RFC 9472
A YANG Data Model for Reporting Software Bills of Materials (SBOMs) and Vulnerability Information
RFC 9472 🎀 A YANG Data Model for Reporting Software Bills of Materials (SBOMs) and Vulnerability Information
Title block tea ☕💅 This doc is from the IETF (Internet Engineering Task Force), and it's a Standards Track document, so it's officially Internet protocol stuff, not a vibe check. 🦋
- Authors: E. Lear (Cisco Systems) and S. Rose (NIST) 🫶
- Category: Standards Track ✨
- ISSN: 2070-1721
- Date: October 2023 🌸
Abstract 🌈
okay so bestie, to level up our cybersecurity 🔥, automation has to be able to find out what software a device is running, whether that software has known vulnerabilities, and what recommendations (if any) suppliers have. This memo extends the Manufacturer User Description (MUD) YANG schema 💜 so it can point to software bills of materials (SBOMs) and vulnerability information, using a new transparency schema. it's giving organized ✨
Status of This Memo 📜
This is an Internet Standards Track document. 🎀
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). It's the consensus of the IETF community, it got public review, and the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG) approved it for publication. If you want more on Internet Standards, check out Section 2 of RFC 7841. 💅
For the current status of this document, any errata, and how to send feedback, go to https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9472. 🦋
Copyright Notice 💖
Copyright (c) 2023 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. 🌸
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) as in effect on the date this document was published. Please read these carefully, because they explain your rights and restrictions for this document. 🙈 Code Components pulled out of this document must include the Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions, and they come without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License. ⭐
Table of Contents 🧚
1. Introduction
1.1. Requirements Language
1.2. How This Information Is Retrieved
1.3. Formats
2. The Well-Known Transparency Endpoint Set
3. The mud-transparency Extension
4. The mud-sbom Augmentation to the MUD YANG Data Model
5. Examples
5.1. Without ACLS
5.2. SBOM Located on the Device
5.3. Further Contact Required
5.4. With ACLS
6. Security Considerations
7. IANA Considerations
7.1. MUD Extension
7.2. YANG Registration
7.3. Well-Known Prefix
8. References
8.1. Normative References
8.2. Informative References
Acknowledgments
Authors' Addresses1. Introduction 💫
A bunch of efforts are going on to make it way easier to see what software is running on a system and what vulnerabilities that software might have [EO2021]. 👀
Put simply, this memo is here to answer two kinds of questions for tens of thousands of devices across a huge variety of device types 🌍. Those questions are:
- Is this system susceptible to a particular vulnerability?
- Which devices in a particular environment contain vulnerabilities that require some action?
Quick heads-up: this memo doesn't define the format of this information. It only covers how to locate and retrieve these objects 🦋. So the model is meant to help with discovery, and on its own it doesn't give you any access to the underlying data.
Software bills of materials (SBOMs) describe what software a device contains, including versions and dependencies 📦. There are different SBOM formats, like Software Package Data Exchange [SPDX] or CycloneDX [CycloneDX15]. 🎀
System vulnerabilities can also be described in several data formats, including the CycloneDX format we just mentioned, the Common Vulnerability Reporting Framework [CVRF], and the Common Security Advisory Format [CSAF] 💅. This information is usually used to tell administrators about the state of any known vulnerabilities on a system.
SBOM and vulnerability information can be used together with other sources of vulnerability information 🫶. For example, a network management tool could discover that a system uses a particular set of software components, search a national vulnerability database to find known vulnerabilities, and then apply the information the manufacturer provided through this mechanism to produce a vulnerability report ✨. That report may be used to show what, if any, versions of software fix the vulnerability, or whether the system runs the vulnerable code at all.
Both classes of information elements are optional under the model specified in this memo 🌸. You can provide only an SBOM, only vulnerability information, or both an SBOM and vulnerability information.
Note that SBOM formats may also carry other information, the most common being licensing terms 📜. Because this specification is neutral about content, it's left to format developers such as the Linux Foundation, OASIS, and ISO to decide which attributes they will support.
