RFC 9640
YANG Data Types and Groupings for Cryptography
Introduction to RFC 9640: YANG Data Types and Groupings for Cryptography 🎀
okay bestie, let's get into it ✨ this is RFC 9640, and it's a Standards Track doc from the IETF, written by K. Watsen of Watsen Networks, dated October 2024. It's an ISSN 2070-1721 doc, so yes, it's officially Internet Standards material 💅 It doesn't obsolete or update any other RFC, so it's a fresh start, no drama 🌸
The whole vibe: it's a YANG 1.1 module (that's [RFC7950] for the nerds 🤓) full of identities, typedefs, and groupings for crypto stuff. Basically it's the building blocks that other modules borrow from, and it's giving foundational energy 🧚
Status of This Memo 🌈
This is an Internet Standards Track document, obviously 💖
It's a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), it represents the consensus of the IETF community, it went through public review, and the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG) approved it for publication. If you want the full scoop on what "Internet Standard" means, check Section 2 of RFC 7841 🫶
For the current status, errata, or to leave feedback, head to https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9640 ✨
Copyright Notice 💜
Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved 🦋
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication. Read those carefully, because they spell out your rights and restrictions 📜
Code Components extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions, and they're provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License. So if you copy code out of here, keep that license text with it 🙈
Table of Contents 🍓
- Introduction 1.1. Relation to Other RFCs 1.2. Specification Language 1.3. Adherence to the NMDA 1.4. Conventions
- The "ietf-crypto-types" Module 2.1. Data Model Overview 2.2. Example Usage 2.3. YANG Module
- Security Considerations 3.1. No Support for CRMF 3.2. No Support for Key Generation 3.3. Unconstrained Public Key Usage 3.4. Unconstrained Private Key Usage 3.5. Cleartext Passwords and Keys 3.6. Encrypting Passwords and Keys 3.7. Deletion of Cleartext Key Values 3.8. Considerations for the "ietf-crypto-types" YANG Module
- IANA Considerations 4.1. The IETF XML Registry 4.2. The YANG Module Names Registry
- References 5.1. Normative References 5.2. Informative References Acknowledgements Author's Address
1. Introduction 💖
This document presents a YANG 1.1 [RFC7950] module defining identities, typedefs, and groupings useful to cryptographic applications. Simple as that 🧁
1.1. Relation to Other RFCs 🌸
So this module is part of a whole squad of RFCs that work together to support configuring both clients and servers of NETCONF [RFC6241] and RESTCONF [RFC8040] ✨
There's a diagram showing how the main YANG groupings depend on each other. Some documents define secondary groupings that add dependencies the diagram doesn't show, and the labels are just shorthand for the defining RFCs, whose citations are listed under the diagram 🦋
Arrows point from referencer to referenced, so "crypto-types" has no dependencies at all, while "keystore" depends on "crypto-types" 💅
crypto-types
^ ^
/ \
/ \
truststore keystore
^ ^ ^ ^
| +---------+ | |
| | | |
| +------------+ |
tcp-client-server | / | |
^ ^ ssh-client-server | |
| | ^ tls-client-server
| | | ^ ^ http-client-server
| | | | | ^
| | | +-----+ +---------+ |
| | | | | |
| +-----------|--------|--------------+ | |
| | | | | |
+-----------+ | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
netconf-client-server restconf-client-server +========================+==========================+
| Label in Diagram | Reference |
+========================+==========================+
| crypto-types | RFC 9640 |
+------------------------+--------------------------+
| truststore | [RFC9641] |
+------------------------+--------------------------+
| keystore | [RFC9642] |
+------------------------+--------------------------+
| tcp-client-server | [RFC9643] |
+------------------------+--------------------------+
| ssh-client-server | [RFC9644] |
+------------------------+--------------------------+
| tls-client-server | [RFC9645] |
+------------------------+--------------------------+
| http-client-server | [HTTP-CLIENT-SERVER] |
+------------------------+--------------------------+
| netconf-client-server | [NETCONF-CLIENT-SERVER] |
+------------------------+--------------------------+
| restconf-client-server | [RESTCONF-CLIENT-SERVER] |
+------------------------+--------------------------+Table 1: Labels in Diagram to RFC Mapping 🧾
1.2. Specification Language 📖
Here's the important bit: the key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they show up in ALL CAPS, just like here 🔥
1.3. Adherence to the NMDA 🌷
This document is compliant with the Network Management Datastore Architecture (NMDA) [RFC8342]. It does not define any protocol-accessible nodes that are "config false" ✨
1.4. Conventions 🎀
Lots of examples use "BASE64VALUE=" as a placeholder for binary data that's been base64 encoded (per Section 9.8 of [RFC7950]). Real base64 blobs are often many lines long and super distracting, so the placeholder keeps things clean 🧼
Examples here use XML [W3C.REC-xml-20081126] encoding, but JSON [RFC8259] could be used instead 🌈
Some examples have long lines that may get folded, as described in [RFC8792] 🫶
2. The "ietf-crypto-types" Module 🧚
This section defines a YANG 1.1 [RFC7950] module called "ietf-crypto-types". The overview lives in Section 2.1, examples are in Section 2.2, and the actual YANG module is in Section 2.3 💜
2.1. Data Model Overview 🦋
This section gives an overview of the "ietf-crypto-types" module in terms of its features, identities, typedefs, and groupings 🍓
2.1.1. Features 💅
The following diagram lists all the "feature" statements defined in the "ietf-crypto-types" module:
Features:
+-- one-symmetric-key-format
+-- one-asymmetric-key-format
+-- symmetrically-encrypted-value-format
+-- asymmetrically-encrypted-value-format
+-- cms-enveloped-data-format
+-- cms-encrypted-data-format
+-- p10-csr-format
+-- csr-generation
+-- certificate-expiration-notification
+-- cleartext-passwords
+-- encrypted-passwords
+-- cleartext-symmetric-keys
+-- hidden-symmetric-keys
+-- encrypted-symmetric-keys
+-- cleartext-private-keys
+-- hidden-private-keys
+-- encrypted-private-keysThe diagram above uses syntax that's similar to, but not the same as, the one in [RFC8340] ✨
2.1.2. Identities 🌈
The following diagram shows the hierarchy of the "identity" statements defined in the "ietf-crypto-types" module:
Identities:
+-- public-key-format
| +-- subject-public-key-info-format
| +-- ssh-public-key-format
+-- private-key-format
| +-- rsa-private-key-format
| +-- ec-private-key-format
| +-- one-asymmetric-key-format
| {one-asymmetric-key-format}?
+-- symmetric-key-format
| +-- octet-string-key-format
| +-- one-symmetric-key-format
| {one-symmetric-key-format}?
+-- encrypted-value-format
| +-- symmetrically-encrypted-value-format
| | | {symmetrically-encrypted-value-format}?
| | +-- cms-encrypted-data-format
| | {cms-encrypted-data-format}?
| +-- asymmetrically-encrypted-value-format
| | {asymmetrically-encrypted-value-format}?
| +-- cms-enveloped-data-format
| {cms-enveloped-data-format}?
+-- csr-format
+-- p10-csr-format {p10-csr-format?}The diagram above uses syntax that's similar to, but not the same as, the one in [RFC8340] 🫶
Some comments on that diagram, bestie 👑
- There are five base identities. The first three are for the format of key data, the fourth is for the format of encrypted values, and the fifth is for the format of a certificate signing request (CSR). These base identities are "abstract" in the object-oriented sense: they define a "class" of formats, not one specific format 🧚
- The terminal identities define the specific encoding formats. The derived identities in this document are enough for the effort described in Section 1.1, but since they're identities, additional derived identities MAY be defined by future efforts 💖
- Identities for uncommon formats are enabled by "feature" statements, so applications can support them when they need them 🎀
(Part 1 of 9. More parts coming, so stay tuned, bestie 💕)
2.1.3. Typedefs ✨
Okay bestie, this diagram shows how all the typedefs in the ietf-crypto-types module are related to each other 🌳💖
Typedefs:
binary
+-- csr-info
+-- csr
+-- x509
| +-- trust-anchor-cert-x509
| +-- end-entity-cert-x509
+-- crl
+-- ocsp-request
+-- ocsp-response
+-- cms
+-- data-content-cms
+-- signed-data-cms
| +-- trust-anchor-cert-cms
| +-- end-entity-cert-cms
+-- enveloped-data-cms
+-- digested-data-cms
+-- encrypted-data-cms
+-- authenticated-data-cmsHeads up, the syntax in this diagram is kinda like the one in [RFC8340], but it's not exactly the same 🤓
Some tea on how these typedefs work:
- Every typedef in the
ietf-crypto-typesmodule extends thebinarytype from [RFC7950] 🫶 - On top of that, every typedef gives you a way to encode an ASN.1 [ITU.X680.2021] structure using DER [ITU.X690.2021] 💅
- The
trust-anchor-*andend-entity-*typedefs are syntactically identical to their base typedefs. The only difference is what kind of content you're expected to put in them. They exist to make common modeling needs easier 🎀
2.1.4. Groupings 🧚
The ietf-crypto-types module defines these grouping statements:
encrypted-value-groupingpassword-groupingsymmetric-key-groupingpublic-key-groupingprivate-key-groupingasymmetric-key-pair-groupingcertificate-expiration-groupingtrust-anchor-cert-groupingend-entity-cert-groupinggenerate-csr-groupingasymmetric-key-pair-with-cert-groupingasymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping
Each of these groupings gets its own subsection, and we're going through them one by one 🌸
2.1.4.1. The "encrypted-value-grouping" Grouping 🔐
This tree diagram [RFC8340] shows the encrypted-value-grouping grouping:
grouping encrypted-value-grouping:
+-- encrypted-by
+-- encrypted-value-format identityref
+-- encrypted-value binaryComments:
- The
encrypted-bynode is an empty container (it's hard to spot in the diagram, iykyk 🙈). A consuming module MUST augment key references into it. Theietf-crypto-typesmodule can't populate this container itself, since the module only defines groupings. Section 2.2.1 has an example of a consuming module filling in theencrypted-bycontainer 🔑 - The
encrypted-valuenode is the value that got encrypted by the key referenced in theencrypted-bynode. It's encoded in whatever format fits the kind of key that did the encrypting.- If a symmetric key did the encrypting, the encrypted value is encoded using the format tied to the
symmetrically-encrypted-value-formatidentity. - If an asymmetric key did the encrypting, the encrypted value is encoded using the format tied to the
asymmetrically-encrypted-value-formatidentity.
