destination address, the first-hop gateway will not realize when it needs to send a Redirect. On the other hand, if the host has embedded gateway functionality, then it has routing information without listening to Redirects.

In the Weak ES model, the route computation for an outgoing datagram is the mapping:

                         route(dest IP addr, TOS) -> gateway, interface

3.3.4.3 Choosing a Source Address ๐ŸŒธ

DISCUSSION:

When it sends an initial connection request (for example, a TCP "SYN" segment) or a datagram service request (for example, a UDP-based query), the transport layer on a multihomed host needs to know which source address to use. If the application doesn't specify it, the transport layer must ask the IP layer to perform the conceptual mapping:

     GET_SRCADDR(remote IP addr, TOS)
                                               -> local IP address

Here TOS is the Type-of-Service value (see Section 3.2.1.6), and the result is the desired source address. The following rules are suggested for implementing this mapping ๐Ÿงš:

(a) If the remote Internet address lies on one of the (sub-)nets to which the host is directly connected, a corresponding source address may be chosen, unless the corresponding interface is known to be down.

(b) The route cache may be consulted, to see if there is an active route to the specified destination network through any network interface. If so, a local IP address corresponding to that interface may be chosen.

(c) The table of static routes, if any (see Section 3.3.1.2), may be similarly consulted.

(d) The default gateways may be consulted. If these gateways are assigned to different interfaces, the interface corresponding to the gateway with the highest preference may be chosen.

In the future, there may be a defined way for a multihomed host to ask the gateways on all connected networks for advice about the best network to use for a given destination ๐Ÿ”ฎ.

IMPLEMENTATION:

It will be noted that this process is essentially the same as datagram routing (see Section 3.3.1), so hosts may be able to combine the implementation of the two functions ๐ŸŽ€.

3.3.5 Source Route Forwarding ๐Ÿฆ‹

Subject to the restrictions given below, a host MAY be able to act as an intermediate hop in a source route, forwarding a source-routed datagram to the next specified hop โœจ.

However, in performing this gateway-like function, the host MUST obey all the relevant rules for a gateway forwarding source-routed datagrams [INTRO:2]. This includes the following specific provisions, which override the corresponding host provisions given earlier in this document ๐Ÿ’…:

(A) TTL (ref. Section 3.2.1.7)

The TTL field MUST be decremented, and the datagram perhaps discarded, as specified for a gateway in [INTRO:2].

(B) ICMP Destination Unreachable (ref. Section 3.2.2.1)

A host MUST be able to generate Destination Unreachable messages with the following codes:

  • 4 (Fragmentation Required but DF Set) when a source-routed datagram cannot be fragmented to fit into the target network;
  • 5 (Source Route Failed) when a source-routed datagram cannot be forwarded, e.g., because of a routing problem or because the next hop of a strict source route is not on a connected network.

(C) IP Source Address (ref. Section 3.2.1.3)

A source-routed datagram being forwarded MAY (and normally will) have a source address that is not one of the IP addresses of the forwarding host ๐ŸŒˆ.

(D) Record Route Option (ref. Section 3.2.1.8d)

A host that is forwarding a source-routed datagram containing a Record Route option MUST update that option, if it has room.

(E) Timestamp Option (ref. Section 3.2.1.8e)

A host that is forwarding a source-routed datagram containing a Timestamp Option MUST add the current timestamp to that option, according to the rules for this option.

Okay so, bestie, picking up right where we left off: local vs non-local source routing ๐Ÿฆ‹. To keep things clear, we call it local source-routing when the next hop goes out the same physical interface the datagram came in on. Anything else is non-local source-routing ๐Ÿงญ.

  • A host is permitted to perform local source-routing without restriction ๐Ÿ’–.
  • A host that supports non-local source-routing MUST have a configurable switch to disable forwarding, and this switch MUST default to disabled ๐Ÿ”’. Secure by default, iconic ๐Ÿ‘‘.
  • The host MUST satisfy all gateway requirements for configurable policy filters [INTRO:2] restricting non-local forwarding ๐Ÿงš.

If a host gets a datagram with an incomplete source route but doesn't forward it for some reason, the host SHOULD return an ICMP Destination Unreachable (code 5, Source Route Failed) message ๐Ÿ’Œ, unless the datagram was itself an ICMP error message. Literally no ICMP error wars allowed ๐Ÿ™ˆ.

3.3.6 Broadcasts ๐Ÿ“ก

Okay, broadcasts are giving main character energy โœจ. Section 3.2.1.3 defined the four standard IP broadcast address forms, and they look like this:

  Limited Broadcast:  {-1, -1}

  Directed Broadcast:  {<Network-number>,-1}

  Subnet Directed Broadcast:
                     {<Network-number>,<Subnet-number>,-1}

  All-Subnets Directed Broadcast: {<Network-number>,-1,-1}

A host MUST recognize any of these forms in the destination address of an incoming datagram ๐Ÿซถ. No ignoring them, periodt ๐Ÿ’….

Now the plot twist ๐Ÿ˜ญ. There is a class of hosts* that use non-standard broadcast address forms, substituting 0 for -1 ๐Ÿ“. All hosts SHOULD

*4.2BSD Unix and its derivatives, but not 4.3BSD. ๐Ÿฆ‹

Okay so this bit is about the broadcast address drama ๐ŸŽ€. A host MAY optionally have a config option to pick the 0 or the -1 form of broadcast address, for each physical interface, but this option SHOULD default to the standard -1 form. Hosts still have to recognize and accept any of these non-standard broadcast addresses as the destination of an incoming datagram, no matter which form is in use ๐Ÿ’….

When a host sends a datagram to a link-layer broadcast address, the IP destination address MUST be a legal IP broadcast or IP multicast address ๐Ÿ”ฅ. And if a host gets a datagram over a link-layer broadcast (see Section 2.4) but the IP destination isn't a multicast or broadcast address, the host SHOULD silently discard it ๐Ÿ™ˆ. Hosts SHOULD use the Limited Broadcast address when they broadcast to a connected network ๐ŸŒธ.

DISCUSSION TEA โ˜•: Using the Limited Broadcast address instead of a Directed Broadcast address can make the system more robust ๐Ÿ’œ. Things go wrong a lot when machines don't understand the whole plethora of broadcast addresses (see Section 3.2.1.3), or when they have different ideas about which ones are in use. The biggest offender is a machine that doesn't understand subnetting but is plugged into a subnetted net ๐Ÿ’€. If you send a Subnet Broadcast for the connected network, that machine will think it's a message for some other host, and it's literally going to be so confused ๐Ÿ˜ญ. There's been debate about whether a datagram sent to the Limited Broadcast address should go out from every interface of a multihomed host. This spec takes no stand on it, so that one's up to you bestie ๐Ÿงš.

3.3.7. IP Multicasting โœจ

A host SHOULD support local IP multicasting on all connected networks that have a mapping from Class D IP addresses to link-layer addresses specified (see below) ๐Ÿซถ. Local multicasting support means sending multicast datagrams, joining multicast groups, receiving multicast datagrams, and leaving multicast groups. That implies support for everything in [IP:4] except the IGMP protocol itself, which is OPTIONAL ๐Ÿ“.

DISCUSSION: IGMP is what gives gateways that can do multicast routing the info they need to support IP multicasting across multiple networks ๐ŸŒˆ. Right now multicast-routing gateways are still in the experimental stage and aren't widely available ๐Ÿงช. For hosts that aren't connected to networks with those gateways, or that don't need to receive multicast datagrams from other networks, IGMP does nothing for them, so it's optional for now ๐Ÿคทโ€โ™€๏ธ. The rest of [IP:4] is still recommended, since it gives IP-layer access to local network multicast addressing, which is a way better option than local broadcast addressing ๐Ÿ‘‘. IGMP is expected to become recommended at some point in the future, once multicast-routing gateways are more common ๐Ÿ”ฎ.

If IGMP isn't implemented, a host SHOULD still join the "all-hosts" group (224.0.0.1) when the IP layer initializes, and stay a member for as long as the IP layer is active โœจ.

DISCUSSION: Joining the "all-hosts" group keeps strictly local multicasting uses working, like a gateway discovery protocol, even when IGMP isn't implemented ๐Ÿงšโ€โ™€๏ธ.

The mapping of IP Class D addresses to local addresses is currently specified for these types of networks ๐Ÿ—บ๏ธ:

  • Ethernet/IEEE 802.3, as defined in [IP:4] ๐Ÿ’œ
  • Any network that supports broadcast but not multicast addressing: every IP Class D address maps to the local broadcast address ๐Ÿ“ก
  • Any type of point-to-point link (e.g., SLIP or HDLC links): no mapping required. All IP multicast datagrams are sent as-is, inside the local framing ๐ŸŽ€

Mappings for other types of networks will be specified in the future ๐Ÿ”œ.

A host SHOULD provide a way for higher-layer protocols or applications to figure out which of the host's connected networks support IP multicast addressing ๐Ÿ”.

3.3.8. Error Reporting ๐Ÿšจ

Wherever practical, hosts MUST return ICMP error datagrams when they detect an error, except in cases where returning an ICMP error message is specifically prohibited ๐Ÿ™…โ€โ™€๏ธ.

DISCUSSION: A super common thing in datagram networks is the "black hole disease" ๐Ÿ•ณ๏ธ: datagrams get sent out, and nothing comes back. Without any error datagrams, the user has zero clue what went wrong, and that's so frustrating ๐Ÿ˜ค.

3.4. INTERNET/TRANSPORT LAYER INTERFACE ๐Ÿ”Œ

The interface between the IP layer and the transport layer MUST provide full access to all the mechanisms of the IP layer, including options, Type-of-Service, and Time-to-Live ๐Ÿ’–. The transport layer MUST either have mechanisms to set these interface parameters, or provide a path to pass them through from an application, or both ๐Ÿซถ.

DISCUSSION: Apps are urged to use these mechanisms where it makes sense, even when they aren't currently working on the Internet (like TOS) ๐Ÿ’…. That way they're instantly useful once they do start working, without a ton of retrofitting in host software ๐Ÿ™Œ.

Okay now we get to the conceptual interface between the transport layer and the IP layer, written as a set of procedure calls ๐Ÿง . It's an extension of the info in Section 3.3 of RFC-791 [IP:1] ๐Ÿ“œ.

  • Send Datagram ๐Ÿ“ค
SEND(src, dst, prot, TOS, TTL, BufPTR, len, Id, DF, opt
     => result )

The parameters are defined in RFC-791. Passing an Id parameter is optional; see Section 3.2.1.5 โœจ.

  • Receive Datagram ๐Ÿ“ฅ
RECV(BufPTR, prot
     => result, src, dst, SpecDest, TOS, len, opt)

All the parameters are defined in RFC-791, except for:

SpecDest = specific-destination address of datagram
            (defined in Section 3.2.1.3)

The result parameter dst holds the datagram's destination address. Since that might be a broadcast or multicast address, the SpecDest parameter (which isn't shown in RFC-791) MUST be passed ๐ŸŽฏ. The opt parameter has all the IP options received in the datagram, and these MUST ALSO be passed up to the transport layer ๐Ÿงฉ.

Wait, correction bestie: that last one is MUST in the original, and the word "also" is lowercase, so it's written as: these MUST also be passed to the transport layer ๐Ÿ’•.

  • Select Source Address ๐Ÿงญ
GET_SRCADDR(remote, TOS)  -> local

remote = remote IP address
TOS = Type-of-Service
local = local IP address

See Section 3.3.4.3 ๐Ÿ”Ž.

  • Find Maximum Datagram Sizes ๐Ÿ“
GET_MAXSIZES(local, remote, TOS) -> MMS_R, MMS_S

MMS_R = maximum receive transport-message size.
MMS_S = maximum send transport-message size.
(local, remote, TOS defined above)

See Sections 3.3.2 and 3.3.3 ๐ŸŒŸ.

  • Advice on Delivery Success ๐Ÿšฆ
ADVISE_DELIVPROB(sense, local, remote, TOS)

Here the parameter sense is a 1-bit flag saying whether positive or negative advice is being given; see the discussion in Section 3.3.1.4. The other parameters were defined earlier ๐Ÿ’ซ.

  • Send ICMP Message ๐Ÿ’Œ
SEND_ICMP(src, dst, TOS, TTL, BufPTR, len, Id, DF, opt)
     -> result

(Parameters defined in RFC-791.)

Passing an Id parameter is optional; see Section 3.2.1.5. The transport layer MUST be able to send certain ICMP messages: Port Unreachable or any of the query-type messages ๐Ÿ“. You could totally think of this as a special case of the SEND() call, but it's described separately so it's clearer ๐Ÿซง.

  • Receive ICMP Message ๐Ÿ“ฌ
RECV_ICMP(BufPTR ) -> result, src, dst, len, opt

(Parameters defined in RFC-791.)

The IP layer MUST pass certain ICMP messages up to the right transport-layer routine ๐Ÿš€. Again, this could be seen as a special case of RECV(), but it's separate for clarity ๐Ÿ’….