This memo does not specify how vulnerability information may be retrieved directly from the endpoint 🙈. That's because vulnerability information changes at different rates than software updates do. However, some SBOM formats may also contain vulnerability information.
SBOMs and vulnerability information are advertised and retrieved through a YANG augmentation of the Manufacturer User Description (MUD) model [RFC8520] 💜. The schema creates a grouping that can also be used independently of MUD. Also, other MUD features, such as access controls, don't need to be present.
The mechanisms in this document are meant to handle two use cases 🦋:
- A network-layer management system retrieving information from an Internet of Things (IoT) device as part of its ongoing life cycle. Such devices may or may not have query interfaces available.
- An application-layer management system retrieving vulnerability or SBOM information to evaluate the posture of an application server of some form. These application servers may themselves be containers or hypervisors. Discovering the topology of a server is beyond the scope of this memo.
To cover these two key use cases, objects may be found in one of three ways:
- on the devices themselves
- on a website (e.g., via a URI)
- through some form of out-of-band contact with the supplier
With the first method, devices have interfaces that allow direct retrieval 🔥. Examples of these interfaces might be an HTTP [RFC9110] or Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) [RFC7252] endpoint. There may also be private interfaces.
With the second method, if a device doesn't have an appropriate retrieval interface but the manufacturer offers one directly, a URI to that information is discovered through interfaces such as MUD via DHCP or bootstrapping and ownership transfer mechanisms 🎀.
With the third method, a supplier may want to make an SBOM or vulnerability information available under certain circumstances, and may need to evaluate each request individually 👑. The result of that evaluation might be the SBOM, the vulnerability itself, a restricted URL, or no access at all.
To enable application-layer discovery, this memo defines a well-known URI [RFC8615] ✨. Management or orchestration tools can query this well-known URI to retrieve a system's SBOM information. Further queries may be needed depending on the content and structure of the response.
1.1. Requirements Language 🌷
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. 🫶
1.2. How This Information Is Retrieved 🗺️
Section 4 describes a data model that extends the MUD file format to carry SBOM and vulnerability information 💖. Section 1.5 of [RFC8520] describes the mechanisms devices can use to emit a URL pointing to this file. Devices can also share this URL through documentation, or inside a QR code on the box 📦. Section 2 describes a well-known URL that an SBOM could be served from on the local device.
Note that vulnerability and SBOM information are likely to change at different rates 🦋. MUD's cache-validity node gives manufacturers a way to control how often tooling should check for those changes.
1.3. Formats 🎨
There are multiple ways to express both SBOMs and vulnerability information 🌈. When they're retrieved from the device or from a remote web server, tools will need to look at the Content-Type header to figure out exactly which format is being sent. IoT devices in particular have limited capabilities, so using a specific Accept: header in HTTP or the Accept Option in CoAP is NOT RECOMMENDED 🙈. Instead, backend tooling is encouraged to support all known formats, and it SHOULD silently discard SBOM information sent with a media type it doesn't understand.
If multiple SBOMs are intended to be supported in the same file, the media type should properly reflect that 💅. For example, one might use application/{someformat}+json-seq. It's up to those supporting those formats to make the appropriate registrations in this case.
Some formats may support both vulnerability and software inventory information ✨. When both are available from the same URL, both sbom-url and members of the vuln-url list MUST indicate that. Network management systems MUST take note when the SBOM and vulnerability information are accessible via the same resource, and they MUST NOT retrieve that resource a second time 🧚.
2. The Well-Known Transparency Endpoint Set 🌸
A well-known endpoint is defined:
"/.well-known/sbom" retrieves an SBOMAs discussed earlier, the precise format of a response depends on the Content-Type provided 🎀.
3. The mud-transparency Extension 💜
We're now going to formally define the mud-transparency extension 🦋. This is done in two parts.
