RFC 9516

Active Operations, Administration, and Maintenance (OAM) for Service Function Chaining (SFC)

๐Ÿ“… published November 2023, from ietf

Active Operations, Administration, and Maintenance (OAM) for Service Function Chaining (SFC) ๐Ÿฆ‹

Title block tea โ˜•: this is RFC 9516, published by the IETF in November 2023 and written by G. Mirsky (Ericsson), W. Meng (ZTE Corporation), T. Ao (China Mobile), B. Khasnabish, K. Leung (Individual Contributor), and G. Mishra (Verizon Inc.). It's a Standards Track doc (the ISSN is 2070-1721), and the header doesn't list anything it obsoletes or updates. ๐Ÿ’…

Abstract

Okay so the abstract is giving "here's the plan" ๐ŸŽ€. This doc presents a set of requirements for active Operations, Administration, and Maintenance (OAM) for Service Function Chaining (SFC) in a network. Based on those requirements, it describes two things: how active OAM messages get encapsulated in SFC, and a mechanism for detecting and localizing defects. Iconic. โœจ

Status of This Memo

This is an Internet Standards Track document, bestie ๐Ÿ‘‘

It's a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), so it represents the consensus of the IETF community. It went through public review and got approved for publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). If you want more on Internet Standards, check Section 2 of RFC 7841 ๐ŸŒธ

For the current status, any errata, and how to send feedback, go to https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9516 ๐Ÿงš

Copyright (c) 2023 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. ๐Ÿ”’

This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) as they stand on the publication date. Please actually read these, because they spell out your rights and restrictions for this document. If you pull Code Components out of this document, they must include Revised BSD License text, as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions, and they come with no warranty, as described in the Revised BSD License. Be careful with the code, fr fr ๐Ÿซถ

Table of Contents

1.  Introduction
2.  Terminology and Conventions
  2.1.  Requirements Language
  2.2.  Acronyms
3.  Requirements for Active OAM in SFC
4.  Active OAM Identification in the NSH
5.  SFC Active OAM Header
6.  Echo Request/Reply for SFC
  6.1.  Return Codes
  6.2.  Authentication in Echo Request/Reply
  6.3.  SFC Echo Request Transmission
    6.3.1.  Source ID TLV
  6.4.  Processing a Received SFC Echo Request
    6.4.1.  Errored TLVs TLV
  6.5.  SFC Echo Reply Transmission
    6.5.1.  Reply Service Function Path TLV
    6.5.2.  Theory of Operation
    6.5.3.  SFC Echo Reply Reception
    6.5.4.  Tracing an SFP
  6.6.  The Use of the Consistency Verification Request Message
    6.6.1.  SFF Information Record TLV
    6.6.2.  SF Information Sub-TLV
    6.6.3.  SF Information Sub-TLV Construction
7.  Security Considerations
8.  Operational Considerations
9.  IANA Considerations
  9.1.  SFC Active OAM Protocol
  9.2.  SFC Active OAM
    9.2.1.  SFC Active OAM Message Types
    9.2.2.  SFC Echo Request Flags
    9.2.3.  SFC Echo Types
    9.2.4.  SFC Echo Reply Modes
    9.2.5.  SFC Echo Return Codes
    9.2.6.  SFC Active OAM TLV Types
    9.2.7.  SF Identifier Types
10. References
  10.1.  Normative References
  10.2.  Informative References
Acknowledgments
Contributors
Authors' Addresses

1. Introduction โœจ

Let's start with the basics. [RFC7665] defines the data plane elements you need to build Service Function Chaining (SFC). There are three of them:

  1. Classifiers ๐Ÿ”, which classify incoming packets. This classification may end up associating a received packet with a service function chain.
  2. Service Function Forwarders (SFFs) ๐Ÿšš, which forward traffic to one or more connected Service Functions (SFs) based on the info carried in the SFC encapsulation. They also take traffic coming back from the SFs and forward it to the next SFF.
  3. SFs ๐Ÿ’…, which apply specific service treatment to received packets.

There are different levels of looking at SFC. The first is the service function chain, which is a totally abstract view. It defines an ordered set of SFs that must be applied to packets picked out by classification rules. The catch is that the chain doesn't say exactly how SFFs map to SFs. So SFC has another logical construct called a Service Function Path (SFP). According to [RFC7665], an SFP is the instantiation of SFC in the network. It sits between the totally abstract SFCs and a fully specified, ordered list of SFF and SF identities that a packet visits as it goes through SFC. That fully specified list is called the Rendered Service Path (RSP). The big difference: the SFP is the logical construct, and the RSP is how the SFP actually gets realized through a sequence of specific SFC data plane elements. Main character energy ๐ŸŽ€

This document defines how active Operations, Administration, and Maintenance (OAM), as defined for active OAM in [RFC7799], is implemented when the Network Service Header (NSH) [RFC8300] is used as the SFC encapsulation. Following the analysis of SFC OAM in [RFC8924], this document applies the requirements listed in Section 4 of [RFC8924] to active OAM in an SFP that supports fault management and performance monitoring. When necessary, it also extends them. ๐Ÿงš

Active OAM tools that follow this spec improve OAM's Fault Management (FM) abilities. For example, they can use the query mechanism to troubleshoot and localize defects. That fits the stateless character of transactions in SFC NSH [RFC8300], so it's a vibe ๐Ÿฆ‹ For FM OAM in SFC, the SFC Echo Request and Echo Reply are specified in Section 6. These mechanisms enable on-demand continuity checks and connectivity verification, among other operations, over SFC in networks. They address the functionalities discussed in Sections 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3 of [RFC8924] ๐Ÿซถ

Heads up ๐Ÿ™ˆ: Performance Monitoring OAM, which [RFC8924] requires, is not satisfied by this document. It's out of scope.

The SFC Echo Request and Echo Reply can also be used with encapsulations other than the NSH. For example, they can use MPLS encapsulation, as described in [RFC8595]. Whether the SFC Echo Request/Reply mechanism works in SFC encapsulations other than the NSH is outside the scope of this document, so don't go there with this doc ๐Ÿ’€

The intended scope of SFC active OAM is use within a single provider's operational domain. The deployment scope is deliberately constrained, as explained in [RFC7665] and [RFC8300], and it's limited to a single network administrative domain. Keep it contained, babe ๐Ÿ“

2. Terminology and Conventions ๐Ÿ“š

The terminology defined in [RFC7665] is used all over this document, and you're expected to already know it. Pls go read it first ๐Ÿฅน

In this document, SFC OAM refers to active OAM [RFC7799] in an SFC architecture. Also, "Echo Request/Reply" and "SFC Echo Request/Reply" are used interchangeably. Same energy, different names ๐Ÿ’œ

2.1. Requirements Language ๐ŸŽฏ

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. So capitals = the official BCP 14 meaning, and lowercase is just regular English. Respect the caps ๐Ÿ˜ค

2.2. Acronyms ๐Ÿงพ

  • E2E: End-to-End
  • FM: Fault Management
  • MAC: Message Authentication Code
  • NSH: Network Service Header
  • OAM: Operations, Administration, and Maintenance
  • RSP: Rendered Service Path
  • SF: Service Function
  • SFC: Service Function Chaining
  • SFF: Service Function Forwarder
  • SFI: Service Function Instance
  • SFP: Service Function Path

3. Requirements for Active OAM in SFC ๐ŸŽ€

okay so [RFC8924] already told us that SFC needs its own special tools for the FM OAM job, covering failure detection, defect characterization, and localization ๐Ÿ”. This doc is where we lock in the requirements for active FM OAM mechanisms in an SFC architecture. bestie, pay attention, this is the good stuff โœจ

                 +-----+ +-----+ +-----+ +-----+ +-----+ +-----+
                 |SFI11| |SFI12| |SFI21| |SFI22| |SFI31| |SFI32|
                 +-----+ +-----+ +-----+ +-----+ +-----+ +-----+
                     \    /          \   /           \    /
      +----------+   +----+         +----+          +----+
      |Classifier|---|SFF1|---------|SFF2|----------|SFF3|
      +----------+   +----+         +----+          +----+

