RFC 7646
Definition and Use of DNSSEC Negative Trust Anchors
RFC 7646: Definition and Use of DNSSEC Negative Trust Anchors 🦋
Okay bestie, this one is a whole vibe. 💖 It was published in September 2015 as an Informational RFC, which means it's shared for information and isn't a Standards Track spec. The ISSN is 2070-1721. Five people wrote it, all from big-deal orgs: P. Ebersman (Comcast), W. Kumari (Google), C. Griffiths (Nominet), J. Livingood (Comcast), and R. Weber (Nominum). It doesn't obsolete or update any other RFCs, so it stands on its own. ✨
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) P. Ebersman
Request for Comments: 7646 Comcast
Category: Informational W. Kumari
ISSN: 2070-1721 Google
C. Griffiths
Nominet
J. Livingood
Comcast
R. Weber
Nominum
September 2015Abstract
Okay so DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) is now entering widespread deployment, and it's giving big "we're finally here" energy 🎀. BUT, the tools and processes for signing domains aren't as mature and reliable yet as the ones for regular, non-DNSSEC domain admin stuff. 😭 This document introduces Negative Trust Anchors (NTAs), which can be used to mitigate DNSSEC validation failures by disabling DNSSEC validation at specified domains. It's the fix for when things go sideways. 🫶
Status of This Memo
This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is published for informational purposes. 🌸
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has received public review and has been approved for publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Not all documents approved by the IESG are a candidate for any level of Internet Standard; see Section 2 of RFC 5741.
Information about the current status of this document, any errata, and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7646.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. 🔒
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction and Motivation .....................................3
1.1. Definition of a Negative Trust Anchor ......................3
1.2. Motivations for Negative Trust Anchors .....................4
1.2.1. Mitigating Domain Validation Failures ...............4
1.2.2. Improving End-User Experience .......................4
1.2.3. Avoiding Switching to a Non-validating Resolver .....5
2. Use of a Negative Trust Anchor ..................................5
2.1. Applicability of Negative Trust Anchors ....................6
3. Managing Negative Trust Anchors .................................7
3.1. Alerting Users to Negative Trust Anchor Use ................7
4. Removal of a Negative Trust Anchor ..............................7
5. Comparison to Other DNS Misconfigurations .......................8
6. Intentionally Broken Domains ....................................8
7. Discovering Broken Domains ......................................9
8. Security Considerations ........................................11
9. References .....................................................11
9.1. Normative References ......................................11
9.2. Informative References ....................................12
Appendix A. Configuration Examples ...............................13
A.1. NLnet Labs Unbound ........................................13
A.2. Internet System Consortium (ISC) BIND .....................14
A.3. Nominum Vantio ............................................14
Acknowledgements ..................................................15
Authors' Addresses ................................................151. Introduction and Motivation ✨
Okay so DNSSEC has now entered widespread deployment, but the signing tools and processes are still less mature and reliable than the stuff for non-DNSSEC admin. 🙈 Because of that, operators of DNS recursive resolvers, like Internet Service Providers (ISPs), sometimes notice domains mismanaging their DNSSEC-related resource records. That mess triggers DNSSEC validation failures, and suddenly a ton of end users can't reach the domain. 💀 Most people assume the problem is with their ISP or resolver operator, so they may switch to a non-validating resolver or call their ISP to complain, instead of realizing the domain itself is the problem. Without the techniques in this document, that pressure might push the resolver operator to turn off DNSSEC validation (or just not deploy it at all). 😤
This document defines Negative Trust Anchors (NTAs), which can be used during the transition to ubiquitous DNSSEC deployment. 🧚 NTAs are configured locally on a validating DNS recursive resolver to shield end users from DNSSEC-related authoritative name server operational errors. They're meant to be temporary, and only the organization that needs an NTA should set one up. It should not be distributed by any organizations outside of the administrative boundary. Finally, NTAs only pertain to DNSSEC and not to Public Key Infrastructures (PKIs) such as X.509. 🎀