First, the extension name "transparency" is listed in the "extensions" array of the MUD file ✨. This schema extension is intended to be used wherever it might be appropriate, not just with MUD.
Second, the "mud" container is augmented with a list of SBOM sources 💖.
This is done as follows:
module: ietf-mud-transparency
augment /mud:mud:
+--rw transparency
+--rw (sbom-retrieval-method)?
| +--:(cloud)
| | +--rw sboms* [version-info]
| | +--rw version-info string
| | +--rw sbom-url? inet:uri
| +--:(local-well-known)
| | +--rw sbom-local-well-known? identityref
| +--:(sbom-contact-info)
| +--rw sbom-contact-uri? inet:uri
+--rw sbom-archive-list? inet:uri
+--rw (vuln-retrieval-method)?
+--:(cloud)
| +--rw vuln-url* inet:uri
+--:(vuln-contact-info)
+--rw vuln-contact-uri? inet:uriSee [RFC8340] for a description of YANG trees 🧠.
4. The mud-sbom Augmentation to the MUD YANG Data Model ✨
okay bestie, this YANG module is going to reference [RFC6991], [RFC7231], [RFC7252], [RFC8520], and [RFC9110]. 💅 it's the module that augments the MUD model so you can tell people where the SBOM and vulnerability info lives 🧚
<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-mud-transparency@2023-10-10.yang"
module ietf-mud-transparency {
yang-version 1.1;
namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-mud-transparency";
prefix mudtx;
import ietf-inet-types {
prefix inet;
reference
"RFC 6991: Common YANG Data Types";
}
import ietf-mud {
prefix mud;
reference
"RFC 8520: Manufacturer Usage Description Specification";
}
organization
"IETF OPSAWG (Ops Area) Working Group";
contact
"WG Web: <https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/opsawg/>
WG List: <opsawg@ietf.org>
Editor: Eliot Lear <lear@cisco.com>
Editor: Scott Rose <scott.rose@nist.gov>";
description
"This YANG module augments the ietf-mud model to provide for
reporting of SBOMs and vulnerability information.
The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL', 'SHALL
NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED', 'NOT RECOMMENDED',
'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this document are to be interpreted as
described in BCP 14 (RFC 2119) (RFC 8174) when, and only when,
they appear in all capitals, as shown here.
Copyright (c) 2023 IETF Trust and the persons identified as
authors of the code. All rights reserved.
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject to
the license terms contained in, the Revised BSD License set
forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions
Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
This version of this YANG module is part of RFC 9472
(https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9472);
see the RFC itself for full legal notices.";
revision 2023-10-10 {
description
"Initial proposed standard.";
reference
"RFC 9472: A YANG Data Model for Reporting Software Bills
of Materials (SBOMs) and Vulnerability Information";
}
identity local-type {
description
"Base identity for local well-known choices.";
}
identity http {
base mudtx:local-type;
description
"Use http (RFC 7231) (insecure) to retrieve SBOM information.