Figure 1: An Example of SFC Data Plane Architecture

Figure 1 is our example setup ๐Ÿ’… It's a service function chain with three distinct service functions. The SFP goes through SFF1, SFF2, and SFF3, and each SFF is hooked up to two Service Function Instances (SFIs) of the same SF. E2E (End-to-End) SFC OAM runs from the Classifier as the ingress all the way to SFF3 as the egress. Segment SFC OAM has a smaller scope, just two elements that are part of the same SFP. So here are the requirements for FM SFC OAM, whether it's E2E or segment scope:

REQ1: Packets of SFC active OAM SHOULD be fate sharing with the monitored SFC data in the forward direction, going from the ingress toward the egress endpoint(s) of the OAM test. ๐Ÿซถ

Fate sharing in an SFC environment basically means a test packet takes the same path and gets the same treatment in the underlay network layer as an SFC-encapsulated packet. Lowkey the whole point ๐Ÿ˜Œ

REQ2: SFC OAM MUST support monitoring of the continuity of the SFP between any of its elements. ๐ŸŒธ

An SFC failure might get declared when several consecutive test packets don't show up within a predetermined time โฐ For example, in the E2E FM SFC OAM case, the egress (SFF3 in Figure 1) could be the one spotting the SFP failure, by watching a flow of periodic test packets ๐Ÿ‘€ The ingress might be able to recover from the failure, like using redundant SFC elements. So it's super useful for the egress to signal the new defect state back to the ingress (the Classifier, in this example). Hence, our next requirement:

REQ3: SFC OAM MUST support Remote Defect Indication notification by the egress to the ingress. ๐Ÿ’€

REQ4: SFC OAM MUST support connectivity verification of the SFP. The definitions of the misconnection defect, entry, and exit criteria are outside the scope of this document. ๐Ÿ™ˆ

Once an SFF detects the defect, the goal of the SFC OAM shifts from detecting a defect to characterizing and localizing it. It's giving detective era ๐Ÿ•ต๏ธโ€โ™€๏ธ

REQ5: SFC OAM MUST support fault localization of the loss of continuity check within an SFP. ๐Ÿ”ฅ

REQ6: SFC OAM MUST support an SFP tracing to discover the RSP. ๐Ÿฆ‹

In the Figure 1 example, two distinct instances of the same SF share the same SFF. So the SFP can be realized over several RSPs that use different instances of the same type of SF, for instance, RSP1(SFI11--SFI21--SFI31) and RSP2(SFI12--SFI22--SFI32). Available RSPs can be found using the trace function discussed in Section 4.3 of [RFC8924], or the procedure defined in Section 6.5.4 ๐Ÿ’œ

REQ7: SFC OAM MUST have the ability to discover and exercise all available RSPs in the network. ๐Ÿ‘‘

The SFC OAM layer model described in [RFC8924] gives us an approach for defect localization within a service function chain ๐Ÿงฉ As a first step, the continuity of the SFP for SFFs that are part of the same SFP could be verified. Once the reachability of SFFs has already been verified, the SFFs that serve an SF may be used as a test packet source. In that case, an SFF can act as a proxy for another element within the service function chain. Proxy queen behavior ๐Ÿงš

REQ8: SFC OAM MUST be able to trigger on-demand FM remotely, with responses being directed toward the initiator of the remote request. ๐Ÿ“

Now let's see how the SFC Echo Request/Reply mechanism lines up with these requirements โœจ

  • REQ1: Fate sharing via the SFC Echo Request/Reply defined in Section 6.
  • REQ2: Continuity monitoring via the SFP tracing defined in Section 6.5.4.
  • REQ3: Remote defect detection via the SFC Echo Request/Reply defined in Section 6.
  • REQ4: Connectivity verification via the SFP tracing defined in Section 6.5.4.
  • REQ5: Fault localization via verification of the SFP consistency defined in Section 6.6.
  • REQ6: SFP tracing as described in Section 6.5.4 and verification of SFP consistency as defined in Section 6.6.
  • REQ7: Discover and exercise available RSPs via trace defined in Section 6.5.4.
  • REQ8: Can be addressed by adding the proxying capability to the SFC Echo Request/Reply described in this document. [RFC7555] describes an example of a proxy function for an Echo Request. Specification of a proxy function for SFC Echo Request is outside the scope of this document. ๐Ÿ™Œ

4. Active OAM Identification in the NSH ๐Ÿชช

So SFC active OAM bundles OAM commands and/or data inside a message that comes right after the NSH ๐Ÿ“ฆ To spot an SFC active OAM message, the Next Protocol field MUST be set to SFC Active OAM (0x07) (Section 9.1). The O bit in the NSH MUST be set, according to [RFC9451]. ๐Ÿซถ

Now the tea โ˜• If the O bit is clear but the Next Protocol field is set to SFC Active OAM (0x07), that's an erroneous combination, and an implementation MUST report it. The notification mechanism is outside the scope of this specification, but it MUST include rate-limiting control, so nobody's getting spammed ๐Ÿšซ The packet SHOULD be dropped. An implementation MAY have control to enable processing of the OAM payload. Your call, bestie ๐Ÿ’…


5. SFC Active OAM Header ๐ŸŽ

SFC OAM is required to perform multiple tasks, and several active OAM protocols could be used to cover all the requirements ๐Ÿง  When IP/UDP encapsulation of an SFC OAM control message is used, protocols can be demultiplexed using the destination UDP port number. But an extra IP/UDP header, especially in an IPv6 network, adds overhead compared to the length of an Active OAM Control Packet (e.g., BFD Control packet [RFC5880]) ๐Ÿ˜ค In some environments, like when measuring performance metrics, it's beneficial to send OAM packets in a broad range of lengths so they feel more like real application traffic ๐ŸŒˆ This document defines an Active OAM Header (Figure 2) to demultiplex active OAM protocols on SFC, and it's giving efficiency queen โœจ

    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |   V   | Msg Type  | Reserved  |          Length               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   ~              SFC Active OAM Control Packet                    ~
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

Figure 2: SFC Active OAM Header

Here's what each field does ๐Ÿฐ

  • V: a four-bit field that indicates the current version of the SFC Active OAM Header. The current value is 0. The version number is to be incremented whenever a change is made that affects the ability of an implementation to parse or process the SFC Active OAM Header correctly, for example, if syntactic or semantic changes are made to any of the fixed fields. ๐Ÿ”ข
  • Msg Type: a six-bit field that identifies the OAM protocol, e.g., the Echo Request/Reply. ๐Ÿงพ
  • Reserved: a six-bit field. It MUST be zeroed on transmission and ignored on receipt. ๐Ÿซง
  • Length: a two-octet field that is the length of the SFC Active OAM Control Packet in octets. ๐Ÿ“

6. Echo Request/Reply for SFC โœจ

okay bestie, the Echo Request/Reply is a super famous active OAM mechanism ๐Ÿงš people use it to check that a path is still connected, catch when the control plane and the data plane don't agree ๐Ÿค”, and track down where a defect in the data plane is hiding ๐Ÿ”. ICMP ([RFC0792] for IPv4 and [RFC4443] for IPv6 networks) and MPLS [RFC8029] are iconic examples that run on this same Echo Request/Reply idea ๐Ÿ’…. The SFC Echo Request/Reply control message (its format is in Figure 3 ๐Ÿ’–) is one flavour of the SFC Active OAM Control Packet, which lives inside the SFC Active OAM Header (Figure 2) ๐ŸŽ€.

    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |      Echo Request Flags       |          Reserved             |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |   Echo Type   |   Reply Mode  |  Return Code  |Return Subcode |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                        Sender's Handle                        |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                         Sequence Number                       |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   ~                              TLVs                             ~
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

                  Figure 3: SFC Echo Request/Reply Format

Here's how the fields work, bestie ๐Ÿ’œ

Echo Request Flags is a two-octet bit vector field ๐ŸŒธ. Section 9.2.2 asks IANA to make a brand-new registry for flags. This spec defines all the flags for future use. Flags MUST be zeroed on transmission and ignored on receipt ๐Ÿ™ˆ.

Reserved is a two-octet field. It MUST be zeroed on transmission and ignored on receipt. No drama, just zeros ๐Ÿค.

Echo Type is a one-octet field that reflects the packet type. The SFC Echo Request/Reply Echo Types defined in this document are listed in Section 9.2.3.