Using an NTA to temporarily disable DNSSEC validation for one specific misconfigured domain name immediately restores access for end users. 💅 That gives the domain's admins time to fix their misconfiguration, while the organization using the NTA keeps DNSSEC validation turned on and can still reach the broken domain. Iconic, right? 👑
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. 📜
1.1. Definition of a Negative Trust Anchor 🔍
Trust anchors are defined in [RFC5914]. A trust anchor is used by a validating caching resolver as a starting point for building the authentication chain for a signed DNS response. Think of it like this: NTAs stop validation of the authentication chain. 🛑 Instead, the validator treats any upstream responses as if the zone is unsigned, and it does not set the Authentic Data (AD) bit in responses it sends to clients. Note that this is a behavior and not a separate resource record. 🙃 An NTA can potentially be implemented at any level within the chain of trust, and it stops validation from that point in the chain on down. Validation starts up again if there is a positive trust anchor further down the chain. For example, if there is an NTA at example.com and a positive trust anchor at foo.bar.example.com, then validation resumes for foo.bar.example.com and anything below it. 🌈
1.2. Motivations for Negative Trust Anchors 💜
1.2.1. Mitigating Domain Validation Failures
A domain name can fail validation for two general reasons: a legitimate security failure (for example, because of an attack or compromise of some sort) or a misconfiguration on the part of a zone administrator. 🧐 As domains transition to DNSSEC, the most common reason for a validation failure has been misconfiguration. So, domain administrators should be sure to read [RFC6781] in full. 📖 They should pay special attention to Section 4.2 of [RFC6781], which pertains to key rollovers, because those appear to be the cause of many recent validation failures. 😬
It's also possible that some DNSSEC validation failures could come from differences in how different software developers interpret DNSSEC standards, and/or how those developers choose to implement support for DNSSEC. 🫠 For example, it's conceivable that a domain may be DNSSEC-signed properly, and one vendor's DNS recursive resolvers will validate the domain, but other vendors' software may fail to validate it. Chaos, honestly. 🌪️
1.2.2. Improving End-User Experience 🌸
End users generally don't know about, understand, or care about the resolution process that makes connections happen, and that's by design! 🫶 The whole point of DNS is to shield users from having to remember IP addresses by giving systems a friendlier name. So it follows that end users don't, and shouldn't, be expected to know about DNSSEC, validation, or anything like that. 🙅♀️ As a result, they may misread a failure to reach a domain caused by a DNSSEC-related misconfiguration. They may (incorrectly) assume that their ISP is purposely blocking access to the domain, or that it's a performance failure on the part of their ISP (especially the ISP's DNS servers). 😤 They may then contact their ISP to complain, which costs the ISP money. They might also vent online, through a blog, web forum, or social media site, which can lead to frustration from other end users or general criticism of an ISP or DNS recursive resolver operator. Not the vibe. 💀
As end users publicize these failures, others may recommend they switch from security-aware DNS resolvers to resolvers that don't perform DNSSEC validation. 😭 This is a shame, because the ISP or other DNS recursive resolver operator is actually doing exactly what it's supposed to do by failing to resolve that domain name. This is the expected result when a domain can no longer be validated, and it protects end users from a potential security threat. 🛡️ An NTA would let the ISP specifically fix the failure to reach that one domain, without compromising security for other sites. That's a happy end user with minimal impact on the ISP, while DNSSEC security stays intact for domains that are correctly maintained. 🥰
The following text from [RFC4033] is worth noting: "In the final analysis, however, authenticating both DNS keys and data is a matter of local policy, which may extend or even override the protocol extensions defined in this document set." 📝 A responsibility (one of many) of a caching server operator is to protect the integrity of the cache. 🗄️