- If a symmetric key did the encrypting, the encrypted value is encoded using the format tied to the
See Section 2.1.2 for info about the "format" identities 💜
2.1.4.2. The "password-grouping" Grouping 🙊
This section has a tree diagram [RFC8340] showing the password-grouping grouping. The diagram doesn't expand the grouping statement(s) it uses internally:
grouping password-grouping:
+-- (password-type)
+--:(cleartext-password) {cleartext-passwords}?
| +-- cleartext-password? string
+--:(encrypted-password) {encrypted-passwords}?
+-- encrypted-password
+---u encrypted-value-groupingComments:
- The
password-groupinglets you configure the credentials needed to log in to a remote system 🔓 If you need to configure a password for a local account, theianach:crypt-hashtypedef from [RFC7317] should be used instead. - For the referenced
groupingstatement(s):- The
encrypted-value-groupinggrouping is covered in Section 2.1.4.1.
- The
- The
choicestatement lets the password data be either cleartext or encrypted:- The
cleartext-passwordnode can hold any cleartext value. - The
encrypted-passwordnode is an instance of theencrypted-value-groupingfrom Section 2.1.4.1 ✨
- The
2.1.4.3. The "symmetric-key-grouping" Grouping 🗝️
This section has a tree diagram [RFC8340] showing the symmetric-key-grouping grouping. The diagram doesn't expand the grouping statement(s) it uses internally:
grouping symmetric-key-grouping:
+-- key-format? identityref
+-- (key-type)
+--:(cleartext-symmetric-key)
| +-- cleartext-symmetric-key? binary
| {cleartext-symmetric-keys}?
+--:(hidden-symmetric-key) {hidden-symmetric-keys}?
| +-- hidden-symmetric-key? empty
+--:(encrypted-symmetric-key) {encrypted-symmetric-keys}?
+-- encrypted-symmetric-key
+---u encrypted-value-groupingComments:
- For the referenced
groupingstatement(s):- The
encrypted-value-groupinggrouping is covered in Section 2.1.4.1.
- The
- The
key-formatnode is an identity-reference to thesymmetric-key-formatabstract base identity from Section 2.1.2. That lets the symmetric key be encoded in any of the formats the derived identities define 🎀 - The
choicestatement lets the private key data be cleartext, encrypted, or hidden:- The
cleartext-symmetric-keynode can hold any cleartext key value. - The
hidden-symmetric-keynode is of typeempty, because the real value can't be shown through the management interface 🙈 - The
encrypted-symmetric-keynode's structure is covered in Section 2.1.4.1.
- The
2.1.4.4. The "public-key-grouping" Grouping 🦋
This section has a tree diagram [RFC8340] showing the public-key-grouping grouping. The diagram doesn't expand any grouping statement(s) it uses internally:
grouping public-key-grouping:
+-- public-key-format identityref
+-- public-key binaryComments:
- The
public-key-formatnode is an identity-reference to thepublic-key-formatabstract base identity from Section 2.1.2. That lets the public key be encoded in any of the formats the derived identities define 🌈 - The
public-keynode holds the public key data in the chosen format. Nochoicestatement is used to hide or encrypt the public key data, because there's no need to do that for public keys 🫶
2.1.4.5. The "private-key-grouping" Grouping 🔥
This section has a tree diagram [RFC8340] showing the private-key-grouping grouping. The diagram doesn't expand the grouping statement(s) it uses internally:
grouping private-key-grouping:
+-- private-key-format? identityref
+-- (private-key-type)
+--:(cleartext-private-key) {cleartext-private-keys}?
| +-- cleartext-private-key? binary
+--:(hidden-private-key) {hidden-private-keys}?
| +-- hidden-private-key? empty
+--:(encrypted-private-key) {encrypted-private-keys}?
+-- encrypted-private-key
+---u encrypted-value-groupingComments:
- For the referenced
groupingstatement(s):- The
encrypted-value-groupinggrouping is covered in Section 2.1.4.1.
- The
- The
private-key-formatnode is an identity-reference to theprivate-key-formatabstract base identity from Section 2.1.2. That lets the private key be encoded in any of the formats the derived identities define 👑 - The
choicestatement lets the private key data be cleartext, encrypted, or hidden:- The
cleartext-private-keynode can hold any cleartext key value. - The
hidden-private-keynode is of typeempty, because the real value can't be shown through the management interface 🙈 - The
encrypted-private-keynode's structure is covered in Section 2.1.4.1.
- The
2.1.4.6. The "asymmetric-key-pair-grouping" Grouping 💞
This section has a tree diagram [RFC8340] showing the asymmetric-key-pair-grouping grouping. The diagram doesn't expand the grouping statement(s) it uses internally:
grouping asymmetric-key-pair-grouping:
+---u public-key-grouping
+---u private-key-groupingComments:
- For the referenced
groupingstatement(s):- The
public-key-groupinggrouping is covered in Section 2.1.4.4. - The
private-key-groupinggrouping is covered in Section 2.1.4.5 ✨
- The
2.1.4.7. The "certificate-expiration-grouping" Grouping ⏰
This section has a tree diagram [RFC8340] showing the certificate-expiration-grouping grouping:
grouping certificate-expiration-grouping:
+---n certificate-expiration
{certificate-expiration-notification}?
+-- expiration-date yang:date-and-timeComments:
- This grouping exists for one reason: to define the
certificate-expirationnotification statement. The groupings in Sections 2.1.4.8 and 2.1.4.9 use it 🎀 - The
certificate-expirationnotification lets servers tell clients when certificates are getting close to expiring 😭 - The
expiration-datenode says when the certificate will (or did) expire 🍓 - The notification itself already identifies which certificate is expiring. For an example, check out Section 2.2.3 🔍
2.1.4.8. The "trust-anchor-cert-grouping" Grouping 🌟
This section has a tree diagram [RFC8340] showing the trust-anchor-cert-grouping grouping. The diagram doesn't expand the grouping statement(s) it uses internally:
grouping trust-anchor-cert-grouping:
+-- cert-data? trust-anchor-cert-cms
+---u certificate-expiration-groupingComments:
- For the referenced
groupingstatement(s):- The
certificate-expiration-groupinggrouping is covered in Section 2.1.4.7.
- The
- The
cert-datanode holds a chain of one or more certificates. That chain has at most one self-signed certificate (the "root" certificate). It's encoded using thesigned-data-cmstypedef from Section 2.1.3 🌳
2.1.4.9. The "end-entity-cert-grouping" Grouping 🦢
This section has a tree diagram [RFC8340] showing the end-entity-cert-grouping grouping. The diagram doesn't expand the grouping statement(s) it uses internally:
grouping end-entity-cert-grouping:
+-- cert-data? end-entity-cert-cms
+---u certificate-expiration-groupingComments:
- For the referenced
groupingstatement(s):- The
certificate-expiration-groupinggrouping is covered in Section 2.1.4.7.
- The
- The
cert-datanode holds a chain of one or more certificates. That chain has at most one certificate that is not self-signed and does not have the Basic constraint"CA true"(where "CA" means Certification Authority). It's encoded using thesigned-data-cmstypedef from Section 2.1.3 💅
2.1.4.10. The "generate-csr-grouping" Grouping 📝
okay bestie, here's the tree diagram [RFC8340] for the "generate-csr-grouping" grouping 🌸
grouping generate-csr-grouping:
+---x generate-csr {csr-generation}?
