RFC 9607
RTP Payload Format for the Secure Communication Interoperability Protocol (SCIP) Codec
RFC 9607 π RTP Payload Format for the Secure Communication Interoperability Protocol (SCIP) Codec π
okay bestie, let's get into this one π§β¨ it's an IETF Standards Track doc, so it's officially an Internet standard, no cap π. it's from July 2024 and it's written by D. Hanson, M. Faller, and K. Maver, all from General Dynamics Mission Systems, Inc. π the ISSN is 2070-1721. it doesn't obsolete or update any other RFCs, so it's a fresh start πΈ
the whole thing is about how to carry SCIP traffic inside RTP packets. SCIP is an application-layer protocol that handles end-to-end session setup, encrypts the payload, packetizes and depacketizes the media, and gives you reliable transport π₯. the doc is meant to be a globally available reference for network gear makers, buyers, and anyone policy-adjacent π¦
IESG Note β
The IESG note is a big deal, so read it twice π
this spec depends on a second technical spec, [SCIP210], that is not publicly available. so the IETF wasn't able to do a full security review of it, either on its own or inside Audio/Video Transport (AVT) π. implementers should know that the IETF can't verify any of the security claims in this document π
Status of This Memo π
this is an Internet Standards Track document π. it's a product of the IETF, it has the consensus of the IETF community, it went through public review, and the IESG approved it for publication π. for more on Internet Standards, check Section 2 of RFC 7841 β¨. the current status, errata, and feedback info live at https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9607 π
Copyright Notice π«Ά
Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. π
this doc is covered by BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) as of the publication date. please actually read those, because they spell out your rights and restrictions π any Code Components pulled out of this doc have to include the Revised BSD License text, as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions, and they come with no warranty, per the Revised BSD License π₯
Table of Contents π¦
1. Key Points
2. Introduction
2.1. Conventions
2.2. Abbreviations
3. Background
4. Payload Format
4.1. RTP Header Fields
4.2. Congestion Control Considerations
4.3. Use of Augmented RTPs with SCIP
5. Payload Format Parameters
5.1. Media Subtype "audio/scip"
5.2. Media Subtype "video/scip"
5.3. Mapping to SDP
5.4. SDP Offer/Answer Considerations
6. Security Considerations
7. IANA Considerations
8. SCIP Contact Information
9. References
9.1. Normative References
9.2. Informative References
Authors' Addresses
1. Key Points π
- SCIP is an application-layer protocol that uses RTP as its transport π§. this doc defines the SCIP media subtypes you list in SDP, and it only needs a basic RTP transport channel for SCIP payloads π. that basic channel is comparable to Clearmode, as defined in [RFC4040] β¨
- SCIP sends encrypted traffic and does not need Secure RTP (SRTP) for payload protection π₯. it also does reliable transport at the application layer, so there's no need to negotiate RTCP retransmission capabilities π
- SCIP has built-in mechanisms to negotiate protocol message versions and capabilities πΈ. to avoid SCIP protocol ossification (as described in [RFC9170]), middleboxes MUST NOT attempt to parse the SCIP payload π. as this doc explains, that parsing serves no useful purpose π
- SCIP is network agnostic π¦. it can run over any digital link, including non-IP modem-based PSTN and ISDN π. the SCIP media subtypes in this doc were built for SCIP to run over RTP π
- SCIP handles packetization and depacketization by producing encrypted media packets that are no greater than the MTU size π. the SCIP payload is opaque to the network, so SCIP acts as a tunneling protocol for encrypted media, and middleboxes don't need to parse SCIP payloads π§. since SCIP payloads are integrity protected, any modification gets flagged as an integrity violation by SCIP endpoints, which leads to communication failure π
2. Introduction π
this doc details how the "audio/scip" and "video/scip" pseudo-codecs [MediaTypes] are used as a secure session establishment protocol and a media transport protocol over RTP β¨
it covers how:
- encrypted audio and video codec payloads are carried over RTP π¦;
- the IP network layer does not implement SCIP as a protocol, since SCIP runs at the application layer in endpoints π ;
- the IP network layer lets SCIP traffic pass through the network transparently π;
- some network devices don't recognize SCIP and may strip the SCIP codecs from the SDP media payload declaration before forwarding to the next network node π; and finally,
- SCIP endpoint devices don't work on networks where the SCIP media subtype has been removed from the SDP media payload declaration π.