Reply Mode is a one-octet field that defines the type of return path the sender of the Echo Request is asking for ๐Ÿ›ค๏ธ.

Return Code and Return Subcode are one-octet fields each ๐ŸŽ€. They can be used to tell the sender how processing its request went. For all Return Code values defined in this document (Section 9.2.5), the value of the Return Subcode field MUST be set to zero.

Sender's Handle is a four-octet field ๐Ÿฆ‹. It MUST be filled in by the sender of the Echo Request and returned unchanged by the Echo Reply sender (if a reply is being sent). The sender of the Echo Request SHOULD use a pseudorandom number generator [RFC4086] to set the value of the Sender's Handle field. In some use cases, an implementation MAY use the Sender's Handle for proprietary signaling, as long as the system that receives the SFC Echo Request doesn't alter the value of the Sender's Handle field but copies it into the SFC Echo Reply.

Sequence Number is a four-octet field, assigned by the sender โœจ. It can be used, for example, to detect missed replies. The initial Sequence Number contains an unsigned integer that wraps around. It MUST be pseudorandomly generated [RFC4086] and then SHOULD be monotonically increasing in the course of the test session. If a reply is sent, the sender of the SFC Echo Reply message MUST copy the value from the received SFC Echo Request.

TLVs are next, and they're giggle-worthy ๐Ÿงธ A TLV is a variable-length construct whose length is a multiple of four-octet words. Multiple TLVs MAY be placed in an SFC Echo Request/Reply packet. None, one, or more sub-TLVs may be enclosed in the value part of a TLV, subject to the semantics of the (outer) TLV. If no TLVs are included in an SFC Echo Request/Reply, the value of the Length field in the SFC Active OAM Header MUST be 16 octets. Figure 4 shows the format of an SFC Echo Request/Reply TLV, and here's what each field means:

    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |      Type     |    Reserved   |           Length              |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   ~                            Value                              ~
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

                Figure 4: SFC Echo Request/Reply TLV Format

Type is a one-octet field that characterizes how the Value field is interpreted ๐Ÿท๏ธ. Type values are allocated according to Section 9.2.6.

Reserved is a one-octet field. The field MUST be zeroed on transmission and ignored on receipt.

Length is a two-octet field equal to the Value field's length in octets, as an unsigned integer ๐Ÿ“.

Value is a variable-length field. The value of the Type field determines its interpretation and encoding.

6.1. Return Codes

The value of the Return Code field MUST be set to zero by the sender of an Echo Request. The receiver of said Echo Request MUST set it to one of the values in IANA's "SFC Echo Return Codes" registry (Section 9.2.5) in the corresponding Echo Reply that it generates. ๐ŸŽฏ

6.2. Authentication in Echo Request/Reply

Authentication can be used to protect the integrity of the information in the SFC Echo Request and/or Echo Reply ๐Ÿ”. In [RFC9145], a variable-length Context Header has been defined to protect the integrity of the NSH and the payload. The header can also be used for the optional encryption of sensitive metadata. The MAC#1 Context Header is more suitable for the integrity protection of SFC active OAM, particularly of the SFC Echo Request and Echo Reply, as defined in this document. On the other hand, using the MAC#2 Context Header allows the detection of mishandling of the O bit by a transient SFC element ๐Ÿ‘€.

6.3. SFC Echo Request Transmission

The SFC Echo Request control packet MUST use the appropriate underlay network encapsulation of the monitored SFP ๐Ÿš€. The Echo Request MUST set the O bit in the NSH, as defined in [RFC9451]. The NSH MUST be immediately followed by the SFC Active OAM Header defined in Section 4. The Echo Type field's value in the SFC Active OAM Header MUST be set to the SFC Echo Request/Reply value (1), per Section 9.2.1.

The value of the Reply Mode field MUST be set to one of the following ๐Ÿ’…:

  • Do Not Reply (1): This is the value if one-way monitoring is desired. If the Echo Request is used to measure synthetic packet loss, the receiver may report loss measurement results to a remote node. Ways of learning the identity of that node are outside the scope of this specification.
  • Reply via an IPv4/IPv6 UDP Packet (2): If an SFC Echo Request is not encapsulated in IP/UDP, then this value requests the use of the Source ID TLV Section 6.3.1).
  • Reply via Specified Path (4): This value requests the use of the particular return path specified in the included TLV to verify bidirectional continuity, and may also increase the robustness of the monitoring by selecting a more stable path. Section 6.5.1 provides an example of communicating an explicit path for the Echo Reply ๐Ÿ›ฃ๏ธ.
  • Reply via an IPv4/IPv6 UDP Packet with the data integrity protection (5): This value requests the use of the MAC Context Header [RFC9145].
  • Reply via Specified Path with the data integrity protection (7): This value requests the use of the MAC Context Header [RFC9145].

6.3.1. Source ID TLV

The responder to the SFC Echo Request encapsulates the SFC Echo Reply message in the IP/UDP packet if the Reply Mode is "Reply via an IPv4/IPv6 UDP Packet" or "Reply via an IPv4/IPv6 UDP Packet with the data integrity protection". Because the NSH does not identify the ingress node that generated the Echo Request, information that sufficiently identifies the source MUST be included in the message, so that the IP destination address and destination UDP port number for IP/UDP encapsulation of the SFC Echo Reply could be derived. The sender of the SFC Echo Request MUST include the Source ID TLV (Figure 5) ๐Ÿ—บ๏ธ.

    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |    Source ID  |   Reserved1   |           Length              |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |          Port Number          |           Reserved2           |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   ~                         IP Address                            ~
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

                        Figure 5: SFC Source ID TLV

The fields are defined as follows ๐Ÿ’–:

  • Source ID: the value MUST be set to 1 (Section 9.2.6).
  • Reserved1: a one-octet field. The field MUST be zeroed on transmission and ignored on receipt.
  • Length: the value equals the length of the data following the Length field, counted in octets. The value of the Length field can be 8 or 20. If the value of the field is neither, the Source ID TLV is considered to be malformed ๐Ÿšซ.
  • Port Number: a two-octet field. It contains the UDP port number of the sender of the SFC OAM control message. The value of the field MUST be used as the destination UDP port number in the IP/UDP encapsulation of the SFC Echo Reply message.
  • Reserved2: a two-octet field. The field MUST be zeroed on transmit and ignored on receipt.
  • IP Address: a field that contains the IP address of the sender of the SFC OAM control message, i.e., IPv4 or IPv6. The value of the field MUST be used as the destination IP address in the IP/UDP encapsulation of the SFC Echo Reply message.

A single Source ID TLV for each address family, i.e., IPv4 and IPv6, MAY be present in an SFC Echo Request message. If the Source ID TLVs for both address families are present in an SFC Echo Request message, the SFF MUST NOT replicate an SFC Echo Reply, but choose the destination IP address for the one SFC Echo Reply it sends based on the local policy ๐Ÿง . The source IP address used in the IP/UDP encapsulation of the SFC Echo Reply is one of the IP addresses associated with the responder. The value of the Port Number field MUST be used as the destination UDP port number in the IP/UDP encapsulation of the SFC Echo Reply message. The responder selects the source UDP port number from the dynamic range of port numbers. If more than one Source ID TLV per the address family is present, the receiver MUST use the first TLV and ignore the rest. The Echo Reply message, including relevant TLVs, follows the IP/UDP headers immediately ๐Ÿฆ‹โœจ

6.4. Processing a Received SFC Echo Request โœจ

okay so when an SFF gets an SFC Echo Request, it only punts it up to the control plane for validation and processing if one of these packet processing exceptions fires ๐Ÿ‘€: NSH TTL expiration, NSH Service Index expiration, or the receiver is the terminal SFF for an SFP. it's giving very specific trigger energy ๐Ÿ’…

An SFF that received the SFC Echo Request MUST validate the packet as follows ๐Ÿซถ:

