RFC 7855
Source Packet Routing in Networking (SPRING) Problem Statement and Requirements
RFC 7855: Source Packet Routing in Networking (SPRING) Problem Statement and Requirements 🎀
Okay bestie, let's get into this one! 💖 RFC 7855 is an Informational document from May 2016, which means it's a "here's what we're thinking" kind of doc, not a strict rulebook. ✨ It was written by Stephane Previdi (editor), Clarence Filsfils (editor), Bruno Decraene, Stephane Litkowski, Martin Horneffer, and Rob Shakir. 🫶 Previdi and Filsfils are from Cisco Systems, Decraene and Litkowski are from Orange, Horneffer is from Deutsche Telekom, and Shakir is from Jive Communications. 🌈
It's part of the SPRING (Source Packet Routing in Networking) working group, and it doesn't obsolete or update any earlier RFCs. 💅 It's giving "problem statement first, solutions later" energy, and the whole point is to explain the use cases and requirements that the SPRING architecture needs to handle for unicast traffic. 🦋
ISSN: 2070-1721.
Abstract ✨
The ability for a node to specify a forwarding path, other than the normal shortest path, that a particular packet will traverse, benefits a number of network functions. 🌸 Source-based routing mechanisms have been specified for network protocols before, but they haven't seen widespread adoption. 🥺
Here's the vibe: in this doc, the term "source" means "the point at which the explicit route is imposed." 💜 So it's not limited to the packet's originator. The node that slaps the explicit route on the packet could be the ingress node of an operator's network. 👑
This document outlines various use cases, with their requirements, that need to be taken into account by the Source Packet Routing in Networking (SPRING) architecture for unicast traffic. 🧚 Multicast use cases and requirements are out of scope. 🙈
Status of This Memo ✨
This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification. It's published for informational purposes, so no standards vibes here. 🍓
It's a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) and represents the consensus of the IETF community. 🫶 It's been through public review and got approved for publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Not every IESG-approved doc is candidate for any level of Internet Standard, though. For that, check out Section 2 of RFC 5741. 💅
Want the latest on this document, any errata, or how to send feedback? Head over to http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7855. 🔥
Copyright Notice ✨
Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. 🌈
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication. Please read these carefully, because they spell out your rights and restrictions. 📜 Code Components pulled out of this document must include Simplified BSD License text, as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions, and they come without warranty, as described in the Simplified BSD License. 🎀
Table of Contents 🦋
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Data Planes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. SPRING Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. IGP-Based MPLS Tunneling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1.1. Example of IGP-Based MPLS Tunnels . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2. Fast Reroute (FRR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.3. Traffic Engineering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.3.1. Examples of Traffic-Engineering Use Cases . . . . . . 7
3.4. Interoperability with Non-SPRING Nodes . . . . . . . . . 13
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5. Manageability Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181. Introduction 🌸
The ability for a node to specify a unicast forwarding path, other than the normal shortest path, that a particular packet will traverse, benefits a number of network functions. 💖 Some examples:
- Some types of network virtualization, including multi-topology networks and the partitioning of network resources for VPNs 🧚
- Network, link, path, and node protection such as fast reroute 🔥
- Network programmability 💅
- OAM techniques 🛠️
- Simplification and reduction of network signaling components 🫶
- Load balancing and traffic engineering 👑
Source-based routing mechanisms have been specified for network protocols before, but they haven't seen widespread adoption beyond MPLS traffic engineering. 🥺
These network functions may need more flexibility and more source-imposed routing than the previously defined methods can give. 🦋 Same definition of "source" as before: "the point at which the explicit route is imposed." So it's not limited to the originator, and the node imposing the explicit route may be the ingress node of an operator's network. 💜 We'll keep using this definition throughout the doc. ✨
So the Source Packet Routing in Networking (SPRING) architecture is being defined to address the use cases and requirements in this document. 🎀