the United States, along with its NATO partners, has implemented SCIP in secure voice, video, and data products running on commercial, private, and tactical IP networks worldwide, using the scip media subtype πΊπΈπ₯. the SCIP data on the network is encrypted, so in-line network equipment can't interpret the traffic stream in any way π. SCIP-based RTP traffic is opaque and can vary a lot in structure and frequency, which makes traffic profiling not possible π«Ά. also, since SCIP keeps evolving independently of this doc, any network device that tries to filter traffic (for example, with deep packet inspection) may cause unintended consequences later, when changes to SCIP traffic aren't recognized by that device π
the SCIP protocol defined in SCIP-210 [SCIP210] has built-in support for packetization and depacketization, retransmission, capability exchange, version negotiation, and payload encryption π§. since the traffic is encrypted, neither the RTP transport nor middleboxes can usefully parse or modify SCIP payloads π. modifications are detected as integrity violations, which result in retransmission and, eventually, communication failure β¨
because you don't need to know the SCIP payload format to carry SCIP signaling or media through middleboxes, SCIP-210 is an informative reference πΈ. older versions of the SCIP-210 spec are publicly available, but the authors strongly encourage network implementers to treat SCIP payloads as opaque octets π¦. when you do that correctly, you don't need to look at SCIP-210 at all π . any assumptions about the format of SCIP messages defined in SCIP-210 are likely to cause protocol ossification and communication failures as the protocol evolves π
Note: The IETF has not conducted a security review of SCIP, so it hasn't verified the claims in this document π
2.1. Conventions π
the key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] only when they appear in all capitals, as shown here π
the best current practices for writing an RTP payload format spec, per [RFC2736] and [RFC8088], were followed β¨
when referring to the Secure Communication Interoperability Protocol, use the uppercase acronym "SCIP" π«Ά. when referring to the media subtype scip, use lowercase "scip" π
2.2. Abbreviations π
the following abbreviations are used in this document π§
AVP: Audio-Visual Profile
AVPF: Audio-Visual Profile with Feedback
FNBDT: Future Narrowband Digital Terminal
ICWG: Interoperability Control Working Group
IICWG: International Interoperability Control Working Group
MELPe: Mixed Excitation Linear Prediction Enhanced
MTU: Maximum Transmission Unit
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OEM: Original Equipment Manufacturer
SAVP: Secure Audio-Visual Profile
SAVPF: Secure Audio-Visual Profile with Feedback
SCIP: Secure Communication Interoperability Protocol
SDP: Session Description Protocol
SRTP: Secure Real-time Transport Protocol
STANAG: Standardization Agreement
to be continued in part 2, bestie ππ§ keep an eye out!
3. Background β¨
okay so SCIP (Secure Communication Interoperability Protocol) is basically the queen of negotiating secure voice, data, and video apps π with all kinds of crypto suites. It's also been super widely accepted as a secure comms protocol, and it's giving reliable π
SCIP started in the US as the Future Narrowband Digital Terminal (FNBDT) Protocol in the late 1990s π¦ A combined U.S. Department of Defense and vendor consortium formed a governing org called the Interoperability Control Working Group (ICWG) to manage it. Then the group grew to include NATO, NATO partners, and European vendors, under the name International Interoperability Control Working Group (IICWG). That was later renamed the SCIP Working Group πΈ
First-gen SCIP devices ran on circuit-switched networks. Then SCIP expanded to radio and IP networks π The scip media subtype carries SCIP secure session establishment signaling and secure application traffic. The built-in negotiation and flexibility of the SCIP protocols make it a natural pick for lots of scenarios that need secure apps and their encryption suites π«Ά NATO adopted SCIP in STANAG 5068 π₯ SCIP standards are currently available to participating government and military communities and select OEMs of equipment that supports SCIP.