+---w input
| +---w csr-format identityref
| +---w csr-info csr-info
+--ro output
+--ro (csr-type)
+--:(p10-csr)
+--ro p10-csr? p10-csrthe comments, ngl, are the main event 💅
- this grouping has ONE job: it defines the "generate-csr" action statement, and the groupings in Sections 2.1.4.11 and 2.1.4.12 use it 🦋
- the action takes two input parameters. "csr-info" is for what content should be in the certificate, and "csr-format" is for what CSR format to hand back. the action returns the CSR in the format you asked for. both the "csr-info" and "csr" types get the full breakdown in Section 2.1.3 ✨
- want an example? go check Section 2.2.2 🎀
2.1.4.11. The "asymmetric-key-pair-with-cert-grouping" Grouping 🔐
this is the tree diagram [RFC8340] for the "asymmetric-key-pair-with-cert-grouping" grouping. it doesn't expand the internal "grouping" statement(s), so don't panic when you see just the names 🙈
grouping asymmetric-key-pair-with-cert-grouping:
+---u asymmetric-key-pair-grouping
+---u end-entity-cert-grouping
+---u generate-csr-groupingcomments time 💖
- this grouping gives you an asymmetric key with at most one associated certificate. it's a super common combo in protocol models, so it's giving "classic" 👑
- for the referenced "grouping" statement(s):
- the "asymmetric-key-pair-grouping" grouping is in Section 2.1.4.6 🌈
- the "end-entity-cert-grouping" grouping is in Section 2.1.4.9 🧚
- the "generate-csr-grouping" grouping is in Section 2.1.4.10 🍓
2.1.4.12. The "asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping" Grouping 🎀
same energy, but this time it's the tree diagram [RFC8340] for the "asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping" grouping. again, it doesn't expand the internal "grouping" statement(s) 💅
grouping asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping:
+---u asymmetric-key-pair-grouping
+-- certificates
| +-- certificate* [name]
| +-- name string
| +---u end-entity-cert-grouping
+---u generate-csr-groupingcomments, bestie 🫶
- this grouping gives you an asymmetric key with one or more associated certificates. this combo shows up a lot in configuration models, so it's iconic ⭐
- for the referenced "grouping" statement(s):
- the "asymmetric-key-pair-grouping" grouping is in Section 2.1.4.6 🌸
- the "end-entity-cert-grouping" grouping is in Section 2.1.4.9 🦋
- the "generate-csr-grouping" grouping is in Section 2.1.4.10 ✨
2.1.5. Protocol-Accessible Nodes 🛰️
the "ietf-crypto-types" module doesn't have any protocol-accessible nodes, lowkey. BUT the module still needs to be "implemented", as described in Section 5.6.5 of [RFC7950], so the identities in Section 2.1.2 can be defined 🧠
2.2. Example Usage 🌈
2.2.1. The "symmetric-key-grouping", "asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping", and "password-grouping" Groupings 🔑
okay, time for the example! this non-normative module shows off the "symmetric-key-grouping" (Section 2.1.4.3), the "asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping" (Section 2.1.4.12), and the "password-grouping" (Section 2.1.4.2) "grouping" statements 💅
the big takeaway is a whole chain of encryption 🔗. a hidden private key (ex-hidden-asymmetric-key) encrypts a symmetric key (ex-encrypted-one-symmetric-based-symmetric-key), and that symmetric key encrypts another private key (ex-encrypted-rsa-based-asymmetric-key). the same symmetric key also encrypts a password (ex-encrypted-password). it's giving layers 🧅✨
2.2.1.1. Example Module 🎀
module ex-crypto-types-usage {
yang-version 1.1;
namespace "https://example.com/ns/example-crypto-types-usage";
prefix ectu;
import ietf-crypto-types {
prefix ct;
reference
"RFC 9640: YANG Data Types and Groupings for Cryptography";
}
organization
"Example Corporation";
contact
"YANG Designer <mailto:yang.designer@example.com>";
description
"This example module illustrates the 'symmetric-key-grouping'
and 'asymmetric-key-grouping' groupings defined in the
'ietf-crypto-types' module defined in RFC 9640.";
revision 2024-10-10 {
description
"Initial version.";
reference
"RFC 9640: YANG Data Types and Groupings for Cryptography";
}
container symmetric-keys {
description
"A container of symmetric keys.";
list symmetric-key {
key "name";
description
"A symmetric key.";
leaf name {
type string;
description
"An arbitrary name for this key.";
}
uses ct:symmetric-key-grouping {
augment "key-type/encrypted-symmetric-key/"
+ "encrypted-symmetric-key/encrypted-by" {
description
"Augments in a 'choice' statement enabling the
encrypting key to be any other symmetric or
asymmetric key.";
uses encrypted-by-grouping;
}
}
}
}
container asymmetric-keys {
description
"A container of asymmetric keys.";
list asymmetric-key {
key "name";
leaf name {
type string;
description
"An arbitrary name for this key.";
}
uses ct:asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping {
augment "private-key-type/encrypted-private-key/"
+ "encrypted-private-key/encrypted-by" {
description
"Augments in a 'choice' statement enabling the
encrypting key to be any other symmetric or
asymmetric key.";
uses encrypted-by-grouping;
}
}
description
"An asymmetric key pair with associated certificates.";
}
}
container passwords {
description
"A container of passwords.";
list password {
key "name";
leaf name {
type string;
description
"An arbitrary name for this password.";
}
uses ct:password-grouping {
augment "password-type/encrypted-password/"
+ "encrypted-password/encrypted-by" {
description
"Augments in a 'choice' statement enabling the
encrypting key to be any symmetric or
asymmetric key.";
uses encrypted-by-grouping;
}
}
description
"A password.";
}
}
grouping encrypted-by-grouping {
description
"A grouping that defines a choice enabling references
to other keys.";
choice encrypted-by {
mandatory true;
description
"A choice amongst other symmetric or asymmetric keys.";
case symmetric-key-ref {
leaf symmetric-key-ref {
type leafref {
path "/ectu:symmetric-keys/ectu:symmetric-key/"
+ "ectu:name";
}
description
"Identifies the symmetric key that encrypts this key.";
}
}
case asymmetric-key-ref {
leaf asymmetric-key-ref {
type leafref {
path "/ectu:asymmetric-keys/ectu:asymmetric-key/"
+ "ectu:name";
}
description
"Identifies the asymmetric key that encrypts this key.";
}
}
}
}
}2.2.1.2. Tree Diagram for the Example Module 🌳
the tree diagram [RFC8340] for this example module looks like this, and it's a whole vibe 🦋
module: ex-crypto-types-usage
+--rw symmetric-keys
| +--rw symmetric-key* [name]
| +--rw name string
| +--rw key-format? identityref
| +--rw (key-type)
| +--:(cleartext-symmetric-key)
| | +--rw cleartext-symmetric-key? binary
| | {cleartext-symmetric-keys}?
| +--:(hidden-symmetric-key) {hidden-symmetric-keys}?
| | +--rw hidden-symmetric-key? empty
| +--:(encrypted-symmetric-key) {encrypted-symmetric-keys}?
| +--rw encrypted-symmetric-key
| +--rw encrypted-by
| | +--rw (encrypted-by)
| | +--:(symmetric-key-ref)
| | | +--rw symmetric-key-ref? leafref
| | +--:(asymmetric-key-ref)
| | +--rw asymmetric-key-ref? leafref
| +--rw encrypted-value-format identityref
| +--rw encrypted-value binary
+--rw asymmetric-keys
| +--rw asymmetric-key* [name]
| +--rw name string
| +--rw public-key-format? identityref
| +--rw public-key? binary
| +--rw private-key-format? identityref
| +--rw (private-key-type)
| | +--:(cleartext-private-key) {cleartext-private-keys}?
| | | +--rw cleartext-private-key? binary
| | +--:(hidden-private-key) {hidden-private-keys}?
| | | +--rw hidden-private-key? empty
| | +--:(encrypted-private-key) {encrypted-private-keys}?
| | +--rw encrypted-private-key
| | +--rw encrypted-by
| | | +--rw (encrypted-by)
| | | +--:(symmetric-key-ref)
| | | | +--rw symmetric-key-ref? leafref
| | | +--:(asymmetric-key-ref)
| | | +--rw asymmetric-key-ref? leafref
| | +--rw encrypted-value-format identityref
| | +--rw encrypted-value binary
| +--rw certificates
| | +--rw certificate* [name]
| | +--rw name string
| | +--rw cert-data end-entity-cert-cms
| | +---n certificate-expiration
| | {certificate-expiration-notification}?
| | +-- expiration-date yang:date-and-time
| +---x generate-csr {csr-generation}?
| +---w input
| | +---w csr-format identityref
| | +---w csr-info csr-info
| +--ro output
| +--ro (csr-type)
| +--:(p10-csr)
| +--ro p10-csr? p10-csr
+--rw passwords
+--rw password* [name]
+--rw name string
+--rw (password-type)
+--:(cleartext-password) {cleartext-passwords}?
| +--rw cleartext-password? string
+--:(encrypted-password) {encrypted-passwords}?