The SPRING architecture MUST allow incremental and selective deployment, without any requirement of a flag day or massive upgrade of all network elements. 🌈
The SPRING architecture MUST allow the policy state to live in the packet header and not in the intermediate nodes along the path. 📦 So the policy is instantiated in the packet header, and it does not require any policy state in midpoints and tail-ends. 🧚
The SPRING architecture objective is not to replace existing source-routing and traffic-engineering mechanisms. 🙅♀️ Instead, it complements them and addresses use cases where removing signaling and path state from the core is a requirement. 💜
Multicast use cases and requirements are out of scope for this document. 🙈
1.1. Requirements Language 💅
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119]. 📖
2. Data Planes 🦋
The SPRING architecture SHOULD be general, so it's easy to apply to different data planes. 🌸
The SPRING architecture SHOULD leverage the existing MPLS data plane without any modification. It should also leverage the IPv6 data plane with a new IPv6 Routing Header Type (IPv6 Routing Header is defined in [RFC2460]). A proposal for a new type of routing header is made by [SRH]. ✨
The SPRING architecture MUST allow interoperability between SPRING-capable and non-SPRING-capable nodes in both the MPLS and IPv6 data planes. 🫶
3. SPRING Use Cases 👑
3.1. IGP-Based MPLS Tunneling 🎀
The source-based routing model, applied to the MPLS data plane, lets you tunnel services like VPN ([RFC4364]), Virtual Private LAN Service (VPLS) ([RFC4761], [RFC4762]), and Virtual Private Wire Service (VPWS) ([RFC6624]), from an ingress Provider Edge (PE) to an egress PE. 🧚 You can do this with or without an explicit path, and without requiring forwarding-plane or control-plane state in intermediate nodes. 💖 Point-to-multipoint and multipoint-to-multipoint tunnels are outside the scope of this document. 🙈
3.1.1. Example of IGP-Based MPLS Tunnels 🌈
Let's look at an example use case. 🔥
P1---P2
/ \
A---CE1---PE1 PE2---CE2---Z
\ /
P3---P4Figure 1: IGP-Based MPLS Tunneling
In Figure 1 above, the four nodes A, CE1, CE2, and Z are part of the same VPN. 💜 CE2 advertises to PE2 a route to Z. PE2 binds a local label LZ to that route, then propagates the route and its label via the Multiprotocol Border Gateway Protocol (MPBGP) to PE1, with next-hop address 192.0.2.2 (i.e., the local address of PE2). 🦋 PE1 installs the VPN prefix Z in the appropriate VPN Routing and Forwarding table (VRF), and resolves the next hop onto the IGP-based MPLS tunnel to PE2. ✨
To cope with the reality of current deployments, the SPRING architecture MUST allow PE-to-PE forwarding according to the IGP shortest path, without adding any other signaling protocol. 🌸 Each PE's forwarded packet carries the info it needs, derived from the topology database, to deliver the packet to the remote PE. 📦
3.2. Fast Reroute (FRR) 💅
Fast Reroute (FRR) technologies have been deployed by network operators to cope with link or node failures, through precomputation of backup paths. 🔥
An illustration of the problem statement for FRR and micro-loop avoidance can be found in [SPRING-RESIL]. 🧚
The SPRING architecture MUST address the following requirements:
- support of Fast Reroute (FRR) on any topology 💖
- precomputation and setup of backup path without any additional signaling (other than the regular IGP/BGP protocols) 🫶
- support of shared risk constraints 👑
- support of node and link protection 🛡️
- support of micro-loop avoidance 🌈
That's the end of part 1! 🎀 Stay tuned for part 2, where we get into Traffic Engineering, the examples, and the rest of the good stuff. 😭💜
3.3. Traffic Engineering ✨
Okay bestie, Traffic Engineering (TE) is the umbrella term for techniques that let operators control how specific traffic flows get treated inside their networks 💅 There are lots of flavours: single vs. multiple domains, with or without bandwidth admission control, centralized vs. distributed path computation, and more 🌈
Some deployments only use TE a little, like meeting a particular app or customer need, or working around a specific bandwidth limit in the network (that's called tactical TE 🎯). In those cases you really want to keep the cost down as much as possible, meaning fewer signaling protocols and fewer nodes that need special configuration or features 🙈 Other deployments go hard with TE, like fine-tuning flows at the application level ✨ For those, you need super high scalability, especially on the midpoints 🔥
The source-based routing model lets you do traffic engineering without needing a signaling component at all. Iconic 🧚
The SPRING architecture MUST support the following traffic-engineering requirements:
- loose or strict options
- bandwidth admission control
- distributed vs. centralized model (e.g., Path Computation Element (PCE) [STATEFUL-PCE], Software-Defined Networking (SDN) Controller)
- disjointness in dual-plane networks
- egress peer engineering
- load balancing among non-parallel links (i.e., links connected to different adjacent neighbors).