BUT (and this is a big but π) SCIP has to work over global networks, including private and commercial ones. If a network doesn't have the info needed to support SCIP, some networks might not support the SCIP media subtypes at all. Problems can pop up just because that info isn't as easy to get for OEMs, network admins, and network architects π
This document gives the essential info about the audio/scip and video/scip media subtypes. That lets network equipment manufacturers list "scip" as a known audio and video media subtype in their gear π§ Then network admins can write and carry out a compatible security policy that includes audio/scip and video/scip as permitted codecs on the network. β¨
All current IP-based SCIP endpoints implement "scip" as a media subtype. Registering scip as a media subtype gives manufacturers one common reference to recognize SCIP in an SDP payload declaration. Iconic, honestly π
4. Payload Format π
The scip media subtype identifies and indicates support for SCIP traffic carried over RTP. The network MUST NOT perform transcoding, lossy compression, or other data modifications on the SCIP RTP payload π Inside the network, including the VoIP network, audio/scip and video/scip data streams MUST be a transparent relay and get treated as "clear-channel data," similar to the Clearmode media subtype defined by [RFC4040] π
[RFC4040] gets referenced because Clearmode doesn't define specific RTP payload content, packet size, or packet intervals. What it does is let Clearmode devices signal that they support a compatible mode of operation, and it defines a transparent channel where devices can talk to each other. This document takes a similar approach π¦ Network devices that support SCIP need to let SCIP endpoints signal that they support SCIP, and give them a transparent channel to communicate on π«Ά
SCIP is an application-layer protocol defined in SCIP-210. SCIP traffic is made of encrypted SCIP control messages and codec data. The payload size and interval vary a LOT depending on the state of the SCIP protocol inside the SCIP device π
Figure 1 shows the RTP payload format for SCIP π
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| RTP Header |
+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+
| |
| SCIP Payload |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 1: SCIP RTP Payload Format
The SCIP codec produces an encrypted bitstream that gets carried over RTP. Unlike other codecs, SCIP doesn't have its own upper layer syntax (for example, no Network Adaptation Layer (NAL) units) π Instead, it encrypts the output of the audio and video codecs it uses (like G.729D, H.264 [RFC6184], and so on). SCIP does this by encapsulating the encrypted codec output, which was already formatted according to the relevant RTP payload spec for that codec β¨ SCIP endpoints MAY employ mechanisms, like inter-media RTP synchronization as described in [RFC8088], Section 3.3.4, to synchronize audio/scip and video/scip streams π
Figure 2 shows, in a notional way, how codec packets and SCIP control messages get packetized for transmission over RTP π§
+-----------+ +-----------------------+
| Codec | | SCIP control messages |
+-----------+ +-----------------------+
| |
| |
V V
+--------------------------------------------------+
| Packetizer* (<= MTU size) |
+--------------------------------------------------+
| |
| |
V |
+--------------+ |
| Encryption | |
+--------------+ |
| |
| |
V V
+--------------------------------------------------+
| RTP |
+--------------------------------------------------+
Figure 2: SCIP RTP Architecture
*Packetizer: The SCIP application layer makes sure all traffic sent to the RTP layer doesn't go over the MTU size. The receiving SCIP RTP layer handles packet identification, ordering, and reassembly. When it's needed, the SCIP application layer also handles error detection and retransmission π«Ά
As described above, the SCIP RTP payload format is variable, so it can't be described with specifics in this document. You can find the details in SCIP-210 π¦ SCIP will keep evolving, so SCIP RTP traffic MUST NOT be filtered by network devices based on what's currently observed or documented π ββοΈ This document's focus is for network devices to treat the SCIP RTP payload as opaque and let it traverse the network. Network devices MUST NOT modify SCIP RTP packets π
4.1. RTP Header Fields π
The SCIP RTP header fields SHALL conform to [RFC3550] πΈ