+--rw encrypted-password
+--rw encrypted-by
| +--rw (encrypted-by)
| +--:(symmetric-key-ref)
| | +--rw symmetric-key-ref? leafref
| +--:(asymmetric-key-ref)
| +--rw asymmetric-key-ref? leafref
+--rw encrypted-value-format identityref
+--rw encrypted-value binary2.2.1.3. Usage Example for the Example Module ✨
Okay, bestie, the grand finale of the example module is here 🎀 This one shows off a bunch of symmetric and asymmetric keys, the way they might actually look in configuration. Let's go 💅
=============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================<symmetric-keys
xmlns="https://example.com/ns/example-crypto-types-usage"
xmlns:ct="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-crypto-types">
<symmetric-key>
<name>ex-hidden-symmetric-key</name>
<hidden-symmetric-key/>
</symmetric-key>
<symmetric-key>
<name>ex-octet-string-based-symmetric-key</name>
<key-format>ct:octet-string-key-format</key-format>
<cleartext-symmetric-key>BASE64VALUE=</cleartext-symmetric-key>
</symmetric-key>
<symmetric-key>
<name>ex-one-symmetric-based-symmetric-key</name>
<key-format>ct:one-symmetric-key-format</key-format>
<cleartext-symmetric-key>BASE64VALUE=</cleartext-symmetric-key>
</symmetric-key>
<symmetric-key>
<name>ex-encrypted-one-symmetric-based-symmetric-key</name>
<key-format>ct:one-symmetric-key-format</key-format>
<encrypted-symmetric-key>
<encrypted-by>
<asymmetric-key-ref>ex-hidden-asymmetric-key</asymmetric-key\
-ref>
</encrypted-by>
<encrypted-value-format>ct:cms-enveloped-data-format</encrypte\
d-value-format>
<encrypted-value>BASE64VALUE=</encrypted-value>
</encrypted-symmetric-key>
</symmetric-key>
</symmetric-keys>
<asymmetric-keys
xmlns="https://example.com/ns/example-crypto-types-usage"
xmlns:ct="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-crypto-types">
<asymmetric-key>
<name>ex-hidden-asymmetric-key</name>
<public-key-format>ct:subject-public-key-info-format</public-key\
-format>
<public-key>BASE64VALUE=</public-key>
<hidden-private-key/>
<certificates>
<certificate>
<name>ex-hidden-asymmetric-key-cert</name>
<cert-data>BASE64VALUE=</cert-data>
</certificate>
</certificates>
</asymmetric-key>
<asymmetric-key>
<name>ex-rsa-based-asymmetric-key</name>
<public-key-format>ct:subject-public-key-info-format</public-key\
-format>
<public-key>BASE64VALUE=</public-key>
<private-key-format>ct:rsa-private-key-format</private-key-forma\
t>
<cleartext-private-key>BASE64VALUE=</cleartext-private-key>
<certificates>
<certificate>
<name>ex-cert</name>
<cert-data>BASE64VALUE=</cert-data>
</certificate>
</certificates>
</asymmetric-key>
<asymmetric-key>
<name>ex-one-asymmetric-based-asymmetric-key</name>
<public-key-format>ct:subject-public-key-info-format</public-key\
-format>
<public-key>BASE64VALUE=</public-key>
<private-key-format>ct:one-asymmetric-key-format</private-key-fo\
rmat>
<cleartext-private-key>BASE64VALUE=</cleartext-private-key>
</asymmetric-key>
<asymmetric-key>
<name>ex-encrypted-rsa-based-asymmetric-key</name>
<public-key-format>ct:subject-public-key-info-format</public-key\
-format>
<public-key>BASE64VALUE=</public-key>
<private-key-format>ct:rsa-private-key-format</private-key-forma\
t>
<encrypted-private-key>
<encrypted-by>
<symmetric-key-ref>ex-encrypted-one-symmetric-based-symmetri\
c-key</symmetric-key-ref>
</encrypted-by>
<encrypted-value-format>ct:cms-encrypted-data-format</encrypte\
d-value-format>
<encrypted-value>BASE64VALUE=</encrypted-value>
</encrypted-private-key>
</asymmetric-key>
</asymmetric-keys>
<passwords
xmlns="https://example.com/ns/example-crypto-types-usage"
xmlns:ct="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-crypto-types">
<password>
<name>ex-cleartext-password</name>
<cleartext-password>super-secret</cleartext-password>
</password>
<password>
<name>ex-encrypted-password</name>
<encrypted-password>
<encrypted-by>
<symmetric-key-ref>ex-encrypted-one-symmetric-based-symmetri\
c-key</symmetric-key-ref>
</encrypted-by>
<encrypted-value-format>ct:cms-encrypted-data-format</encrypte\
d-value-format>
<encrypted-value>BASE64VALUE=</encrypted-value>
</encrypted-password>
</password>
</passwords>2.2.2. The "generate-csr" Action 🧁
Next up, the "generate-csr" action, which we talked about back in Section 2.1.4.10. This one shows it working over the NETCONF protocol, and it's giving pure main character energy 🦋
REQUEST
<rpc message-id="101"
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:base:1.0"
xmlns:ct="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-crypto-types">
<action xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:1">
<asymmetric-keys
xmlns="https://example.com/ns/example-crypto-types-usage">
<asymmetric-key>
<name>ex-hidden-asymmetric-key</name>
<generate-csr>
<csr-format>ct:p10-csr-format</csr-format>
<csr-info>BASE64VALUE=</csr-info>
</generate-csr>
</asymmetric-key>
</asymmetric-keys>
</action>
</rpc>RESPONSE
=============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================<rpc-reply message-id="101"
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:base:1.0">
<p10-csr xmlns="https://example.com/ns/example-crypto-types-usage"\
>BASE64VALUE=</p10-csr>
</rpc-reply>2.2.3. The "certificate-expiration" Notification 🔔
Now for the "certificate-expiration" notification, which we covered in Section 2.1.4.7. Once again, this is the NETCONF protocol doing its thing 💜
=============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================<notification
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:notification:1.0">
<eventTime>2018-05-25T00:01:00Z</eventTime>
<asymmetric-keys xmlns="https://example.com/ns/example-crypto-type\
s-usage">
<asymmetric-key>
<name>ex-hidden-asymmetric-key</name>
<certificates>
<certificate>
<name>ex-hidden-asymmetric-key-cert</name>
<certificate-expiration>
<expiration-date>2018-08-05T14:18:53-05:00</expiration-d\
ate>
</certificate-expiration>
</certificate>
</certificates>
</asymmetric-key>
</asymmetric-keys>
</notification>2.3. YANG Module 🌈
This module has normative references to [RFC2119], [RFC2986], [RFC4253], [RFC5280], [RFC5652], [RFC5915], [RFC5958], [RFC6031], [RFC6960], [RFC6991], [RFC7093], [RFC8017], [RFC8174], [RFC8341], and [ITU.X690.2021].
<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-crypto-types@2024-10-10.yang"
module ietf-crypto-types {
yang-version 1.1;
namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-crypto-types";
prefix ct;
import ietf-yang-types {
prefix yang;
reference
"RFC 6991: Common YANG Data Types";
}
import ietf-netconf-acm {
prefix nacm;
reference
"RFC 8341: Network Configuration Access Control Model";
}
organization
"IETF NETCONF (Network Configuration) Working Group";
contact
"WG Web: https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/netconf
WG List: NETCONF WG list <mailto:netconf@ietf.org>
Author: Kent Watsen <mailto:kent+ietf@watsen.net>";
description
"This module defines common YANG types for cryptographic
applications.
The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL',
'SHALL NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED',
'NOT RECOMMENDED', 'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this document
are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 (RFC 2119)
(RFC 8174) when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified
as authors of the code. All rights reserved.