- limiting (scalable, preferably zero) per-service state and signaling on midpoint and tail-end routers.
- ECMP-awareness
- node resiliency property (i.e., the traffic-engineering policy is not anchored to a specific core node whose failure could impact the service).
Most of the time, TE uses the "loose" route option, where most explicit paths can be written down in just a few hops 💖 But sometimes you need the "strict" option, where every single hop in the explicit path gets spelled out 😭 That can turn into a long list of hops, which gets instantiated into an MPLS label stack (in the MPLS data plane) or a list of IPv6 addresses (in the IPv6 data plane) 🫶
Honestly? With long, strict source-routed paths, the deployment only works if the head-end of the explicit path can actually handle instantiating long explicit paths 💅
Or, plot twist 🦋 a controller could chop the end-to-end path into a bunch of sub-paths. Each sub-path is supported by its own head-end and advertised with a single identifier. Then stitching (concatenating) those sub-path identifiers gives you a compression scheme, so the whole end-to-end path can be expressed in way fewer hops 🎀 Main character energy.
3.3.1. Examples of Traffic-Engineering Use Cases
Here are the two sets of use cases:
- Traffic Engineering without Admission Control
- Traffic Engineering with Admission Control
3.3.1.1. Traffic Engineering without Bandwidth Admission Control
In this section we go through the TE use cases that don't involve bandwidth admission control 🌸
3.3.1.1.1. Disjointness in Dual-Plane Networks
Lots of networks are built with a dual-plane design, as shown in Figure 2 🧚
Each aggregation region k is connected to the core by two C
routers C1k and C2k, where k refers to the region.
C1k is part of plane 1 and aggregation region k
C2k is part of plane 2 and aggregation region k
C1k has a link to C2j iff k = j.
The core nodes of a given region are directly connected.
Inter-region links only connect core nodes of the same plane.
{C1k has a link to C1j} iff {C2k has a link to C2j}.
The distribution of these links depends on the topological
properties of the core of the Autonomous System (AS). The
design rule presented above specifies that these links appear
in both core planes.We assume a common design rule in these deployments: the inter-plane link costs (Cik - Cjk, where i != j) are set so that the route to an edge destination from a given plane stays within that plane, unless the plane gets partitioned 🫶
Edge Router A
/ \
/ \
/ \ Agg Region A
/ \
/ \
C1A----------C2A
| \ | \
| \ | \
| C1B----------C2B
Plane1 | | | | Plane2
| | | |
C1C--|-----C2C |
\ | \ |
\ | \ |
C1Z----------C2Z
\ /
\ / Agg Region Z
\ /
\ /
Edge Router Z
Figure 2: Dual-Plane Network and DisjointnessIn this scenario the operator needs the ability to deploy different strategies 💅 For example, Edge Router A should be able to use these three options:
- The traffic is load-balanced across any ECMP path through the network.
- The traffic is load-balanced across any ECMP path within Plane1 of the network.
- The traffic is load-balanced across any ECMP path within Plane2 of the network.
Most of the data traffic from A to Z would use the first option, so the capacity gets used efficiently ✨ The operator would save the other two choices for specific premium traffic that has asked for disjoint transport 👑
The SPRING architecture MUST support this use case with the following requirements:
- Zero per-service state and signaling on midpoint and tail-end routers.