SCIP traffic can be continuous or discontinuous. The Timestamp field MUST increment based on the sampling clock for discontinuous transmission, as described in [RFC3550], Section 5.1 β For continuous transmission applications, the Timestamp field depends on the sampling rate of the media, as specified in the media subtype's spec (for example, Mixed Excitation Linear Prediction Enhanced (MELPe)). Heads up: during a SCIP session, both discontinuous and continuous traffic are highly probable π
The Marker bit SHALL be set to zero for discontinuous traffic. The Marker bit for continuous traffic follows the underlying media subtype spec. The underlying media is opaque within SCIP RTP packets π₯
4.2. Congestion Control Considerations π
The bitrate of SCIP may be adjusted depending on what the underlying codec can do (like MELPe [RFC8130], G.729D [RFC3551], and so on). The number of encoded audio frames per packet can also be adjusted to control congestion. Discontinuous transmission can also be used if the underlying codec supports it π§
Since UDP doesn't provide congestion control, applications that use RTP over UDP SHOULD implement their own congestion control above the UDP layer [RFC8085], and they MAY also implement a transport circuit breaker [RFC8083] π The RTP Media Congestion Avoidance Techniques (RMCAT) working group [RMCAT] describes the interactions and conceptual interfaces needed between the application components related to congestion control. That covers the RTP layer, the higher-level media codec control layer, and the lower-level transport interface, plus the components dedicated to congestion control functions π¦
Using the packet loss feedback mechanisms in AVPF [RFC4585] and SAVPF [RFC5124] is OPTIONAL, because SCIP itself manages retransmissions of some errored or lost packets π Specifically, the payload-specific feedback messages defined in [RFC4585], Section 6.3 are OPTIONAL when transporting video data π«Ά
4.3. Use of Augmented RTPs with SCIP π
The SCIP application-layer protocol uses RTP as a basic transport for the audio/scip and video/scip payloads. Extra RTPs that don't modify the SCIP payload are considered OPTIONAL in this document, and it's up to the SCIP device vendor whether to implement them. Some examples include, but aren't limited to:
- "RTP Payload Format for Generic Forward Error Correction" [RFC5109]
- "Multiplexing RTP Data and Control Packets on a Single Port" [RFC5761]
- "Symmetric RTP / RTP Control Protocol (RTCP)" [RFC4961]
- "Negotiating Media Multiplexing Using the Session Description Protocol (SDP)" a.k.a. BUNDLE [RFC9143]
5. Payload Format Parameters πΈ
The SCIP RTP payload format is identified using the scip media subtype, which is registered in accordance with [RFC4855] and per the media type registration template from [RFC6838] π A clock rate of 8000 Hz SHALL be used for audio/scip. A clock rate of 90000 Hz SHALL be used for video/scip β
5.1. Media Subtype "audio/scip" π¦
The registration template for audio/scip is below, verbatim π
Type name: audio
Subtype name: scip
Required parameters: N/A
Optional parameters: N/A
Encoding considerations: Binary. This media subtype is only defined
for transfer via RTP. There SHALL be no transcoding of the audio
stream as it traverses the network.
Security considerations: See Section 6.
Interoperability considerations: N/A
Published specification: [SCIP210]
Applications that use this media type: N/A
Fragment identifier considerations: none
Additional information:
Deprecated alias names for this type: N/A
Magic number(s): N/A
File extension(s): N/A
Macintosh file type code(s): N/A
Person & email address to contact for further information: Michael
Faller (michael.faller@gd-ms.com or MichaelFFaller@gmail.com) and
Daniel Hanson (dan.hanson@gd-ms.com)
Intended usage: COMMON
Restrictions on usage: N/A
Authors: Michael Faller (michael.faller@gd-ms.com or
MichaelFFaller@gmail.com) and Daniel Hanson (dan.hanson@gd-ms.com)
Change controller: SCIP Working Group (ncia.cis3@ncia.nato.int)
5.2. Media Subtype "video/scip" π₯β¨
Okay bestie, this is the registration template for the video one. Here it is exactly as written:
Type name: video
Subtype name: scip
Required parameters: N/A
Optional parameters: N/A
Encoding considerations: Binary. This media subtype is only defined
for transfer via RTP. There SHALL be no transcoding of the video
stream as it traverses the network.