  1. If the SFC Echo Request is integrity protected, the receiving SFF first MUST verify the authentication ๐Ÿ”.
    1. Suppose the authentication validation has failed and the Source ID TLV is considered properly formatted. In that case, the SFF MUST send an SFC Echo Reply with the Return Code set to 3 ("Authentication failed") and the Subcode set to zero to the system identified in the Source ID TLV (see Section 6.5), according to a rate-limit control mechanism. not the vibe, but it's handled ๐Ÿ™…โ€โ™€๏ธ
    2. If the authentication is validated successfully, the SFF that has received an SFC Echo Request verifies the rest of the packet's general consistency โœ….
  2. Validate the Source ID TLV, as defined in Section 6.3.1 ๐Ÿ“‹.
    1. If the Source ID TLV is determined to be malformed, the received SFC Echo Request processing is stopped, the message is dropped, and the event SHOULD be logged, according to a rate-limiting control for logging. ๐Ÿชต
  3. The Sender's Handle and Sequence Number fields are not examined but are copied in the SFC Echo Reply message ๐Ÿงพ. they just get passed along, no judgment ๐ŸŒธ
  4. If the packet is not well formed, i.e., not formed according to this specification, the receiving SFF SHOULD send an SFC Echo Reply with the Return Code set to 1 ("Malformed Echo Request received") and the Subcode set to zero under the control of the rate-limiting mechanism to the system identified in the Source ID TLV (see Section 6.5). that's a whole malformed moment ๐Ÿ’€
  5. If there are any TLVs that the SFF does not understand, the SFF MUST send an SFC Echo Reply with the Return Code set to 2 ("One or more of the TLVs was not understood") and set the Subcode to zero. Also, the SFF MAY include an Errored TLVs TLV (Section 6.4.1) that, as sub-TLVs, contains only the misunderstood TLVs ๐Ÿงš.
  6. If the consistency check of the received Echo Request succeeded, i.e., the Echo Request is deemed properly formed, then the SFF at the end of the SFP MUST send an SFC Echo Reply with the Return Code set to 5 ("End of the SFP") and the Subcode set to zero ๐Ÿ๐Ÿ‘‘.
  7. If the SFF is not at the end of the SFP and the NSH TTL value is 1, the SFF MUST send an SFC Echo Reply with the Return Code set to 4 ("SFC TTL Exceeded") and the Subcode set to zero โฐ๐Ÿ’€.
  8. In all other cases, for the validated Echo Request message, a transit, i.e., not at the end of the SFP, SFF MUST send an SFC Echo Reply with the Return Code set to 0 ("No Error") and the Subcode set to zero ๐Ÿฆ‹. the main character moment is literally a clean transit ๐ŸŒˆ

6.4.1. Errored TLVs TLV ๐Ÿ“

okay so if the Return Code for the Echo Reply comes out as 2 ("One or more of the TLVs was not understood"), the Errored TLVs TLV might be included in an Echo Reply. its whole job is to tell the Echo Request sender about TLVs that either aren't supported by an implementation or got parsed and found to be in error ๐Ÿ”

    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |  Errored TLVs |    Reserved   |            Length             |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                             Value                             |
   .                                                               .
   .                                                               .
   .                                                               .
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

                         Figure 6: Errored TLVs TLV

the fields are defined like this ๐Ÿ“:

  • Errored TLVs - the field MUST be set to 2 (Section 9.2.6).
  • Reserved - the field MUST be zeroed on transmission and ignored on receipt.
  • Length - the value equals to length of the Value field in octets.
  • Value - the field contains the TLVs, encoded as sub-TLVs (as shown in Figure 7), that were not understood or failed to be parsed correctly.
    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |  Sub-TLV Type |    Reserved   |        Sub-TLV Length         |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   ~                        Sub-TLV Value                          ~
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

            Figure 7: Not Understood or Failed TLV as a Sub-TLV

and the sub-TLV fields ๐Ÿงฉ:

  • Sub-TLV Type - a copy of the first octet of the TLV that is not understood or failed to be parsed.
  • Reserved - MUST be zeroed on transmission and ignored on receipt.
  • Sub-TLV Length - the value equals the value of the Length field of the errored TLV.
  • Sub-TLV Value - the field contains data that follows the Length field in the errored TLV.

6.5. SFC Echo Reply Transmission ๐Ÿ“ค

the Reply Mode field is the boss that decides whether and how the Echo Reply message gets sent ๐Ÿ‘‘. the Echo Request sender MAY use TLVs to ask that the corresponding Echo Reply goes out over a specified path. for example, there's a TLV that specifies the return path of the Echo Reply if the Return Mode in the Echo Request is set to Reply via Specified Path (4), and that's described in Section 6.5.1 ๐Ÿ›ค๏ธ. Value 1 is the "Do Not Reply" mode, which suppresses the Echo Reply packet transmission ๐Ÿค. and the value 2 of the Reply Mode field asks for the Echo Reply packet to be sent out-of-band as an IPv4/IPv6 UDP packet ๐Ÿ“ฆ.


6.5.1. Reply Service Function Path TLV ๐Ÿงต

okay so the SFC Echo Request always travels the SFP it's pointed at using the NSH ๐Ÿš‚, but the corresponding Echo Reply usually gets sent without the NSH. every once in a while an operator might want to tell the responder to send an Echo Reply with the NSH over a particular SFP, so this section defines a brand new TLV, the Reply Service Function Path TLV, for the Reply via Specified Path mode of the SFC Echo Reply โœจ.

this TLV can give you an efficient way to test SFCs like bidirectional and hybrid SFC, as defined in Section 2.2 of [RFC7665] ๐Ÿ”. for example, it lets an operator test both directions of a bidirectional or hybrid SFP with a single SFC Echo Request/Reply operation. iconic efficiency ๐Ÿ’…

The Reply Service Function Path TLV carries the info that sufficiently identifies the return SFP the SFC Echo Reply message is expected to follow. the format is shown in Figure 8 ๐ŸŽ€:

    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |   Reply SFP   |    Reserved   |          Length               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |    Reply Service Function Path Identifier     | Service Index |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

                       Figure 8: SFC Reply TLV Format

the fields, explained ๐Ÿง :

  • Reply SFP (3) - identifies the TLV that contains information about the SFC Reply path.
  • Reserved - MUST be zeroed on transmission and ignored on receipt.
  • Length - the value MUST be equal to 4.
  • Reply Service Function Path Identifier - a three-octet field that contains the SFP identifier for the path that the SFC Echo Reply message is requested to be sent over.
  • Service Index - a one-octet field. The value is set to the value of the Service Index field in the NSH of the SFC Echo Reply message.

6.5.2. Theory of Operation ๐Ÿง โœจ

okay this is the vibe check on how the return path works ๐Ÿ”Ž. [RFC7110] defines a mechanism to control the return path for the MPLS Label Switched Path (LSP) Echo Reply ๐Ÿ›ฃ๏ธ. in the SFC's case, the return path is an SFP along which the SFC Echo Reply message MUST be transmitted. so the Reply Service Function Path TLV in the SFC Echo Request message MUST sufficiently identify the SFP that the sender expects the receiver to use for the corresponding SFC Echo Reply ๐ŸŽฏ.

when sending an Echo Request, the sender MUST set the value of the Reply Mode field to "Reply via Specified Path", defined in Section 6.3, and if the specified path is an SFC path, the Request MUST include the Reply Service Function Path TLV ๐Ÿ“ฌ. that TLV is made of the identifier of the reverse SFP plus an appropriate Service Index, so it's basically the reverse SFP's ID card ๐Ÿชช.

if the NSH of the received SFC Echo Request includes the MAC Context Header, the packet's authentication MUST be verified before using any data, as defined in Section 6.4 ๐Ÿ”. no skipping the bouncer, periodt ๐Ÿ’….

The destination SFF of the SFP being tested and the SFF at which the NSH TTL expired (as per [RFC8300]) are referred to as responding SFFs. the processing described below equally applies to both cases ๐Ÿค.

if the Echo Request message with the Reply Service Function Path TLV received by the responding SFF has the Reply Mode value of "Reply via Specified Path" but no Reply Service Function Path TLV is present, then the responding SFF MUST send an Echo Reply with the Return Code set to 6 ("Reply Service Function Path TLV is missing") ๐Ÿ™ˆ. and if the responding SFF can't find the requested SFP, it MUST send an Echo Reply with the Return Code set to 7 ("Reply SFP was not found") and include the Reply Service Function Path TLV from the Echo Request message ๐Ÿ”.