1.2.3. Avoiding Switching to a Non-validating Resolver 🚫
As noted in Section 1.2.2, some people may consider switching to an alternative, non-validating resolver themselves, or may recommend that others do so. 😬 But if a domain fails DNSSEC validation and becomes inaccessible, that could very well be due to a security-related issue. 🚨 To be as safe and secure as possible, end users should not change to DNS servers that don't perform DNSSEC validation as a workaround, and people should not recommend that others do so either. 🙅♀️ Domains that fail DNSSEC for legitimate reasons (as opposed to misconfiguration) may be under the control of hackers, or there could be other significant security issues with the domain. Scary, bestie. 👻
So, switching to a non-validating resolver to restore access to a domain that fails DNSSEC validation is not a recommended practice. It's bad advice to pass along to others, and it's potentially harmful to end-user security. 💔
2. Use of a Negative Trust Anchor ✨
okay so before anyone touches an NTA, trained DNS server folks must confirm that the DNSSEC validation failure is due to misconfiguration 🔍. Why? Because the exact same breakage could happen if an attacker got into a domain's authoritative servers and modified those records, or had the domain pointed at their own rogue authoritative servers 😬. Scary stuff!! They should also confirm that the domain is not intentionally broken, like for testing purposes (see Section 6 💅). And finally, they should make a reasonable attempt to contact the domain owner of the misconfigured zone, preferably before implementing the NTA 📞.
Involving trained technical personnel is costly 💸, but operational experience suggests this is a very rare event, usually on the order of once per quarter (or even less) 🌸. So it's not like it's happening every day, bestie.
It is important for the resolver operator to confirm that the domain is still under the ownership/control of the legitimate owner of the domain. This makes sure that disabling validation for a specific domain doesn't direct users to an address under an attacker's control 🙈. Contacting the domain owner and telling them the DNSSEC records the resolver operator is seeing lets the operator figure out whether the issue is a DNSSEC misconfiguration or an attack 🕵️♀️. The detective work is everything.
In the case of a validation failure due to misconfiguration of a Top-Level Domain (TLD) or a popular domain name (such as a top 100 website), content or services in the affected TLD or domain could be inaccessible for a large number of users 😭. In those cases, it may be appropriate to use an NTA as soon as the misconfiguration is confirmed. An example of a list of "top N" websites is the Alexa "Top 500 Sites on the Web" [Alexa], or a list of the of the most-accessed names in the resolver's cache 📈.
Once a domain has been confirmed to fail DNSSEC validation due to a DNSSEC-related misconfiguration, an ISP or other DNS recursive resolver operator may elect to use an NTA for that domain or sub-domain. This tells their DNS recursive resolver to temporarily not perform DNSSEC validation at or in the misconfigured domain 🧚. This immediately restores access to the domain for end users while the domain's administrator fixes the misconfiguration(s). It does not, and should not, involve turning off validation more broadly. Main character energy is protecting the whole internet, not just one domain 👑.
2.1. Applicability of Negative Trust Anchors
An NTA MUST only be used for a limited duration ⏳. Implementors SHOULD allow the operator using the NTA to set an end time and date associated with any NTA. Optimally, this time and date is set in a DNS recursive resolver's configuration, though in the short term, this may also be achieved via other systems or supporting processes 🎀. Use of an NTA MUST NOT be automatic. No auto-pilot here, periodt 🙅♀️.
Finally, an NTA SHOULD be used only in a specific domain or sub-domain, and MUST NOT affect validation of other names up the authentication chain 🦋. For example, an NTA for zone1.example.com would affect only names at or below zone1.example.com, and validation would still be performed on example.com, .com, and the root ("."). This NTA also SHOULD NOT affect names in another branch of the tree (such as example.net). In another example, an NTA for example.com would affect only names within example.com, and validation would still be performed on .com and the root ("."). In this scenario, if there is a (probably manually configured) trust anchor for zone1.example.com, validation would be performed for zone1.example.com and subdomains of zone1.example.com 🌈. Precision is everything, bestie 💖.