Security considerations: See Section 6.
Interoperability considerations: N/A
Published specification: [SCIP210]
Applications that use this media type: N/A
Fragment identifier considerations: none
Additional information:
Deprecated alias names for this type: N/A
Magic number(s): N/A
File extension(s): N/A
Macintosh file type code(s): N/A
Person & email address to contact for further information: Michael
Faller (michael.faller@gd-ms.com or MichaelFFaller@gmail.com) and
Daniel Hanson (dan.hanson@gd-ms.com)
Intended usage: COMMON
Restrictions on usage: N/A
Authors: Michael Faller (michael.faller@gd-ms.com or
MichaelFFaller@gmail.com) and Daniel Hanson (dan.hanson@gd-ms.com)
Change controller: SCIP Working Group (ncia.cis3@ncia.nato.int)
The big one in there is the SHALL: video has to go over RTP, and it must never get transcoded on its way across the network. Zero sneaky re-encoding allowed π ββοΈπ
5.3. Mapping to SDP πΈ
Now we map all of this onto SDP. The payload format media subtype and its parameters SHALL be implemented according to Section 3 of [RFC4855], no exceptions π«Ά
Here's the vibe: SCIP already has its own capabilities exchange built in, so SDP only needs to negotiate that SCIP is in use during Offer/Answer. The actual codecs getting wrapped inside SCIP get sorted out later through SCIP control messages. Efficient and iconic π
The media type info has a specific home in the Session Description Protocol (SDP) [RFC8866], which is what everyone uses to describe RTP sessions. When SDP is describing a session that uses the SCIP codec, here's where everything goes:
- The media type ("audio") goes in SDP
m=as the media name foraudio/scip, and the media type ("video") goes in SDPm=as the media name forvideo/scip. π§πΉ - The media subtype ("scip") goes in SDP
a=rtpmapas the encoding name. The required parameter "rate" also goes ina=rtpmap, but as the clock rate β±οΈ - The optional parameters "ptime" and "maxptime" go in the SDP
a=ptimeanda=maxptimeattributes, respectively β¨
Example mapping for audio/scip:
m=audio 50000 RTP/AVP 96
a=rtpmap:96 scip/8000
Example mapping for video/scip:
m=video 50002 RTP/AVP 97
a=rtpmap:97 scip/90000
And if you want both audio and video in one go:
m=audio 50000 RTP/AVP 96
a=rtpmap:96 scip/8000
m=video 50002 RTP/AVP 97
a=rtpmap:97 scip/90000
5.4. SDP Offer/Answer Considerations π¦
Following the SDP Offer/Answer model [RFC3264], the SCIP device SHALL list the SCIP payload type number in order of preference in the "m" media line. Preference order matters, babe π
For example, here's an SDP Offer where scip is the preferred audio media subtype:
m=audio 50000 RTP/AVP 96 0 8
a=rtpmap:96 scip/8000
a=rtpmap:0 PCMU/8000
a=rtpmap:8 PCMA/8000
6. Security Considerations ππ
Okay, security is serious business, so let's do this properly π₯Ή
RTP packets using the payload format defined here are subject to the security considerations in the RTP specification [RFC3550], plus anything in whatever RTP profile you're running, like RTP/AVP [RFC3551], RTP/AVPF [RFC4585], RTP/SAVP [RFC3711], or RTP/SAVPF [RFC5124]. BUT, as "Securing the RTP Framework: Why RTP Does Not Mandate a Single Media Security Solution" [RFC7202] explains, it is NOT the payload format's job to pick or require the solutions that handle basic security goals like confidentiality, integrity, and source authenticity for RTP in general. That responsibility belongs to whoever is building the application using RTP π If you need guidance on the available security mechanisms and what to keep in mind, check out "Options for Securing RTP Sessions" [RFC7201].