This method is NOT RECOMMENDED but may be unavoidable for
certain classes of deployment where TLS has not or
cannot be implemented.";
reference
"RFC 7231: Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1):
Semantics and Content";
}
identity https {
base mudtx:local-type;
description
"Use https (secure) to retrieve SBOM information. See
RFC 9110.";
reference
"RFC 9110: HTTP Semantics";
}
identity coap {
base mudtx:local-type;
description
"Use COAP (RFC 7252) (insecure) to retrieve SBOM. This method
is NOT RECOMMENDED, although it may be unavoidable
for certain classes of implementations/deployments.";
reference
"RFC 7252: The Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP)";
}
identity coaps {
base mudtx:local-type;
description
"Use COAPS (secure) to retrieve SBOM (RFC 7252).";
}
grouping transparency-extension {
description
"This grouping provides a means to describe the location of
software bills of material and vulnerability descriptions.";
container transparency {
description
"Container of methods to get SBOMs and vulnerability
information.";
choice sbom-retrieval-method {
description
"How to find SBOM information.";
case cloud {
list sboms {
key "version-info";
description
"A list of SBOMs tied to different software
or hardware versions.";
leaf version-info {
type string;
description
"The version to which this SBOM refers.";
}
leaf sbom-url {
type inet:uri {
pattern '((coaps?)|(https?)):.*';
}
description
"A statically located URL.";
}
}
}
case local-well-known {
leaf sbom-local-well-known {
type identityref {
base mudtx:local-type;
}
description
"Which communication protocol to choose.";
}
}
case sbom-contact-info {
leaf sbom-contact-uri {
type inet:uri {
pattern '((mailto)|(https?)|(tel)):.*';
}
description
"This MUST be a tel, an http, an https, or
a mailto uri schema that customers can use to
contact someone for SBOM information.";
}
}
}
leaf sbom-archive-list {
type inet:uri;
description
"This URI returns a JSON list of URLs that consist of
SBOMs that were previously published for this
device. Publication dates can be found inside
the SBOMs.";
}
choice vuln-retrieval-method {
description
"How to find vulnerability information.";
case cloud {
leaf-list vuln-url {
type inet:uri;
description
"List of statically located URLs that reference
vulnerability information.";
}
}
case vuln-contact-info {
leaf vuln-contact-uri {
type inet:uri {
pattern '((mailto)|(https?)|(tel)):.*';
}
description
"This MUST be a tel, an http, an https, or
a mailto uri schema that customers can use to
contact someone for vulnerability information.";
}
}
}
}
}
augment "/mud:mud" {
description
"Add extension for software transparency.";
uses transparency-extension;
}
}
<CODE ENDS>5. Examples 🎀
okay so in this example MUD file that uses a cloud service, the modelX shows where the SBOM lives, using a URL 🌸 ngl the ACLs (Access Control Lists) in a MUD file are NOT required 🙈 but they're a very good idea for IP-based devices, periodt 💅
5.1. Without ACLS ✨
this first MUD file shows how to get SBOM and vulnerability info without ACLs 🦋
{
"ietf-mud:mud": {
"mud-version": 1,
"extensions": [
"transparency"
],
"mudtx:transparency": {
sboms: [ {
"version-info": "1.2",
"sbom-url": "https://iot.example.com/info/modelX/sbom.json"
} ],
"vuln-url" : [
"https://iotd.example.com/info/modelX/csaf.json"
]
},
"mud-url": "https://iot.example.com/modelX.json",
"mud-signature": "https://iot.example.com/modelX.p7s",
"last-update": "2022-01-05T13:29:12+00:00",
"cache-validity": 48,
"is-supported": true,
"systeminfo": "retrieving vuln and SBOM info via a cloud service",
"mfg-name": "Example, Inc.",
"documentation": "https://iot.example.com/doc/modelX",
"model-name": "modelX"
}
}the second example shows that just the SBOM info comes from the cloud 🧚
{
"ietf-mud:mud": {
"mud-version": 1,
"extensions": [
"transparency"
],
"mudtx:transparency": {
sboms: [ {
"version-info": "1.2",
"sbom-url": "https://iot.example.com/info/modelX/sbom.json"
} ],
},
"mud-url": "https://iot.example.com/modelX.json",
"mud-signature": "https://iot.example.com/modelX.p7s",
"last-update": "2022-01-05T13:29:12+00:00",
"cache-validity": 48,
"is-supported": true,
"systeminfo": "retrieving vuln and SBOM info via a cloud service",
"mfg-name": "Example, Inc.",
"documentation": "https://iot.example.com/doc/modelX",
"model-name": "modelX"
}
}5.2. SBOM Located on the Device 🔥