3. Managing Negative Trust Anchors 🧸
While NTAs have proven useful during the early stages of DNSSEC adoption, domain owners are ultimately responsible for managing and ensuring that their DNS records are configured correctly 💅.
Most current implementations of DNS validating resolvers follow [RFC4033] on configuring a trust anchor, using either a public key as in a DNSKEY resource record (RR) or a hash of a public key as in a DS RR 🔑.
Different DNS validators may have different configuration names for an NTA. For examples, see Appendix A 📝.
An NTA placed at a node where there is a configured positive trust anchor MUST take precedence over that trust anchor, effectively disabling it 🚫. Implementations MAY issue a warning or informational message when this occurs, so that operators are not surprised when this happens 🫶.
3.1. Alerting Users to Negative Trust Anchor Use
End users of a DNS recursive resolver, or other people, may wonder why a domain that fails DNSSEC validation resolves with a supposedly validating resolver 🤔. So implementors should consider transparently disclosing NTAs that are currently in place or were in place in the past, such as on a website [Disclosure-Example] 🪞. Honesty is iconic.
This is particularly important since there is currently no special DNS query response code that could tell end users or applications that an NTA is in place 😭. Such disclosures should optimally include both the date and time that the NTA was put in place and when it was removed 🗓️.
4. Removal of a Negative Trust Anchor 🧹
As explored in Section 8, using an NTA once the zone correctly validates can have security considerations 💀. It is therefore RECOMMENDED that NTA implementors should periodically attempt to validate the domain in question, for the period of time that the NTA is in place, until such validation is again successful 🔁. NTAs MUST expire automatically when their configured lifetime ends ⏰. The lifetime SHOULD NOT exceed a week. There is limited experience with what this value should be, but at least one large vendor has documented customer feedback suggesting that a week is reasonable, based on expectations of how long failures take to fix or to be forgotten 🙃. Operational experience may further refine these expectations.
Before removing the NTA, all authoritative resolvers listed in the zone should be checked. (Due to anycast and load balancers, it may not be possible to check all instances 🌐.)
Once all testing succeeds, an NTA should be removed as soon as is reasonably possible ✅. One possible method to automatically determine when the NTA can be removed is to send a periodic query for type Start of Authority (SOA) at the NTA node. If it gets a response that it can validate (whether the response was an actual SOA answer or a NOERROR/NODATA with appropriate NSEC/NSEC3 records), the NTA is presumed no longer to be necessary and is removed 🧠. Implementations SHOULD, by default, perform this operation. Note that under some circumstances, this is undesirable behavior (for example, if www.example.com has a bad signature, but example.com/SOA is fine) 😬. So implementations may wish to allow the operator to override this spot-check/behavior. Sometimes you need a manual override, and that's valid 💜.
When removing the NTA, the implementation SHOULD remove all cached entries at and below the NTA node 🧼.
5. Comparison to Other DNS Misconfigurations 🔍
Domain administrators are ultimately responsible for managing and ensuring their DNS records are configured correctly. ISPs or other DNS recursive resolver operators cannot and should not correct misconfigured A, CNAME, MX, or other resource records of domains for which they are not authoritative 🙅♀️. Expecting non-authoritative entities to protect domain administrators from any misconfiguration of resource records is therefore unrealistic and unreasonable. In the long term, it is harmful to the delegated design of the DNS and could lead to extensive operational instability and/or variation 💀. Not the vibe.
With DNSSEC breakage, it is often possible to tell that there is a misconfiguration just by looking at the data, without needing to guess what it should have been 🕵️♀️✨.
6. Intentionally Broken Domains 🧪
Some domains, such as dnssec-failed.org, have been intentionally broken for testing purposes [Website-Visitors] [Netalyzr] 🧫. For example, dnssec-failed.org is a DNSSEC-signed domain that is broken. If an end user is querying a validating DNS recursive resolver, then this or other similarly intentionally broken domains should fail to resolve, and should result in a "Server Failure" error (RCODE 2, also known as SERVFAIL) 🚨. If such a domain resolves successfully, then it is a sign that the DNS recursive resolver is not fully validating 👀.