Suppose the SFC Echo Request receiver cannot determine whether the specified return path SFP has the route to the initiator. In that case, it SHOULD set the value of the Return Code field to 8 ("Unverifiable Reply Service Function Path") ๐Ÿคทโ€โ™€๏ธ. the receiver MAY drop the Echo Request when it can't determine whether the SFP's return path has the route to the initiator ๐Ÿ—‘๏ธ. and when sending the Echo Request, the sender SHOULD choose a proper source address according to the specified return path SFP to help the receiver find the viable return path ๐Ÿงญ.


6.5.2.1. Bidirectional SFC Case ๐Ÿ”„

the ability to specify the return path for an Echo Reply might come in clutch for bidirectional SFC ๐Ÿ’–. the egress SFF of the forward SFP might not be co-located with a classifier of the reverse SFP, so the egress SFF has no info about the reverse path of SFC. because of that, even for bidirectional SFC, a reverse SFP needs to be indicated in a Reply Service Function Path TLV in the Echo Request message ๐Ÿซ . it's a whole plot twist, but it makes sense ๐ŸŽฌ.


6.5.3. SFC Echo Reply Reception ๐Ÿ“ฅ

An SFF SHOULD NOT accept the SFC Echo Reply unless the received message passes the following checks ๐Ÿšฆ:

  • the received SFC Echo Reply is well formed;
  • the matching SFC Echo Request is found, that is, the value of the Sender's Handle in the Echo Request sent is equal to the value of Sender's Handle in the Echo Reply received;
  • the Sequence Number in the Echo Reply received matches the Sequence Number of one of the outstanding transmitted Echo Requests; and
  • all other checks passed.

6.5.4. Tracing an SFP โœจ

okay so this is the traceroute glow-up ๐Ÿฆ‹ The SFC Echo Request/Reply can be used to isolate a defect detected in the SFP and trace an RSP. Just like the ICMP Echo Request/Reply [RFC0792] and the MPLS Echo Request/Reply [RFC8029], this mode is called "traceroute" ๐Ÿงš In traceroute mode, the sender sends a sequence of SFC Echo Request messages, starting with the NSH TTL value set to 1, and the TTL goes up by 1 in each next Echo Request packet ๐Ÿ’… The sender stops sending SFC Echo Request packets once the Return Code in the received Echo Reply equals 5 ("End of the SFP") ๐ŸŽ€

Now suppose a specialized information element (like IPv6 Flow Label [RFC6437] or Flow ID [RFC9263]) is being used to spread load across Equal Cost Multipath or Link Aggregation Group paths. In that case, such an element SHOULD also be used for the SFC OAM traffic ๐Ÿซถ Doing so is meant to make the SFC Echo Request follow the same RSP as the monitored flow. Main character energy for the probe packets, fr fr โœจ

Wait, I need to fix that: the original capital key word appears as SHOULD, so the correct rendering is:

In that case, such an element SHOULD also be used for the SFC OAM traffic ๐Ÿซถ

6.6. The Use of the Consistency Verification Request Message ๐ŸŒธ

okay this section is literally a whole detective mission ๐Ÿ•ต๏ธโ€โ™€๏ธ The consistency of an SFP can be checked by comparing the view of the SFP from the control or management plane with information collected by an SFC Echo Request/Reply message as it traverses the path (Figure 3). The sender of an SFP Consistency Verification Request (CVReq) message MUST set the SFC Echo Request/Reply Echo Type field to 3 ("SFP Consistency Verification Request") ๐Ÿ’– The sender of an SFP Consistency Verification Reply (CVRep) message MUST set the SFC Echo Request/Reply Echo Type field to 4 ("SFP Consistency Verification Reply") ๐Ÿ’œ All the processing steps of SFC Echo Request and Echo Reply messages described in Sections 6.3 through 6.5 apply to the processing of CVReq and CVRep, respectively. No skipping, bestie ๐Ÿ™ˆ

Every SFF that receives a CVReq message MUST do the following:

  • Collect information about the SFs traversed by the CVReq packet and send it to the ingress SFF as a CVRep packet over an IP network. ๐Ÿฆ‹
  • Forward the CVReq to the next downstream SFF, if one exists. ๐Ÿงš

So as a result, the ingress SFF collects info about all the traversed SFFs and SFs, aka the actual path the CVReq packet took ๐Ÿ‘‘ That info can be used to verify the SFC's path consistency. The mechanism for SFP consistency verification is outside the scope of this document ๐Ÿ’€

6.6.1. SFF Information Record TLV ๐ŸŽ€

For the received CVReq, an SFF that supports this specification MUST include in the CVRep message the information about SFs that are available from that SFF instance for the specified SFP. The SFF MUST include the SFF Information Record TLV (Figure 9) in the CVRep message. Every SFF sends back a single CVRep message, including information on all the SFs attached to that SFF on the SFP, as requested in the received CVReq message using the SF Information Sub-TLV (Section 6.6.2) ๐Ÿ’…

  0                   1                   2                   3
  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 |SFF Record TLV |    Reserved   |            Length             |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 |       Service Path Identifier (SPI)           |   Reserved    |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 |                                                               |
 |                   SF Information Sub-TLV                      |
 ~                                                               ~
 |                                                               |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

                Figure 9: SFF Information Record TLV

The SFF Information Record TLV is a variable-length TLV that includes the information of all SFs available from the particular SFF instance for the specified SFP. Figure 9 shows the format, and the fields work like this ๐Ÿงš

SFF Record TLV - the value is (4) (Section 9.2.6). ๐ŸŒˆ

Reserved - MUST be zeroed on transmission and ignored on receipt. ๐Ÿซถ

Length - the value equals the sum of lengths of the Service Path Identifier, reserved, and SF Information Sub-TLV fields in octets. ๐Ÿ“

Service Path Identifier (SPI) - the identifier of the SFP that all the SFs in this TLV belong to. ๐Ÿ’œ

SF Information Sub-TLV - the sub-TLV is as defined in Section 6.6.2. โœจ

If the NSH of the received SFC Echo Reply includes the MAC Context Header [RFC9145], the authentication of the packet MUST be verified before using any data. If verification fails, the receiver MUST stop processing the SFF Information Record TLV and notify an operator. The notification mechanism SHOULD include control of rate-limited messages. Specification of the notification mechanism is outside the scope of this document. Security moment, bestie, take it seriously ๐Ÿ˜ญ๐Ÿ”ฅ

6.6.2. SF Information Sub-TLV ๐Ÿฆ‹

Every SFF receiving a CVReq packet MUST include the SF characteristic data in the CVRep packet. The format of an SF Information Sub-TLV, included in a CVRep packet, is shown in Figure 10 ๐ŸŒธ

After the CVReq message traverses the SFP, all the information about the SFs on the SFP is available from the TLVs included in CVRep messages โœจ

  0                   1                   2                   3
  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 |  SF Sub-TLV   |    Reserved   |          Length               |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 |Service Index  |          SF Type              |   SF ID Type  |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 |                          SF Identifier                        |
 ~                                                               ~
 |                                                               |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

          Figure 10: Service Function Information Sub-TLV

SF Sub-TLV - one-octet field. The value is (5) (Section 9.2.6). ๐ŸŽ€

Reserved - one-octet field. The field MUST be zeroed on transmission and ignored on receipt. ๐Ÿ’…

Length - two-octet field. The value of this field is the length of the data following the Length field counted in octets. ๐ŸŒˆ

Service Index - indicates the SF's position on the SFP. ๐Ÿงš

SF Type - two-octet field. It is defined in [RFC9015] and indicates the type of SF, e.g., firewall, Deep Packet Inspection, WAN optimization controller, etc. ๐Ÿ‘‘

SF ID Type - one-octet field with values defined as in Section 9.2.7. ๐Ÿซถ

SF Identifier - an identifier of the SF. The length of the SF Identifier depends on the type of the SF ID Type. For example, if the SF Identifier is its IPv4 address, the SF Identifier should be 32 bits. ๐Ÿ“

6.6.3. SF Information Sub-TLV Construction ๐Ÿ’œ

Each SFF in the SFP MUST send one and only one CVRep corresponding to the CVReq. If only one SF is attached to the SFF in the SFP, only one SF Information Sub-TLV is included in the CVRep. If several SFs are attached to the SFF in the SFP, the SF Information Sub-TLV MUST be constructed as described below in either Section 6.6.3.1 or 6.6.3.2 โœจ

