RFC 7522

Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) 2.0 Profile for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication and Authorization Grants

📅 published May 2015, from ietf

RFC 7522 🎀

okay bestie, this one is RFC 7522 and it is ICONIC 💅

It's an IETF Request for Comments numbered 7522 (ISSN 2070-1721), titled Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) 2.0 Profile for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication and Authorization Grants. It's a Standards Track document dated May 2015. The authors are B. Campbell (Ping Identity), C. Mortimore (Salesforce), and M. Jones (Microsoft) 🧚 Its header doesn't list anything it obsoletes or updates, so it doesn't replace or change any other RFC 🌸

Abstract ✨

This spec explains how to use a SAML 2.0 Bearer Assertion for two things: asking for an OAuth 2.0 access token, and authenticating a client 🦋

Status of This Memo 📜

This is an Internet Standards Track document 💖

It's a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), so it represents the consensus of the IETF community. It went through public review and got approved for publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). If you want more about Internet Standards, check out Section 2 of RFC 5741 🔍

You can find the current status of this document, any errata, and how to send feedback at http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7522.

Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. 🌈

This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) as they stood on the publication date. Read those carefully, because they spell out what you can and can't do with this document. Code Components pulled out of this document must include Simplified BSD License text, as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions, and they come with no warranty, as the Simplified BSD License describes 🫶

Table of Contents 📚

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Notational Conventions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     1.2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   2.  HTTP Parameter Bindings for Transporting Assertions . . . . .   4
     2.1.  Using SAML Assertions as Authorization Grants . . . . . .   4
     2.2.  Using SAML Assertions for Client Authentication . . . . .   5
   3.  Assertion Format and Processing Requirements  . . . . . . . .   6
     3.1.  Authorization Grant Processing  . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     3.2.  Client Authentication Processing  . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   4.  Authorization Grant Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   5.  Interoperability Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   7.  Privacy Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   8.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     8.1.  Sub-Namespace Registration of
           urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:saml2-bearer . . . . . .  12
     8.2.  Sub-Namespace Registration of
           urn:ietf:params:oauth:client-assertion-type:saml2-bearer   13
   9.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     9.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     9.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15

1. Introduction ✨

SAML 2.0 ([OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os]) is an XML-based framework for sharing identity and security info across security domains. It was mainly built for cross-domain Web browser single sign-on (SSO), but it was also designed to be modular and extensible so it can be used in other contexts 💜

The Assertion is an XML security token and a core SAML building block. Other protocols and specs borrow it all the time (for example [OASIS.WSS-SAMLTokenProfile] and [OASIS.WS-Fed]). An Assertion is usually issued by an Identity Provider and consumed by a Service Provider, which relies on its contents to work out who the Assertion's subject is for security purposes 🔐

The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework [RFC6749] gives you a way to make authenticated HTTP requests to a resource using an access token 🦋 An authorization server (AS) issues access tokens to third-party clients, usually with the resource owner's approval (sometimes implicit). In OAuth, an authorization grant is an abstract term for the intermediate credentials that represent the resource owner's authorization, and the client uses one to get an access token. OAuth defines several grant types to cover lots of client types and user experiences. It also lets you define new extension grant types for more clients or to bridge OAuth with other trust frameworks. And you can define extra authentication mechanisms for clients talking to the authorization server 🌸

"Assertion Framework for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication and Authorization Grants" [RFC7521] is an abstract OAuth 2.0 extension. It gives you a general framework for using assertions as client credentials and/or authorization grants with OAuth 2.0 ✨ This spec profiles the OAuth Assertion Framework [RFC7521] to define an extension grant type that uses a SAML 2.0 Bearer Assertion to request an OAuth 2.0 access token, and to serve as client credentials. The format and processing rules for the SAML Assertion here are intentionally similar to, but not identical with, the ones in the Web Browser SSO profile from the SAML Profiles [OASIS.saml-profiles-2.0-os] spec. This spec reuses concepts and patterns from that well-established profile wherever it makes sense 🧚

This document explains how a SAML Assertion can request an access token when a client wants to use an existing trust relationship (expressed through the SAML Assertion's semantics) without a direct user approval step at the authorization server 👑 It also explains how a SAML Assertion can be used as a client authentication mechanism. Using an Assertion for client authentication is orthogonal to, and separable from, using an Assertion as an authorization grant, so you can use them together or separately 💅 Client assertion authentication is just another way for a client to authenticate to the token endpoint, and it must be paired with some grant type to make a complete, meaningful protocol request. Assertion authorization grants may be used with or without client authentication or identification. Whether client authentication is needed with an assertion authorization grant, and which kinds of client authentication are supported, are policy decisions the authorization server gets to make 🫶

The process by which the client gets the SAML Assertion, before it exchanges it with the authorization server or uses it for client authentication, is out of scope. Not this doc's problem 🙈

1.1. Notational Conventions

The key words are the BCP 14 ones that carry real weight. In this document, "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" are read the way RFC 2119 [RFC2119] explains them 📚

Unless noted otherwise, all protocol parameter names and values are case sensitive, so treat capitals and lowercase as different 🔤

