RFC 8692
Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: Additional Algorithm Identifiers for RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA Using SHAKEs
RFC 8692 bestie, we're doing this! 💖🦋
RFC 8692: Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: Additional Algorithm Identifiers for RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA Using SHAKEs ✨
- Authors: P. Kampanakis (Cisco Systems) and Q. Dang (NIST) 💅
- Category: Standards Track 👑
- Date: December 2019 🌸
- ISSN: 2070-1721
- Updates: RFC 3279 (this one doesn't have an Obsoletes line, so it's only updating, not replacing anything) 🫶
Abstract
Okay so digital signatures are how we sign messages, X.509 certificates, and Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) 🔐 This doc updates RFC 3279 ("Algorithms and Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile") and explains how to use the SHAKE function family in X.509 certificates and revocation lists as one-way hash functions with the RSA Probabilistic signature and Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) signature algorithms. It also covers the conventions for the associated subject public keys 💜
Status of This Memo
This is an Internet Standards Track document. ✨
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community, it got public review, and the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG) approved it for publication 🎀 More info on Internet Standards is in Section 2 of RFC 7841.
Info about the current status of this document, any errata, and how to give feedback on it lives at https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8692 🌈
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. 🦋
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) as they stand on the publication date. Please read these carefully, because they spell out your rights and restrictions for this document. Code Components pulled out of this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions, and they come without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License 📜
Table of Contents 💖
1. Introduction
2. Terminology
3. Identifiers
4. Use in PKIX
4.1. Signatures
4.1.1. RSASSA-PSS Signatures
4.1.2. ECDSA Signatures
4.2. Public Keys
5. IANA Considerations
6. Security Considerations
7. References
7.1. Normative References
7.2. Informative References
Appendix A. ASN.1 Module
Acknowledgements
Authors' Addresses1. Introduction ✨
Okay so [RFC3279] already defines crypto algorithm identifiers for the "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile" [RFC5280]. This doc updates RFC 3279 and adds identifiers for a few crypto algorithms that use variable-length output SHAKE functions from [SHA3], which can be used with RFC 5280 🌸
In the SHA-3 family there are two extendable-output functions (SHAKEs): SHAKE128 and SHAKE256. There are also four other hash function instances, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, and SHA3-512, but they're out of scope for this doc 🙈 A SHAKE is a variable-length hash function written as SHAKE(M, d), where the output is a d-bits-long digest of message M. For SHAKE128, the collision and second-preimage-resistance strengths are min(d/2, 128) and min(d, 128) bits. For SHAKE256 they're min(d/2, 256) and min(d, 256) bits. The source for this is Appendix A.1 of [SHA3] 🧚
A SHAKE can be the message digest function (the thing that hashes the message being signed) in the RSA Probabilistic Signature Scheme (RSASSA-PSS) [RFC8017] and in ECDSA [X9.62]. It can also be the hash inside the mask generation function (MGF) in RSASSA-PSS 💅
2. Terminology 🍓
Here are the BCP 14 key words, and they only count when they show up in ALL CAPS like this: "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL". They get interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] 🔥
3. Identifiers 🎀
This section defines four new object identifiers (OIDs): one for RSASSA-PSS and one for ECDSA with each of SHAKE128 and SHAKE256. The same algorithm identifiers can also be used to identify a public key in RSASSA-PSS 🦋
Here are the new identifiers for RSASSA-PSS signatures using SHAKEs:
id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6)
30 }
id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6)
31 }And here are the new algorithm identifiers for ECDSA signatures using SHAKEs:
id-ecdsa-with-shake128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6)
32 }
id-ecdsa-with-shake256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6)
33 }The parameters for all four identifiers above MUST be absent 🚫 That means the identifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one component: the OID. 💀
Sections 4.1.1 and 4.1.2 spell out the required output length for each use of SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 in RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA. Quick summary: when hashing messages to be signed, the output lengths of SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 are 256 and 512 bits. When the SHAKEs are used as MGFs in RSASSA-PSS, their output lengths are (8*ceil((n-1)/8) - 264) or (8*ceil((n-1)/8) - 520) bits, respectively, where n is the RSA modulus size in bits 🧮
4. Use in PKIX 💜
4.1. Signatures ✨
Signatures show up in a bunch of different ASN.1 structures. Here's the ASN.1 representation from [RFC5280]. In an X.509 certificate, a signature is encoded with an algorithm identifier in the signatureAlgorithm attribute, plus a signatureValue attribute that holds the actual signature:
Certificate ::= SEQUENCE {
tbsCertificate TBSCertificate,
signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
signatureValue BIT STRING }The identifiers from Section 3 can be used as the AlgorithmIdentifier in the signatureAlgorithm field of the Certificate sequence, and in the signature field of the TBSCertificate sequence in X.509 [RFC5280]. The parameters of these signature algorithms are absent, as explained in Section 3 🌷
Conforming Certification Authority (CA) implementations MUST specify the algorithms explicitly by using the OIDs from Section 3 when they encode RSASSA-PSS or ECDSA with SHAKE signatures in certificates and CRLs 📜 Conforming client implementations that process certificates and CRLs using RSASSA-PSS or ECDSA with SHAKE MUST recognize the matching OIDs. Encoding rules for RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA signature values are specified in [RFC4055] and [RFC5480], respectively 🫶
When using RSASSA-PSS or ECDSA with SHAKEs, the RSA modulus and ECDSA curve order SHOULD be chosen in line with the SHAKE output length. See Section 6 for more details 🔐
4.1.1. RSASSA-PSS Signatures 🦋
The RSASSA-PSS algorithm is defined in [RFC8017]. When id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 (specified in Section 3) is used, the encoding MUST omit the parameters field. That means the AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one component: id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256. [RFC4055] defines RSASSA-PSS-params, which is used to define the algorithms and inputs to the algorithm. This spec doesn't use parameters, because the hash, mask generation algorithm, trailer, and salt are all baked into the OID definition 🎀
The hash algorithm that hashes a message being signed and the hash algorithm used as the MGF in RSASSA-PSS MUST be the same: both SHAKE128, or both SHAKE256. The output length of the hash algorithm that hashes the message SHALL be 32 bytes (for SHAKE128) or 64 bytes (for SHAKE256) 💅
The MGF takes an octet string of variable length and a desired output length as input, and it outputs an octet string of that desired length. In RSASSA-PSS with SHAKEs, the SHAKEs MUST be used natively as the MGF, instead of the MGF1 algorithm that runs the hash function in multiple iterations (as specified in Appendix B.2.1 of [RFC8017]) 🤯 So the MGF is defined as the SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 output of the mgfSeed for id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 and id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256, respectively. The mgfSeed is the seed the mask is generated from, an octet string [RFC8017]. As explained in Step 9 of Section 9.1.1 of [RFC8017], the output length of the MGF is emLen - hLen - 1 bytes. emLen is the maximum message length ceil((n-1)/8), where n is the RSA modulus in bits. hLen is 32 and 64 bytes for id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 and id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256, respectively. So when SHAKE is the MGF, the SHAKE output length maskLen is (8*emLen - 264) or (8*emLen - 520) bits, respectively 🧠 For example, when the RSA modulus n is 2048 bits, the output length of SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 as the MGF will be 1784 or 1528 bits when id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 is used, respectively 🍓
The RSASSA-PSS saltLength MUST be 32 bytes for id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 or 64 bytes for id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256. Finally, the trailerField MUST be 1, which represents the trailer field with hexadecimal value 0xBC [RFC8017] 🌈
4.1.2. ECDSA Signatures 🧚
The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) is defined in [X9.62]. When the id-ecdsa-with-shake128 or id-ecdsa-with-shake256 algorithm identifier (specified in Section 3) appears, the matching SHAKE function (SHAKE128 or SHAKE256) gets used as the hash. The encoding MUST omit the parameters field. That means the AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one component: the OID id-ecdsa-with-shake128 or id-ecdsa-with-shake256 👑
For simplicity and compliance with the ECDSA standard specification [X9.62], the output length of the hash function must be explicitly determined. The output length, d, for SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 used in ECDSA MUST be 256 or 512 bits, respectively 🔥
Conforming CA implementations that generate ECDSA with SHAKE signatures in certificates or CRLs SHOULD generate those signatures with a deterministically generated, nonrandom k, following all the requirements in [RFC6979]. They MAY also generate such signatures following all other recommendations in [X9.62] or [SEC1], if they have a stated policy that requires conformance to those standards. Those standards haven't specified SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 as hash algorithm options. However, SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 with output lengths of 32 and 64 octets, respectively, can be used instead of 256- and 512-bit output hash algorithms such as SHA256 and SHA512 💖
4.2. Public Keys 🔑
Okay so bestie, certificates that follow [RFC5280] can carry a public key for basically ANY public key algorithm 💅. The certificate tells you which algorithm it is with an algorithm identifier, which is an OID with optional parameters attached. The conventions and encoding for the RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA algorithm identifiers are the ones in Sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.5 of [RFC3279], Section 3.1 of [RFC4055], and Section 2.1 of [RFC5480] 🎀.