For an ICMP error message, the data that gets passed up MUST include the original Internet header plus all the octets of the original message that are included in the ICMP message ๐Ÿงพ. The transport layer uses this data to find the connection state info, if there is any ๐Ÿ”‘.

Specifically, these ICMP messages get passed up:

  • Destination Unreachable ๐Ÿšซ
  • Source Quench ๐Ÿซ 
  • Echo Reply (to ICMP user interface, unless the Echo Request originated in the IP layer) ๐Ÿ“
  • Timestamp Reply (to ICMP user interface) โฑ๏ธ
  • Time Exceeded โŒ›

DISCUSSION: Down the road there might be additions to this interface so path data (see Section 3.3.1.3) can get passed between the IP and transport layers ๐Ÿ›ฃ๏ธ๐Ÿฆ‹.

3.5. INTERNET LAYER REQUIREMENTS SUMMARY ๐Ÿ“‹

Here's the summary table, but the text cuts off mid-header so we'll pick up the rest next part ๐Ÿ’–:

                                                 |        | | | |S| |
                                                 |        | | | |H| |F
                                                 |        | | | |O|M|o
                                                 |        | |S| |U|U|o
                                                 |        | |H| |L|S|t
                                                 |        |M|O| |D|T|n
                                                 |        |U|U|M| | |o
                                                 |        |S|L|A|N|N|t
                                                 |        |T|D|Y|O|O|t
FEATURE                                          |SECTION | | | |T|T|e

okay the table is back and it's giving whole spreadsheet energy ๐Ÿ’…๐ŸŽ€

-------------------------------------------------|--------|-|-|-|-|-|--
                                                 |        | | | | | |
Implement IP and ICMP                            |3.1     |x| | | | |
Handle remote multihoming in application layer   |3.1     |x| | | | |
Support local multihoming                        |3.1     | | |x| | |
Meet gateway specs if forward datagrams          |3.1     |x| | | | |
Configuration switch for embedded gateway        |3.1     |x| | | | |1
   Config switch default to non-gateway          |3.1     |x| | | | |1
   Auto-config based on number of interfaces     |3.1     | | | | |x|1
Able to log discarded datagrams                  |3.1     | |x| | | |
   Record in counter                             |3.1     | |x| | | |
                                                 |        | | | | | |
Silently discard Version != 4                    |3.2.1.1 |x| | | | |
Verify IP checksum, silently discard bad dgram   |3.2.1.2 |x| | | | |
Addressing:                                      |        | | | | | |
  Subnet addressing (RFC-950)                    |3.2.1.3 |x| | | | |
  Src address must be host's own IP address      |3.2.1.3 |x| | | | |
  Silently discard datagram with bad dest addr   |3.2.1.3 |x| | | | |
  Silently discard datagram with bad src addr    |3.2.1.3 |x| | | | |
Support reassembly                               |3.2.1.4 |x| | | | |
Retain same Id field in identical datagram       |3.2.1.5 | | |x| | |
                                                 |        | | | | | |
TOS:                                             |        | | | | | |
  Allow transport layer to set TOS               |3.2.1.6 |x| | | | |
  Pass received TOS up to transport layer        |3.2.1.6 | |x| | | |
  Use RFC-795 link-layer mappings for TOS        |3.2.1.6 | | | |x| |
TTL:                                             |        | | | | | |
  Send packet with TTL of 0                      |3.2.1.7 | | | | |x|
  Discard received packets with TTL < 2          |3.2.1.7 | | | | |x|
  Allow transport layer to set TTL               |3.2.1.7 |x| | | | |
  Fixed TTL is configurable                      |3.2.1.7 |x| | | | |
                                                 |        | | | | | |
IP Options:                                      |        | | | | | |
  Allow transport layer to send IP options       |3.2.1.8 |x| | | | |
  Pass all IP options rcvd to higher layer       |3.2.1.8 |x| | | | |
  IP layer silently ignore unknown options       |3.2.1.8 |x| | | | |
  Security option                                |3.2.1.8a| | |x| | |
  Send Stream Identifier option                  |3.2.1.8b| | | |x| |
  Silently ignore Stream Identifer option        |3.2.1.8b|x| | | | |
  Record Route option                            |3.2.1.8d| | |x| | |
  Timestamp option                               |3.2.1.8e| | |x| | |
Source Route Option:                             |        | | | | | |
  Originate & terminate Source Route options     |3.2.1.8c|x| | | | |
  Datagram with completed SR passed up to TL     |3.2.1.8c|x| | | | |
  Build correct (non-redundant) return route     |3.2.1.8c|x| | | | |
  Send multiple SR options in one header         |3.2.1.8c| | | | |x|
                                                 |        | | | | | |
ICMP:                                            |        | | | | | |
  Silently discard ICMP msg with unknown type    |3.2.2   |x| | | | |
  Include more than 8 octets of orig datagram    |3.2.2   | | |x| | |
      Included octets same as received           |3.2.2   |x| | | | |
  Demux ICMP Error to transport protocol         |3.2.2   |x| | | | |
  Send ICMP error message with TOS=0             |3.2.2   | |x| | | |
  Send ICMP error message for:                   |        | | | | | |
   - ICMP error msg                              |3.2.2   | | | | |x|
   - IP b'cast or IP m'cast                      |3.2.2   | | | | |x|
   - Link-layer b'cast                           |3.2.2   | | | | |x|
   - Non-initial fragment                        |3.2.2   | | | | |x|
   - Datagram with non-unique src address        |3.2.2   | | | | |x|
  Return ICMP error msgs (when not prohibited)   |3.3.8   |x| | | | |
                                                 |        | | | | | |
  Dest Unreachable:                              |        | | | | | |
    Generate Dest Unreachable (code 2/3)         |3.2.2.1 | |x| | | |
    Pass ICMP Dest Unreachable to higher layer   |3.2.2.1 |x| | | | |
    Higher layer act on Dest Unreach             |3.2.2.1 | |x| | | |
      Interpret Dest Unreach as only hint        |3.2.2.1 |x| | | | |
  Redirect:                                      |        | | | | | |
    Host send Redirect                           |3.2.2.2 | | | |x| |
    Update route cache when recv Redirect        |3.2.2.2 |x| | | | |
    Handle both Host and Net Redirects           |3.2.2.2 |x| | | | |
    Discard illegal Redirect                     |3.2.2.2 | |x| | | |
  Source Quench:                                 |        | | | | | |
    Send Source Quench if buffering exceeded     |3.2.2.3 | | |x| | |
    Pass Source Quench to higher layer           |3.2.2.3 |x| | | | |
    Higher layer act on Source Quench            |3.2.2.3 | |x| | | |
  Time Exceeded: pass to higher layer            |3.2.2.4 |x| | | | |
  Parameter Problem:                             |        | | | | | |
    Send Parameter Problem messages              |3.2.2.5 | |x| | | |
    Pass Parameter Problem to higher layer       |3.2.2.5 |x| | | | |
    Report Parameter Problem to user             |3.2.2.5 | | |x| | |
                                                 |        | | | | | |
  ICMP Echo Request or Reply:                    |        | | | | | |
    Echo server and Echo client                  |3.2.2.6 |x| | | | |
    Echo client                                  |3.2.2.6 | |x| | | |
    Discard Echo Request to broadcast address    |3.2.2.6 | | |x| | |
    Discard Echo Request to multicast address    |3.2.2.6 | | |x| | |
    Use specific-dest addr as Echo Reply src     |3.2.2.6 |x| | | | |
    Send same data in Echo Reply                 |3.2.2.6 |x| | | | |
    Pass Echo Reply to higher layer              |3.2.2.6 |x| | | | |
    Reflect Record Route, Time Stamp options     |3.2.2.6 | |x| | | |
    Reverse and reflect Source Route option      |3.2.2.6 |x| | | | |
                                                 |        | | | | | |
  ICMP Information Request or Reply:             |3.2.2.7 | | | |x| |
  ICMP Timestamp and Timestamp Reply:            |3.2.2.8 | | |x| | |
    Minimize delay variability                   |3.2.2.8 | |x| | | |1
    Silently discard b'cast Timestamp            |3.2.2.8 | | |x| | |1
    Silently discard m'cast Timestamp            |3.2.2.8 | | |x| | |1
    Use specific-dest addr as TS Reply src       |3.2.2.8 |x| | | | |1
    Reflect Record Route, Time Stamp options     |3.2.2.6 | |x| | | |1
    Reverse and reflect Source Route option      |3.2.2.8 |x| | | | |1
    Pass Timestamp Reply to higher layer         |3.2.2.8 |x| | | | |1
    Obey rules for "standard value"              |3.2.2.8 |x| | | | |1
                                                 |        | | | | | |
  ICMP Address Mask Request and Reply:           |        | | | | | |
    Addr Mask source configurable                |3.2.2.9 |x| | | | |
    Support static configuration of addr mask    |3.2.2.9 |x| | | | |
    Get addr mask dynamically during booting     |3.2.2.9 | | |x| | |
    Get addr via ICMP Addr Mask Request/Reply    |3.2.2.9 | | |x| | |
      Retransmit Addr Mask Req if no Reply       |3.2.2.9 |x| | | | |3
      Assume default mask if no Reply            |3.2.2.9 | |x| | | |3
      Update address mask from first Reply only  |3.2.2.9 |x| | | | |3
    Reasonableness check on Addr Mask            |3.2.2.9 | |x| | | |
    Send unauthorized Addr Mask Reply msgs       |3.2.2.9 | | | | |x|
      Explicitly configured to be agent          |3.2.2.9 |x| | | | |
    Static config=> Addr-Mask-Authoritative flag |3.2.2.9 | |x| | | |
      Broadcast Addr Mask Reply when init.       |3.2.2.9 |x| | | | |3
                                                 |        | | | | | |
ROUTING OUTBOUND DATAGRAMS:                      |        | | | | | |
  Use address mask in local/remote decision      |3.3.1.1 |x| | | | |
  Operate with no gateways on conn network       |3.3.1.1 |x| | | | |
  Maintain "route cache" of next-hop gateways    |3.3.1.2 |x| | | | |
  Treat Host and Net Redirect the same           |3.3.1.2 | |x| | | |
  If no cache entry, use default gateway         |3.3.1.2 |x| | | | |
    Support multiple default gateways            |3.3.1.2 |x| | | | |
  Provide table of static routes                 |3.3.1.2 | | |x| | |
    Flag: route overridable by Redirects         |3.3.1.2 | | |x| | |
  Key route cache on host, not net address       |3.3.1.3 | | |x| | |
  Include TOS in route cache                     |3.3.1.3 | |x| | | |
                                                 |        | | | | | |
  Able to detect failure of next-hop gateway     |3.3.1.4 |x| | | | |
  Assume route is good forever                   |3.3.1.4 | | | |x| |
  Ping gateways continuously                     |3.3.1.4 | | | | |x|
  Ping only when traffic being sent              |3.3.1.4 |x| | | | |
  Ping only when no positive indication          |3.3.1.4 |x| | | | |
  Higher and lower layers give advice            |3.3.1.4 | |x| | | |
  Switch from failed default g'way to another    |3.3.1.5 |x| | | | |
  Manual method of entering config info          |3.3.1.6 |x| | | | |
                                                 |        | | | | | |
REASSEMBLY and FRAGMENTATION:                    |        | | | | | |
  Able to reassemble incoming datagrams          |3.3.2   |x| | | | |
    At least 576 byte datagrams                  |3.3.2   |x| | | | |
    EMTU_R configurable or indefinite            |3.3.2   | |x| | | |
  Transport layer able to learn MMS_R            |3.3.2   |x| | | | |
  Send ICMP Time Exceeded on reassembly timeout  |3.3.2   |x| | | | |
    Fixed reassembly timeout value               |3.3.2   | |x| | | |
                                                 |        | | | | | |
  Pass MMS_S to higher layers                    |3.3.3   |x| | | | |
  Local fragmentation of outgoing packets        |3.3.3   | | |x| | |
     Else don't send bigger than MMS_S           |3.3.3   |x| | | | |
  Send max 576 to off-net destination            |3.3.3   | |x| | | |
  All-Subnets-MTU configuration flag             |3.3.3   | | |x| | |
                                                 |        | | | | | |
MULTIHOMING:                                     |        | | | | | |
  Reply with same addr as spec-dest addr         |3.3.4.2 | |x| | | |
  Allow application to choose local IP addr      |3.3.4.2 |x| | | | |
  Silently discard d'gram in "wrong" interface   |3.3.4.2 | | |x| | |
  Only send d'gram through "right" interface     |3.3.4.2 | | |x| | |4
                                                 |        | | | | | |
SOURCE-ROUTE FORWARDING:                         |        | | | | | |
  Forward datagram with Source Route option      |3.3.5   | | |x| | |1
    Obey corresponding gateway rules             |3.3.5   |x| | | | |1
      Update TTL by gateway rules                |3.3.5   |x| | | | |1
      Able to generate ICMP err code 4, 5        |3.3.5   |x| | | | |1
      IP src addr not local host                 |3.3.5   | | |x| | |1
      Update Timestamp, Record Route options     |3.3.5   |x| | | | |1
    Configurable switch for non-local SRing      |3.3.5   |x| | | | |1
      Defaults to OFF                            |3.3.5   |x| | | | |1
    Satisfy gwy access rules for non-local SRing |3.3.5   |x| | | | |1
    If not forward, send Dest Unreach (cd 5)     |3.3.5   | |x| | | |2
                                                 |        | | | | | |
BROADCAST:                                       |        | | | | | |
  Broadcast addr as IP source addr               |3.2.1.3 | | | | |x|
  Receive 0 or -1 broadcast formats OK           |3.3.6   | |x| | | |
  Config'ble option to send 0 or -1 b'cast       |3.3.6   | | |x| | |
    Default to -1 broadcast                      |3.3.6   | |x| | | |
  Recognize all broadcast address formats        |3.3.6   |x| | | | |
  Use IP b'cast/m'cast addr in link-layer b'cast |3.3.6   |x| | | | |
  Silently discard link-layer-only b'cast dg's   |3.3.6   | |x| | | |
  Use Limited Broadcast addr for connected net   |3.3.6   | |x| | | |