- ECMP-awareness.
- Node resiliency property: The traffic-engineering policy is not anchored to a specific core node whose failure could impact the service.
3.3.1.1.2. Egress Peering Traffic Engineering
+------+
| |
+---D F
+---------+ / | AS2 |\ +------+
| |/ +------+ \| Z |
A C | |
| |\ +------+ /| AS4 |
B AS1 | \ | |/ +------+
| | +---E G
+---------+ | AS3 |
+------+\
Figure 3: Egress Peering Traffic EngineeringLet's imagine the network in Figure 3, where:
- C in AS1 learns about destination Z of AS4 via two BGP paths (AS2, AS4) and (AS3, AS4).
- C may or may not be configured to enforce the next-hop-self behavior before propagating the paths within AS1.
- C may propagate all the paths to Z within AS1 (using BGP ADD-PATH as specified in [ADD-PATH]).
- C may install in its Forwarding Information Base (FIB) only the route via AS2, or only the route via AS3, or both.
In that context, the SPRING architecture MUST allow the operator of AS1 to apply a traffic-engineering policy like this one, regardless of the configured behavior of the next-hop-self 🔥
- Steer 60% of the Z-destined traffic received at A via AS2 and 40% via AS3.
- Steer 80% of the Z-destined traffic received at B via AS2 and 20% via AS3.
The SPRING architecture MUST allow an ingress node (i.e., an explicit route source node) to select the exit point of a packet as any combination of an egress node, an egress interface, a peering neighbor, and a peering AS 🦋
The use cases and requirements for egress peer engineering are described in [SR-BGP-EPE] 💜
3.3.1.1.3. Load Balancing among Non-parallel Links
The SPRING architecture MUST allow a given node to load-share traffic across multiple non-parallel links (i.e., links connected to different adjacent routers), even if those lead to different neighbors. This can be really useful for supporting traffic-engineering policies 🌈
+---C---D---+
| |
PE1---A---B-----F-----E---PE2
Figure 4: Multiple (Non-parallel) AdjacenciesIn the example above, the operator requires PE1 to load-balance its PE2-destined traffic between the ABCDE and ABFE equal-cost paths in a controlled way, where the operator MUST be allowed to distribute traffic unevenly between paths (Weighted Equal-Cost Multipath (WECMP)) ⭐
3.3.1.2. Traffic Engineering with Bandwidth Admission Control
Implementing bandwidth admission control within a network (and its possible routing consequence, which is routing along explicit paths where the bandwidth is available) takes a capacity-planning process 🍓
Spreading load among ECMP paths is a key attribute of the capacity-planning processes applied to packet-based networks 💖
3.3.1.2.1. Capacity-Planning Process ✨
Capacity planning is all about predicting how the traffic matrix will land on the topology for a bunch of expected traffic and topology changes 🔮. The big move is simulating where the traffic goes along ECMP-aware shortest paths and then counting the bandwidth it eats up 📊.
Bandwidth accounting along a demand's shortest path is a basic skill for any planning tool or PCE server 💅.
Check out this example. Assuming a default IGP metric of 1, and an IGP metric of 2 for link GF, a 1600 Mbps A-to-Z flow gets counted as using 1600 Mbps on links AB and FZ, 800 Mbps on links BC, BG, and GF, and 400 Mbps on links CD, DF, CE, and EF. 🤯
C-----D
/ \ \
A---B +--E--F--Z
\ /
G------+
Figure 5: Capacity Planning an ECMP-Based DemandECMP is everywhere 🌍 in Service Provider (SP), enterprise, and data-center architectures, and it's not rare to spot as many as 128 different ECMP paths between one source and one destination inside a single network domain 😳. Spreading traffic across as many ECMP paths as possible is a major efficiency goal 🎯.
Here's a slice of a network where 5 ECMP paths already show up from A to M, drawn out for you 🦋.