Traditionally, the rsaEncryption OID is what identifies RSA public keys 🌸. That same rsaEncryption OID keeps working for the subject public key when the RSA private key owner does NOT want to restrict the key to RSASSA-PSS with SHAKEs, so it's still totally valid in that case ✨. But if the owner wants the key to be ONLY for RSASSA-PSS with SHAKEs, the AlgorithmIdentifiers for RSASSA-PSS from Section 3 SHOULD be used as the algorithm field in the SubjectPublicKeyInfo sequence [RFC5280] 🦋. Conforming client implementations that process RSASSA-PSS with SHAKE public keys when they handle certificates and CRLs MUST recognize the matching OIDs 🫶.
Conforming CA implementations MUST spell out the X.509 public key algorithm explicitly, using the OIDs from Section 3, whenever they encode ECDSA with SHAKE public keys in certificates and CRLs 💜. Conforming client implementations that process ECDSA with SHAKE public keys when handling certificates and CRLs MUST recognize the corresponding OIDs too 🙈.
The identifier parameters, as explained in Section 3, MUST be absent 💀. No parameters, no cap, periodt 💅.
5. IANA Considerations 📋
Okay, IANA has some registry homework for us 🌈. One object identifier for the ASN.1 module in Appendix A got assigned in the "SMI Security for PKIX Module Identifier" (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.0) registry, and it's giving main character energy 👑:
+---------+--------------------------+------------+
| Decimal | Description | References |
+=========+==========================+============+
| 94 | id-mod-pkix1-shakes-2019 | RFC 8692 |
+---------+--------------------------+------------+
Table 1IANA also updated the "SMI Security for PKIX Algorithms" (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.6) registry [SMI-PKIX] with four brand new entries 🍓:
+---------+------------------------+------------+
| Decimal | Description | References |
+=========+========================+============+
| 30 | id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 | RFC 8692 |
+---------+------------------------+------------+
| 31 | id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 | RFC 8692 |
+---------+------------------------+------------+
| 32 | id-ecdsa-with-shake128 | RFC 8692 |
+---------+------------------------+------------+
| 33 | id-ecdsa-with-shake256 | RFC 8692 |
+---------+------------------------+------------+
Table 2And last but not least, IANA updated the "Hash Function Textual Names" registry [Hash-Texts] with two more entries for SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 🧚:
+--------------------+-------------------------+-----------+
| Hash Function Name | OID | Reference |
+====================+=========================+===========+
| shake128 | 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.11 | RFC 8692 |
+--------------------+-------------------------+-----------+
| shake256 | 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.12 | RFC 8692 |
+--------------------+-------------------------+-----------+
Table 36. Security Considerations 🔐
⚠️ Bestie, this section is SERIOUS, so read it carefully 😭.
This document updates [RFC3279]. The Security Considerations section of that document applies to this specification as well 🫶.
NIST has defined appropriate use of the hash functions in terms of algorithm strengths and the expected time frames for secure use, in Special Publications (SPs) [SP800-78-4] and [SP800-107] 📚. These documents can be used as guides for picking appropriate key sizes for different security scenarios 🔑.
SHAKE128 with a 256-bit output length offers 128 bits of collision and preimage resistance 💖. So the SHAKE128 OIDs in this specification are RECOMMENDED with a 2048-bit (112-bit security) or 3072-bit (128-bit security) RSA modulus, or with curves whose group order is 256 bits (128-bit security) ✨. SHAKE256 with a 512-bit output length offers 256 bits of collision and preimage resistance 🌟. So the SHAKE256 OIDs in this specification are RECOMMENDED with a 4096-bit RSA modulus or higher, or with curves whose group order is at least 512 bits, such as the NIST Curve P-521 (256-bit security) 👑. Note that we recommended a 4096-bit RSA because we would need a 15360-bit modulus for 256 bits of security, which is impractical for today's technology 💀.
7. References 📚
7.1. Normative References 💜
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC3279] Bassham, L., Polk, W., and R. Housley, "Algorithms and
Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 3279, DOI 10.17487/RFC3279, April
2002, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3279>.