                                                 |        | | | | | |
MULTICAST:                                       |        | | | | | |
  Support local IP multicasting (RFC-1112)       |3.3.7   | |x| | | |
  Support IGMP (RFC-1112)                        |3.3.7   | | |x| | |
  Join all-hosts group at startup                |3.3.7   | |x| | | |
  Higher layers learn i'face m'cast capability   |3.3.7   | |x| | | |
                                                 |        | | | | | |
INTERFACE:                                       |        | | | | | |
  Allow transport layer to use all IP mechanisms |3.4     |x| | | | |
  Pass interface ident up to transport layer     |3.4     |x| | | | |
  Pass all IP options up to transport layer      |3.4     |x| | | | |
  Transport layer can send certain ICMP messages |3.4     |x| | | | |
  Pass spec'd ICMP messages up to transp. layer  |3.4     |x| | | | |
     Include IP hdr+8 octets or more from orig.  |3.4     |x| | | | |
  Able to leap tall buildings at a single bound  |3.5     | |x| | | |

Footnotes: โœจ

(1) Only if feature is implemented. ๐ŸŽ€

(2) This requirement is overruled if datagram is an ICMP error message. ๐Ÿ’…

(3) Only if feature is implemented and is configured "on". ๐ŸŒธ

(4) Unless has embedded gateway functionality or is source routed. ๐Ÿฆ‹


4. TRANSPORT PROTOCOLS ๐Ÿš€

4.1. USER DATAGRAM PROTOCOL -- UDP ๐Ÿ’–

4.1.1. INTRODUCTION ๐Ÿงš

Okay so the User Datagram Protocol, UDP [UDP:1], is the minimalist queen of transport ๐Ÿ‘‘. It offers only a minimal transport service, which means non-guaranteed datagram delivery, and it gives applications direct access to the datagram service of the IP layer. UDP is for apps that don't need the full TCP experience, or for apps that want stuff like multicast or broadcast delivery, which TCP just can't do ๐Ÿซถ.

UDP is almost a null protocol ๐Ÿ’€. The only things it adds on top of IP are checksumming of data and multiplexing by port number. That means an application running over UDP has to handle the end-to-end drama that a connection-oriented protocol would've handled for it, like retransmission for reliable delivery, packetization and reassembly, flow control, congestion avoidance, and so on, whenever those things are needed ๐Ÿ˜ญ. The fairly complex coupling between IP and TCP is going to be mirrored in the coupling between UDP and lots of applications that use it ๐Ÿ”ฅ.

4.1.2. PROTOCOL WALK-THROUGH โœจ

There are no known errors in the specification of UDP ๐ŸŒˆ.

4.1.3. SPECIFIC ISSUES ๐ŸŽ€

4.1.3.1. Ports ๐Ÿฆ‹

UDP well-known ports follow the exact same rules as TCP well-known ports, so check out Section 4.2.2.1 below ๐Ÿ’….

If a datagram shows up addressed to a UDP port that has no pending LISTEN call, UDP SHOULD send an ICMP Port Unreachable message ๐Ÿ™ˆ.

4.1.3.2. IP Options ๐Ÿ“

UDP MUST pass any IP option that it receives from the IP layer transparently to the application layer ๐Ÿซถ.

An application MUST be able to specify IP options to be sent in its UDP datagrams, and UDP MUST pass these options to the IP layer โœจ.

DISCUSSION: Right now, the only options that need to get passed through UDP are Source Route, Record Route, and Time Stamp. New options might be defined later, and UDP need not and should not make any assumptions about the format or content of options it passes to or from the application ๐ŸŒธ. The one possible exception would be an IP-layer security option ๐Ÿ”.

An application based on UDP will need to grab a source route from a request datagram and supply a reversed route for sending the matching reply ๐Ÿ”„๐Ÿ’œ.

4.1.3.3. ICMP Messages ๐Ÿ’Œ

UDP MUST pass to the application layer all ICMP error messages that it receives from the IP layer ๐Ÿšจ. Conceptually at least, this can be done with an upcall to the ERROR_REPORT routine (see Section 4.2.4.1) ๐Ÿ“ž.

DISCUSSION: ICMP error messages that come back from sending a UDP datagram are received asynchronously, so they don't arrive at a predictable time โฐ. A UDP-based app that wants to receive ICMP error messages is responsible for keeping the state it needs to demultiplex those messages when they show up. For example, the app might keep a pending receive operation for this purpose ๐Ÿงฉ. The app is also responsible for avoiding confusion from a delayed ICMP error message that resulted from an earlier use of the same port(s) ๐Ÿ‘€.

4.1.3.4. UDP Checksums ๐Ÿ”

A host MUST implement the facility to generate and validate UDP checksums ๐Ÿ’ฏ. An application MAY optionally be able to control whether a UDP checksum will be generated, but it MUST default to checksumming on โœ….

If a UDP datagram is received with a checksum that is non-zero and invalid, UDP MUST silently discard the datagram ๐Ÿซฅ. An application MAY optionally be able to control whether UDP datagrams without checksums should be discarded or passed to the application ๐ŸŽ›๏ธ.

DISCUSSION: Some apps that normally only run across local area networks have decided to turn off UDP checksums for efficiency ๐ŸŽ๏ธ. As a result, there have been numerous reported cases of undetected errors ๐Ÿ˜ฑ. Whether it's ever a good idea to turn off UDP checksumming is very controversial ๐Ÿฟ.

IMPLEMENTATION: There's a common implementation error with UDP checksums, and it's a big one ๐Ÿšฉ. Unlike the TCP checksum, the UDP checksum is optional. The value zero is transmitted in the checksum field of a UDP header to indicate that there's no checksum. If the transmitter really calculates a UDP checksum of zero, it must transmit the checksum as all 1's (65535) instead ๐Ÿง . No special action is required at the receiver, since zero and 65535 are equivalent in 1's complement arithmetic ๐ŸŒŸ.

4.1.3.5. UDP Multihoming ๐Ÿ 

When a UDP datagram is received, its specific-destination address MUST be passed up to the application layer ๐Ÿ“ฌ.

An application program MUST be able to specify the IP source address to be used for sending a UDP datagram, or to leave it unspecified. If it leaves it unspecified, the networking software will choose an appropriate source address ๐ŸŽฏ. There SHOULD be a way to communicate the chosen source address up to the application layer, so that the application can later receive a reply datagram only from the corresponding interface (e.g, so that the application can later receive a reply datagram only from the corresponding interface) ๐Ÿงญ.

DISCUSSION: A request/response app that uses UDP should use a source address for the response that is the same as the specific destination address of the request ๐Ÿ’•. See the "General Issues" section of [INTRO:1] ๐Ÿ“–.

4.1.3.6. Invalid Addresses ๐Ÿšซ

A UDP datagram received with an invalid IP source address (e.g., a broadcast or multicast address) must be discarded by UDP or by the IP layer (see Section 3.2.1.3) ๐Ÿ—‘๏ธ.

When a host sends a UDP datagram, the source address MUST be (one of) the IP address(es) of the host ๐Ÿก.

4.1.4. UDP/APPLICATION LAYER INTERFACE ๐ŸŒ‰

The application interface to UDP MUST provide the full services of the IP/transport interface described in Section 3.4 of this document ๐ŸŽ. So an application using UDP needs the functions of the GET_SRCADDR(), GET_MAXSIZES(), ADVISE_DELIVPROB(), and RECV_ICMP() calls described in Section 3.4 ๐Ÿซถ. For example, GET_MAXSIZES() can be used to learn the effective maximum UDP maximum datagram size for a particular {interface,remote host,TOS} triplet ๐Ÿ“.

An application-layer program MUST be able to set the TTL and TOS values, as well as IP options, for sending a UDP datagram, and these values must be passed transparently to the IP layer ๐ŸŽ›๏ธ. UDP MAY pass the received TOS up to the application layer ๐Ÿ’….

4.1.5. UDP REQUIREMENTS SUMMARY ๐Ÿ“‹

                                                 |        | | | |S| |
                                                 |        | | | |H| |F
                                                 |        | | | |O|M|o
                                                 |        | |S| |U|U|o
                                                 |        | |H| |L|S|t
                                                 |        |M|O| |D|T|n
                                                 |        |U|U|M| | |o
                                                 |        |S|L|A|N|N|t
                                                 |        |T|D|Y|O|O|t
FEATURE                                          |SECTION | | | |T|T|e
-------------------------------------------------|--------|-|-|-|-|-|--
                                                 |        | | | | | |
    UDP                                          |        | | | | | |
                                                 |        | | | | | |
UDP send Port Unreachable                        |4.1.3.1 | |x| | | |
                                                 |        | | | | | |
IP Options in UDP                                |        | | | | | |
 - Pass rcv'd IP options to applic layer         |4.1.3.2 |x| | | | |
 - Applic layer can specify IP options in Send   |4.1.3.2 |x| | | | |
 - UDP passes IP options down to IP layer        |4.1.3.2 |x| | | | |
                                                 |        | | | | | |
Pass ICMP msgs up to applic layer                |4.1.3.3 |x| | | | |
                                                 |        | | | | | |
UDP checksums:                                   |        | | | | | |
 - Able to generate/check checksum               |4.1.3.4 |x| | | | |
 - Silently discard bad checksum                 |4.1.3.4 |x| | | | |
 - Sender Option to not generate checksum        |4.1.3.4 | | |x| | |
   - Default is to checksum                      |4.1.3.4 |x| | | | |
 - Receiver Option to require checksum           |4.1.3.4 | | |x| | |
                                                 |        | | | | | |
UDP Multihoming                                  |        | | | | | |
 - Pass spec-dest addr to application            |4.1.3.5 |x| | | | |
 - Applic layer can specify Local IP addr        |4.1.3.5 |x| | | | |
 - Applic layer specify wild Local IP addr       |4.1.3.5 |x| | | | |
 - Applic layer notified of Local IP addr used   |4.1.3.5 | |x| | | |
                                                 |        | | | | | |
Bad IP src addr silently discarded by UDP/IP     |4.1.3.6 |x| | | | |
Only send valid IP source address                |4.1.3.6 |x| | | | |
UDP Application Interface Services               |        | | | | | |
Full IP interface of 3.4 for application         |4.1.4   |x| | | | |
 - Able to spec TTL, TOS, IP opts when send dg   |4.1.4   |x| | | | |
 - Pass received TOS up to applic layer          |4.1.4   | | |x| | |

4.2. TRANSMISSION CONTROL PROTOCOL -- TCP โœจ

4.2.1. INTRODUCTION

okay so TCP is basically the main virtual-circuit transport protocol for the Internet suite ๐Ÿ’– It gives you reliable, in-sequence delivery of a full-duplex stream of octets (8-bit bytes), and it's the go-to for anything that needs reliable, connection-oriented transport, like mail (SMTP), file transfer (FTP), and virtual terminal service (Telnet). The requirements for those application-layer protocols live in [INTRO:1] ๐ŸŽ€

4.2.2. PROTOCOL WALK-THROUGH ๐Ÿฆ‹

4.2.2.1. Well-Known Ports: RFC-793 Section 2.7 ๐Ÿ”Œ

DISCUSSION:

TCP sets aside port numbers 0-255 as "well-known" ports, which are used to reach services that are standardized across the whole Internet ๐ŸŒˆ Everything past that is free real estate that applications can grab. The current well-known port definitions are listed in the RFC called "Assigned Numbers" [INTRO:6]. Before you can define a new well-known port, you need an RFC that documents the proposed service in enough detail for new implementations to be built, so no shortcuts, bestie ๐Ÿ’…

