RFC 8097
BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended Community
RFC 8097: BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended Community 💖
okay bestie, so this one is about BGP (the protocol routers use to tell each other where IP prefixes live) 🌸
Let me set the scene with the title block first. ✨
- Number: RFC 8097 🎀
- Authors: P. Mohapatra (Sproute Networks), K. Patel (Arrcus, Inc.), J. Scudder (Juniper Networks), D. Ward (Cisco), and R. Bush (Internet Initiative Japan, Inc.) 👑
- Category: Standards Track 🦋
- Date: March 2017 🌈
- ISSN: 2070-1721 💜
It's an IETF document that's been reviewed publicly and approved by the IESG, so it's an actual Internet Standard. No cap, this one matters. 🔥
Abstract ✨
okay so this doc defines a brand new BGP opaque extended community 💅 to carry the origination Autonomous System (AS) validation state inside an autonomous system. Internal BGP (IBGP) speakers that receive this validation state can set up local policies so it can influence their decision process. It's giving main character energy for route selection 🦋
Status of This Memo 🌸
This is an Internet Standards Track document. 🎀
It's a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) and represents the consensus of the IETF community. It got public review and was approved for publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). For more on Internet Standards, see Section 2 of RFC 7841. ✨
Info about the current status, errata, and how to give feedback lives at http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8097. 💖
Copyright Notice 💜
Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. 🌈
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) as in effect on the publication date. Read these carefully, because they spell out your rights and restrictions. 🙈 Code Components pulled from this doc must include Simplified BSD License text, as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions, and come without warranty as described in that license. 🫶
Table of Contents 🧚
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Origin Validation State Extended Community . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Deployment Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61. Introduction 🎀
okay so the intro basically repeats the abstract: this doc defines a new BGP opaque extended community to carry the origination AS validation state inside an autonomous system. IBGP speakers that receive it can configure local policies so it influences their decision process. 💅
1.1. Requirements Language 🦋
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119]. 🌸
2. Origin Validation State Extended Community 💖
The origin validation state extended community is an opaque extended community [RFC4360] with the following encoding: ✨
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| 0x43 | 0x00 | Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Reserved |validationstate|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+The high-order octet of the extended Type field is 0x43, which means it's non-transitive. 🙈 The low-order octet of the extended Type field, as assigned by IANA, is 0x00. The Reserved field MUST be set to 0 and ignored upon receipt of this community. 🫶 The last octet of the extended community is an unsigned integer that gives the route's validation state [RFC6811]. It can take these values:
+-------+-----------------------------+
| Value | Meaning |
+-------+-----------------------------+
| 0 | Lookup result = "valid" |
| 1 | Lookup result = "not found" |
| 2 | Lookup result = "invalid" |
+-------+-----------------------------+If the router is configured to support the extensions in this document, it SHOULD attach the origin validation state extended community to BGP UPDATE messages sent to IBGP peers, by mapping the computed validation state into the last octet of the extended community. 🌈 Similarly, a receiving BGP speaker SHOULD, in the absence of validation state set based on local data, derive a validation state from the last octet of the extended community, if it's present. 💜
An implementation SHOULD NOT send more than one instance of the origin validation state extended community. 🙈 However, if more than one instance is received, an implementation MUST disregard all instances other than the one with the numerically greatest validation state value. 🔥 If the value received is greater than the largest specified value (2), the implementation MUST apply a strategy similar to attribute discard [RFC7606] by discarding the erroneous community and logging the error for further analysis. 💀
By default, implementations MUST drop the origin validation state extended community if it's received from an External BGP (EBGP) peer, without processing it further. 🙅♀️ Similarly, by default, an implementation SHOULD NOT send the community to EBGP peers. However, it SHOULD be possible to configure an implementation to send or accept the community when warranted. 🦋 One example of when the community would reasonably be received from, or sent to, an EBGP peer is when two adjacent ASes are under control of the same administration. A second example is documented in [SIDR-RPKI]. ✨
3. Deployment Considerations 🌸
In deployment scenarios where not all speakers in an autonomous system have been upgraded to support the extensions in this document, it is necessary to define policies that match on the origin validation extended community and set another BGP attribute [RFC6811] that influences best path selection in the same way an implementation of this extension would. 🧚
4. IANA Considerations 💅
IANA has registered the value 0x00, with the name "BGP Origin Validation State Extended Community", in the "Non-Transitive Opaque Extended Community Sub-Types" registry. 🎀
5. Security Considerations 💀
Security considerations such as those in [RFC4272] continue to apply. 😭 Because this document introduces an extended community that will generally be used to affect route selection, the analysis in Section 4.5 ("Falsification") of [RFC4593] is relevant. These issues are neither new nor unique to the origin validation extended community. 🔥
The security considerations in [RFC6811] apply equally to this application of origin validation. 💀 On top of that, this document describes a scheme where router A outsources validation to some router B. If this scheme is used, the participating routers should have the appropriate trust relationship: B should trust A either because they're under the same administrative control or for some other reason (for example, consider [SIDR-RPKI]). 🙈 The security properties of the TCP connection between the two routers should also be considered. See Section 5.1 of [RFC7454] for advice on protecting the TCP connection. 🫶
6. References 🧚
6.1. Normative References 💜
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC4360] Sangli, S., Tappan, D., and Y. Rekhter, "BGP Extended
Communities Attribute", RFC 4360, DOI 10.17487/RFC4360,
February 2006, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4360>.
[RFC6811] Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R.
Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6811, January 2013,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6811>.6.2. Informative References 🌈
[RFC4272] Murphy, S., "BGP Security Vulnerabilities Analysis",
RFC 4272, DOI 10.17487/RFC4272, January 2006,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4272>.
[RFC4593] Barbir, A., Murphy, S., and Y. Yang, "Generic Threats to
Routing Protocols", RFC 4593, DOI 10.17487/RFC4593,
October 2006, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4593>.
[RFC7454] Durand, J., Pepelnjak, I., and G. Doering, "BGP
Operations and Security", BCP 194, RFC 7454,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7454, February 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7454>.
[RFC7606] Chen, E., Ed., Scudder, J., Ed., Mohapatra, P., and K.
Patel, "Revised Error Handling for BGP UPDATE Messages",
RFC 7606, DOI 10.17487/RFC7606, August 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7606>.
[SIDR-RPKI] King, T., Kopp, D., Lambrianidis, A., and A. Fenioux,
"Signaling Prefix Origin Validation Results from a Route-
Server to Peers", Work in Progress,
draft-ietf-sidrops-route-server-rpki-light-01, January
2017.Acknowledgements 🫶
The authors would like to acknowledge the valuable review and suggestions from Wesley George, Roque Gagliano, and Bruno Decraene on this document. 🌸
Authors' Addresses 🦋
Pradosh Mohapatra
Sproute Networks
Email: mpradosh@yahoo.com
Keyur Patel
Arrcus, Inc.
Email: keyur@arrcus.com
John Scudder
Juniper Networks
1194 N. Mathilda Ave
Sunnyvale, CA 94089
United States of America
Email: jgs@juniper.net
Dave Ward
Cisco
170 W. Tasman Drive
San Jose, CA 95124
United States of America
Email: dward@cisco.com
Randy Bush
Internet Initiative Japan, Inc.
5147 Crystal Springs
Bainbridge Island, WA 98110
United States of America
Email: randy@psg.com📦 where this page comes from
- ietf: rfc8097 2017-03
- 💖 girlified by claude-haiku-5-5 on : a language model's rewrite of the original, under its terms