6.6.3.1. Multiple SFs as Hops of an SFP ๐Ÿฆ‹

Multiple SFs attached to the same SFF can be hops of the SFP. The service indexes of these SFs on that SFP will be different. Service Function Types of these SFs could be different or the same. Information about all SFs MAY be included in the CVRep message. Information about each SF MUST be listed as a separate SF Information Sub-TLV in the CVRep message. The same SF can even appear more than once in an SFP with a different service index ๐ŸŒธ

An example of the SFP consistency verification procedure for this case is shown in Figure 11. The Service Function Path (SPI=x) is SF1->SF2->SF4->SF3. SF1, SF2, and SF3 are attached to SFF1, and SF4 is attached to SFF2. The CVReq message is sent to the SFFs in the sequence of the SFP (SFF1->SFF2->SFF1). Every SFF (SFF1, SFF2) replies with the information of SFs belonging to the SFP. The SF Information Sub-TLV in Figure 10 contains information for each SF (SF1, SF2, SF3, and SF4) ๐Ÿงš

                 SF1         SF2           SF4                SF3
                 +------+------+            |                  |
    CVReq  ......>  SFF1       ......>  SFF2       ......> SFF1
    (SPI=x)             .                   .                  .
            <............         <..........       <...........
              CVRep1(SF1,SF2)    CVRep2(SF4)    CVRep3(SF3)

          Figure 11: Example 1 for CVRep with Multiple SFs

6.6.3.2. Multiple SFs for Load Balance ๐ŸŒˆ

Multiple SFs may be attached to the same SFF to spread the load; in other words, that means that the particular traffic flow will traverse only one of these SFs. These SFs have the same Service Function Type and Service Index. For this case, the SF ID Type, which must be the same for all of these SFs, appears once, but all the respective SF Identifiers will be listed sequentially in the SF Identifier field of the Service Function Information Sub-TLV (see Figure 10). The number of these SFs can be calculated from the SF ID Type and the value of the Length field of the sub-TLV ๐Ÿ’–

An example of the SFP consistency verification procedure for this case is shown in Figure 12. The Service Function Path (SPI=x) is SF1a/SF1b->SF2a/SF2b. The Service Functions SF1a and SF1b are attached to SFF1, which balances the load among them. The Service Functions SF2a and SF2b are attached to SFF2, which in turn balances its load between them. The CVReq message is sent to the SFFs in the sequence of the SFP (i.e., SFF1->SFF2). Every SFF (SFF1, SFF2) replies with the information of SFs belonging to the SFP. The SF Information Sub-TLV in Figure 10 contains information for all SFs at that hop ๐Ÿซถ

                           /SF1a                   /SF2a
                           \SF1b                   \SF2b
                             |                       |
                            SFF1                    SFF2
        CVReq   .........>  .           .........>  .
        (SPI=x)                .                       .
                   <............        <...............
            CVRep1(SF1a,SF1b)       CVRep2(SF2a,SF2b)

           Figure 12: Example 2 for CVRep with Multiple SFs

7. Security Considerations ๐Ÿ”โœจ

Okay bestie, this part is serious, so let's be careful ๐Ÿ’… As part of SFC OAM, and specifically because it is built on the NSH, the Echo Request/Reply mechanism in this document inherits the security considerations from [RFC7665] and [RFC8300].

When integrity protection is needed for SFC active OAM, especially for the SFC Echo Request/Reply, using one of the Context Headers defined in [RFC9145] is RECOMMENDED ๐Ÿ›ก๏ธ The MAC#1 Context Header could be a better fit for SFC active OAM because it doesn't need the MAC recalculated when the NSH Base Header's TTL field changes ๐Ÿงฎ Integrity protection can also come from mechanisms in the underlay data plane. For example, if the underlay is an IPv6 network, the IP Authentication Header [RFC4302] or the IP Encapsulating Security Payload Header [RFC4303] can be used for integrity protection ๐Ÿ”’ Confidentiality for the SFC Echo Request/Reply exchanges can be achieved with the IP Encapsulating Security Payload Header [RFC4303] ๐Ÿคซ And the security needs of the SFC Echo Request/Reply are similar to those of ICMP ping [RFC0792] [RFC4443] and MPLS LSP ping [RFC8029] ๐Ÿ“

There are at least three ways someone could attack a node in the overlay network using the mechanisms in this document ๐Ÿ‘€ The first is a Denial-of-Service attack, meaning sending SFC Echo Requests to overload an element of SFC ๐Ÿ’ฅ The second may involve spoofing, hijacking, replying to, or otherwise tampering with SFC Echo Requests and/or Replies to misrepresent and alter the operator's view of the state of the SFC ๐ŸŽญ The third is an unauthorized source using an SFC Echo Request/Reply to get information about the SFC and/or its elements, e.g., SFFs and/or SFs ๐Ÿ•ต๏ธโ€โ™€๏ธ

It is RECOMMENDED that implementations throttle the number of SFC Echo Request/Reply messages going to the control plane, which helps mitigate potential Denial-of-Service attacks ๐Ÿšฆ

Reply and spoofing attacks, which involve faking or replying to SFC Echo Reply messages, would have to match the Sender's Handle and Sequence Number of an outstanding SFC Echo Request message. That's highly unlikely for off-path attackers ๐Ÿ™…โ€โ™€๏ธ A non-matching reply would be discarded ๐Ÿ—‘๏ธ

To protect against unauthorized sources trying to get information about the overlay and/or underlay, an implementation MUST have means to check that the source of the Echo Request is part of the SFP ๐Ÿง

Also, since the SF Information Sub-TLV reveals information about the SFP, a spoofed CVReq packet may be used to obtain network information ๐Ÿ˜ฑ So implementations MUST provide a means of checking the source addresses of CVReq messages, as specified in Section 6.3.1 ("Source ID TLV"), against an access list before accepting the message ๐Ÿ“‹ Gatekeeping is everything, periodt ๐Ÿ’…


8. Operational Considerations ๐Ÿ› ๏ธ

This section shares info about the operational side of the SFC NSH Echo Request/Reply, following the recommendations in [RFC5706] ๐Ÿ“š

The SFC NSH Echo Request/Reply provides essential OAM functions for network operators ๐Ÿงฐ It's meant to detect and localize defects in SFC ๐Ÿ” For example, by comparing the results of the trace function in operational and failed states, an operator can find the defect, e.g., the connection between SFF1 and SFF2 (Figure 1) ๐Ÿ•ต๏ธ Once a failure is narrowed down to an overlay link, a more specific failure location can be found using OAM tools in the underlay network ๐ŸŽฏ The mechanism in this document can be used on demand or for periodic validation of an SFP or RSP โฐ Because the protocol uses the control plane, which may have limited capacity, an operator must be able to rate limit Echo Request and Echo Reply messages ๐Ÿšง A reasonably selected default interval between Echo Request control packets can give an operator some extra benefit โœจ

If the protocol is deployed incrementally in the NSH domain, SFC elements such as a Classifier or SFF that don't support SFC active OAM will discard the protocol's packets ๐Ÿ™ˆ If SFC uses a reclassification along the SFP, or when the load balancing principle is unknown, fate sharing between data and active OAM packets can't be guaranteed ๐Ÿคทโ€โ™€๏ธ As a result, the OAM outcome might not reflect the state of the entire SFC properly, only its segment ๐Ÿงฉ In general, it's an operational task to consider the cases where active OAM may not share fate with the monitored SFP ๐Ÿ“

The SFC NSH Echo Request/Reply can also be used alongside the existing mechanisms discussed in [RFC8924], filling the gaps and extending their functionality ๐Ÿซถ

Management of the SFC NSH Echo Request/Reply protocol can be handled by a proprietary tool, e.g., a command line interface, or by a data model that is structured or standardized ๐Ÿ–ฅ๏ธ


9. IANA Considerations ๐Ÿ“‡

The terms used in the IANA considerations below are meant to be consistent with [RFC8126] ๐ŸŽ€

9.1. SFC Active OAM Protocol ๐Ÿฆ‹

IANA has assigned the following new type in the "NSH Next Protocol" registry within the "Network Service Header (NSH) Parameters" group of registries ๐ŸŒธ