Applications SHOULD use one or more appropriate strong security mechanisms. Not optional energy, that's a strong recommendation π€
The rest of this section talks about the security properties of the payload format itself.
This RTP payload format and its media decoder don't show any significant non-uniformity in receiver-side computational complexity for packet processing. So they don't inherently pose a denial-of-service threat from pathological data, and the payload format doesn't carry any active content π‘οΈ
Here's a big one: SCIP only encrypts the contents carried in the RTP payload. It does NOT protect the RTP header or RTCP packets. If your application needs extra protection for RTP headers and/or RTCP, you might look at mechanisms like SRTP [RFC3711]. Those extra mechanisms are considered OPTIONAL in this document, though π
7. IANA Considerations π
The "audio/scip" and "video/scip" media subtypes were already registered in the "Media Types" registry [MediaTypes]. IANA has updated those registrations to point at this document. Tidy and official π
8. SCIP Contact Information π
The SCIP protocol is looked after by the SCIP Working Group. If you want the current SCIP-210 specification [SCIP210], you can request it from the email address below π¬
SCIP Working Group, CIS3 Partnership
NATO Communications and Information Agency
Oude Waalsdorperweg 61
2597 AK The Hague, Netherlands
Email: ncia.cis3@ncia.nato.int
There's also an older public version of the SCIP-210 specification, which you can download from https://www.iad.gov/SecurePhone/index.cfm. Heads up: a U.S. Department of Defense Root Certificate should be installed before you can access that website π
9. References π
9.1. Normative References π§
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC2736] Handley, M. and C. Perkins, "Guidelines for Writers of RTP
Payload Format Specifications", BCP 36, RFC 2736,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2736, December 1999,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2736>.
[RFC3264] Rosenberg, J. and H. Schulzrinne, "An Offer/Answer Model
with Session Description Protocol (SDP)", RFC 3264,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3264, June 2002,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3264>.
[RFC3550] Schulzrinne, H., Casner, S., Frederick, R., and V.
Jacobson, "RTP: A Transport Protocol for Real-Time
Applications", STD 64, RFC 3550, DOI 10.17487/RFC3550,
July 2003, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3550>.
[RFC3551] Schulzrinne, H. and S. Casner, "RTP Profile for Audio and
Video Conferences with Minimal Control", STD 65, RFC 3551,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3551, July 2003,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3551>.
[RFC3711] Baugher, M., McGrew, D., Naslund, M., Carrara, E., and K.
Norrman, "The Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP)",
RFC 3711, DOI 10.17487/RFC3711, March 2004,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3711>.
[RFC4585] Ott, J., Wenger, S., Sato, N., Burmeister, C., and J. Rey,
"Extended RTP Profile for Real-time Transport Control
Protocol (RTCP)-Based Feedback (RTP/AVPF)", RFC 4585,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4585, July 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4585>.
[RFC5124] Ott, J. and E. Carrara, "Extended Secure RTP Profile for
Real-time Transport Control Protocol (RTCP)-Based Feedback
(RTP/SAVPF)", RFC 5124, DOI 10.17487/RFC5124, February
2008, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5124>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8866] Begen, A., Kyzivat, P., Perkins, C., and M. Handley, "SDP:
Session Description Protocol", RFC 8866,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8866, January 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8866>.
9.2. Informative References β¨
okay bestie, these are the receipts π§Ύ the informative ones are the "go read this if you want the deeper lore" list ππ«Ά
[MediaTypes]
IANA, "Media Types",
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/media-types>.
[RFC4040] Kreuter, R., "RTP Payload Format for a 64 kbit/s
Transparent Call", RFC 4040, DOI 10.17487/RFC4040, April
2005, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4040>.