C
/ \
B-D-L--
/ \ / \
A E \
\ M
\ G /
\ / \ /
F K
\ /
I
Figure 6: ECMP Topology ExampleWhen the capacity-planning process spots a traffic growth scenario plus a topology change that would cause congestion, a capacity increase gets triggered 📈. If that upgrade can't land in time, a traffic-engineering solution gets switched on in the network 🚨.
The basic TE goal is to find the smallest set of demands that must be pushed off their shortest path to kill the congestion. Then you compute an explicit path for each one and install those traffic-engineered policies in the network 🛠️.
The SPRING architecture MUST offer simple support for ECMP-based shortest-path placement, plus explicit path policy, without adding extra signaling in the domain 🙌. That includes:
- the ability to steer a packet across a set of ECMP paths
- the ability to diverge from a set of ECMP shortest paths to one or more paths that aren't in that set
3.3.1.2.2. SDN Use Case
The SDN use case lives in the SDN controller, for example a Stateful PCE as described in [STATEFUL-PCE] 🎮.
The SDN controller runs the show when it comes to the traffic matrix and topology 👑. It decides whether new traffic gets to join the network, and it picks how the accepted traffic gets routed. It keeps an eye on the topology, and when something changes, it works out the minimum traffic that needs to move onto an alternate path to ease bandwidth congestion 💜.
The algorithms behind all this are a local matter for the SDN controller and are outside the scope of this document 🤫.
Collecting traffic and topology info works the same way as it does for other SDN-based traffic-engineering solutions 📡. Same goes for instantiating policy information at a traffic-engineering head-end 🧚.
In the context of centralized optimization and the SDN use case, the SPRING architecture MUST have the following attributes:
- Explicit routing capability, with or without ECMP-awareness.
- No signaling hop-by-hop through the network.
- The policy state is only maintained at the policy head-end. No policy state is maintained at midpoints and tail-ends.
- Automated guaranteed FRR for any topology.
- The policy state is in the packet header and not in the intermediate nodes along the path. The policy is absent from midpoints and tail-ends.
- Highly responsive to change: the SDN Controller only needs to apply a policy change at the head-end. No delay is introduced by programming the midpoints and tail-ends along the path 💨.
3.4. Interoperability with Non-SPRING Nodes
SPRING nodes MUST interoperate with non-SPRING nodes, in both the MPLS and IPv6 data planes, so SPRING can roll out gradually on the MPLS and IPv6 networks people already have 🐢💕.
4. Security Considerations 🔐
SPRING reuses the concept of source routing by encoding the path right in the packet 📦. Like other similar source-routing architectures, an attacker can mess with the traffic path by changing the packet header 😱. By doing that, an attacker may be able to cause outages on any part of the network 💀.
SPRING adds some metadata to the packet, namely the list of forwarding path elements the packet must traverse. Depending on the data plane, this list may shrink as the packet travels, keeping only the next elements and forgetting the past ones 🧹.
The SPRING architecture MUST provide clear trust domain boundaries, so source-routing information is only usable inside the trusted domain and never exposed to the outside world 🚧.
From a network protection standpoint, there's an assumed trust model: any node that imposes an explicit route on a packet is assumed to be allowed to do so. This is a big change from plain IP, which only offers shortest-path routing, but it's not fundamentally different from existing techniques that already provide explicit routing 🤷♀️. By default, the explicit routing information is expected not to leak across the boundaries of the administered domain 🙅♀️.
Therefore, the data plane MUST NOT expose any source-routing information when a packet leaves the trusted domain. Special care will be needed for existing data planes like MPLS, especially in the inter-provider scenario, where a third-party provider may push MPLS labels corresponding to a SPRING header anywhere in the stack 🫣. The architecture document MUST analyze the exact security considerations of that scenario 🔍.
Filtering routing information is typically done in the control plane, but extra filtering in the forwarding plane is also required. In SPRING, there's no control plane (for source-routed paths) between the source and the midpoints, so filtering in the control plane is not possible (or not required, depending on how you look at it) 🤔. Filtering MUST be performed on the forwarding plane at the boundaries, and it MAY require looking at multiple labels or instructions 🏰.