Some systems take this a step further and add a third chunk to the TCP port space: reserved ports, which are usually for operating-system-specific services. For example, reserved ports might sit between 256 and some system-dependent upper limit. Some systems also protect the well-known and reserved ports by only letting privileged users open TCP connections on those values. That's totally fair, as long as the host doesn't assume every other host protects its low-numbered ports the same way ๐Ÿ™ˆ

4.2.2.2. Use of Push: RFC-793 Section 2.8 ๐Ÿ“

When an application makes a series of SEND calls without setting the PUSH flag, TCP MAY aggregate the data internally instead of sending it right away. Same deal on the receiving end: when a series of segments comes in without the PSH bit, a TCP MAY queue the data internally instead of handing it to the receiving application โœจ

The PSH bit is not a record marker, and it has nothing to do with segment boundaries. When the transmitter packetizes data, it SHOULD collapse successive PSH bits so it can send the biggest possible segment ๐Ÿ”ฅ

A TCP MAY implement PUSH flags on SEND calls. If PUSH flags aren't implemented, then the sending TCP has to: (1) not buffer data indefinitely, and (2) MUST set the PSH bit in the last buffered segment (aka when there's no more queued data waiting to go) ๐Ÿซถ

Now the RFC-793 pages 48, 50, and 74 kinda imply that a received PSH flag must be passed up to the application layer, and that's an error. Passing a received PSH flag to the application layer is now OPTIONAL ๐Ÿ’œ

An application program is logically required to set the PUSH flag in a SEND call whenever it needs to force delivery of the data to avoid a communication deadlock. Still, a TCP SHOULD send a maximum-sized segment whenever possible, because that's better for performance (see Section 4.2.3.4) โœจ

DISCUSSION:

When the PUSH flag isn't implemented on SEND calls, meaning the application/TCP interface uses a pure streaming model, the application layer is partly responsible for bundling up tiny data fragments into reasonably sized segments ๐Ÿงš

Generally, an interactive application protocol must set the PUSH flag at least in the last SEND call in each command or response sequence. A bulk transfer protocol like FTP should set the PUSH flag on the last segment of a file, or whenever it's needed to prevent buffer deadlock ๐ŸŒธ

At the receiver, the PSH bit forces buffered data to be delivered to the application, even if less than a full buffer has arrived. On the flip side, leaving the PSH bit off can avoid unnecessary wakeup calls to the application process, which can be a huge performance win for large timesharing hosts. Passing the PSH bit to the receiving application lets the application do a similar optimization of its own ๐Ÿ‘‘

4.2.2.3. Window Size: RFC-793 Section 3.1 ๐ŸชŸ

The window size MUST be treated as an unsigned number. Otherwise, large window sizes would look like negative windows and TCP would not work at all ๐Ÿ˜ญ It is RECOMMENDED that implementations reserve 32-bit fields for the send and receive window sizes in the connection record, and do all window computations with 32 bits.

DISCUSSION:

The window field in the TCP header is known to be too small for high-speed, long-delay paths. Experimental TCP options have been defined to extend the window size; see for example [TCP:11]. Since that extension might get adopted down the line, TCP implementors should treat windows as 32 bits, so they're ready when it does ๐Ÿฆ‹

4.2.2.4. Urgent Pointer: RFC-793 Section 3.1 ๐Ÿšจ

The second sentence is wrong: the urgent pointer points to the sequence number of the LAST octet (not LAST+1) in a sequence of urgent data. The description on page 56 (last sentence) is correct ๐Ÿ™Œ

A TCP MUST support a sequence of urgent data of any length.

A TCP MUST inform the application layer asynchronously whenever it receives an Urgent pointer and there was previously no pending urgent data, or whenever the Urgent pointer advances in the data stream. There MUST be a way for the application to learn how much urgent data remains to be read from the connection, or at least to determine whether or not more urgent data remains to be read ๐Ÿ’–

DISCUSSION:

The Urgent mechanism can technically be used for any application, but it's normally used to send "interrupt"-type commands to a Telnet program (see the "Using Telnet Synch Sequence" section in [INTRO:1]) ๐ŸŽ€

The asynchronous or "out-of-band" notification lets the application go into "urgent mode" and read data from the TCP connection. That means control commands can still get through to an application whose normal input buffers are completely full of unprocessed data ๐Ÿ’…

IMPLEMENTATION:

The generic ERROR-REPORT() upcall described in Section 4.2.4.1 is a possible mechanism for telling the application that urgent data has arrived โœจ

4.2.2.5. TCP Options: RFC-793 Section 3.1 ๐ŸŽ

A TCP MUST be able to receive a TCP option in any segment. A TCP MUST ignore without error any TCP option it does not implement, assuming that the option has a length field (all TCP options defined in the future will have length fields) ๐ŸŒˆ TCP MUST be prepared to handle an illegal option length (e.g., zero) without crashing. A suggested procedure is to reset the connection and log the reason ๐Ÿ˜ญ

4.2.2.6. Maximum Segment Size Option: RFC-793 Section 3.1 ๐Ÿ“

TCP MUST implement both sending and receiving the Maximum Segment Size option [TCP:4] ๐Ÿ”ฅ

TCP SHOULD send an MSS (Maximum Segment Size) option in every SYN segment when its receive MSS differs from the default 536, and MAY send it always ๐Ÿ’œ

If an MSS option is not received at connection setup, TCP MUST assume a default send MSS of 536 (576-40) [TCP:4] ๐Ÿงš

The maximum size of a segment that TCP really sends, the "effective send MSS," MUST be the smaller of two things: the send MSS (which reflects the available reassembly buffer size at the remote host) and the largest size the IP layer allows. The formula looks like this ๐Ÿ‘‘

               Eff.snd.MSS =

                  min(SendMSS+20, MMS_S) - TCPhdrsize - IPoptionsize

where:

  • SendMSS is the MSS value received from the remote host, or the default 536 if no MSS option is received.
  • MMS_S is the maximum size for a transport-layer message that TCP may send.
  • TCPhdrsize is the size of the TCP header. This is normally 20, but it may be larger if TCP options are to be sent.
  • IPoptionsize is the size of any IP options that TCP will pass to the IP layer with the current message.

The MSS value to be sent in an MSS option must be less than or equal to the following, where MMS_R is the maximum size for a transport-layer message that can be received (and reassembled) ๐ŸŒธ

               MMS_R - 20

TCP obtains MMS_R and MMS_S from the IP layer. See the generic call GET_MAXSIZES in Section 3.4 ๐Ÿซถ

The TCP segment size is lowkey a big deal for performance ๐Ÿ“ฆโœจ Bigger segments push more actual data through each header and per-datagram processing overhead, so throughput goes up ๐Ÿš€. BUT if the packet is so huge that it causes IP fragmentation, efficiency drops off a cliff if any fragment gets lost ๐Ÿ’€ [IP:9].

Some TCP implementations only send an MSS option when the destination host is on a non-connected network ๐Ÿ™ˆ. Still, the TCP layer usually doesn't have the info it needs to make that call, so it's way better to let the IP layer figure out a good MTU for the Internet path ๐Ÿ—บ๏ธ. So our rec is that TCP always sends the option (if it's not 536), and the IP layer works out MMS_R as specified in 3.3.3 and 3.4 ๐Ÿ’…. A proposed IP-layer way to measure the MTU would then only touch IP, not TCP ๐Ÿซถ.

4.2.2.7 TCP Checksum: RFC-793 Section 3.1 โœจ

Unlike the UDP checksum (see Section 4.1.3.4), the TCP checksum is never optional ๐Ÿ™…โ€โ™€๏ธ. The sender MUST generate it and the receiver MUST check it ๐Ÿ”.

4.2.2.8 TCP Connection State Diagram: RFC-793 Section 3.2, page 23 ๐Ÿ—บ๏ธ

Okay so this diagram has a few problems, bestie ๐Ÿ™ˆ:

  • (a) The arrow from SYN-SENT to SYN-RCVD should be labeled with "snd SYN,ACK", to agree with the text on page 68 and with Figure 8.
  • (b) There could be an arrow from SYN-RCVD state to LISTEN state, conditioned on receiving a RST after a passive open (see text page 70).
  • (c) It is possible to go directly from FIN-WAIT-1 to the TIME-WAIT state (see page 75 of the spec).

4.2.2.9 Initial Sequence Number Selection: RFC-793 Section 3.3, page 27 ๐Ÿ”ข

A TCP MUST use the specified clock-driven selection of initial sequence numbers. No skipping this one, periodt ๐Ÿ’œ.

4.2.2.10 Simultaneous Open Attempts: RFC-793 Section 3.4, page 32 ๐Ÿค

There is an error in Figure 8: the packet on line 7 should be identical to the packet on line 5 ๐Ÿ™ƒ.

A TCP MUST support simultaneous open attempts ๐Ÿ‘ฏโ€โ™€๏ธ.

DISCUSSION: It sometimes surprises implementors that if two applications attempt to simultaneously connect to each other, only one connection is generated instead of two ๐Ÿ˜ญ. This was an intentional design decision, so don't try to "fix" it ๐Ÿ›‘.

4.2.2.11 Recovery from Old Duplicate SYN: RFC-793 Section 3.4, page 33 ๐Ÿ•ฐ๏ธ

Note that a TCP implementation MUST keep track of whether a connection has reached SYN_RCVD state as the result of a passive OPEN or an active OPEN ๐Ÿ“.

4.2.2.12 RST Segment: RFC-793 Section 3.4 ๐Ÿ’Œ

A TCP SHOULD allow a received RST segment to include data ๐Ÿ’–.

DISCUSSION It has been suggested that a RST segment could contain ASCII text that encoded and explained the cause of the RST ๐Ÿงพ. No standard has been established for such data yet ๐Ÿคทโ€โ™€๏ธ.

4.2.2.13 Closing a Connection: RFC-793 Section 3.5 ๐Ÿ‘‹

A TCP connection may end in two ways: (1) the normal TCP close sequence using a FIN handshake, and (2) an "abort," where one or more RST segments are sent and the connection state is immediately discarded ๐Ÿ’ฅ. If a TCP connection is closed by the remote site, the local application MUST be informed whether it closed normally or was aborted ๐Ÿ“ฃ.

The normal TCP close sequence delivers buffered data reliably in both directions ๐ŸŽ€. Since the two directions of a TCP connection are closed independently, a connection can be "half closed," i.e., closed in only one direction, and a host is permitted to keep sending data in the open direction on a half-closed connection ๐Ÿฆ‹.

A host MAY implement a "half-duplex" TCP close sequence, so that an application that has called CLOSE cannot keep reading data from the connection ๐Ÿ™…. If such a host issues a CLOSE call while received data is still pending in TCP, or if new data comes in after CLOSE is called, its TCP SHOULD send a RST to show that data was lost ๐Ÿ˜ฌ.

When a connection is closed actively, it MUST linger in TIME-WAIT state for a time 2xMSL (Maximum Segment Lifetime) โณ. However, it MAY accept a new SYN from the remote TCP to reopen the connection directly from TIME-WAIT state, if it:

  • (1) assigns its initial sequence number for the new connection to be larger than the largest sequence number it used on the previous connection incarnation, and
  • (2) returns to TIME-WAIT state if the SYN turns out to be an old duplicate.

DISCUSSION: TCP's full-duplex, data-preserving close is a feature that is not included in the analogous ISO transport protocol TP4 ๐ŸŒˆ.

Some systems have not implemented half-closed connections, presumably because they don't fit the I/O model of their particular operating system ๐Ÿ–ฅ๏ธ. On these systems, once an application has called CLOSE, it can no longer read input data from the connection, and this is referred to as a "half-duplex" TCP close sequence ๐Ÿซ .

The graceful close algorithm of TCP requires that the connection state stay defined on (at least) one end of the connection for a timeout period of 2xMSL, i.e., 4 minutes โฑ๏ธ. During this period, the (remote socket, local socket) pair that defines the connection is busy and can't be reused ๐Ÿšง. To shorten the time that a given port pair is tied up, some TCPs allow a new SYN to be accepted in TIME-WAIT state ๐Ÿƒโ€โ™€๏ธ๐Ÿ’จ.

4.2.2.14 Data Communication: RFC-793 Section 3.7, page 40 ๐Ÿ“ฌ

Since RFC-793 was written, there has been a ton of work on TCP algorithms for efficient data communication ๐Ÿง . Later sections of this document describe required and recommended TCP algorithms to decide when to send data (Section 4.2.3.4), when to send an acknowledgment (Section 4.2.3.2), and when to update the window (Section 4.2.3.3) ๐Ÿ“‹.

DISCUSSION: One important performance issue is "Silly Window Syndrome" or "SWS" [TCP:5], a stable pattern of small incremental window movements that results in extremely poor TCP performance ๐Ÿ˜ฉ. Algorithms to avoid SWS are described below for both the sending side (Section 4.2.3.4) and the receiving side (Section 4.2.3.3) ๐Ÿ›ก๏ธ.