[RFC4855] Casner, S., "Media Type Registration of RTP Payload
Formats", RFC 4855, DOI 10.17487/RFC4855, February 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4855>.
[RFC4961] Wing, D., "Symmetric RTP / RTP Control Protocol (RTCP)",
BCP 131, RFC 4961, DOI 10.17487/RFC4961, July 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4961>.
[RFC5109] Li, A., Ed., "RTP Payload Format for Generic Forward Error
Correction", RFC 5109, DOI 10.17487/RFC5109, December
2007, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5109>.
[RFC5761] Perkins, C. and M. Westerlund, "Multiplexing RTP Data and
Control Packets on a Single Port", RFC 5761,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5761, April 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5761>.
[RFC6184] Wang, Y.-K., Even, R., Kristensen, T., and R. Jesup, "RTP
Payload Format for H.264 Video", RFC 6184,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6184, May 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6184>.
[RFC6838] Freed, N., Klensin, J., and T. Hansen, "Media Type
Specifications and Registration Procedures", BCP 13,
RFC 6838, DOI 10.17487/RFC6838, January 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6838>.
[RFC7201] Westerlund, M. and C. Perkins, "Options for Securing RTP
Sessions", RFC 7201, DOI 10.17487/RFC7201, April 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7201>.
[RFC7202] Perkins, C. and M. Westerlund, "Securing the RTP
Framework: Why RTP Does Not Mandate a Single Media
Security Solution", RFC 7202, DOI 10.17487/RFC7202, April
2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7202>.
[RFC8083] Perkins, C. and V. Singh, "Multimedia Congestion Control:
Circuit Breakers for Unicast RTP Sessions", RFC 8083,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8083, March 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8083>.
[RFC8085] Eggert, L., Fairhurst, G., and G. Shepherd, "UDP Usage
Guidelines", BCP 145, RFC 8085, DOI 10.17487/RFC8085,
March 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8085>.
[RFC8088] Westerlund, M., "How to Write an RTP Payload Format",
RFC 8088, DOI 10.17487/RFC8088, May 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8088>.
[RFC8130] Demjanenko, V. and D. Satterlee, "RTP Payload Format for
the Mixed Excitation Linear Prediction Enhanced (MELPe)
Codec", RFC 8130, DOI 10.17487/RFC8130, March 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8130>.
[RFC9143] Holmberg, C., Alvestrand, H., and C. Jennings,
"Negotiating Media Multiplexing Using the Session
Description Protocol (SDP)", RFC 9143,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9143, February 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9143>.
[RFC9170] Thomson, M. and T. Pauly, "Long-Term Viability of Protocol
Extension Mechanisms", RFC 9170, DOI 10.17487/RFC9170,
December 2021, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9170>.
[RMCAT] IETF, "RTP Media Congestion Avoidance Techniques (rmcat)",
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/rmcat/about>.
[SCIP210] SCIP Working Group, "SCIP Signaling Plan, SCIP-210".
Available by request via email to
<ncia.cis3@ncia.nato.int>.
Authors' Addresses π
these are the people who wrote it, the GD Mission Systems crew π¦ their contact details are right here, verbatim:
Daniel Hanson
General Dynamics Mission Systems, Inc.
150 Rustcraft Road
Dedham, MA 02026
United States of America
Email: dan.hanson@gd-ms.com
Michael Faller
General Dynamics Mission Systems, Inc.
150 Rustcraft Road
Dedham, MA 02026
United States of America
Email: michael.faller@gd-ms.com, MichaelFFaller@gmail.com
Keith Maver
General Dynamics Mission Systems, Inc.
150 Rustcraft Road
Dedham, MA 02026
United States of America
Email: keith.maver@gd-ms.com
and that's the whole spec, babe ππ β¨
π¦ where this page comes from
- ietf: rfc9607 2024-07
- π girlified by claude-haiku-5-5 on : a language model's rewrite of the original, under its terms