Organizations that utilize NTAs should not add an NTA for any intentionally broken domain. Such additions are prevented by the requirement that the operator attempt to contact the administrators for the zone that has broken DNSSEC 🛑.
Organizations operating an intentionally broken domain may wish to consider adding a TXT record for the domain, to the effect of "This domain is purposely DNSSEC broken for testing purposes" 📝🎀.
7. Discovering Broken Domains 🔍
Okay bestie, figuring out that a domain is DNSSEC broken because of an operator mistake instead of an attack is lowkey not trivial 😭 So the examples here need to be vetted by an experienced professional before anyone makes the call to implement an NTA 🫶
One of the big things to look for is consistency and history 📜 So it's good if you can look at the server's DNS traffic over a long period of time, or if you have a database that stores DNS names and their answers (aka a "passive DNS database") 🗃️ Another iconic tool is DNSViz (http://dnsviz.net), which also stores DNSSEC-related data historically ✨ The drawback is that you need it to have tested the domain before the incident happens 💀
The first and easiest check is whether the failure is consistent across different software implementations 🕵️♀️ If it's not, you want to tell the vendor where it fails so they can dig deeper.
Next up, figure out the actual failure mode 🔎 At the time of this writing, there are several tools that do this, including:
- DNSViz (http://dnsviz.net)
- Verisign DNSSEC debugger (http://dnssec-debugger.verisignlabs.com)
- Zonemaster (http://www.zonemaster.fr, https://github.com/dotse/zonemaster)
Most of these are open source and can be installed locally 💻 Using them over the Internet has the advantage of giving you visibility from a different point 🌍 This is an incomplete list, and it's expected that more tools will be developed over time to help troubleshoot DNSSEC issues 🧰
Once you know what the error is, check whether it shows up consistently around the world and from all authoritative servers 🌏 Use DNS Tools (dig) or DNS looking glasses to verify this. An error that's consistently the same is more likely to be caused by an operator than by an attack 🙌 Also, if the output from the authoritative server is consistently different from what the resolvers show, that hints at an attack rather than an error, unless EDNS0 client subnet [CLIENT-SUBNET] is applied to the domain 👀
A last check is to look at the actual DNS data 📊 Is the result of the query still the same, or has it changed? A lot of DNSSEC errors happen on events that change DNSSEC data, but the actual record someone wants to reach often stays the same. If the data is the same, that's an indication (not a guarantee) that the error is operator caused 🤏 Keep in mind that DNS is used to balance traffic globally, so the data for a name might be different in different parts of the Internet 🦋
Here are some examples of common DNSSEC failures that have been seen as operator signing errors on the Internet:
- RRSIG timing issue. Each signature has an inception time and an expiry time between which it's valid. Letting that time run out without creating a new signature is one of the most common DNSSEC errors 😩 To a lesser extent, this also happens if signatures were made active before the inception time. For all of these errors, your primary check is the data. Signature expiration is also about the only error we see on actual data (like
www.example.com). All other errors are more or less about the chain of trust established by DS records in the parent zone and DNSKEYs in the child zones. These mostly happen during key rollovers, but they aren't limited to that 🔗 - DNSKEYs in a child zone don't match the DS record in the parent zone. There's a big variety of this, and it can happen at any point in the key lifecycle. DNSViz is the best tool for showing problems in the chain 🏆 If you debug it yourself, use
dig +multilineso you can see the key id of a DNSKEY. Common variations include:- DS pointing to a non-existent key in the child zone. Questions to consider here include: Has there ever been a key (and if so, was it used)? Has there been a recent change in the DNSKEY RRSet (indicating a key rollover)? Has the actual data in the zone changed? Is the zone DNSSEC signed at all, and has it been in the past? 🤔
- DS pointing to an existent key, but no signatures are made with that key. Do the checks above, plus check whether another key in the DNSKEY RRSet is now being used to sign the records 🔑
- Data in DS or DNSKEY doesn't match the other. This is more common in initial setup, when there was a copy-and-paste error 😬 Again, checking the history of the data is the best you can do there.