So, in brief, SWS happens when the receiver advances the right window edge whenever it has any new buffer space available to receive data, and the sender uses any incremental window, no matter how small, to send more data [TCP:5] ๐Ÿ™ƒ. The result can be a stable pattern of sending tiny data segments, even though both sender and receiver have a large total buffer space for the connection ๐Ÿซจ. SWS can only happen during the transmission of a large amount of data; if the connection goes quiescent, the problem disappears ๐Ÿ‘‹. It's caused by typical straightforward implementation of window management, but the sender and receiver algorithms given below will avoid it โœ….

Another important TCP performance issue is that some applications, especially remote login to character-at-a-time hosts, tend to send streams of one-octet data segments ๐Ÿ”ค. To avoid deadlocks, every TCP SEND call from such applications must be "pushed," either explicitly by the application or implicitly by TCP ๐Ÿซธ. The result may be a stream of TCP segments that each contain one data octet, which makes very inefficient use of the Internet and contributes to Internet congestion ๐Ÿšฆ. The Nagle Algorithm described in Section 4.2.3.4 provides a simple and effective solution to this problem โœจ. It does have the effect of clumping characters over Telnet connections, which may initially surprise users used to single-character echo, but user acceptance has not been a problem ๐Ÿ™Œ.

Note that the Nagle algorithm and the send SWS avoidance algorithm play complementary roles in improving performance ๐Ÿค. The Nagle algorithm discourages sending tiny segments when the data to be sent increases in small increments, while the SWS avoidance algorithm discourages small segments resulting from the right window edge advancing in small increments ๐Ÿ’….

A careless implementation can send two or more acknowledgment segments per data segment received ๐Ÿ˜ต. For example, suppose the receiver acknowledges every data segment immediately. When the application program later consumes the data and increases the available receive buffer space again, the receiver may send a second acknowledgment segment to update the window at the sender ๐Ÿ“ค. The extreme case happens with single-character segments on TCP connections using the Telnet protocol for remote login service ๐Ÿ’€. Some implementations have been observed where each incoming 1-character segment generates three return segments: (1) the acknowledgment, (2) a one-byte increase in the window, and (3) the echoed character, respectively ๐Ÿคฏ.

4.2.2.15 Retransmission Timeout: RFC-793 Section 3.7, page 41 โฐ

The algorithm suggested in RFC-793 for calculating the retransmission timeout is now known to be inadequate; see Section 4.2.3.1 below ๐Ÿ™…โ€โ™€๏ธ.

Recent work by Jacobson [TCP:7] on Internet congestion and TCP retransmission stability has produced a transmission algorithm that combines "slow start" with "congestion avoidance" ๐ŸŒธ. A TCP MUST implement this algorithm ๐Ÿ’œ.

If a retransmitted packet is identical to the original packet (which implies not only that the data boundaries haven't changed, but also that the window and acknowledgment fields of the header haven't changed), then the same IP Identification field MAY be used (see Section 3.2.1.5) ๐Ÿ†”.

4.2.2.15 Continued โœจ

IMPLEMENTATION: okay so some TCP implementors like to "packetize" the data stream ๐Ÿ“ฆ. That means they pick the segment boundaries the moment segments are first sent, then queue them in a "retransmission queue" until they're acknowledged. Another design (which might honestly be simpler ๐Ÿซถ) is to wait and packetize only each time data is transmitted or retransmitted, so there's no segment retransmission queue at all.

In an implementation WITH a segment retransmission queue, TCP performance can get a glow-up by repacketizing the segments still awaiting acknowledgment when the first retransmission timeout occurs ๐Ÿ”ฅ. The outstanding segments that fit get combined into one maximum-sized segment, with a new IP Identification value. TCP then keeps that combined segment in the retransmit queue until it's acknowledged. BUT if the first two segments in the retransmission queue add up to more than one maximum-sized segment, TCP only retransmits the first segment, using the original IP Identification field ๐Ÿค“.


4.2.2.16 Managing the Window: RFC-793 Section 3.7, page 41 ๐ŸชŸ

A TCP receiver SHOULD NOT shrink the window, i.e., move the right window edge to the left. Still, a sending TCP MUST be robust against window shrinking, because it can make the "useable window" (see Section 4.2.3.4) go negative ๐Ÿ˜ฌ.

If that happens, the sender SHOULD NOT send new data, but it SHOULD retransmit normally the old unacknowledged data between SND.UNA and SND.UNA+SND.WND. The sender MAY also retransmit old data beyond SND.UNA+SND.WND, but it SHOULD NOT time out the connection just because data beyond the right window edge isn't acknowledged. If the window shrinks to zero, the TCP MUST probe it in the standard way (see next Section).

DISCUSSION: so many TCP implementations get totally confused if the window shrinks from the right after data has already been sent into a larger window ๐Ÿ™ƒ. TCP has a heuristic to pick the latest window update despite possible datagram reordering. As a result, it may ignore a window update that offers a smaller window than before if neither the sequence number nor the acknowledgment number has increased. Iykyk.


4.2.2.17 Probing Zero Windows: RFC-793 Section 3.7, page 42 ๐Ÿงธ

Probing of zero (offered) windows MUST be supported.

A TCP MAY keep its offered receive window closed indefinitely. As long as the receiving TCP keeps sending acknowledgments in response to the probe segments, the sending TCP MUST allow the connection to stay open.

DISCUSSION: it is extremely important to remember that ACK segments containing no data are NOT reliably transmitted by TCP ๐Ÿ’€. If zero window probing isn't supported, a connection may hang forever when an ACK segment that re-opens the window gets lost.

The delay in opening a zero window usually happens when the receiving application stops taking data from its TCP. For example, picture a printer daemon application that's stopped because the printer ran out of paper ๐Ÿ–จ๏ธ.

The transmitting host SHOULD send the first zero-window probe when a zero window has existed for the retransmission timeout period (see Section 4.2.2.15), and it SHOULD increase the interval between successive probes exponentially.

DISCUSSION: this procedure minimizes delay if the zero-window condition is due to a lost ACK segment carrying a window-opening update ๐Ÿ’œ. Exponential backoff is recommended, possibly with some maximum interval that isn't specified here. The procedure is similar to the retransmission algorithm, and it may be possible to combine the two in the implementation.


4.2.2.18 Passive OPEN Calls: RFC-793 Section 3.8 ๐Ÿšช

Every passive OPEN call either creates a new connection record in LISTEN state, or it returns an error. It MUST NOT affect any previously created connection record.

A TCP that supports multiple concurrent users MUST provide an OPEN call that will functionally allow an application to LISTEN on a port while a connection block with the same local port is in SYN-SENT or SYN-RECEIVED state.

DISCUSSION: some applications (e.g., SMTP servers) may need to handle multiple connection attempts at about the same time ๐Ÿ“ฌ. The chance of a connection attempt failing goes down when the application can listen for a new connection at the same moment an earlier attempt is going through the three-way handshake.

IMPLEMENTATION: acceptable implementations of concurrent opens may permit multiple passive OPEN calls, or they may allow "cloning" of LISTEN-state connections from a single passive OPEN call ๐Ÿงฌ.


4.2.2.19 Time to Live: RFC-793 Section 3.9, page 52 โณ

RFC-793 specified that TCP was to request the IP layer to send TCP segments with TTL = 60. This is obsolete, so the TTL value used to send TCP segments MUST be configurable. See Section 3.2.1.7 for discussion.


4.2.2.20 Event Processing: RFC-793 Section 3.9 ๐ŸŽ€

While it is not strictly required, a TCP SHOULD be capable of queueing out-of-order TCP segments. Change the "may" in the last sentence of the first paragraph on page 70 to "should".

DISCUSSION: some small-host implementations skipped segment queueing because of limited buffer space ๐Ÿฅบ. That omission can hurt TCP throughput, since losing a single segment makes all later segments look "out of sequence".

In general, the processing of received segments MUST be implemented to aggregate ACK segments whenever possible. For example, if the TCP is processing a series of queued segments, it MUST process them all before sending any ACK segments.

Here are some detailed error corrections and notes on the Event Processing section of RFC-793 ๐Ÿ’…:

  • (a) CLOSE Call, CLOSE-WAIT state, p. 61: enter LAST-ACK state, not CLOSING.
  • (b) LISTEN state, check for SYN (pp. 65, 66): With a SYN bit, if the security/compartment or the precedence is wrong for the segment, a reset is sent. The wrong form of reset is shown in the text. It should be:
<SEQ=0><ACK=SEG.SEQ+SEG.LEN><CTL=RST,ACK>
  • (c) SYN-SENT state, Check for SYN, p. 68: When the connection enters ESTABLISHED state, the following variables must be set:
SND.WND <- SEG.WND
SND.WL1 <- SEG.SEQ
SND.WL2 <- SEG.ACK
  • (d) Check security and precedence, p. 71: The first heading "ESTABLISHED STATE" should really be a list of all states other than SYN-RECEIVED: ESTABLISHED, FIN-WAIT-1, FIN-WAIT-2, CLOSE-WAIT, CLOSING, LAST-ACK, and TIME-WAIT.
  • (e) Check SYN bit, p. 71: "In SYN-RECEIVED state and if the connection was initiated with a passive OPEN, then return this connection to the LISTEN state and return. Otherwise..."
  • (f) Check ACK field, SYN-RECEIVED state, p. 72: When the connection enters ESTABLISHED state, the variables listed in (c) must be set.
  • (g) Check ACK field, ESTABLISHED state, p. 72: The ACK is a duplicate if SEG.ACK =< SND.UNA (the = was omitted). Similarly, the window should be updated if: SND.UNA =< SEG.ACK =< SND.NXT.
  • (h) USER TIMEOUT, p. 77: It would be better to notify the application of the timeout rather than letting TCP force the connection closed. However, see also Section 4.2.3.5.

4.2.2.21 Acknowledging Queued Segments: RFC-793 Section 3.9 ๐Ÿงบ

A TCP MAY send an ACK segment acknowledging RCV.NXT when a valid segment arrives that is in the window but not at the left window edge.

DISCUSSION: RFC-793 (see page 74) was ambiguous about whether an ACK segment should be sent when an out-of-order segment arrives, i.e., when SEG.SEQ is unequal to RCV.NXT ๐Ÿค”.

One reason for ACKing out-of-order segments might be to support an experimental algorithm known as "fast retransmit" ๐Ÿƒโ€โ™€๏ธ. With this algorithm, the sender uses the "redundant" ACKs to deduce that a segment has been lost before the retransmission timer expires. It counts how many times an ACK has been received with the same value of SEG.ACK and the same right window edge. If more than a threshold number of such ACKs arrive, the segment containing the octets starting at SEG.ACK is assumed to be lost and is retransmitted, without waiting for a timeout. The threshold is chosen to compensate for the maximum likely segment reordering in the Internet. There isn't yet enough experience with the fast retransmit algorithm to determine how useful it is ๐Ÿง.


4.2.3 SPECIFIC ISSUES ๐ŸŒธ

4.2.3.1 Retransmission Timeout Calculation โฑ๏ธ

A host TCP MUST implement Karn's algorithm and Jacobson's algorithm for computing the retransmission timeout ("RTO").

  • Jacobson's algorithm for computing the smoothed round-trip ("RTT") time incorporates a simple measure of the variance [TCP:7].
  • Karn's algorithm for selecting RTT measurements ensures that ambiguous round-trip times will not corrupt the calculation of the smoothed round-trip time [TCP:6].

This implementation also MUST include "exponential backoff" for successive RTO values for the same segment. Retransmission of SYN segments SHOULD use the same algorithm as data segments.

4.2.3.1 Retransmission Timeout (continued) ๐Ÿ’…

DISCUSSION: Okay so there were two known problems with the RTO calculations in RFC-793 ๐Ÿ™ˆ First, accurately measuring RTTs is hard when retransmissions are happening ๐Ÿ˜ญ Second, the smoothed round-trip time algorithm was inadequate [TCP:7], because it wrongly assumed that the variance in RTT values would be small and constant ๐Ÿ’€ Karn's algorithm fixed the first problem, and Jacobson's algorithm fixed the second โœจ

The performance boost from these fixes goes from noticeable to dramatic ๐Ÿ”ฅ Jacobson's way of folding in the measured RTT variance matters most on low-speed links, where natural variation in packet sizes causes a big swing in RTT ๐Ÿข One vendor saw link utilization on a 9.6kb line jump from 10% to 90% just by adding Jacobson's variance algorithm to TCP ๐Ÿ˜ฑ๐Ÿ‘‘

The following values SHOULD be used to initialize the estimation parameters for a new connection:

(a) RTT = 0 seconds.

(b) RTO = 3 seconds. (The smoothed variance is to be initialized to the value that will result in this RTO).