in the next example, the SBOM is sitting on the device itself, and there's no vulnerability info provided 💜
{
"ietf-mud:mud": {
"mud-version": 1,
"extensions": [
"transparency"
],
"mudtx:transparency": {
"sbom-local-well-known": "https"
},
"mud-url": "https://iot.example.com/modelX.json",
"mud-signature": "https://iot.example.com/modelX.p7s",
"last-update": "2022-01-05T13:29:47+00:00",
"cache-validity": 48,
"is-supported": true,
"systeminfo": "retrieving SBOM info from a local source",
"mfg-name": "Example, Inc.",
"documentation": "https://iot.example.com/doc/modelX",
"model-name": "modelX"
}
}in this one, the SBOM gets pulled from the device, while the vuln info is available from the cloud 🌈 this is likely a common case because vendors may learn of vulnerability information more frequently than they update software 🍓
{
"ietf-mud:mud": {
"mud-version": 1,
"extensions": [
"transparency"
],
"mudtx:transparency": {
"sbom-local-well-known": "https",
"vuln-url" : [
"https://iotd.example.com/info/modelX/csaf.json"
]
},
"mud-url": "https://iot-device.example.com/modelX.json",
"mud-signature": "https://iot-device.example.com/modelX.p7s",
"last-update": "2022-01-05T13:25:14+00:00",
"cache-validity": 48,
"is-supported": true,
"systeminfo": "mixed example: SBOM on device, vuln info in cloud",
"mfg-name": "Example, Inc.",
"documentation": "https://iot-device.example.com/doc/modelX",
"model-name": "modelX"
}
}5.3. Further Contact Required ⭐
in this example, the network manager has to take further steps to get the SBOM info 🫶 the vuln info is still available though ✨
{
"ietf-mud:mud": {
"mud-version": 1,
"extensions": [
"transparency"
],
"mudtx:transparency": {
"contact-info": "https://iot-device.example.com/contact-info.html",
"vuln-url" : [
"https://iotd.example.com/info/modelX/csaf.json"
]
},
"mud-url": "https://iot-device.example.com/modelX.json",
"mud-signature": "https://iot-device.example.com/modelX.p7s",
"last-update": "2021-07-09T06:16:42+00:00",
"cache-validity": 48,
"is-supported": true,
"systeminfo": "retrieving vuln and SBOM info via a cloud service",
"mfg-name": "Example, Inc.",
"documentation": "https://iot-device.example.com/doc/modelX",
"model-name": "modelX"
}
}5.4. With ACLS ✨
Okay bestie, last but not least, here's a full example where the device gives us SBOM and vulnerability info and access control info. 💖 Everything lives in one JSON blob:
{
"ietf-mud:mud": {
"mud-version": 1,
"extensions": [
"transparency"
],
"mudtx:transparency": {
"sbom-local-well-known": "https",
"vuln-url" : [
"https://iotd.example.com/info/modelX/csaf.json"
]
},
"mud-url": "https://iot.example.com/modelX.json",
"mud-signature": "https://iot.example.com/modelX.p7s",
"last-update": "2022-01-05T13:30:31+00:00",
"cache-validity": 48,
"is-supported": true,
"systeminfo": "retrieving vuln and SBOM info via a cloud service",
"mfg-name": "Example, Inc.",
"documentation": "https://iot.example.com/doc/modelX",
"model-name": "modelX",
"from-device-policy": {
"access-lists": {
"access-list": [
{
"name": "mud-65443-v4fr"
}
]
}
},
"to-device-policy": {
"access-lists": {
"access-list": [
{
"name": "mud-65443-v4to"
}
]
}
}
},
"ietf-access-control-list:acls": {
"acl": [
{
"name": "mud-65443-v4to",
"type": "ipv4-acl-type",
"aces": {
"ace": [
{
"name": "cl0-todev",
"matches": {
"ipv4": {
"ietf-acldns:src-dnsname": "iotserver.example.com"
}
},
"actions": {
"forwarding": "accept"
}
}
]
}
},
{
"name": "mud-65443-v4fr",
"type": "ipv4-acl-type",
"aces": {
"ace": [
{
"name": "cl0-frdev",
"matches": {
"ipv4": {
"ietf-acldns:dst-dnsname": "iotserver.example.com"
}
},
"actions": {
"forwarding": "accept"
}
}
]
}
}
]
}
}So at this point, the management system can try to grab the SBOM, figure out which format it's in by checking the Content-Type header on the response to a GET request, do the whole process again on its own for the vulnerability info, and apply ACLs as appropriate. 🦋
6. Security Considerations 🔒
Bestie, this part is SERIOUS, so pay attention. 🙈 This document describes a schema for discovering where software transparency information lives, but it does not specify the access model for the information itself. In particular, the YANG module specified here isn't necessarily meant to be reached through regular network management protocols like NETCONF [RFC6241] or RESTCONF [RFC8040], so the regular security considerations for that kind of usage aren't covered here.