Bestie, this part is serious. Forwarding-plane filtering at the edges is what keeps the outside world from poking at your source routes 🚨.
For the MPLS data plane, this isn't a brand-new requirement, because the existing MPLS architecture already allows this kind of source routing by stacking multiple labels 🥞. For security protection, Section 2.4 of [RFC4381] and Section 8.2 of [RFC5920] already call for filtering MPLS packets on trust boundaries 🛡️.
If all MPLS labels get filtered at domain boundaries, then SPRING doesn't introduce any change ✅. If only a subset of labels gets filtered, then SPRING does introduce a change, because the border router is expected to decide which information (for example, labels) gets filtered, even though the border router isn't the one originating those label advertisements 😬.
Since the SPRING architecture must be based on a clear trust domain, mechanisms for authenticating and validating the source-routing information must be evaluated by the SPRING architecture, so any attack or unwanted source-routing manipulation gets shut down 🔒.
Data-plane security considerations MUST be addressed in each document related to the SPRING data plane (that's MPLS and IPv6) 📝.
The IPv6 data plane proposes using a cryptographic signature on the source-routed path, which would make configuration easier 🔏. That's needed more for IPv6, which is end to end in nature, compared to MPLS, which is typically restricted to a controlled and trusted zone 🏡.
In the forwarding plane, data-plane extension documents MUST address the security implications of the required change ⚠️.
As for privacy, SPRING doesn't propose any change when it comes to encryption 🙈. Each data plane may or may not provide existing or future encryption capability 🤞.
To build the source-routing information into the packet, a node in the SPRING architecture needs to learn information from a control layer 🧠. Since that control layer is in charge of programming forwarding instructions, an attacker who takes over that component could also manipulate the traffic path 💅. Any control protocol used in the SPRING architecture SHOULD provide security mechanisms or design to protect against such a control-layer attacker 🛡️. Control-plane security considerations MUST be addressed in each document related to the SPRING control plane 💜.
5. Manageability Considerations 🛠️
The SPRING WG MUST define Operations, Administration, and Maintenance (OAM) procedures that apply to SPRING-enabled networks 📋.
In SPRING networks, the path the packet takes is encoded in the header 🗺️. The SPRING architecture MUST include the necessary OAM mechanisms so the network operator can validate that a path is effective, and check and monitor its liveness and performance 👀. A path can also be defined in the forwarding layer (in both MPLS and IPv6 data planes) or as a service path, which is formed by a set of service instances 🧩. The network operator MUST be capable of monitoring, controlling, and managing paths (both network-based and service-based) using OAM procedures 🎛️.
OAM use cases and requirements are detailed in [OAM-USE] and [SR-OAM] 📚.
6. References 📖
6.1. Normative References
okay bestie, these are the ones you literally have to read before anything else 📚🎀 the spec leans on them hard, so you need the exact details 🫶
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.[RFC2460] Deering, S. and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6
(IPv6) Specification", RFC 2460, DOI 10.17487/RFC2460,
December 1998, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2460>.[RFC4364] Rosen, E. and Y. Rekhter, "BGP/MPLS IP Virtual Private
Networks (VPNs)", RFC 4364, DOI 10.17487/RFC4364, February
2006, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4364>.[RFC4761] Kompella, K., Ed. and Y. Rekhter, Ed., "Virtual Private
LAN Service (VPLS) Using BGP for Auto-Discovery and
Signaling", RFC 4761, DOI 10.17487/RFC4761, January 2007,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4761>.[RFC4762] Lasserre, M., Ed. and V. Kompella, Ed., "Virtual Private
LAN Service (VPLS) Using Label Distribution Protocol (LDP)
Signaling", RFC 4762, DOI 10.17487/RFC4762, January 2007,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4762>.[RFC6624] Kompella, K., Kothari, B., and R. Cherukuri, "Layer 2
Virtual Private Networks Using BGP for Auto-Discovery and
Signaling", RFC 6624, DOI 10.17487/RFC6624, May 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6624>.6.2. Informative References
these ones are the extra reading 🌸 they're not strictly required, but they give you the bigger picture and the drafts people are working on right now 👀
[ADD-PATH] Walton, D., Retana, A., Chen, E., and J. Scudder,
"Advertisement of Multiple Paths in BGP", Work in
Progress, draft-ietf-idr-add-paths-14, April 2016.[OAM-USE] Geib, R., Ed., Filsfils, C., Pignataro, C., Ed., and N.