The recommended upper and lower bounds on the RTO are known to be inadequate on large internets ๐ŸŒ The lower bound SHOULD be measured in fractions of a second (so high-speed LANs fit in) ๐Ÿš€ and the upper bound should be 2*MSL, i.e., 240 seconds โฑ๏ธ

DISCUSSION: Experience has shown that these initialization values are reasonable ๐Ÿซถ Even if they weren't, the Karn and Jacobson algorithms make TCP behavior reasonably insensitive to the initial parameter choices, so it's giving stable no matter what ๐Ÿ’–


4.2.3.2 When to Send an ACK Segment ๐Ÿฆ‹

A host that is receiving a stream of TCP data segments can increase efficiency, both in the Internet and in the hosts, by sending fewer than one ACK (acknowledgment) segment per data segment received ๐Ÿงš This is known as a "delayed ACK" [TCP:5] โœจ

A TCP SHOULD implement a delayed ACK ๐Ÿ’… but the ACK should not be excessively delayed. In particular, the delay MUST be less than 0.5 seconds, and in a stream of full-sized segments there SHOULD be an ACK for at least every second segment ๐Ÿซถ

DISCUSSION:

A delayed ACK gives the application a chance to update the window and maybe send an immediate response ๐ŸŒธ In particular, with character-mode remote login, a delayed ACK can cut the number of segments sent by the server by a factor of 3, because the ACK, window update, and echo character all ride along together in one segment ๐Ÿคฏ

On some large multi-user hosts, a delayed ACK can also substantially reduce protocol processing overhead, since there are fewer total packets to process [TCP:5] ๐Ÿง  But excessive delays on ACK's can disturb the round-trip timing and packet "clocking" algorithms [TCP:7] ๐Ÿ˜ฌ


4.2.3.3 When to Send a Window Update ๐ŸชŸ

A TCP MUST include a SWS avoidance algorithm in the receiver [TCP:5] ๐Ÿ›ก๏ธ

IMPLEMENTATION:

The receiver's SWS avoidance algorithm decides when the right window edge may be advanced. This is customarily called "updating the window" ๐ŸŽ€ This algorithm combines with the delayed ACK algorithm (see Section 4.2.3.2) to determine when an ACK segment containing the current window will actually be sent to the receiver ๐Ÿ“ฌ We use the notation of RFC-793, so check Figures 4 and 5 in that document ๐Ÿ“–

The solution to receiver SWS is to avoid advancing the right window edge RCV.NXT+RCV.WND in small increments, even when data arrives from the network in small segments ๐Ÿฃ

Suppose the total receive buffer space is RCV.BUFF. At any given moment, RCV.USER octets of this total may be tied up with data that has been received and acknowledged but that the user process hasn't consumed yet ๐Ÿ“ When the connection is quiescent, RCV.WND = RCV.BUFF and RCV.USER = 0 ๐Ÿ’ค

Keeping the right window edge fixed as data arrives and gets acknowledged means the receiver has to offer less than its full buffer space. In other words, the receiver must specify a RCV.WND that keeps RCV.NXT+RCV.WND constant as RCV.NXT increases ๐Ÿงฉ So the total buffer space RCV.BUFF is generally split into three parts:

    |<------- RCV.BUFF ---------------->|
         1             2            3
----|---------|------------------|------|----
           RCV.NXT               ^
                              (Fixed)
1 - RCV.USER =  data received but not yet consumed;
2 - RCV.WND =   space advertised to sender;
3 - Reduction = space available but not yet
                advertised.

The suggested SWS avoidance algorithm for the receiver is to keep RCV.NXT+RCV.WND fixed until the reduction satisfies:

RCV.BUFF - RCV.USER - RCV.WND  >=

       min( Fr * RCV.BUFF, Eff.snd.MSS )

Here Fr is a fraction whose recommended value is 1/2 โœจ Eff.snd.MSS is the effective send MSS for the connection (see Section 4.2.2.6) ๐Ÿ’– Once the inequality is satisfied, RCV.WND is set to RCV.BUFF-RCV.USER ๐Ÿฅฐ

Heads up, the general effect of this algorithm is to advance RCV.WND in increments of Eff.snd.MSS (for realistic receive buffers: Eff.snd.MSS < RCV.BUFF/2) ๐Ÿ“ˆ Also, the receiver must use its own Eff.snd.MSS, assuming it's the same as the sender's ๐Ÿซถ


4.2.3.4 When to Send Data ๐Ÿš€

A TCP MUST include a SWS avoidance algorithm in the sender ๐Ÿ’œ

A TCP SHOULD implement the Nagle Algorithm [TCP:9] to coalesce short segments ๐Ÿงถ However, there MUST be a way for an application to disable the Nagle algorithm on an individual connection ๐Ÿ”“ In all cases, sending data is also subject to the limitation imposed by the Slow Start algorithm (Section 4.2.2.15) ๐Ÿข

DISCUSSION:

The Nagle algorithm generally works like this:

If there is unacknowledged data (i.e., SND.NXT >
SND.UNA), then the sending TCP buffers all user
data (regardless of the PSH bit), until the
outstanding data has been acknowledged or until
the TCP can send a full-sized segment (Eff.snd.MSS
bytes; see Section 4.2.2.6).

Some applications (for example, real-time display window updates) need the Nagle algorithm turned off, so small data segments can be streamed out at the maximum rate ๐ŸŽ๏ธ๐Ÿ’จ

IMPLEMENTATION:

The sender's SWS avoidance algorithm is trickier than the receiver's, because the sender doesn't know (directly) the receiver's total buffer space RCV.BUFF ๐Ÿฅบ An approach that works well is for the sender to calculate Max(SND.WND), the maximum send window it has seen so far on the connection, and use that as an estimate of RCV.BUFF ๐Ÿงฎ Unfortunately, this can only be an estimate, since the receiver may reduce the size of RCV.BUFF at any time โ˜น๏ธ To avoid a resulting deadlock, there has to be a timeout that forces transmission of data, overriding the SWS avoidance algorithm. In practice, this timeout should seldom occur ๐Ÿ™

The "useable window" [TCP:5] is:

U = SND.UNA + SND.WND - SND.NXT

In other words, it's the offered window minus the data that was sent but not acknowledged ๐Ÿ“ฆ If D is the amount of data queued in the sending TCP but not yet sent, then the following set of rules is recommended ๐Ÿ“

Send data:

(1) if a maximum-sized segment can be sent, i.e., if:

min(D,U) >= Eff.snd.MSS;

(2) or if the data is pushed and all queued data can be sent now, i.e., if:

[SND.NXT = SND.UNA and] PUSHED and D <= U

(the bracketed condition is imposed by the Nagle algorithm);

(3) or if at least a fraction Fs of the maximum window can be sent, i.e., if:

[SND.NXT = SND.UNA and]

        min(D.U) >= Fs * Max(SND.WND);

(4) or if data is PUSHed and the override timeout occurs.

Here Fs is a fraction whose recommended value is 1/2 ๐Ÿฐ The override timeout should be in the range 0.1 - 1.0 seconds โฒ๏ธ It may be convenient to combine this timer with the timer used to probe zero windows (Section 4.2.2.17) ๐Ÿซง

Finally, note that the SWS avoidance algorithm just specified is to be used instead of the sender-side algorithm contained in [TCP:5] ๐Ÿ’…โœจ


4.2.3.5 TCP Connection Failures ๐Ÿ’”

Excessive retransmission of the same segment by TCP points to some failure of the remote host or the Internet path ๐Ÿ˜ต This failure may be short or long ๐ŸŒง๏ธ The following procedure MUST be used to handle excessive retransmissions of data segments [IP:11] ๐Ÿ“‹

(a) There are two thresholds, R1 and R2, that measure the amount of retransmission that has occurred for the same segment. R1 and R2 might be measured in time units or as a count of retransmissions โณ

(b) When the number of transmissions of the same segment reaches or exceeds threshold R1, pass negative advice (see Section 3.3.1.4) to the IP layer, to trigger dead-gateway diagnosis ๐Ÿ•ต๏ธโ€โ™€๏ธ

(c) When the number of transmissions of the same segment reaches a threshold R2 that is greater than R1, close the connection ๐Ÿšช

(d) An application MUST be able to set the value for R2 for a particular connection ๐Ÿ‘‘ For example, an interactive application might set R2 to "infinity," giving the user control over when to disconnect ๐Ÿซตโœจ

(d) okay so TCP SHOULD tell the application about the delivery problem (unless the application has turned that off; see Section 4.2.4.1) when R1 is reached and before R2 ๐Ÿซถ. This lets a remote login (User Telnet) program tell the user what's going on, for example ๐Ÿ’….

The value of R1 SHOULD correspond to at least 3 retransmissions, at the current RTO. The value of R2 SHOULD correspond to at least 100 seconds โฐ.

An attempt to open a TCP connection could fail with excessive retransmissions of the SYN segment, by receipt of a RST segment, or by an ICMP Port Unreachable ๐Ÿ™ˆ. SYN retransmissions MUST be handled in the general way just described for data retransmissions, including notification of the application layer ๐Ÿ“ฃ.

However, the values of R1 and R2 may be different for SYN and data segments โœจ. In particular, R2 for a SYN segment MUST be set large enough to provide retransmission of the segment for at least 3 minutes. The application can close the connection (i.e., give up on the open attempt) sooner, of course ๐Ÿฆ‹.

DISCUSSION: Some Internet paths have significant setup times, and the number of such paths is likely to increase in the future ๐ŸŒˆ.

4.2.3.6 TCP Keep-Alives ๐Ÿงš

Implementors MAY include "keep-alives" in their TCP implementations, although this practice is not universally accepted ๐Ÿคทโ€โ™€๏ธ. If keep-alives are included, the application MUST be able to turn them on or off for each TCP connection, and they MUST default to off ๐Ÿ’œ.

Keep-alive packets MUST only be sent when no data or acknowledgement packets have been received for the connection within an interval. This interval MUST be configurable and MUST default to no less than two hours โณ.

It is extremely important to remember that ACK segments that contain no data are not reliably transmitted by TCP ๐Ÿ˜ญ. Consequently, if a keep-alive mechanism is implemented it MUST NOT interpret failure to respond to any specific probe as a dead connection ๐Ÿซถ.

An implementation SHOULD send a keep-alive segment with no data; however, it MAY be configurable to send a keep-alive segment containing one garbage octet, for compatibility with erroneous TCP implementations ๐ŸŽ€.

DISCUSSION: A "keep-alive" mechanism periodically probes the other end of a connection when the connection is otherwise idle, even when there is no data to be sent. The TCP specification does not include a keep-alive mechanism because it could: (1) cause perfectly good connections to break during transient Internet failures; (2) consume unnecessary bandwidth ("if no one is using the connection, who cares if it is still good?"); and (3) cost money for an Internet path that charges for packets ๐Ÿ’ธ.

Some TCP implementations, however, have included a keep-alive mechanism. To confirm that an idle connection is still active, these implementations send a probe segment designed to elicit a response from the peer TCP. Such a segment generally contains SEG.SEQ = SND.NXT-1 and may or may not contain one garbage octet of data. Note that on a quiet connection SND.NXT = RCV.NXT, so that this SEG.SEQ will be outside the window ๐Ÿ‘€. Therefore, the probe causes the receiver to return an acknowledgment segment, confirming that the connection is still live. If the peer has dropped the connection due to a network partition or a crash, it will respond with a RST instead of an acknowledgment segment ๐Ÿ’€.

Unfortunately, some misbehaved TCP implementations fail to respond to a segment with SEG.SEQ = SND.NXT-1 unless the segment contains data ๐Ÿ˜ค. Alternatively, an implementation could determine whether a peer responded correctly to keep-alive packets with no garbage data octet ๐Ÿง.

A TCP keep-alive mechanism should only be invoked in server applications that might otherwise hang indefinitely and consume resources unnecessarily if a client crashes or aborts a connection during a network failure ๐ŸŒธ.

4.2.3.7 TCP Multihoming ๐ŸŒ

If an application on a multihomed host does not specify the local IP address when actively opening a TCP connection, then the TCP MUST ask the IP layer to select a local IP address before sending the (first) SYN. See the function GET_SRCADDR() in Section 3.4 ๐Ÿ—บ๏ธ.

At all other times, a previous segment has either been sent or received on this connection, and TCP MUST use the same local address is used that was used in those previous segments ๐Ÿ”’.

4.2.3.8 IP Options ๐ŸŽˆ

When received options are passed up to TCP from the IP layer, TCP MUST ignore options that it does not understand ๐Ÿ™…โ€โ™€๏ธ.

A TCP MAY support the Time Stamp and Record Route options โฑ๏ธ.

An application MUST be able to specify a source route when it actively opens a TCP connection, and this MUST take precedence over a source route received in a datagram ๐Ÿ‘‘.

When a TCP connection is OPENed passively and a packet arrives with a completed IP Source Route option (containing a return route), TCP MUST save the return route and use it for all segments sent on this connection. If a different source route arrives in a later segment, the later definition SHOULD override the earlier one ๐Ÿ”.

4.2.3.9 ICMP Messages ๐Ÿ“จ

TCP MUST act on an ICMP error message passed up from the IP layer, directing it to the connection that created the error. The necessary demultiplexing information can be found in the IP header contained within the ICMP message ๐Ÿ”.