[RFC4055] Schaad, J., Kaliski, B., and R. Housley, "Additional
Algorithms and Identifiers for RSA Cryptography for use in
the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 4055,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4055, June 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4055>.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
[RFC5480] Turner, S., Brown, D., Yiu, K., Housley, R., and T. Polk,
"Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key
Information", RFC 5480, DOI 10.17487/RFC5480, March 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5480>.
[RFC8017] Moriarty, K., Ed., Kaliski, B., Jonsson, J., and A. Rusch,
"PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2",
RFC 8017, DOI 10.17487/RFC8017, November 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8017>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[SHA3] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "SHA-3
Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-Output
Functions", DOI 10.6028/NIST.FIPS.202, FIPS PUB 202,
August 2015, <https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.202>.7.2. Informative References 🦋
[Hash-Texts]
IANA, "Hash Function Textual Names",
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/hash-function-text-
names/>.
[RFC5912] Hoffman, P. and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for the
Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)", RFC 5912,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5912, June 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5912>.
[RFC6979] Pornin, T., "Deterministic Usage of the Digital Signature
Algorithm (DSA) and Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
Algorithm (ECDSA)", RFC 6979, DOI 10.17487/RFC6979, August
2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6979>.
[SEC1] Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group, "SEC 1:
Elliptic Curve Cryptography", May 2009,
<http://www.secg.org/sec1-v2.pdf>.
[SMI-PKIX] IANA, "SMI Security for PKIX Algorithms",
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-numbers>.
[SP800-107]
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
"Recommendation for Applications Using Approved Hash
Algorithms", DOI 10.6028/NIST.SP.800-107r1, Revision 1,
NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-107, August 2012,
<http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-107r1>.
[SP800-78-4]
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
"Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Sizes for Personal
Identity Verification", DOI 10.6028/NIST.SP.800-78-4, NIST
Special Publication (SP) 800-78-4, May 2015,
<http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-78-4>.
[X9.62] ANSI, "Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services
Industry: the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
(ECDSA)", ANSI X9.62, 2005.Appendix A. ASN.1 Module 🧚
Okay so this appendix is where the ASN.1 module for SHAKEs in X.509 lives 💖 Literally the whole thing is new, so it doesn't come from any earlier RFC ✨ It does reference [RFC5912], which is the bestie we're building on 🫶
PKIXAlgsForSHAKE-2019 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-pkix1-shakes-2019(94) }
DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN
-- EXPORTS ALL;
IMPORTS
-- FROM RFC 5912
PUBLIC-KEY, SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, DIGEST-ALGORITHM, SMIME-CAPS
FROM AlgorithmInformation-2009
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-algorithmInformation-02(58) }
-- FROM RFC 5912
RSAPublicKey, rsaEncryption, pk-rsa, pk-ec,
CURVE, id-ecPublicKey, ECPoint, ECParameters, ECDSA-Sig-Value
FROM PKIXAlgs-2009 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-pkix1-algorithms2008-02(56) }
;
--
-- Message Digest Algorithms (mda-)
--
DigestAlgorithms DIGEST-ALGORITHM ::= {
-- This expands DigestAlgorithms from RFC 5912
mda-shake128 |
mda-shake256,
...
}
--
-- One-Way Hash Functions
--
-- SHAKE128
mda-shake128 DIGEST-ALGORITHM ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-shake128 -- with output length 32 bytes.
}
id-shake128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
us(840) organization(1) gov(101)
csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4)
hashAlgs(2) 11 }
-- SHAKE256
mda-shake256 DIGEST-ALGORITHM ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-shake256 -- with output length 64 bytes.
}
id-shake256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
us(840) organization(1) gov(101)
csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4)
hashAlgs(2) 12 }
--
-- Public Key (pk-) Algorithms
--
PublicKeys PUBLIC-KEY ::= {
-- This expands PublicKeys from RFC 5912
pk-rsaSSA-PSS-SHAKE128 |
pk-rsaSSA-PSS-SHAKE256,
...
}
-- The hashAlgorithm is mda-shake128
-- The maskGenAlgorithm is id-shake128
-- Mask Gen Algorithm is SHAKE128 with output length
-- (8*ceil((n-1)/8) - 264) bits, where n is the RSA
-- modulus in bits.