1.2. Terminology

All terms are defined in these specs: "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework" [RFC6749], the OAuth Assertion Framework [RFC7521], and "Assertions and Protocols for the OASIS Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) V2.0" [OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os] 🦋

2. HTTP Parameter Bindings for Transporting Assertions 💌

The OAuth Assertion Framework [RFC7521] defines generic HTTP parameters for carrying assertions during interactions with a token endpoint. This section defines the specific parameters, and how to treat them, when you're using SAML 2.0 Bearer Assertions 🎀

2.1. Using SAML Assertions as Authorization Grants

To use a SAML Bearer Assertion as an authorization grant, the client sends an access token request, as defined in Section 4 of the OAuth Assertion Framework [RFC7521], with the specific parameter values and encodings below 💖

The grant_type parameter's value is urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:saml2-bearer.

The assertion parameter's value holds a single SAML 2.0 Assertion. It MUST NOT contain more than one SAML 2.0 Assertion 💀 The SAML Assertion XML data MUST be encoded using base64url, where the encoding follows Section 5 of RFC 4648 [RFC4648] and the padding bits are set to zero. To skip extra encoding steps (for example, by "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" [W3C.REC-html401-19991224]), the base64url-encoded data MUST NOT be line wrapped, and pad characters ("=") MUST NOT be included 🍓

The "scope" parameter may be used, as defined in the OAuth Assertion Framework [RFC7521], to say which scope you're requesting ✨

Client authentication is optional, as described in Section 3.2.1 of OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749]. That means client_id is only needed when you use a form of client authentication that relies on that parameter 🧚

Here's an example access token request with an Assertion as an authorization grant. The extra line breaks are just for display 🌈

     POST /token.oauth2 HTTP/1.1
     Host: as.example.com
     Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

     grant_type=urn%3Aietf%3Aparams%3Aoauth%3Agrant-type%3Asaml2-bearer&
     assertion=PHNhbWxwOl...[omitted for brevity]...ZT4

2.2. Using SAML Assertions for Client Authentication

To use a SAML Bearer Assertion for client authentication, the client uses the parameter values and encodings below 🔐

The client_assertion_type parameter's value is urn:ietf:params:oauth:client-assertion-type:saml2-bearer.

The client_assertion parameter's value MUST contain a single SAML 2.0 Assertion. The SAML Assertion XML data MUST be encoded using base64url, where the encoding follows Section 5 of RFC 4648 [RFC4648] and the padding bits are set to zero. To avoid extra encoding steps (for example, by "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" [W3C.REC-html401-19991224]), the base64url-encoded data SHOULD NOT be line wrapped, and pad characters ("=") SHOULD NOT be included 🫶

Here's an example of a client authenticating with an Assertion while presenting an authorization code grant in an access token request. The extra line breaks are for display only 💜

     POST /token.oauth2 HTTP/1.1
     Host: as.example.com
     Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

     grant_type=authorization_code&
     code=n0esc3NRze7LTCu7iYzS6a5acc3f0ogp4&
     client_assertion_type=urn%3Aietf%3Aparams%3Aoauth
     %3Aclient-assertion-type%3Asaml2-bearer&
     client_assertion=PHNhbW...[omitted for brevity]...ZT

3. Assertion Format and Processing Requirements ✨

okay so before the authorization server even thinks about handing out an access token response (see OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749]) or trusting an Assertion for client authentication, it MUST validate that Assertion against the checklist below 🫶. Any extra restrictions and policy on top of that are totally up to the authorization server 💅.