  • Source Quench

TCP MUST react to a Source Quench by slowing transmission on the connection. The RECOMMENDED procedure is for a Source Quench to trigger a "slow start," as if a retransmission timeout had occurred ๐Ÿข.

  • Destination Unreachable -- codes 0, 1, 5

Since these Unreachable messages indicate soft error conditions, TCP MUST NOT abort the connection, and it SHOULD make the information available to the application ๐Ÿซง.

DISCUSSION: TCP could report the soft error condition directly to the application layer with an upcall to the ERROR_REPORT routine, or it could merely note the message and report it to the application only when and if the TCP connection times out ๐Ÿ“.

  • Destination Unreachable -- codes 2-4

These are hard error conditions, so TCP SHOULD abort the connection ๐Ÿšซ.

  • Time Exceeded -- codes 0, 1

This should be handled the same way as Destination Unreachable codes 0, 1, 5 (see above) โŒ›.

  • Parameter Problem

This should be handled the same way as Destination Unreachable codes 0, 1, 5 (see above) ๐Ÿงพ.

4.2.3.10 Remote Address Validation ๐Ÿ›ก๏ธ

A TCP implementation MUST reject as an error a local OPEN call for an invalid remote IP address (e.g., a broadcast or multicast address) ๐Ÿšง.

An incoming SYN with an invalid source address must be ignored either by TCP or by the IP layer (see Section 3.2.1.3) ๐Ÿ™ƒ.

A TCP implementation MUST silently discard an incoming SYN segment that is addressed to a broadcast or multicast address ๐Ÿคซ.

4.2.3.11 TCP Traffic Patterns ๐Ÿšฆ

IMPLEMENTATION: The TCP protocol specification [TCP:1] gives the implementor much freedom in designing the algorithms that control the message flow over the connection: packetizing, managing the window, sending acknowledgments, etc. These design decisions are difficult because a TCP must adapt to a wide range of traffic patterns. Experience has shown that a TCP implementor needs to verify the design on two extreme traffic patterns ๐Ÿงช:

  • Single-character Segments

Even if the sender is using the Nagle Algorithm, when a TCP connection carries remote login traffic across a low-delay LAN the receiver will generally get a stream of single-character segments. If remote terminal echo mode is in effect, the receiver's system will generally echo each character as it is received โŒจ๏ธ.

  • Bulk Transfer

When TCP is used for bulk transfer, the data stream should be made up (almost) entirely of segments of the size of the effective MSS. Although TCP uses a sequence number space with byte (octet) granularity, in bulk-transfer mode its operation should be as if TCP used a sequence space that counted only segments ๐Ÿ“ฆ.

Experience has furthermore shown that a single TCP can effectively and efficiently handle these two extremes ๐Ÿ’ช.

The most important tool for verifying a new TCP implementation is a packet trace program ๐Ÿ”ฌ. There is a large volume of experience showing the importance of tracing a variety of traffic patterns with other TCP implementations and studying the results carefully ๐Ÿ“š.

4.2.3.12 Efficiency ๐ŸŽ๏ธ

IMPLEMENTATION: Extensive experience has led to the following suggestions for efficient implementation of TCP ๐Ÿ’…:

  • (a) Don't Copy Data

In bulk data transfer, the primary CPU-intensive tasks are copying data from one place to another and checksumming the data. It is vital to minimize the number of copies of TCP data. Since the ultimate speed limitation may be fetching data across the memory bus, it may be useful to combine the copy with checksumming, doing both with a single memory fetch ๐Ÿง .

  • (b) Hand-Craft the Checksum Routine

4.2.4. TCP/APPLICATION LAYER INTERFACE โœจ

4.2.4.1. Asynchronous Reports ๐Ÿ””

There MUST be a mechanism for reporting soft TCP error conditions to the application. ๐Ÿซถ Basically, we're assuming this looks like an application-supplied ERROR_REPORT routine that the transport layer can upcall [INTRO:7] asynchronously, whenever it wants:

ERROR_REPORT(local connection name, reason, subreason)

The precise encoding of the reason and subreason parameters is not specified here. ๐Ÿคทโ€โ™€๏ธ However, the conditions that are reported asynchronously to the application MUST include:

  • ICMP error message arrived (see 4.2.3.9)
  • Excessive retransmissions (see 4.2.3.5)
  • Urgent pointer advance (see 4.2.2.4)

However, an application program that does not want to receive such ERROR_REPORT calls SHOULD be able to effectively disable these calls. ๐Ÿ™ˆ

DISCUSSION: These error reports are generally soft errors, so lots of apps can ignore them with zero drama. ๐Ÿ’… Someone suggested these calls should default to "disabled," but that's not required. ๐ŸŒธ

4.2.4.2. Type-of-Service ๐ŸŽ€

The application layer MUST be able to specify the Type-of-Service (TOS) for segments that are sent on a connection. ๐Ÿ‘‘ It's not required, but the application SHOULD be able to change the TOS during the connection lifetime. TCP SHOULD pass the current TOS value without change to the IP layer when it sends segments on the connection. ๐Ÿ’–

The TOS is specified independently in each direction on the connection, so the receiver application is the one that specifies the TOS used for ACK segments. ๐Ÿงš

TCP MAY pass the most recently received TOS up to the application. โœจ

DISCUSSION Some applications (e.g., SMTP) totally change what they're doing partway through a connection, so they'd really like to change the TOS too. ๐Ÿ˜ญ Also, the OPEN call in RFC-793 has an "options" parameter where the caller can specify IP options like source route, record route, or timestamp. ๐Ÿฆ‹

4.2.4.3. Flush Call ๐ŸŒŠ

Some TCP implementations have included a FLUSH call. It empties the TCP send queue of any data the user has already handed over with SEND calls but which is still to the right of the current send window. ๐Ÿ“ In other words, it flushes as much queued send data as possible without losing sequence number synchronization. ๐Ÿ”ฅ This is handy for implementing the "abort output" function of Telnet. ๐Ÿ’œ

4.2.4.4. Multihoming ๐ŸŒˆ

The user interface outlined in sections 2.7 and 3.8 of RFC-793 needs to be extended for multihoming. ๐ŸŒธ The OPEN call MUST have an optional parameter:

OPEN( ... [local IP address,] ... )

to allow the specification of the local IP address. ๐Ÿ“

DISCUSSION: Some TCP-based apps need to specify the local IP address they want to use when opening a particular connection. FTP is a classic example. ๐Ÿ—‚๏ธ

IMPLEMENTATION: A passive OPEN call with a specified "local IP address" parameter will wait for an incoming connection request to that address. ๐Ÿ‘€ If the parameter is unspecified, a passive OPEN waits for an incoming connection request to any local IP address, and then binds the local IP address of the connection to the particular address that gets used. ๐Ÿฆ‹

For an active OPEN call, a specified "local IP address" parameter is used for opening the connection. โœจ If the parameter is unspecified, the networking software chooses an appropriate local IP address (see Section 3.3.4.2) for the connection. ๐Ÿ’…

4.2.5. TCP REQUIREMENT SUMMARY ๐Ÿ“‹

                                                 |        | | | |S| |
                                                 |        | | | |H| |F
                                                 |        | | | |O|M|o
                                                 |        | |S| |U|U|o
                                                 |        | |H| |L|S|t
                                                 |        |M|O| |D|T|n
                                                 |        |U|U|M| | |o
                                                 |        |S|L|A|N|N|t
                                                 |        |T|D|Y|O|O|t
FEATURE                                          |SECTION | | | |T|T|e
-------------------------------------------------|--------|-|-|-|-|-|--
                                                 |        | | | | | |
Push flag                                        |        | | | | | |
  Aggregate or queue un-pushed data              |4.2.2.2 | | |x| | |
  Sender collapse successive PSH flags           |4.2.2.2 | |x| | | |
  SEND call can specify PUSH                     |4.2.2.2 | | |x| | |

    If cannot: sender buffer indefinitely        |4.2.2.2 | | | | |x|
    If cannot: PSH last segment                  |4.2.2.2 |x| | | | |
  Notify receiving ALP of PSH                    |4.2.2.2 | | |x| | |1
  Send max size segment when possible            |4.2.2.2 | |x| | | |
                                                 |        | | | | | |
Window                                           |        | | | | | |
  Treat as unsigned number                       |4.2.2.3 |x| | | | |
  Handle as 32-bit number                        |4.2.2.3 | |x| | | |
  Shrink window from right                       |4.2.2.16| | | |x| |
  Robust against shrinking window                |4.2.2.16|x| | | | |
  Receiver's window closed indefinitely          |4.2.2.17| | |x| | |
  Sender probe zero window                       |4.2.2.17|x| | | | |
    First probe after RTO                        |4.2.2.17| |x| | | |
    Exponential backoff                          |4.2.2.17| |x| | | |
  Allow window stay zero indefinitely            |4.2.2.17|x| | | | |
  Sender timeout OK conn with zero wind          |4.2.2.17| | | | |x|
                                                 |        | | | | | |
Urgent Data                                      |        | | | | | |
  Pointer points to last octet                   |4.2.2.4 |x| | | | |
  Arbitrary length urgent data sequence          |4.2.2.4 |x| | | | |
  Inform ALP asynchronously of urgent data       |4.2.2.4 |x| | | | |1
  ALP can learn if/how much urgent data Q'd      |4.2.2.4 |x| | | | |1
                                                 |        | | | | | |
TCP Options                                      |        | | | | | |
  Receive TCP option in any segment              |4.2.2.5 |x| | | | |
  Ignore unsupported options                     |4.2.2.5 |x| | | | |
  Cope with illegal option length                |4.2.2.5 |x| | | | |
  Implement sending & receiving MSS option       |4.2.2.6 |x| | | | |
  Send MSS option unless 536                     |4.2.2.6 | |x| | | |
  Send MSS option always                         |4.2.2.6 | | |x| | |
  Send-MSS default is 536                        |4.2.2.6 |x| | | | |
  Calculate effective send seg size              |4.2.2.6 |x| | | | |
                                                 |        | | | | | |
TCP Checksums                                    |        | | | | | |
  Sender compute checksum                        |4.2.2.7 |x| | | | |
  Receiver check checksum                        |4.2.2.7 |x| | | | |
                                                 |        | | | | | |
Use clock-driven ISN selection                   |4.2.2.9 |x| | | | |
                                                 |        | | | | | |
Opening Connections                              |        | | | | | |
  Support simultaneous open attempts             |4.2.2.10|x| | | | |
  SYN-RCVD remembers last state                  |4.2.2.11|x| | | | |
  Passive Open call interfere with others        |4.2.2.18| | | | |x|
  Function: simultan. LISTENs for same port      |4.2.2.18|x| | | | |
  Ask IP for src address for SYN if necc.        |4.2.3.7 |x| | | | |
    Otherwise, use local addr of conn.           |4.2.3.7 |x| | | | |
  OPEN to broadcast/multicast IP Address         |4.2.3.14| | | | |x|
  Silently discard seg to bcast/mcast addr       |4.2.3.14|x| | | | |