All of the above is just a starting point for deciding whether or not to deploy a trust anchor 🌸 It's not possible to give a simple checklist to run through that determines whether a domain is broken because of an attack or an operator error. Sorry, no shortcuts here, babe 💅
8. Security Considerations 🚨
Okay, this part is serious, so buckle up 🎢 End-to-end DNSSEC validation is disabled for as long as an NTA is in use. On top of that, the NTA may still be in place after the DNS misconfiguration that broke validation has been fixed. So there can be a gap between when a domain has been re-secured and when the NTA is removed ⏳ Also, an NTA may be put in place by DNS recursive resolver operators without the knowledge of the authoritative domain administrator for a given domain name. Still, attempts SHOULD be made to contact and inform the domain administrator before putting the NTA in place 📞
Another side effect of implementing an NTA is that it may break client applications that assume a domain is signed and expect an AD bit in the response 💔 It's expected that many applications that require DNSSEC for a domain will do their own validation, so this should not be a major issue 🫶
9. References 📚
9.1. Normative References
Here are the must-read refs, the ones the whole spec leans on ✨
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC4033] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements",
RFC 4033, DOI 10.17487/RFC4033, March 2005,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4033>.
[RFC5914] Housley, R., Ashmore, S., and C. Wallace, "Trust Anchor
Format", RFC 5914, DOI 10.17487/RFC5914, June 2010,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5914>.
[RFC6781] Kolkman, O., Mekking, W., and R. Gieben, "DNSSEC
Operational Practices, Version 2", RFC 6781,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6781, December 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6781>.9.2. Informative References
And these are the extra-credit reads 🤓
[Alexa] Alexa, "The top 500 sites on the web",
<http://www.alexa.com/topsites>.
[CLIENT-SUBNET]
Contavalli, C., van der Gaast, W., Lawrence, D., and W.
Kumari, "Client Subnet in DNS Queries", Work in Progress,
draft-ietf-dnsop-edns-client-subnet-03, August 2015.
[Disclosure-Example]
Comcast, "faa.gov Failing DNSSEC Validation (Fixed)",
February 2013, <http://dns.comcast.net/index.php/entry/
faa-gov-failing-dnssec-validation-fixed>.
[Netalyzr] Weaver, N., Kreibich, C., Nechaev, B., and V. Paxson,
"Implications of Netalyzr's DNS Measurements", Securing
and Trusting Internet Names (SATIN), April 2011,
<http://conferences.npl.co.uk/satin/presentations/
satin2011slides-Weaver.pdf>.
[Unbound-Config]
Wijngaards, W., "Unbound: How to Turn Off DNSSEC", June
2010, <http://unbound.net/documentation/
howto_turnoff_dnssec.html>.
[Website-Visitors]
Mens, J., "Is my Web site being used via a DNSSEC-
validator?", July 2012, <http://jpmens.net/2012/07/30/
is-my-web-site-being-used-via-dnssec-validator/>.Appendix A. Configuration Examples ⚙️
This section has example configurations for achieving NTA functionality for the zone foo.example.com 🎀
Note: These are simply examples. Name server operators are expected to test and understand the implications of these operations. Also note that some available implementations may not implement all recommended functionality in this document. In that case, it's advisable to ask the developer or vendor of the implementation to support the missing feature, rather than start using the incomplete implementation 🙏
A.1. NLnet Labs Unbound
Unbound [Unbound-Config] lets us simply disable validation checking for a specific zone by adding configuration statements to unbound.conf 🧁
server:
domain-insecure: "foo.example.com"Using the 'unbound-control' command, you can add and remove NTAs without restarting the name server ✨
Using the "unbound-control" command:
list_insecure list domain-insecure zones
insecure_add zone add domain-insecure zone
insecure_remove zone remove domain-insecure zoneItems added with the "unbound-control" command are added to the running server and are lost when the server is restarted. Items from unbound.conf stay after a restart 💾
For additional information, see [Unbound-Config] 🔗
A.2. Internet System Consortium (ISC) BIND
Use the "rndc" command 💻
nta -dump
List all negative trust anchors.