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with
or without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and
subject to the license terms contained in, the Revised
BSD License set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's
Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
This version of this YANG module is part of RFC 9640
(https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9640); see the RFC
itself for full legal notices.";
revision 2024-10-10 {
description
"Initial version.";
reference
"RFC 9640: YANG Data Types and Groupings for Cryptography";
}
/****************/
/* Features */
/****************/
feature one-symmetric-key-format {
description
"Indicates that the server supports the
'one-symmetric-key-format' identity.";
}
feature one-asymmetric-key-format {
description
"Indicates that the server supports the
'one-asymmetric-key-format' identity.";
}
feature symmetrically-encrypted-value-format {
description
"Indicates that the server supports the
'symmetrically-encrypted-value-format' identity.";
}
feature asymmetrically-encrypted-value-format {
description
"Indicates that the server supports the
'asymmetrically-encrypted-value-format' identity.";
}
feature cms-enveloped-data-format {
description
"Indicates that the server supports the
'cms-enveloped-data-format' identity.";
}
feature cms-encrypted-data-format {
description
"Indicates that the server supports the
'cms-encrypted-data-format' identity.";
}
feature p10-csr-format {
description
"Indicates that the server implements support
for generating P10-based CSRs, as defined
in RFC 2986.";
reference
"RFC 2986: PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax
Specification Version 1.7";
}
feature csr-generation {
description
"Indicates that the server implements the
'generate-csr' action.";
}
feature certificate-expiration-notification {
description
"Indicates that the server implements the
'certificate-expiration' notification.";
}
feature cleartext-passwords {
description
"Indicates that the server supports cleartext
passwords.";
}
feature encrypted-passwords {
description
"Indicates that the server supports password
encryption.";
}
feature cleartext-symmetric-keys {
description
"Indicates that the server supports cleartext
symmetric keys.";
}
feature hidden-symmetric-keys {
description
"Indicates that the server supports hidden keys.";
}
feature encrypted-symmetric-keys {
description
"Indicates that the server supports encryption
of symmetric keys.";
}
feature cleartext-private-keys {
description
"Indicates that the server supports cleartext
private keys.";
}
feature hidden-private-keys {
description
"Indicates that the server supports hidden keys.";
}
feature encrypted-private-keys {
description
"Indicates that the server supports encryption
of private keys.";
}
/*************************************************/
/* Base Identities for Key Format Structures */
/*************************************************/
identity symmetric-key-format {
description
"Base key-format identity for symmetric keys.";
}
identity public-key-format {
description
"Base key-format identity for public keys.";
}okay so this is the part where the YANG module gets into the key format identities 🔑✨ private keys first, then public keys, symmetric keys, encrypted values, and CSR and certificate typedefs. the code is verbatim, bestie 💅
identity private-key-format {
description
"Base key-format identity for private keys.";
}
/****************************************************/
/* Identities for Private Key Format Structures */
/****************************************************/
identity rsa-private-key-format {
base private-key-format;
description
"Indicates that the private key value is encoded as
an RSAPrivateKey (from RFC 8017), encoded using ASN.1
distinguished encoding rules (DER), as specified in
ITU-T X.690.";
reference
"RFC 8017:
PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2
ITU-T X.690:
Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER) 02/2021";
}
identity ec-private-key-format {
base private-key-format;
description
"Indicates that the private key value is encoded as
an ECPrivateKey (from RFC 5915), encoded using ASN.1
distinguished encoding rules (DER), as specified in
ITU-T X.690.";
reference
"RFC 5915:
Elliptic Curve Private Key Structure
ITU-T X.690:
Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER) 02/2021";
}
identity one-asymmetric-key-format {
if-feature "one-asymmetric-key-format";
base private-key-format;
description
"Indicates that the private key value is a
Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) OneAsymmetricKey
structure, as defined in RFC 5958, encoded using
ASN.1 distinguished encoding rules (DER), as
specified in ITU-T X.690.";
reference
"RFC 5958:
Asymmetric Key Packages
ITU-T X.690:
Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER) 02/2021";
}
/***************************************************/
/* Identities for Public Key Format Structures */
/***************************************************/
identity ssh-public-key-format {
base public-key-format;
description
"Indicates that the public key value is a Secure Shell (SSH)
public key, as specified in RFC 4253, Section 6.6, i.e.:
string certificate or public key format
identifier
byte[n] key/certificate data.";
reference
"RFC 4253: The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol";
}
identity subject-public-key-info-format {
base public-key-format;
description
"Indicates that the public key value is a SubjectPublicKeyInfo
structure, as described in RFC 5280, encoded using ASN.1
distinguished encoding rules (DER), as specified in
ITU-T X.690.";
reference
"RFC 5280:
Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile
ITU-T X.690:
Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER) 02/2021";
}
/******************************************************/
/* Identities for Symmetric Key Format Structures */
/******************************************************/
identity octet-string-key-format {
base symmetric-key-format;
description
"Indicates that the key is encoded as a raw octet string.
The length of the octet string MUST be appropriate for
the associated algorithm's block size.
The identity of the associated algorithm is outside the
scope of this specification. This is also true when
the octet string has been encrypted.";
}
identity one-symmetric-key-format {
if-feature "one-symmetric-key-format";
base symmetric-key-format;
description
"Indicates that the private key value is a CMS
OneSymmetricKey structure, as defined in RFC 6031,
encoded using ASN.1 distinguished encoding rules
(DER), as specified in ITU-T X.690.";
reference
"RFC 6031:
Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
Symmetric Key Package Content Type
ITU-T X.690:
Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER) 02/2021";
}
/*************************************************/
/* Identities for Encrypted Value Structures */
/*************************************************/
identity encrypted-value-format {
description
"Base format identity for encrypted values.";
}
identity symmetrically-encrypted-value-format {
if-feature "symmetrically-encrypted-value-format";
base encrypted-value-format;
description
"Base format identity for symmetrically encrypted
values.";
}
identity asymmetrically-encrypted-value-format {
if-feature "asymmetrically-encrypted-value-format";
base encrypted-value-format;
description
"Base format identity for asymmetrically encrypted
values.";
}
identity cms-encrypted-data-format {
if-feature "cms-encrypted-data-format";
base symmetrically-encrypted-value-format;
description
"Indicates that the encrypted value conforms to
the 'encrypted-data-cms' type with the constraint
that the 'unprotectedAttrs' value is not set.";
reference
"RFC 5652:
Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
ITU-T X.690:
Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER) 02/2021";
}
identity cms-enveloped-data-format {
if-feature "cms-enveloped-data-format";
base asymmetrically-encrypted-value-format;
description
"Indicates that the encrypted value conforms to the
'enveloped-data-cms' type with the following constraints:
The EnvelopedData structure MUST have exactly one
'RecipientInfo'.
If the asymmetric key supports public key cryptography
(e.g., RSA), then the 'RecipientInfo' must be a
'KeyTransRecipientInfo' with the 'RecipientIdentifier'
using a 'subjectKeyIdentifier' with the value set using
'method 1' in RFC 7093 over the recipient's public key.
Otherwise, if the asymmetric key supports key agreement
(e.g., Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)), then the
'RecipientInfo' must be a 'KeyAgreeRecipientInfo'. The
'OriginatorIdentifierOrKey' value must use the
'OriginatorPublicKey' alternative. The
'UserKeyingMaterial' value must not be present. There
must be exactly one 'RecipientEncryptedKeys' value
having the 'KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier' set to 'rKeyId'
with the value set using 'method 1' in RFC 7093 over the
recipient's public key.";
reference
"RFC 5652:
Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
RFC 7093:
Additional Methods for Generating Key
Identifiers Values
ITU-T X.690:
Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER) 02/2021";
}
/*********************************************************/
/* Identities for Certificate Signing Request Formats */
/*********************************************************/
identity csr-format {
description
"A base identity for the certificate signing request
formats. Additional derived identities MAY be defined
by future efforts.";
}
identity p10-csr-format {
if-feature "p10-csr-format";
base csr-format;
description
"Indicates the CertificationRequest structure
defined in RFC 2986.";
reference
"RFC 2986: PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax
Specification Version 1.7";
}
/***************************************************/
/* Typedefs for ASN.1 structures from RFC 2986 */
/***************************************************/
typedef csr-info {
type binary;
description
"A CertificationRequestInfo structure, as defined in
RFC 2986, encoded using ASN.1 distinguished encoding
rules (DER), as specified in ITU-T X.690.";
reference
"RFC 2986:
PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax
Specification Version 1.7
ITU-T X.690:
Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER) 02/2021";
}
typedef p10-csr {
type binary;
description
"A CertificationRequest structure, as specified in
RFC 2986, encoded using ASN.1 distinguished encoding
rules (DER), as specified in ITU-T X.690.";
reference
"RFC 2986:
PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax Specification
Version 1.7
ITU-T X.690:
Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER) 02/2021";
}
/***************************************************/
/* Typedefs for ASN.1 structures from RFC 5280 */
/***************************************************/
typedef x509 {
type binary;
description
"A Certificate structure, as specified in RFC 5280,
encoded using ASN.1 distinguished encoding rules (DER),
as specified in ITU-T X.690.";
reference
"RFC 5280:
Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile
ITU-T X.690:
Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER) 02/2021";
}
typedef crl {
type binary;
description
"A CertificateList structure, as specified in RFC 5280,
encoded using ASN.1 distinguished encoding rules (DER),
as specified in ITU-T X.690.";
reference
"RFC 5280:
Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile
ITU-T X.690:
Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER) 02/2021";
}Okay so this is where the YANG module picks up its ASN.1 typedefs 💖 The OCSP ones come from RFC 6960, the CMS ones come from RFC 5652, and the certificate ones lean on RFC 5280 🦋
/***************************************************/
/* Typedefs for ASN.1 structures from RFC 6960 */
/***************************************************/
typedef oscp-request {
type binary;
description
"A OCSPRequest structure, as specified in RFC 6960,
encoded using ASN.1 distinguished encoding rules
(DER), as specified in ITU-T X.690.";
reference
"RFC 6960:
X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online
Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP
ITU-T X.690:
Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER) 02/2021";
}
typedef oscp-response {
type binary;
description
"A OCSPResponse structure, as specified in RFC 6960,
encoded using ASN.1 distinguished encoding rules
(DER), as specified in ITU-T X.690.";
reference
"RFC 6960:
X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online
Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP
ITU-T X.690:
Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER) 02/2021";
}
/***********************************************/
/* Typedefs for ASN.1 structures from 5652 */
/***********************************************/
typedef cms {
type binary;
description
"A ContentInfo structure, as specified in RFC 5652,
encoded using ASN.1 distinguished encoding rules (DER),
as specified in ITU-T X.690.";
reference
"RFC 5652:
Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
ITU-T X.690:
Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER) 02/2021";
}
typedef data-content-cms {
type cms;
description
"A CMS structure whose top-most content type MUST be the
data content type, as described in Section 4 of RFC 5652.";
reference
"RFC 5652: Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)";
}
typedef signed-data-cms {
type cms;
description
"A CMS structure whose top-most content type MUST be the
signed-data content type, as described in Section 5 of
RFC 5652.";
reference
"RFC 5652: Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)";
}
typedef enveloped-data-cms {
type cms;
description
"A CMS structure whose top-most content type MUST be the
enveloped-data content type, as described in Section 6
of RFC 5652.";
reference
"RFC 5652: Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)";
}
typedef digested-data-cms {
type cms;
description
"A CMS structure whose top-most content type MUST be the
digested-data content type, as described in Section 7
of RFC 5652.";
reference
"RFC 5652: Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)";
}
typedef encrypted-data-cms {
type cms;
description
"A CMS structure whose top-most content type MUST be the
encrypted-data content type, as described in Section 8
of RFC 5652.";
reference
"RFC 5652: Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)";
}
typedef authenticated-data-cms {
type cms;
description
"A CMS structure whose top-most content type MUST be the
authenticated-data content type, as described in Section 9
of RFC 5652.";
reference
"RFC 5652: Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)";
}
/*********************************************************/
/* Typedefs for ASN.1 structures related to RFC 5280 */
/*********************************************************/
typedef trust-anchor-cert-x509 {
type x509;
description
"A Certificate structure that MUST encode a self-signed
root certificate.";
}
typedef end-entity-cert-x509 {
type x509;
description
"A Certificate structure that MUST encode a certificate
that is neither self-signed nor has Basic constraint
CA true.";
}
/*********************************************************/
/* Typedefs for ASN.1 structures related to RFC 5652 */
/*********************************************************/
typedef trust-anchor-cert-cms {
type signed-data-cms;
description
"A CMS SignedData structure that MUST contain the chain of
X.509 certificates needed to authenticate the certificate
presented by a client or end entity.