                                                 |        | | | | | |
Closing Connections                              |        | | | | | |
  RST can contain data                           |4.2.2.12| |x| | | |
  Inform application of aborted conn             |4.2.2.13|x| | | | |
  Half-duplex close connections                  |4.2.2.13| | |x| | |
    Send RST to indicate data lost               |4.2.2.13| |x| | | |
  In TIME-WAIT state for 2xMSL seconds           |4.2.2.13|x| | | | |
    Accept SYN from TIME-WAIT state              |4.2.2.13| | |x| | |
                                                 |        | | | | | |
Retransmissions                                  |        | | | | | |
  Jacobson Slow Start algorithm                  |4.2.2.15|x| | | | |
  Jacobson Congestion-Avoidance algorithm        |4.2.2.15|x| | | | |
  Retransmit with same IP ident                  |4.2.2.15| | |x| | |
  Karn's algorithm                               |4.2.3.1 |x| | | | |
  Jacobson's RTO estimation alg.                 |4.2.3.1 |x| | | | |
  Exponential backoff                            |4.2.3.1 |x| | | | |
  SYN RTO calc same as data                      |4.2.3.1 | |x| | | |
  Recommended initial values and bounds          |4.2.3.1 | |x| | | |
                                                 |        | | | | | |
Generating ACK's:                                |        | | | | | |
  Queue out-of-order segments                    |4.2.2.20| |x| | | |
  Process all Q'd before send ACK                |4.2.2.20|x| | | | |
  Send ACK for out-of-order segment              |4.2.2.21| | |x| | |
  Delayed ACK's                                  |4.2.3.2 | |x| | | |
    Delay < 0.5 seconds                          |4.2.3.2 |x| | | | |
    Every 2nd full-sized segment ACK'd           |4.2.3.2 |x| | | | |
  Receiver SWS-Avoidance Algorithm               |4.2.3.3 |x| | | | |
                                                 |        | | | | | |
Sending data                                     |        | | | | | |
  Configurable TTL                               |4.2.2.19|x| | | | |
  Sender SWS-Avoidance Algorithm                 |4.2.3.4 |x| | | | |
  Nagle algorithm                                |4.2.3.4 | |x| | | |
    Application can disable Nagle algorithm      |4.2.3.4 |x| | | | |
                                                 |        | | | | | |
Connection Failures:                             |        | | | | | |
  Negative advice to IP on R1 retxs              |4.2.3.5 |x| | | | |
  Close connection on R2 retxs                   |4.2.3.5 |x| | | | |
  ALP can set R2                                 |4.2.3.5 |x| | | | |1
  Inform ALP of  R1<=retxs<R2                    |4.2.3.5 | |x| | | |1
  Recommended values for R1, R2                  |4.2.3.5 | |x| | | |
  Same mechanism for SYNs                        |4.2.3.5 |x| | | | |
    R2 at least 3 minutes for SYN                |4.2.3.5 |x| | | | |
                                                 |        | | | | | |
Send Keep-alive Packets:                         |4.2.3.6 | | |x| | |
  - Application can request                      |4.2.3.6 |x| | | | |
  - Default is "off"                             |4.2.3.6 |x| | | | |
  - Only send if idle for interval               |4.2.3.6 |x| | | | |
  - Interval configurable                        |4.2.3.6 |x| | | | |
  - Default at least 2 hrs.                      |4.2.3.6 |x| | | | |
  - Tolerant of lost ACK's                       |4.2.3.6 |x| | | | |
                                                 |        | | | | | |
IP Options                                       |        | | | | | |
  Ignore options TCP doesn't understand          |4.2.3.8 |x| | | | |
  Time Stamp support                             |4.2.3.8 | | |x| | |
  Record Route support                           |4.2.3.8 | | |x| | |
  Source Route:                                  |        | | | | | |
    ALP can specify                              |4.2.3.8 |x| | | | |1
      Overrides src rt in datagram               |4.2.3.8 |x| | | | |
    Build return route from src rt               |4.2.3.8 |x| | | | |
    Later src route overrides                    |4.2.3.8 | |x| | | |
                                                 |        | | | | | |
Receiving ICMP Messages from IP                  |4.2.3.9 |x| | | | |
  Dest. Unreach (0,1,5) => inform ALP            |4.2.3.9 | |x| | | |
  Dest. Unreach (0,1,5) => abort conn            |4.2.3.9 | | | | |x|
  Dest. Unreach (2-4) => abort conn              |4.2.3.9 | |x| | | |
  Source Quench => slow start                    |4.2.3.9 | |x| | | |
  Time Exceeded => tell ALP, don't abort         |4.2.3.9 | |x| | | |
  Param Problem => tell ALP, don't abort         |4.2.3.9 | |x| | | |
                                                 |        | | | | | |
Address Validation                               |        | | | | | |
  Reject OPEN call to invalid IP address         |4.2.3.10|x| | | | |
  Reject SYN from invalid IP address             |4.2.3.10|x| | | | |
  Silently discard SYN to bcast/mcast addr       |4.2.3.10|x| | | | |
                                                 |        | | | | | |
TCP/ALP Interface Services                       |        | | | | | |
  Error Report mechanism                         |4.2.4.1 |x| | | | |
  ALP can disable Error Report Routine           |4.2.4.1 | |x| | | |
  ALP can specify TOS for sending                |4.2.4.2 |x| | | | |
    Passed unchanged to IP                       |4.2.4.2 | |x| | | |
  ALP can change TOS during connection           |4.2.4.2 | |x| | | |
  Pass received TOS up to ALP                    |4.2.4.2 | | |x| | |
  FLUSH call                                     |4.2.4.3 | | |x| | |
  Optional local IP addr parm. in OPEN           |4.2.4.4 |x| | | | |
-------------------------------------------------|--------|-|-|-|-|-|--
-------------------------------------------------|--------|-|-|-|-|-|--

Footnotes ๐ŸŽ€

(1) "ALP" means Application-Layer program. ๐Ÿ’…

5. REFERENCES โœจ

Introductory References ๐Ÿงš

[INTRO:1] "Requirements for Internet Hosts -- Application and Support," IETF Host Requirements Working Group, R. Braden, Ed., RFC-1123, October 1989. ๐ŸŒธ

[INTRO:2] "Requirements for Internet Gateways," R. Braden and J. Postel, RFC-1009, June 1987. ๐Ÿฆ‹

[INTRO:3] "DDN Protocol Handbook," NIC-50004, NIC-50005, NIC-50006, (three volumes), SRI International, December 1985. ๐Ÿ“š

[INTRO:4] "Official Internet Protocols," J. Reynolds and J. Postel, RFC-1011, May 1987.

This document is republished periodically with new RFC numbers, so the latest version is the one you want. ๐Ÿ’œ

[INTRO:5] "Protocol Document Order Information," O. Jacobsen and J. Postel, RFC-980, March 1986. ๐ŸŽ€

[INTRO:6] "Assigned Numbers," J. Reynolds and J. Postel, RFC-1010, May 1987.

This document is also republished periodically with new RFC numbers, so again, grab the latest one. ๐Ÿซถ

[INTRO:7] "Modularity and Efficiency in Protocol Implementations," D. Clark, RFC-817, July 1982. โœจ

[INTRO:8] "The Structuring of Systems Using Upcalls," D. Clark, 10th ACM SOSP, Orcas Island, Washington, December 1985. ๐ŸŒˆ

Secondary References ๐Ÿ“

[INTRO:9] "A Protocol for Packet Network Intercommunication," V. Cerf and R. Kahn, IEEE Transactions on Communication, May 1974. ๐Ÿ”ฅ

[INTRO:10] "The ARPA Internet Protocol," J. Postel, C. Sunshine, and D. Cohen, Computer Networks, Vol. 5, No. 4, July 1981. ๐Ÿ’–

[INTRO:11] "The DARPA Internet Protocol Suite," B. Leiner, J. Postel, R. Cole and D. Mills, Proceedings INFOCOM 85, IEEE, Washington DC, March 1985. Also in: IEEE Communications Magazine, March 1985. Also available as ISI-RS-85-153. ๐Ÿฆ‹

[INTRO:12] "Final Text of DIS8473, Protocol for Providing the Connectionless Mode Network Service," ANSI, published as RFC-994, March 1986. ๐ŸŒธ

[INTRO:13] "End System to Intermediate System Routing Exchange Protocol," ANSI X3S3.3, published as RFC-995, April 1986. ๐Ÿ‘‘

[LINK:1] "Trailer Encapsulations," S. Leffler and M. Karels, RFC-893, April 1984. ๐Ÿ’…

[LINK:2] "An Ethernet Address Resolution Protocol," D. Plummer, RFC-826, November 1982. โœจ

[LINK:3] "A Standard for the Transmission of IP Datagrams over Ethernet Networks," C. Hornig, RFC-894, April 1984.

[LINK:4] "A Standard for the Transmission of IP Datagrams over IEEE 802 "Networks," J. Postel and J. Reynolds, RFC-1042, February 1988.

This RFC is a total goldmine ๐Ÿ’Ž for implementers planning to use IEEE 802 networks. Bookmark it. ๐Ÿ”–

IP LAYER REFERENCES ๐ŸŒธ

[IP:1] "Internet Protocol (IP)," J. Postel, RFC-791, September 1981.

[IP:2] "Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP)," J. Postel, RFC-792, September 1981.

[IP:3] "Internet Standard Subnetting Procedure," J. Mogul and J. Postel, RFC-950, August 1985.

[IP:4] "Host Extensions for IP Multicasting," S. Deering, RFC-1112, August 1989.

[IP:5] "Military Standard Internet Protocol," MIL-STD-1777, Department of Defense, August 1983.

Okay so this spec, as amended by RFC-963, is meant to describe the Internet Protocol but it has some serious omissions ๐Ÿ˜ญ (like the mandatory subnet extension [IP:3] and the optional multicasting extension [IP:4]). It's also out of date. If there's a conflict, RFC-791, RFC-792, and RFC-950 must be taken as authoritative, while the present document is authoritative over all. ๐Ÿ‘‘

[IP:6] "Some Problems with the Specification of the Military Standard Internet Protocol," D. Sidhu, RFC-963, November 1985.

[IP:7] "The TCP Maximum Segment Size and Related Topics," J. Postel, RFC-879, November 1983.

This one discusses and clarifies the relationship between the TCP Maximum Segment Size option and the IP datagram size. ๐ŸŽ€

[IP:8] "Internet Protocol Security Options," B. Schofield, RFC-1108, October 1989.

[IP:9] "Fragmentation Considered Harmful," C. Kent and J. Mogul, ACM SIGCOMM-87, August 1987. Published as ACM Comp Comm Review, Vol. 17, no. 5.

This useful paper talks about the problems created by Internet fragmentation and presents alternative solutions. Main character energy ๐Ÿฆ‹

[IP:10] "IP Datagram Reassembly Algorithms," D. Clark, RFC-815, July 1982.

This and the following paper should be read by every implementor. No excuses ๐Ÿ’…

[IP:11] "Fault Isolation and Recovery," D. Clark, RFC-816, July 1982.

SECONDARY IP REFERENCES ๐Ÿงš

[IP:12] "Broadcasting Internet Datagrams in the Presence of Subnets," J. Mogul, RFC-922, October 1984.

[IP:13] "Name, Addresses, Ports, and Routes," D. Clark, RFC-814, July 1982.

[IP:14] "Something a Host Could Do with Source Quench: The Source Quench Introduced Delay (SQUID)," W. Prue and J. Postel, RFC-1016, July 1987.

This RFC first described directed broadcast addresses. However, the bulk of the RFC is concerned with gateways, not hosts. ๐Ÿ™ˆ

UDP REFERENCES ๐Ÿซถ

[UDP:1] "User Datagram Protocol," J. Postel, RFC-768, August 1980.

TCP REFERENCES ๐Ÿ’œ

[TCP:1] "Transmission Control Protocol," J. Postel, RFC-793, September 1981.

[TCP:2] "Transmission Control Protocol," MIL-STD-1778, US Department of Defense, August 1984.

This specification, as amended by RFC-964, is meant to describe the same protocol as RFC-793 [TCP:1]. If there's a conflict, RFC-793 takes precedence, and the present document is authoritative over both. โœจ

[TCP:3] "Some Problems with the Specification of the Military Standard Transmission Control Protocol," D. Sidhu and T. Blumer, RFC-964, November 1985.

[TCP:4] "The TCP Maximum Segment Size and Related Topics," J. Postel, RFC-879, November 1983.

[TCP:5] "Window and Acknowledgment Strategy in TCP," D. Clark, RFC-813, July 1982.

[TCP:6] "Round Trip Time Estimation," P. Karn & C. Partridge, ACM SIGCOMM-87, August 1987.

[TCP:7] "Congestion Avoidance and Control," V. Jacobson, ACM SIGCOMM-88, August 1988.

SECONDARY TCP REFERENCES ๐ŸŒˆ

[TCP:8] "Modularity and Efficiency in Protocol Implementation," D. Clark, RFC-817, July 1982.

[TCP:9] "Congestion Control in IP/TCP," J. Nagle, RFC-896, January 1984.

[TCP:10] "Computing the Internet Checksum," R. Braden, D. Borman, and C. Partridge, RFC-1071, September 1988.

[TCP:11] "TCP Extensions for Long-Delay Paths," V. Jacobson & R. Braden, RFC-1072, October 1988.


Security Considerations ๐Ÿ”

Okay, bestie, real talk ๐Ÿ˜ญ There are many security issues in the communication layers of host software, but a full discussion is beyond the scope of this RFC.

The Internet architecture generally provides little protection against spoofing of IP source addresses, so any security mechanism that is based upon verifying the IP source address of a datagram should be treated with suspicion. ๐Ÿšจ However, in restricted environments some source-address checking may be possible. For example, there might be a secure LAN whose gateway to the rest of the Internet discarded any incoming datagram with a source address that spoofed the LAN address. In this case, a host on the LAN could use the source address to test for local vs. remote source. ๐Ÿง

This problem is complicated by source routing, and some have suggested that source-routed datagram forwarding by hosts (see Section 3.3.5) should be outlawed for security reasons. Ngl, that's a whole vibe ๐Ÿ’€

Security-related issues are mentioned in sections concerning the IP Security option (Section 3.2.1.8), the ICMP Parameter Problem message (Section 3.2.2.5), IP options in UDP datagrams (Section 4.1.3.2), and reserved TCP ports (Section 4.2.2.1). Go check those, periodt ๐Ÿ’–


Author's Address ๐Ÿ–‹๏ธ

Robert Braden
USC/Information Sciences Institute
4676 Admiralty Way
Marina del Rey, CA 90292-6695

Phone: (213) 822 1511

EMail: Braden@ISI.EDU
๐Ÿ“ฆ where this page comes from