nta [-lifetime duration] [-force] domain [view]
Set a negative trust anchor, disabling DNSSEC validation
for the given domain.
Using -lifetime specifies the duration of the NTA, up
to one week. The default is one hour.
Using -force prevents the NTA from expiring before its
full lifetime, even if the domain can validate sooner.
nta -remove domain [view]
Remove a negative trust anchor, re-enabling validation
for the given domain.A.3. Nominum Vantio
Here's the Nominum Vantio setup, copied exactly as written 🧾
**
*negative-trust-anchors*
_Format_: name
_Command Channel_: view.update name=world negative-trust-
anchors=(foo.example.com)
_Command Channel_: resolver.update name=res1 negative-trust-
anchors=(foo.example.com)
*Description*: Disables DNSSEC validation for a domain, even if the
domain is under an existing security root.Acknowledgements 🫶
Okay, big thank-you energy to everyone who helped make this document happen 💖 Several people contributed to it and/or played an important role in its development and evolution. Some did detailed reviews and gave feedback and constructive criticism for future revisions, and some jumped into healthy debates about the subject, all of which was super helpful 🌈 So the following individuals deserve a shoutout: Joe Abley, John Barnitz, Tom Creighton, Marco Davids, Brian Dickson, Patrik Falstrom, Tony Finch, Chris Ganster, Olafur Gudmundsson, Peter Hagopian, Wes Hardaker, Paul Hoffman, Christer Holmberg, Shane Kerr, Murray Kucherawy, Rick Lamb, Marc Lampo, Ted Lemon, Scott Rose, A. Schulze, Wendy Seltzer, Antoin Verschuren, Paul Vixie, Patrik Wallstrom, Nick Weaver, W.C.A. Wijngaards, and Suzanne Woolf 👑
And a special, extra-big round of applause for Edward Lewis, Evan Hunt, Andrew Sullivan, and Tatuya Jinmei, who provided especially large amounts of text and/or detailed review 🏆✨
Authors' Addresses 💌
okay bestie, this is the crew behind the document 🫶 Here's where you can find each of them, with their org, address, email, and website where they have one ✨
Paul Ebersman
Comcast
One Comcast Center
1701 John F. Kennedy Boulevard
Philadelphia, PA 19103
United States
Email: ebersman-ietf@dragon.net
Warren Kumari
Google
1600 Amphitheatre Parkway
Mountain View, CA 94043
United States
Email: warren@kumari.net
URI: http://www.google.com
Chris Griffiths
Nominet
Minerva House
Edmund Halley Road
Oxford Science Park
Oxford OX4 4DQ
United Kingdom
Email: cgriffiths@gmail.com
URI: http://www.nominet.org.uk/
Jason Livingood
Comcast
One Comcast Center
1701 John F. Kennedy Boulevard
Philadelphia, PA 19103
United States
Email: jason_livingood@cable.comcast.com
URI: http://www.comcast.com
Ralf Weber
Nominum
Email: Ralf.Weber@nominum.com
URI: http://www.nominum.comthat's the whole squad 💜 the end of the doc, periodt 🌈👑
📦 where this page comes from
- ietf: rfc7646 2015-09
- 💖 girlified by claude-haiku-5-5 on : a language model's rewrite of the original, under its terms