The CMS MUST contain only a single chain of certificates.
The client or end-entity certificate MUST only authenticate
to the last intermediate CA certificate listed in the chain.
In all cases, the chain MUST include a self-signed root
certificate. In the case where the root certificate is
itself the issuer of the client or end-entity certificate,
only one certificate is present.
This CMS structure MAY (as applicable where this type is
used) also contain suitably fresh (as defined by local
policy) revocation objects with which the device can
verify the revocation status of the certificates.
This CMS encodes the degenerate form of the SignedData
structure (RFC 5652, Section 5.2) that is commonly used
to disseminate X.509 certificates and revocation objects
(RFC 5280).";
reference
"RFC 5280:
Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile
RFC 5652:
Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)";
}
typedef end-entity-cert-cms {
type signed-data-cms;
description
"A CMS SignedData structure that MUST contain the end-entity
certificate itself and MAY contain any number
of intermediate certificates leading up to a trust
anchor certificate. The trust anchor certificate
MAY be included as well.
The CMS MUST contain a single end-entity certificate.
The CMS MUST NOT contain any spurious certificates.
This CMS structure MAY (as applicable where this type is
used) also contain suitably fresh (as defined by local
policy) revocation objects with which the device can
verify the revocation status of the certificates.
This CMS encodes the degenerate form of the SignedData
structure (RFC 5652, Section 5.2) that is commonly
used to disseminate X.509 certificates and revocation
objects (RFC 5280).";
reference
"RFC 5280:
Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile
RFC 5652:
Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)";
}
/*****************/
/* Groupings */
/*****************/
grouping encrypted-value-grouping {
description
"A reusable grouping for a value that has been encrypted by
a referenced symmetric or asymmetric key.";
container encrypted-by {
nacm:default-deny-write;
description
"An empty container enabling a reference to the key that
encrypted the value to be augmented in. The referenced
key MUST be a symmetric key or an asymmetric key.
A symmetric key MUST be referenced via a leaf node called
'symmetric-key-ref'. An asymmetric key MUST be referenced
via a leaf node called 'asymmetric-key-ref'.
The leaf nodes MUST be direct descendants in the data tree
and MAY be direct descendants in the schema tree (e.g.,
'choice'/'case' statements are allowed but not a
container).";
}
leaf encrypted-value-format {
type identityref {
base encrypted-value-format;
}
mandatory true;
description
"Identifies the format of the 'encrypted-value' leaf.
If 'encrypted-by' points to a symmetric key, then an
identity based on 'symmetrically-encrypted-value-format'
MUST be set (e.g., 'cms-encrypted-data-format').
If 'encrypted-by' points to an asymmetric key, then an
identity based on 'asymmetrically-encrypted-value-format'
MUST be set (e.g., 'cms-enveloped-data-format').";
}
leaf encrypted-value {
nacm:default-deny-write;
type binary;
must '../encrypted-by';
mandatory true;
description
"The value, encrypted using the referenced symmetric
or asymmetric key. The value MUST be encoded using
the format associated with the 'encrypted-value-format'
leaf.";
}
}
grouping password-grouping {
description
"A password used for authenticating to a remote system.
The 'ianach:crypt-hash' typedef from RFC 7317 should be
used instead when needing a password to authenticate a
local account.";
choice password-type {
nacm:default-deny-write;
mandatory true;
description
"Choice between password types.";
case cleartext-password {
if-feature "cleartext-passwords";
leaf cleartext-password {
nacm:default-deny-all;
type string;
description
"The cleartext value of the password.";
}
}
case encrypted-password {
if-feature "encrypted-passwords";
container encrypted-password {
description
"A container for the encrypted password value.";
uses encrypted-value-grouping;
}
}
}
}
grouping symmetric-key-grouping {
description
"A symmetric key.";
leaf key-format {
nacm:default-deny-write;
type identityref {
base symmetric-key-format;
}
description
"Identifies the symmetric key's format. Implementations
SHOULD ensure that the incoming symmetric key value is
encoded in the specified format. For encrypted keys, the value is the decrypted key's
format (i.e., the 'encrypted-value-format' conveys the
encrypted key's format).";
}
choice key-type {
nacm:default-deny-write;
mandatory true;
description
"Choice between key types.";
case cleartext-symmetric-key {
leaf cleartext-symmetric-key {
if-feature "cleartext-symmetric-keys";
nacm:default-deny-all;
type binary;
must '../key-format';
description
"The binary value of the key. The interpretation of
the value is defined by the 'key-format' field.";
}
}
case hidden-symmetric-key {
if-feature "hidden-symmetric-keys";
leaf hidden-symmetric-key {
type empty;
must 'not(../key-format)';
description
"A hidden key is not exportable and not extractable;
therefore, it is of type 'empty' as its value is
inaccessible via management interfaces. Though hidden
to users, such keys are not hidden to the server and
may be referenced by configuration to indicate which
key a server should use for a cryptographic operation.
How such keys are created is outside the scope of this
module.";
}
}
case encrypted-symmetric-key {
if-feature "encrypted-symmetric-keys";
container encrypted-symmetric-key {
must '../key-format';
description
"A container for the encrypted symmetric key value.
The interpretation of the 'encrypted-value' node
is via the 'key-format' node";
uses encrypted-value-grouping;
}
}
}
}
grouping public-key-grouping {
description
"A public key.";
leaf public-key-format {
nacm:default-deny-write;
type identityref {
base public-key-format;
}
mandatory true;
description
"Identifies the public key's format. Implementations SHOULD
ensure that the incoming public key value is encoded in the
specified format.";
}
leaf public-key {
nacm:default-deny-write;
type binary;
mandatory true;
description
"The binary value of the public key. The interpretation
of the value is defined by the 'public-key-format' field.";
}
}
grouping private-key-grouping {
description
"A private key.";
leaf private-key-format {
nacm:default-deny-write;
type identityref {
base private-key-format;
}
description
"Identifies the private key's format. Implementations SHOULD
ensure that the incoming private key value is encoded in the
specified format.
For encrypted keys, the value is the decrypted key's
format (i.e., the 'encrypted-value-format' conveys the
encrypted key's format).";
}
choice private-key-type {
nacm:default-deny-write;
mandatory true;
description
"Choice between key types.";
case cleartext-private-key {
if-feature "cleartext-private-keys";
leaf cleartext-private-key {
nacm:default-deny-all;
type binary;
must '../private-key-format';
description
"The value of the binary key. The key's value is
interpreted by the 'private-key-format' field.";
}
}
case hidden-private-key {
if-feature "hidden-private-keys";
leaf hidden-private-key {
type empty;
must 'not(../private-key-format)';
description
"A hidden key. It is of type 'empty' as its value is
inaccessible via management interfaces. Though hidden
to users, such keys are not hidden to the server and
may be referenced by configuration to indicate which
key a server should use for a cryptographic operation.
How such keys are created is outside the scope of this
module.";
}
}
case encrypted-private-key {
if-feature "encrypted-private-keys";
container encrypted-private-key {
must '../private-key-format';
description
"A container for the encrypted asymmetric private key
value. The interpretation of the 'encrypted-value'
node is via the 'private-key-format' node";
uses encrypted-value-grouping;
}
}
}
}
grouping asymmetric-key-pair-grouping {
description
"A private key and, optionally, its associated public key.
Implementations MUST ensure that the two keys, when both
are specified, are a matching pair.";
uses public-key-grouping {
refine "public-key-format" {
mandatory false;
}
refine "public-key" {
mandatory false;
}
}
uses private-key-grouping;
}
grouping certificate-expiration-grouping {
description
"A notification for when a certificate is about to expire or
has already expired.";
notification certificate-expiration {
if-feature "certificate-expiration-notification";
description
"A notification indicating that the configured certificate
is either about to expire or has already expired. When to
send notifications is an implementation-specific decision,
but it is RECOMMENDED that a notification be sent once a
month for 3 months, then once a week for four weeks, and
then once a day thereafter until the issue is resolved.