              +===============+================+===========+
              | Next Protocol | Description    | Reference |
              +===============+================+===========+
              | 0x07          | SFC Active OAM | RFC 9516  |
              +---------------+----------------+-----------+

                     Table 1: SFC Active OAM Protocol

9.2. SFC Active OAM ๐ŸŒˆ

IANA has created the "Service Function Chaining (SFC) Active Operations, Administration, and Maintenance (OAM)" group of registries, which contains the registries described in the following subsections ๐Ÿ“š

9.2.1. SFC Active OAM Message Types ๐Ÿ’Œ

IANA has created the "SFC Active OAM Message Types" registry as follows:

Registry Name: SFC Active OAM Message Types

Assignment Policy: 0 - 31 IETF Review 32 - 62 First Come First Served

Reference: RFC 9516

              +========+========================+===========+
              | Value  | Description            | Reference |
              +========+========================+===========+
              | 0      | Reserved               | RFC 9516  |
              +--------+------------------------+-----------+
              | 1      | SFC Echo Request/Reply | RFC 9516  |
              +--------+------------------------+-----------+
              | 2 - 62 | Unassigned             |           |
              +--------+------------------------+-----------+
              | 63     | Reserved               | RFC 9516  |
              +--------+------------------------+-----------+

                   Table 2: SFC Active OAM Message Types

9.2.2. SFC Echo Request Flags ๐Ÿšฉ

IANA has created the "SFC Echo Request Flags" registry to track the assignment of the 16 flags in the SFC Echo Request Flags field of the SFC Echo Request message ๐Ÿณ๏ธโ€๐ŸŒˆ The flags are numbered from 0 (the most significant bit is transmitted first) to 15 ๐Ÿ”ข

IANA has created the "SFC Echo Request Flags" registry as follows:

Registry Name: SFC Echo Request Flags

Assignment Policy: 0 - 15 Standards Action

Reference: RFC 9516

                 +============+=============+===========+
                 | Bit Number | Description | Reference |
                 +============+=============+===========+
                 | 0 - 15     | Unassigned  |           |
                 +------------+-------------+-----------+

                     Table 3: SFC Echo Request Flags

9.2.3. SFC Echo Types ๐Ÿ“

IANA has created the "SFC Echo Types" registry as follows:

Registry Name: SFC Echo Types

Assignment Policy: 0 - 175 IETF Review 176 - 239 First Come First Served 240 - 251 Experimental Use 252 - 254 Private Use

Reference: RFC 9516

     +===========+======================================+===========+
     | Value     | Description                          | Reference |
     +===========+======================================+===========+
     | 0         | Reserved                             | RFC 9516  |
     +-----------+--------------------------------------+-----------+
     | 1         | SFC Echo Request                     | RFC 9516  |
     +-----------+--------------------------------------+-----------+
     | 2         | SFC Echo Reply                       | RFC 9516  |
     +-----------+--------------------------------------+-----------+
     | 3         | SFP Consistency Verification Request | RFC 9516  |
     +-----------+--------------------------------------+-----------+
     | 4         | SFP Consistency Verification Reply   | RFC 9516  |
     +-----------+--------------------------------------+-----------+
     | 5 - 239   | Unassigned                           |           |
     +-----------+--------------------------------------+-----------+
     | 240 - 251 | Reserved for Experimental Use        | RFC 9516  |
     +-----------+--------------------------------------+-----------+
     | 252 - 254 | Reserved for Private Use             | RFC 9516  |
     +-----------+--------------------------------------+-----------+
     | 255       | Reserved                             | RFC 9516  |
     +-----------+--------------------------------------+-----------+

                         Table 4: SFC Echo Types

9.2.4. SFC Echo Reply Modes

okay so this one is the "SFC Echo Reply Modes" registry ๐Ÿฆ‹ IANA keeps track of it, and it's basically the menu of how an Echo Reply can come back to you. ๐Ÿ’…

Registry Name: SFC Echo Reply Modes

Assignment Policy:

  • 0 - 175: IETF Review
  • 176 - 239: First Come First Served
  • 240 - 251: Experimental Use
  • 252 - 254: Private Use

Reference: RFC 9516

        +=======+====================================+===========+
        | Value | Description                        | Reference |
        +=======+====================================+===========+
        | 0     | Reserved                           | RFC 9516  |
        +-------+------------------------------------+-----------+
        | 1     | Do Not Reply                       | RFC 9516  |
        +-------+------------------------------------+-----------+
        | 2     | Reply via an IPv4/IPv6 UDP Packet  | RFC 9516  |
        +-------+------------------------------------+-----------+
        | 3     | Unassigned                         |           |
        +-------+------------------------------------+-----------+
        | 4     | Reply via Specified Path           | RFC 9516  |
        +-------+------------------------------------+-----------+
        | 5     | Reply via an IPv4/IPv6 UDP Packet  | RFC 9516  |
        |       | with the data integrity protection |           |
        +-------+------------------------------------+-----------+
        | 6     | Unassigned                         |           |
        +-------+------------------------------------+-----------+
        | 7     | Reply via Specified Path with the  | RFC 9516  |
        |       | data integrity protection          |           |
        +-------+------------------------------------+-----------+
        | 8 -   | Unassigned                         |           |
        | 239   |                                    |           |
        +-------+------------------------------------+-----------+
        | 240 - | Reserved for Experimental Use      | RFC 9516  |
        | 251   |                                    |           |
        +-------+------------------------------------+-----------+
        | 252 - | Reserved for Private Use           | RFC 9516  |
        | 254   |                                    |           |
        +-------+------------------------------------+-----------+
        | 255   | Reserved                           | RFC 9516  |
        +-------+------------------------------------+-----------+

                      Table 5: SFC Echo Reply Modes

9.2.5. SFC Echo Return Codes

this is the "SFC Echo Return Codes" registry ๐ŸŽ€ It's where all the "here's what went wrong (or didn't)" codes live, so you always know what the reply is trying to tell you. ๐Ÿซถ

Registry Name: SFC Echo Return Codes

Assignment Policy:

  • 0 - 191: IETF Review
  • 192 - 251: First Come First Served
  • 252 - 254: Private Use

Reference: RFC 9516

   +=========+============================================+===========+
   | Value   | Description                                | Reference |
   +=========+============================================+===========+
   | 0       | No Error                                   | RFC 9516  |
   +---------+--------------------------------------------+-----------+
   | 1       | Malformed Echo Request received            | RFC 9516  |
   +---------+--------------------------------------------+-----------+
   | 2       | One or more of the TLVs was not understood | RFC 9516  |
   +---------+--------------------------------------------+-----------+
   | 3       | Authentication failed                      | RFC 9516  |
   +---------+--------------------------------------------+-----------+
   | 4       | SFC TTL Exceeded                           | RFC 9516  |
   +---------+--------------------------------------------+-----------+
   | 5       | End of the SFP                             | RFC 9516  |
   +---------+--------------------------------------------+-----------+
   | 6       | Reply Service Function Path TLV is missing | RFC 9516  |
   +---------+--------------------------------------------+-----------+
   | 7       | Reply SFP was not found                    | RFC 9516  |
   +---------+--------------------------------------------+-----------+
   | 8       | Unverifiable Reply Service Function Path   | RFC 9516  |
   +---------+--------------------------------------------+-----------+
   | 9 - 251 | Unassigned                                 |           |
   +---------+--------------------------------------------+-----------+
   | 252 -   | Reserved for Private Use                   | RFC 9516  |
   | 254     |                                            |           |
   +---------+--------------------------------------------+-----------+
   | 255     | Reserved                                   | RFC 9516  |
   +---------+--------------------------------------------+-----------+

                      Table 6: SFC Echo Return Codes

9.2.6. SFC Active OAM TLV Types

next up is the "SFC Active OAM TLV Types" registry ๐ŸŒธ These are the TLV type numbers you'll see in Active OAM messages, so it's giving very organised bestie energy. โœจ

Registry Name: SFC Active OAM TLV Types

Assignment Policy:

  • 0 - 175: IETF Review
  • 176 - 239: First Come First Served
  • 240 - 251: Experimental Use
  • 252 - 254: Private Use