We're going to describe protections for both discovery and some advice on protecting the underlying SBOM and vulnerability information. 💅
The model specifies both encrypted and unencrypted ways to retrieve information. This is a matter of pragmatism. Unencrypted communications allow for manipulation of the information being retrieved. So it is RECOMMENDED that implementations offer a means to configure endpoints so that they may make use of TLS or DTLS. 🔐
The ietf-mud-transparency module has no operational impact on the element itself. It's used to discover state information that may be available on or off the element. Even if the module is made writeable, that only indicates a change in how to retrieve read-only elements. There are no means, for instance, to upload an SBOM. Additional risks are discussed below and are applicable to all nodes within the transparency container. 🧚
If an attacker modifies the elements, they may misdirect automation to retrieve a different set of URLs than the designer intended. This in turn leads to two specific sets of risks:
- the information retrieved would be false
- the URLs themselves point to malware
To address either of these risks or any tampering of a URL:
- test any cloud-based URL against a reputation service
- provide the administrator an opportunity to approve further processing when the authority changes to one not known to be reputable
SBOMs are basically an inventory of software, and that's a little spicy. 🌶️ Knowing which specific software is loaded on a system can help an attacker find an appropriate exploit for a known vulnerability, or guide the development of a novel exploit against this system. However, if software is available to an attacker, the attacker may already be able to derive this very same software inventory. When this information resides on the endpoint itself, the endpoint SHOULD NOT provide unrestricted access to the well-known URL by default.
Other servers that offer the data MAY restrict access to SBOM information using appropriate authorization semantics within HTTP. One way to do this would be to issue a certificate to the client for this purpose after a registration process has taken place. Another approach would involve using OAuth in combination. In particular, if a system attempts to retrieve an SBOM via HTTP or CoAP and the client is not authorized, the server MUST produce an appropriate error with instructions on how to register a particular client. 🔑
Another risk is a skew between the SBOM listing and the actual software inventory of a device or container. For example, a manufacturer may update the SBOM on its server, but an individual device hasn't been upgraded yet. This may result in an incorrect policy being applied to a device. A unique mapping of a device's software version and its SBOM can minimize this risk. 🍓
To further mitigate attacks against a device, manufacturers SHOULD recommend network access controls. 🛡️
Vulnerability information is generally made available to databases such as NIST's National Vulnerability Database [NISTNVD]. It's possible that vendors may wish to release information early to some customers. We don't discuss here whether that is a good idea, but if it is employed, then appropriate access controls and authorization SHOULD be applied to that information. 👑
7. IANA Considerations 🌈
7.1. MUD Extension
IANA has added "transparency" to the "MUD Extensions" registry [RFC8520] as follows:
Value: transparency
Reference: RFC 94727.2. YANG Registration
IANA has registered the following YANG module in the "YANG Module Names" registry [RFC6020]:
Name: ietf-mud-transparency
Namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-mud-transparency
Maintained by IANA: N
Prefix: mudtx
Reference: RFC 9472The following URI has been registered in the "IETF XML Registry" [RFC3688]:
URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-mud-transparency
Registrant Contact: IESG
XML: None. Namespace URIs do not represent an XML specification.7.3. Well-Known Prefix
IANA has added the following URI suffix to the "Well-Known URIs" registry in accordance with [RFC8615]:
URI Suffix: sbom
Change Controller: IETF
Reference: RFC 9472
Status: permanent
Related Information: See ISO/IEC 5962:2021 and SPDX.org8. References 📚
8.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC3688] Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3688, January 2004,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3688>.