If the certificate's issuer maintains a Certificate
Revocation List (CRL), the expiration notification MAY
be sent if the CRL is about to expire.";
leaf expiration-date {
type yang:date-and-time;
mandatory true;
description
"Identifies the expiration date on the certificate.";
}
}
}
grouping trust-anchor-cert-grouping {
description
"A trust anchor certificate and a notification for when
it is about to expire or has already expired.";
leaf cert-data {
nacm:default-deny-all;
type trust-anchor-cert-cms;
description
"The binary certificate data for this certificate.";
}
uses certificate-expiration-grouping;
}
grouping end-entity-cert-grouping {
description
"An end-entity certificate and a notification for when
it is about to expire or has already expired. Implementations
SHOULD assert that, where used, the end-entity certificate
contains the expected public key.";
leaf cert-data {
nacm:default-deny-all;
type end-entity-cert-cms;
description
"The binary certificate data for this certificate.";
}
uses certificate-expiration-grouping;
}
grouping generate-csr-grouping {
description
"Defines the 'generate-csr' action.";
action generate-csr {
if-feature "csr-generation";
nacm:default-deny-all;
description
"Generates a certificate signing request structure for
the associated asymmetric key using the passed subject
and attribute values.
This 'action' statement is only available when the
associated 'public-key-format' node's value is
'subject-public-key-info-format'.";
input {
leaf csr-format {
type identityref {
base csr-format;
}
mandatory true;
description
"Specifies the format for the returned certificate.";
}
leaf csr-info {
type csr-info;
mandatory true;
description
"A CertificationRequestInfo structure, as defined in
RFC 2986.
Enables the client to provide a fully populated
CertificationRequestInfo structure that the server
only needs to sign in order to generate the complete
CertificationRequest structure to return in the
'output'.
The 'AlgorithmIdentifier' field contained inside
the 'SubjectPublicKeyInfo' field MUST be one known
to be supported by the device.";
reference
"RFC 2986:
PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax Specification
RFC 9640:
YANG Data Types and Groupings for Cryptography";
}
}
output {
choice csr-type {
mandatory true;
description
"A choice amongst certificate signing request formats.
Additional formats MAY be augmented into this 'choice'
statement by future efforts.";
case p10-csr {
leaf p10-csr {
type p10-csr;
description
"A CertificationRequest, as defined in RFC 2986.";
}
description
"A CertificationRequest, as defined in RFC 2986.";
reference
"RFC 2986:
PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax Specification
RFC 9640:
YANG Data Types and Groupings for Cryptography";
}
}
}
}
} // generate-csr-grouping
grouping asymmetric-key-pair-with-cert-grouping {
description
"A private/public key pair and an associated certificate.
Implementations MUST assert that the certificate contains
the matching public key.";
uses asymmetric-key-pair-grouping;
uses end-entity-cert-grouping;
uses generate-csr-grouping;
} // asymmetric-key-pair-with-cert-grouping
grouping asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping {
description
"A private/public key pair and a list of associated
certificates. Implementations MUST assert that
certificates contain the matching public key.";
uses asymmetric-key-pair-grouping;
container certificates {
nacm:default-deny-write;
description
"Certificates associated with this asymmetric key.";
list certificate {
key "name";
description
"A certificate for this asymmetric key.";
leaf name {
type string;
description
"An arbitrary name for the certificate.";
}
uses end-entity-cert-grouping {
refine "cert-data" {
mandatory true;
}
}
}
}
uses generate-csr-grouping;
} // asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping
}
<CODE ENDS>3. Security Considerations ✨
3.1. No Support for CRMF
okay so the "generate-csr" action in this doc is built on PKCS #10 [RFC2986] 🎀 that's the whole plan, bestie 💅
the Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF) [RFC4211] was also on the table 🧐 but it wasn't clear anyone actually wanted it, so it got left out 🙈 ngl that's a very mature call 💜
if people do end up wanting CRMF support later, a backwards compatible solution can be defined at that time 🦋 so the door stays open, periodt 🌈
3.2. No Support for Key Generation 🔑
okay so early versions of this doc had rpc statements for generating symmetric and asymmetric keys 🙈 but they got yeeted because the group literally could not agree on how to generically identify the key algorithm to use 💀. so the solution here only supports keys being configured through an external client 🎀
separate protocol-specific modules can totally present their own key-generating RPCs, like the generate-asymmetric-key-pair RPC in [RFC9644] and [RFC9645] 🧚
3.3. Unconstrained Public Key Usage 🦋
this module defines the public-key-grouping grouping, which lets you configure public keys with no constraints on their usage, e.g., what operations the key is allowed to be used for (encryption, verification, or both) 💅
the asymmetric-key-pair-grouping grouping uses the public-key-grouping grouping we just talked about and carries the same traits ✨
the asymmetric-key-pair-with-cert-grouping grouping uses the asymmetric-key-pair-grouping grouping, but here the associated certificates MUST constrain the usage of the public key according to local policy 🔒
3.4. Unconstrained Private Key Usage 🗝️
this module defines the asymmetric-key-pair-grouping grouping, which lets you configure private keys with no constraints on their usage, e.g., what operations the key is allowed to be used for (signature, decryption, or both) 🌸
the asymmetric-key-pair-with-cert-grouping grouping uses the asymmetric-key-pair-grouping grouping, and configured certificates (e.g., identity certificates) may constrain the use of the public key according to local policy 🫶
3.5. Cleartext Passwords and Keys 🙅♀️
the module in this document enables cleartext values for passwords and keys to be stored in the configuration database, but only when specific feature statements are enabled 👀. storing cleartext values for passwords and keys is NOT RECOMMENDED 💀
3.6. Encrypting Passwords and Keys 🔐
the module in this document lets cleartext passwords and keys get encrypted via another key, either symmetric or asymmetric 🎀. both formats use a CMS structure (EncryptedData and EnvelopedData, respectively), which allows any encryption algorithm to be used 🌈
to securely encrypt a password or key with a symmetric key, a proper block cipher mode, such as an Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) or Cipher Block Chaining (CBC), MUST be used 🧁. this makes sure that a random Initialization Vector (IV) is part of the input, which guarantees that encrypting the same password or key still produces a different, unpredictable ciphertext ✨. this avoids leaking that some encrypted keys or passwords are the same, and it makes it way harder to pre-generate rainbow tables to brute-force attack weak passwords 😤. the Electronic Codebook (ECB) block cipher mode MUST NOT be used 🚫
3.7. Deletion of Cleartext Key Values 🧹
this module defines storage for cleartext key values that SHOULD be zeroized when deleted, so that the remnants of their persisted storage locations can't be analyzed in any meaningful way 🫣
the cleartext key values are the cleartext-symmetric-key node defined in the symmetric-key-grouping grouping (Section 2.1.4.3) and the cleartext-private-key node defined in the asymmetric-key-pair-grouping grouping (Section 2.1.4.6) 🔑
3.8. Considerations for the "ietf-crypto-types" YANG Module 🧠
this section is modeled after the template defined in Section 3.7.1 of [RFC8407] 📝
the ietf-crypto-types YANG module defines grouping statements that are designed to be accessed via YANG-based management protocols, such as NETCONF [RFC6241] and RESTCONF [RFC8040]. both of these protocols have mandatory-to-implement secure transport layers (e.g., Secure Shell (SSH) [RFC4252], TLS [RFC8446], and QUIC [RFC9000]) and mandatory-to-implement mutual authentication 🤝
the Network Configuration Access Control Model (NACM) [RFC8341] gives you the means to restrict access for particular users to a preconfigured subset of all available protocol operations and content 🚪
since the module in this document only defines groupings, these considerations are mainly for the designers of other modules that use these groupings 💖
some of the readable data nodes in this YANG module may be considered sensitive or vulnerable in some network environments 😬. it is thus important to control read access (e.g., via get, get-config, or notification) to these data nodes. the following subtrees and data nodes have particular sensitivity/vulnerability 👇
- The
cleartext-passwordnode: thecleartext-passwordnode defined in thepassword-groupinggrouping is extra sensitive to read operations, so in normal use cases it should never be returned to a client 🙈. for this reason, the NACM extensiondefault-deny-allhas been applied to it. - The
cleartext-symmetric-keynode: thecleartext-symmetric-keynode defined in thesymmetric-key-groupinggrouping is extra sensitive to read operations, so in normal use cases it should never be returned to a client 🔐. for this reason, the NACM extensiondefault-deny-allhas been applied to it. - The
cleartext-private-keynode: thecleartext-private-keynode defined in theasymmetric-key-pair-groupinggrouping is extra sensitive to read operations, so in normal use cases it should never be returned to a client 😭. for this reason, the NACM extensiondefault-deny-allhas been applied to it. - The
cert-datanode: thecert-datanode defined in both thetrust-anchor-cert-groupingandend-entity-cert-groupinggroupings is extra sensitive to read operations, since certificates can give insight into which other resources, applications, or servers this particular server talks to, and can potentially spill personally identifying information (e.g., end-entity certificates) 👀. for this reason, the NACM extensiondefault-deny-allhas been applied to it.