Kumar, "A Scalable and Topology-Aware MPLS Dataplane
Monitoring System", Work in Progress, draft-ietf-spring-
oam-usecase-03, April 2016.[RFC4381] Behringer, M., "Analysis of the Security of BGP/MPLS IP
Virtual Private Networks (VPNs)", RFC 4381,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4381, February 2006,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4381>.[RFC5920] Fang, L., Ed., "Security Framework for MPLS and GMPLS
Networks", RFC 5920, DOI 10.17487/RFC5920, July 2010,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5920>.[SPRING-RESIL]
Francois, P., Filsfils, C., Decraene, B., and R. Shakir,
"Use-cases for Resiliency in SPRING", Work in Progress,
draft-ietf-spring-resiliency-use-cases-03, April 2016.[SR-BGP-EPE]
Filsfils, C., Ed., Previdi, S., Ed., Ginsburg, D., and D.
Afanasiev, "Segment Routing Centralized BGP Peer
Engineering", Work in Progress, draft-ietf-spring-segment-
routing-central-epe-01, March 2016.[SR-OAM] Kumar, N., Pignataro, C., Akiya, N., Geib, R., Mirsky, G.,
and S. Litkowski, "OAM Requirements for Segment Routing
Network", Work in Progress, draft-ietf-spring-sr-oam-
requirement-01, December 2015.[SRH] Previdi, S., Filsfils, C., Field, B., Leung, I., Linkova,
J., Kosugi, T., Vyncke, E., and D. Lebrun, "IPv6 Segment
Routing Header (SRH)", Work in Progress, draft-ietf-6man-
segment-routing-header-01, March 2016.[STATEFUL-PCE]
Crabbe, E., Minei, I., Medved, J., and R. Varga, "PCEP
Extensions for Stateful PCE", Work in Progress,
draft-ietf-pce-stateful-pce-14, March 2016.Acknowledgements ✨
the authors gave a big shoutout to Yakov Rekhter for his help with this document 🙌💜
The authors would like to thank Yakov Rekhter for his contribution to
this document.Contributors 🫶
these people did a huge amount of the actual content work, so they get the spotlight 🌟
Ruediger Geib
Deutsche Telekom
Heinrich Hertz Str. 3-7
Darmstadt 64295
Germany
Email: Ruediger.Geib@telekom.deRobert Raszuk
Mirantis Inc.
615 National Ave.
94043 Mountain View, CA
United States
Email: robert@raszuk.netAuthors' Addresses 💅
and here are the people who wrote it, with their contact details 💖
Stefano Previdi (editor)
Cisco Systems, Inc.
Via Del Serafico, 200
Rome 00142
Italy
Email: sprevidi@cisco.comClarence Filsfils (editor)
Cisco Systems, Inc.
Brussels
Belgium
Email: cfilsfil@cisco.comBruno Decraene
Orange
France
Email: bruno.decraene@orange.comStephane Litkowski
Orange
France
Email: stephane.litkowski@orange.comMartin Horneffer
Deutsche Telekom
Muenster 48153
Germany
Email: Martin.Horneffer@telekom.deRob Shakir
Jive Communications, Inc.
1275 West 1600 North, Suite 100
Orem, UT 84057
United States
Email: rjs@rob.sh📦 where this page comes from
- ietf: rfc7855 2016-05
- 💖 girlified by claude-haiku-5-5 on : a language model's rewrite of the original, under its terms