[RFC6020] Bjorklund, M., Ed., "YANG - A Data Modeling Language for
the Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6020,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6020, October 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6020>.
[RFC6241] Enns, R., Ed., Bjorklund, M., Ed., Schoenwaelder, J., Ed.,
and A. Bierman, Ed., "Network Configuration Protocol
(NETCONF)", RFC 6241, DOI 10.17487/RFC6241, June 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6241>.
[RFC6991] Schoenwaelder, J., Ed., "Common YANG Data Types",
RFC 6991, DOI 10.17487/RFC6991, July 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6991>.
[RFC7231] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Semantics and Content", RFC 7231,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7231, June 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7231>.
[RFC7252] Shelby, Z., Hartke, K., and C. Bormann, "The Constrained
Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7252,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7252, June 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7252>.
[RFC8040] Bierman, A., Bjorklund, M., and K. Watsen, "RESTCONF
Protocol", RFC 8040, DOI 10.17487/RFC8040, January 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8040>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8520] Lear, E., Droms, R., and D. Romascanu, "Manufacturer Usage
Description Specification", RFC 8520,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8520, March 2019,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8520>.
[RFC8615] Nottingham, M., "Well-Known Uniform Resource Identifiers
(URIs)", RFC 8615, DOI 10.17487/RFC8615, May 2019,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8615>.
[RFC9110] Fielding, R., Ed., Nottingham, M., Ed., and J. Reschke,
Ed., "HTTP Semantics", STD 97, RFC 9110,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9110, June 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9110>.8.2. Informative References
[CSAF] Rock, L., Ed., Hagen, S., Ed., and T. Schmidt, Ed.,
"Common Security Advisory Framework Version 2.0", OASIS
Standard, November 2022,
<https://docs.oasis-open.org/csaf/csaf/v2.0/csaf-v2.0.html>.
[CVRF] Hagen, S., Ed., "CSAF Common Vulnerability Reporting
Framework (CVRF) Version 1.2", Committee Specification 01,
September 2017,
<https://docs.oasis-open.org/csaf/csaf-cvrf/v1.2/csaf-cvrf-v1.2.pdf>.
[CycloneDX15]
CycloneDX, "CycloneDX v1.5 JSON Reference", Version 1.5.0,
<https://cyclonedx.org/docs/1.5/json>.
[EO2021] Biden, J., "Executive Order on Improving the Nation's
Cybersecurity", EO 14028, May 2021.
[NISTNVD] NIST, "National Vulnerability Database",
<https://nvd.nist.gov>.
[RFC8340] Bjorklund, M. and L. Berger, Ed., "YANG Tree Diagrams",
BCP 215, RFC 8340, DOI 10.17487/RFC8340, March 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8340>.
[SPDX] The Linux Foundation, "The Software Package Data Exchange
(SPDX) Specification", Version 2.3, 2022,
<https://spdx.github.io/spdx-spec/v2.3/>.Acknowledgments 💜
Huge thanks to Russ Housley, Dick Brooks, Tom Petch, and Nicolas Comstedt, who provided review comments. You're all iconic. 🫶
Authors' Addresses 🦋
Eliot Lear
Cisco Systems
Richtistrasse 7
CH-8304 Wallisellen
Switzerland
Phone: +41 44 878 9200
Email: lear@cisco.com
Scott Rose
NIST
100 Bureau Dr.
Gaithersburg, MD 20899
United States of America
Phone: +1 301-975-8439
Email: scott.rose@nist.gov📦 where this page comes from
- ietf: rfc9472 2023-10
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