all the writable data nodes defined by all the groupings in this module may be considered sensitive or vulnerable in some network environments 🚨. for instance, even modifying a public key or a certificate can dramatically alter the implemented security policy 💥. for this reason, the NACM extension default-deny-write has been applied to all the data nodes defined in the module 🛡️
some of the operations in this YANG module may be considered sensitive or vulnerable in some network environments, so it is thus important to control access to these operations. here's how they stack up 📋
generate-csr: thisactionstatement SHOULD only be executed by authorized users 🧑💻. for this reason, the NACM extensiondefault-deny-allhas been applied. note that NACM usesdefault-deny-allto protectrpcandactionstatements; it does not define, e.g., an extension calleddefault-deny-execute🤓.
for this action, it is RECOMMENDED that implementations assert channel binding [RFC5056] so as to ensure that the application layer that sent the request is the same as the device authenticated when the secure transport layer was established 🔗✨
4. IANA Considerations 🌷
4.1. The IETF XML Registry 📇
IANA has registered the following URI in the "ns" registry of the "IETF XML Registry" [RFC3688] 💜
URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-crypto-types
Registrant Contact: The IESG
XML: N/A; the requested URI is an XML namespace.4.2. The YANG Module Names Registry 🦋
IANA has registered the following YANG module in the "YANG Module Names" registry [RFC6020] 🎀
Name: ietf-crypto-types
Namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-crypto-types
Prefix: ct
Reference: RFC 96405. References 📚
5. References 📚
5.1. Normative References ✨
okay so these are the must-read references, bestie 💅 you need these to really get the spec, no cap.
[ITU.X680.2021] ITU-T, "Information technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1): Specification of basic notation", ITU-T Recommendation X.680, ISO/IEC 8824-1:2021, February 2021, <https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.680-202102-I>.
[ITU.X690.2021] ITU-T, "Information Technology - ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)", ITU-T Recommendation X.690, ISO/IEC 8825-1:2021, February 2021, <https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.690-202102-I>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC2986] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7", RFC 2986, DOI 10.17487/RFC2986, November 2000, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2986>.
[RFC4252] Ylonen, T. and C. Lonvick, Ed., "The Secure Shell (SSH) Authentication Protocol", RFC 4252, DOI 10.17487/RFC4252, January 2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4252>.
[RFC4253] Ylonen, T. and C. Lonvick, Ed., "The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol", RFC 4253, DOI 10.17487/RFC4253, January 2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4253>.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
[RFC5652] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70, RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5652>.
[RFC5915] Turner, S. and D. Brown, "Elliptic Curve Private Key Structure", RFC 5915, DOI 10.17487/RFC5915, June 2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5915>.
[RFC5958] Turner, S., "Asymmetric Key Packages", RFC 5958, DOI 10.17487/RFC5958, August 2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5958>.
[RFC6031] Turner, S. and R. Housley, "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) Symmetric Key Package Content Type", RFC 6031, DOI 10.17487/RFC6031, December 2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6031>.
[RFC6241] Enns, R., Ed., Bjorklund, M., Ed., Schoenwaelder, J., Ed., and A. Bierman, Ed., "Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6241, DOI 10.17487/RFC6241, June 2011, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6241>.
[RFC6960] Santesson, S., Myers, M., Ankney, R., Malpani, A., Galperin, S., and C. Adams, "X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP", RFC 6960, DOI 10.17487/RFC6960, June 2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6960>.
[RFC6991] Schoenwaelder, J., Ed., "Common YANG Data Types", RFC 6991, DOI 10.17487/RFC6991, July 2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6991>.
[RFC7093] Turner, S., Kent, S., and J. Manger, "Additional Methods for Generating Key Identifiers Values", RFC 7093, DOI 10.17487/RFC7093, December 2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7093>.
[RFC7950] Bjorklund, M., Ed., "The YANG 1.1 Data Modeling Language", RFC 7950, DOI 10.17487/RFC7950, August 2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7950>.
[RFC8017] Moriarty, K., Ed., Kaliski, B., Jonsson, J., and A. Rusch, "PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2", RFC 8017, DOI 10.17487/RFC8017, November 2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8017>.
[RFC8040] Bierman, A., Bjorklund, M., and K. Watsen, "RESTCONF Protocol", RFC 8040, DOI 10.17487/RFC8040, January 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8040>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8341] Bierman, A. and M. Bjorklund, "Network Configuration Access Control Model", STD 91, RFC 8341, DOI 10.17487/RFC8341, March 2018, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8341>.
[RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.
[RFC9000] Iyengar, J., Ed. and M. Thomson, Ed., "QUIC: A UDP-Based Multiplexed and Secure Transport", RFC 9000, DOI 10.17487/RFC9000, May 2021, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9000>.
5.2. Informative References 🦋
these ones are the extra context refs, so they're not required reading, but they're giving so much background 🧚
[HTTP-CLIENT-SERVER] Watsen, K., "YANG Groupings for HTTP Clients and HTTP Servers", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-netconf-http-client-server-23, 15 August 2024, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-netconf-http-client-server-23>.
[NETCONF-CLIENT-SERVER] Watsen, K., "NETCONF Client and Server Models", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-netconf-netconf-client-server-37, 14 August 2024, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-netconf-netconf-client-server-37>.
[RESTCONF-CLIENT-SERVER] Watsen, K., "RESTCONF Client and Server Models", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-netconf-restconf-client-server-38, 14 August 2024, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-netconf-restconf-client-server-38>.
[RFC3688] Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688, DOI 10.17487/RFC3688, January 2004, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3688>.
[RFC4211] Schaad, J., "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)", RFC 4211, DOI 10.17487/RFC4211, September 2005, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4211>.
[RFC5056] Williams, N., "On the Use of Channel Bindings to Secure Channels", RFC 5056, DOI 10.17487/RFC5056, November 2007, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5056>.
[RFC6020] Bjorklund, M., Ed., "YANG - A Data Modeling Language for the Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6020, DOI 10.17487/RFC6020, October 2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6020>.
[RFC7317] Bierman, A. and M. Bjorklund, "A YANG Data Model for System Management", RFC 7317, DOI 10.17487/RFC7317, August 2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7317>.
[RFC8259] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data Interchange Format", STD 90, RFC 8259, DOI 10.17487/RFC8259, December 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8259>.
[RFC8340] Bjorklund, M. and L. Berger, Ed., "YANG Tree Diagrams", BCP 215, RFC 8340, DOI 10.17487/RFC8340, March 2018, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8340>.
[RFC8342] Bjorklund, M., Schoenwaelder, J., Shafer, P., Watsen, K., and R. Wilton, "Network Management Datastore Architecture (NMDA)", RFC 8342, DOI 10.17487/RFC8342, March 2018, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8342>.
[RFC8407] Bierman, A., "Guidelines for Authors and Reviewers of Documents Containing YANG Data Models", BCP 216, RFC 8407, DOI 10.17487/RFC8407, October 2018, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8407>.
[RFC8792] Watsen, K., Auerswald, E., Farrel, A., and Q. Wu, "Handling Long Lines in Content of Internet-Drafts and RFCs", RFC 8792, DOI 10.17487/RFC8792, June 2020, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8792>.
[RFC9641] Watsen, K., "A YANG Data Model for a Truststore", RFC 9641, DOI 10.17487/RFC9641, October 2024, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9641>.
[RFC9642] Watsen, K., "A YANG Data Model for a Keystore", RFC 9642, DOI 10.17487/RFC9642, October 2024, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9642>.
[RFC9643] Watsen, K. and M. Scharf, "YANG Groupings for TCP Clients and TCP Servers", RFC 9643, DOI 10.17487/RFC9643, October 2024, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9643>.
[RFC9644] Watsen, K., "YANG Groupings for SSH Clients and SSH Servers", RFC 9644, DOI 10.17487/RFC9644, October 2024, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9644>.
[RFC9645] Watsen, K., "YANG Groupings for TLS Clients and TLS Servers", RFC 9645, DOI 10.17487/RFC9645, October 2024, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9645>.
[W3C.REC-xml-20081126] Bray, T., Paoli, J., Sperberg-McQueen, C.M., Maler, E., and F. Yergeau, "Extensible Markup Language (XML) 1.0 (Fifth Edition)", World Wide Web Consortium Recommendation REC-xml-20081126, November 2008, <https://www.w3.org/TR/2008/REC-xml-20081126/>.
Acknowledgements 🫶
The authors would like to thank the following for lively discussions on list and in the halls (ordered by first name): Balázs Kovács, Carsten Bormann, Dale Worley, Eric Voit, Éric Vyncke, Francesca Palombini, Jürgen Schönwälder, Lars Eggert, Liang Xia, Mahesh Jethanandani, Martin Björklund, Murray Kucherawy, Nick Hancock, Orie Steele, Paul Wouters, Rich Salz, Rifaat Shekh-Yusef, Rob Wilton, Roman Danyliw, Russ Housley, Sandra Murphy, Tom Petch, Valery Smyslov, Wang Haiguang, Warren Kumari, and Zaheduzzaman Sarker. 💜
Author's Address 🎀
Kent Watsen Watsen Networks Email: kent+ietf@watsen.net
📦 where this page comes from
- ietf: rfc9640 2024-10
- 💖 girlified by claude-haiku-5-5 on : a language model's rewrite of the original, under its terms