Reference: RFC 9516

       +===========+==================================+===========+
       | Value     | Description                      | Reference |
       +===========+==================================+===========+
       | 0         | Reserved                         | RFC 9516  |
       +-----------+----------------------------------+-----------+
       | 1         | Source ID TLV                    | RFC 9516  |
       +-----------+----------------------------------+-----------+
       | 2         | Errored TLVs                     | RFC 9516  |
       +-----------+----------------------------------+-----------+
       | 3         | Reply Service Function Path Type | RFC 9516  |
       +-----------+----------------------------------+-----------+
       | 4         | SFF Information Record Type      | RFC 9516  |
       +-----------+----------------------------------+-----------+
       | 5         | SF Information                   | RFC 9516  |
       +-----------+----------------------------------+-----------+
       | 6 - 239   | Unassigned                       |           |
       +-----------+----------------------------------+-----------+
       | 240 - 251 | Reserved for Experimental Use    | RFC 9516  |
       +-----------+----------------------------------+-----------+
       | 252 - 254 | Reserved for Private Use         | RFC 9516  |
       +-----------+----------------------------------+-----------+
       | 255       | Reserved                         | RFC 9516  |
       +-----------+----------------------------------+-----------+

                    Table 7: SFC Active OAM TLV Types

9.2.7. SF Identifier Types

last registry in this batch is the "SF Identifier Types" one ๐Ÿงš It's the list of what kind of identifier a Service Function can be known by, like IPv4, IPv6 or MAC. Lowkey iconic. ๐Ÿ’œ

IANA has created the "SF Identifier Types" as follows:

Registry Name: SF Identifier Types

Assignment Policy:

  • 0 - 191: IETF Review
  • 192 - 251: First Come First Served
  • 252 - 254: Private Use

Reference: RFC 9516

           +===========+==========================+===========+
           | Value     | Description              | Reference |
           +===========+==========================+===========+
           | 0         | Reserved                 | RFC 9516  |
           +-----------+--------------------------+-----------+
           | 1         | IPv4                     | RFC 9516  |
           +-----------+--------------------------+-----------+
           | 2         | IPv6                     | RFC 9516  |
           +-----------+--------------------------+-----------+
           | 3         | MAC                      | RFC 9516  |
           +-----------+--------------------------+-----------+
           | 4 - 251   | Unassigned               |           |
           +-----------+--------------------------+-----------+
           | 252 - 254 | Reserved for Private Use | RFC 9516  |
           +-----------+--------------------------+-----------+
           | 255       | Reserved                 | RFC 9516  |
           +-----------+--------------------------+-----------+

                       Table 8: SF Identifier Types

10. References ๐Ÿ“š

10.1. Normative References

this is the list of the documents the spec leans on hardest, so you want to actually read these ๐Ÿ“

10.2. Informative References โœจ

Okay bestie, now we're in the "extra reading" pile ๐Ÿ“š๐Ÿฆ‹ These are the docs the spec points to for background. Here they are, exactly as written:

[RFC0792]  Postel, J., "Internet Control Message Protocol", STD 5,
           RFC 792, DOI 10.17487/RFC0792, September 1981,
           <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc792>.

[RFC4086]  Eastlake 3rd, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker,
           "Randomness Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086,
           DOI 10.17487/RFC4086, June 2005,
           <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4086>.

[RFC4302]  Kent, S., "IP Authentication Header", RFC 4302,
           DOI 10.17487/RFC4302, December 2005,
           <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4302>.

[RFC4303]  Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)",
           RFC 4303, DOI 10.17487/RFC4303, December 2005,
           <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4303>.

[RFC4443]  Conta, A., Deering, S., and M. Gupta, Ed., "Internet
           Control Message Protocol (ICMPv6) for the Internet
           Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Specification", STD 89,
           RFC 4443, DOI 10.17487/RFC4443, March 2006,
           <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4443>.

[RFC5706]  Harrington, D., "Guidelines for Considering Operations and
           Management of New Protocols and Protocol Extensions",
           RFC 5706, DOI 10.17487/RFC5706, November 2009,
           <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5706>.

[RFC5880]  Katz, D. and D. Ward, "Bidirectional Forwarding Detection
           (BFD)", RFC 5880, DOI 10.17487/RFC5880, June 2010,
           <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5880>.

[RFC6437]  Amante, S., Carpenter, B., Jiang, S., and J. Rajahalme,
           "IPv6 Flow Label Specification", RFC 6437,
           DOI 10.17487/RFC6437, November 2011,
           <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6437>.

[RFC7110]  Chen, M., Cao, W., Ning, S., Jounay, F., and S. Delord,
           "Return Path Specified Label Switched Path (LSP) Ping",
           RFC 7110, DOI 10.17487/RFC7110, January 2014,
           <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7110>.

[RFC7555]  Swallow, G., Lim, V., and S. Aldrin, "Proxy MPLS Echo
           Request", RFC 7555, DOI 10.17487/RFC7555, June 2015,
           <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7555>.

[RFC7799]  Morton, A., "Active and Passive Metrics and Methods (with
           Hybrid Types In-Between)", RFC 7799, DOI 10.17487/RFC7799,
           May 2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7799>.

[RFC8029]  Kompella, K., Swallow, G., Pignataro, C., Ed., Kumar, N.,
           Aldrin, S., and M. Chen, "Detecting Multiprotocol Label
           Switched (MPLS) Data-Plane Failures", RFC 8029,
           DOI 10.17487/RFC8029, March 2017,
           <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8029>.

[RFC8126]  Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for
           Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26,
           RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017,
           <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126>.

[RFC8595]  Farrel, A., Bryant, S., and J. Drake, "An MPLS-Based
           Forwarding Plane for Service Function Chaining", RFC 8595,
           DOI 10.17487/RFC8595, June 2019,
           <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8595>.

[RFC8924]  Aldrin, S., Pignataro, C., Ed., Kumar, N., Ed., Krishnan,
           R., and A. Ghanwani, "Service Function Chaining (SFC)
           Operations, Administration, and Maintenance (OAM)
           Framework", RFC 8924, DOI 10.17487/RFC8924, October 2020,
           <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8924>.

[RFC9263]  Wei, Y., Ed., Elzur, U., Majee, S., Pignataro, C., and D.
           Eastlake 3rd, "Network Service Header (NSH) Metadata Type
           2 Variable-Length Context Headers", RFC 9263,
           DOI 10.17487/RFC9263, August 2022,
           <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9263>.

Acknowledgments

Big thank-you energy time! ๐Ÿซถ The authors gave a huge shoutout to Dan Wing, Dirk von Hugo, Mohamed Boucadair, Donald Eastlake 3rd, Carlos Pignataro, and Frank Brockners for their super thorough reviews and the most helpful comments ever ๐Ÿ’– They also thanked John Drake for his review and for pointing them to the work on BGP control plane for NSH SFC ๐Ÿงš. Joel M. Halpern gets a gold star ๐ŸŒŸ for his suggestion about the load-balancing scenario, and Darren Dukes gets a standing ovation ๐Ÿ‘ for comments so thoughtful that they made the whole document way better ๐Ÿ’…โœจ


Contributors

Shoutout to the people who helped write this thing too ๐ŸŒธ

Cui Wang
Individual contributor
Email: lindawangjoy@gmail.com


Zhonghua Chen
China Telecom
No.1835, South PuDong Road
Shanghai
201203
China
Phone: +86 18918588897
Email: chenzhongh@chinatelecom.cn

Authors' Addresses

And here's how to reach the authors ๐Ÿ’Œ Slide into those inboxes, bestie ๐Ÿฆ‹

Greg Mirsky
Ericsson
Email: gregimirsky@gmail.com


Wei Meng
ZTE Corporation
Yuhuatai District
No.50 Software Avenue
Nanjing,
China
Email: meng.wei2@zte.com.cn


Ting Ao
China Mobile
No.889, BiBo Road
Shanghai
201203
China
Phone: +86 17721209283
Email: 18555817@qq.com


Bhumip Khasnabish
Individual Contributor
Email: vumip1@gmail.com


Kent Leung
Individual Contributor
530 Showers Drive Ste 7
Mountain View, CA 94040
United States of America
Email: mail4kentl@gmail.com


Gyan Mishra
Verizon Inc.
Email: gyan.s.mishra@verizon.com

And that's the whole RFC, periodt! ๐ŸŒˆ๐Ÿ‘‘๐Ÿ’…

๐Ÿ“ฆ where this page comes from