-- The saltLength is 32. The trailerField is 1.
pk-rsaSSA-PSS-SHAKE128 PUBLIC-KEY ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128
KEY RSAPublicKey
PARAMS ARE absent
-- Private key format not in this module --
CERT-KEY-USAGE { nonRepudiation, digitalSignature,
keyCertSign, cRLSign }
}
-- The hashAlgorithm is mda-shake256
-- The maskGenAlgorithm is id-shake256
-- Mask Gen Algorithm is SHAKE256 with output length
-- (8*ceil((n-1)/8) - 520)-bits, where n is the RSA
-- modulus in bits.
-- The saltLength is 64. The trailerField is 1.
pk-rsaSSA-PSS-SHAKE256 PUBLIC-KEY ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256
KEY RSAPublicKey
PARAMS ARE absent
-- Private key format not in this module --
CERT-KEY-USAGE { nonRepudiation, digitalSignature,
keyCertSign, cRLSign }
}
--
-- Signature Algorithms (sa-)
--
SignatureAlgs SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {
-- This expands SignatureAlgorithms from RFC 5912
sa-rsassapssWithSHAKE128 |
sa-rsassapssWithSHAKE256 |
sa-ecdsaWithSHAKE128 |
sa-ecdsaWithSHAKE256,
...
}
--
-- SMIME Capabilities (sa-)
--
SMimeCaps SMIME-CAPS ::= {
-- The expands SMimeCaps from RFC 5912
sa-rsassapssWithSHAKE128.&smimeCaps |
sa-rsassapssWithSHAKE256.&smimeCaps |
sa-ecdsaWithSHAKE128.&smimeCaps |
sa-ecdsaWithSHAKE256.&smimeCaps,
...
}
-- RSASSA-PSS with SHAKE128
sa-rsassapssWithSHAKE128 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128
PARAMS ARE absent
-- The hashAlgorithm is mda-shake128
-- The maskGenAlgorithm is id-shake128
-- Mask Gen Algorithm is SHAKE128 with output length
-- (8*ceil((n-1)/8) - 264) bits, where n is the RSA
-- modulus in bits.
-- The saltLength is 32. The trailerField is 1
HASHES { mda-shake128 }
PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-rsa | pk-rsaSSA-PSS-SHAKE128 }
SMIME-CAPS { IDENTIFIED BY id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 }
}
id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6)
30 }
-- RSASSA-PSS with SHAKE256
sa-rsassapssWithSHAKE256 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256
PARAMS ARE absent
-- The hashAlgorithm is mda-shake256
-- The maskGenAlgorithm is id-shake256
-- Mask Gen Algorithm is SHAKE256 with output length
-- (8*ceil((n-1)/8) - 520)-bits, where n is the
-- RSA modulus in bits.
-- The saltLength is 64. The trailerField is 1.
HASHES { mda-shake256 }
PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-rsa | pk-rsaSSA-PSS-SHAKE256 }
SMIME-CAPS { IDENTIFIED BY id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 }
}
id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6)
31 }
-- ECDSA with SHAKE128
sa-ecdsaWithSHAKE128 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-ecdsa-with-shake128
VALUE ECDSA-Sig-Value
PARAMS ARE absent
HASHES { mda-shake128 }
PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-ec }
SMIME-CAPS { IDENTIFIED BY id-ecdsa-with-shake128 }
}
id-ecdsa-with-shake128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6)
32 }
-- ECDSA with SHAKE256
sa-ecdsaWithSHAKE256 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-ecdsa-with-shake256
VALUE ECDSA-Sig-Value
PARAMS ARE absent
HASHES { mda-shake256 }
PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-ec }
SMIME-CAPS { IDENTIFIED BY id-ecdsa-with-shake256 }
}
id-ecdsa-with-shake256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6)
33 }
ENDAcknowledgements 🙏
Huge thank-yous to Sean Turner, Jim Schaad, and Eric Rescorla 💖 for all their valuable contributions to this doc, you're literal legends 👑
The authors also want to give a big shoutout to Russ Housley 🫶 for his guidance and his super valuable contributions to the ASN.1 module 🔥
Authors' Addresses 💌
The people who wrote this are below, with their contact info 🦋
Panos Kampanakis
Cisco Systems
Email: pkampana@cisco.com
Quynh Dang
NIST
100 Bureau Drive, Stop 8930
Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8930
United States of America
Email: quynh.dang@nist.gov📦 where this page comes from
- ietf: rfc8692 2019-12
- 💖 girlified by claude-haiku-5-5 on : a language model's rewrite of the original, under its terms