  1. The Assertion's <Issuer> element MUST contain a unique identifier for the entity that issued the Assertion. In the absence of an application profile specifying otherwise, compliant applications MUST compare Issuer values using the Simple String Comparison method defined in Section 6.2.1 of RFC 3986 [RFC3986]. 🌸
  2. The Assertion MUST contain a <Conditions> element with an <AudienceRestriction> element with an <Audience> element that identifies the authorization server as an intended audience. Section 2.5.1.4 of "Assertions and Protocols for the OASIS Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) V2.0" [OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os] defines the <AudienceRestriction> and <Audience> elements and, in addition to the URI references discussed there, the token endpoint URL of the authorization server MAY be used as a URI that identifies the authorization server as an intended audience. The authorization server MUST reject any Assertion that does not contain its own identity as the intended audience. In the absence of an application profile specifying otherwise, compliant applications MUST compare the Audience values using the Simple String Comparison method defined in Section 6.2.1 of RFC 3986 [RFC3986]. As noted in Section 5, the precise strings to be used as the Audience for a given authorization server must be configured out of band by the authorization server and the issuer of the Assertion. 🎀
  3. The Assertion MUST contain a <Subject> element identifying the principal that is the subject of the Assertion. Additional information identifying the subject/principal MAY be included in an <AttributeStatement>.
    • A. For the authorization grant, the Subject typically identifies an authorized accessor for which the access token is being requested (i.e., the resource owner or an authorized delegate), but in some cases, it may be a pseudonymous identifier or other value denoting an anonymous user.
    • B. For client authentication, the Subject MUST be the "client_id" of the OAuth client. 🦋
  4. The Assertion MUST have an expiry that limits the time window during which it can be used. The expiry can be expressed either as the NotOnOrAfter attribute of the <Conditions> element or as the NotOnOrAfter attribute of a suitable <SubjectConfirmationData> element. ⏰
  5. The <Subject> element MUST contain at least one <SubjectConfirmation> element that has a Method attribute with a value of "urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:cm:bearer". If the Assertion does not have a suitable NotOnOrAfter attribute on the <Conditions> element, the <SubjectConfirmation> element MUST contain a <SubjectConfirmationData> element. When present, the <SubjectConfirmationData> element MUST have a Recipient attribute with a value indicating the token endpoint URL of the authorization server (or an acceptable alias). The authorization server MUST verify that the value of the Recipient attribute matches the token endpoint URL (or an acceptable alias) to which the Assertion was delivered. The <SubjectConfirmationData> element MUST have a NotOnOrAfter attribute that limits the window during which the Assertion can be confirmed. The <SubjectConfirmationData> element MAY also contain an Address attribute limiting the client address from which the Assertion can be delivered. Verification of the Address is at the discretion of the authorization server. 🔥
  6. The authorization server MUST reject the entire Assertion if the NotOnOrAfter instant on the <Conditions> element has passed (subject to allowable clock skew between systems). The authorization server MUST reject the <SubjectConfirmation> (but MAY still use the rest of the Assertion) if the NotOnOrAfter instant on the <SubjectConfirmationData> has passed (subject to allowable clock skew). Note that the authorization server may reject Assertions with a NotOnOrAfter instant that is unreasonably far in the future. The authorization server MAY ensure that Bearer Assertions are not replayed, by maintaining the set of used ID values for the length of time for which the Assertion would be considered valid based on the applicable NotOnOrAfter instant. 🙈
Replay protection is the optional part here, but the expiry checks above are not optional. Don't skip them, bestie 💀
  1. If the Assertion issuer directly authenticated the subject, the Assertion SHOULD contain a single <AuthnStatement> representing that authentication event. If the Assertion was issued with the intention that the client act autonomously on behalf of the subject, an <AuthnStatement> SHOULD NOT be included and the client presenting the Assertion SHOULD be identified in the <NameID> or similar element in the <SubjectConfirmation> element, or by other available means like "SAML V2.0 Condition for Delegation Restriction" [OASIS.saml-deleg-cs]. 🧚
  2. Other statements, in particular <AttributeStatement> elements, MAY be included in the Assertion. 💜
  3. The Assertion MUST be digitally signed or have a Message Authentication Code (MAC) applied by the issuer. The authorization server MUST reject Assertions with an invalid signature or MAC. 🔐
  4. Encrypted elements MAY appear in place of their plaintext counterparts as defined in [OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os]. 🌈
  5. The authorization server MUST reject an Assertion that is not valid in all other respects per [OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os], such as (but not limited to) all content within the Conditions element including the NotOnOrAfter and NotBefore attributes, unknown condition types, etc. 👑

3.1. Authorization Grant Processing

Assertion authorization grants may be used with or without client authentication or identification. Whether or not client authentication is needed in conjunction with an Assertion authorization grant, as well as the supported types of client authentication, are policy decisions at the discretion of the authorization server. However, if client credentials are present in the request, the authorization server MUST validate them.

If the Assertion is not valid (including if its subject confirmation requirements cannot be met), the authorization server constructs an error response as defined in OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749]. The value of the "error" parameter MUST be the "invalid_grant" error code. The authorization server MAY include additional information regarding the reasons the Assertion was considered invalid using the "error_description" or "error_uri" parameters.

For example:

HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-store

{
  "error":"invalid_grant",
  "error_description":"Audience validation failed"
}

3.2. Client Authentication Processing

If the client Assertion is not valid (including if its subject confirmation requirements cannot be met), the authorization server constructs an error response as defined in OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749]. The value of the "error" parameter MUST be the "invalid_client" error code. The authorization server MAY include additional information regarding the reasons the Assertion was considered invalid using the "error_description" or "error_uri" parameters. 🙅‍♀️

4. Authorization Grant Example 🎀

okay now the fun part 🥹 these examples show what a conforming Assertion and an access token request actually look like.

The example shows an assertion issued and signed by the SAML Identity Provider identified as "https://saml-idp.example.com". The subject of the Assertion is identified by email address as "brian@example.com", who authenticated to the Identity Provider by means of a digital signature where the key was validated as part of an X.509 Public Key Infrastructure. The intended audience of the Assertion is "https://saml-sp.example.net", which is an identifier for a SAML Service Provider with which the authorization server identifies itself. The Assertion is sent as part of an access token request to the authorization server's token endpoint at "https://authz.example.net/token.oauth2".

Below is an example SAML 2.0 Assertion (whitespace formatting is for display purposes only):

  <Assertion IssueInstant="2010-10-01T20:07:34.619Z"
    ID="ef1xsbZxPV2oqjd7HTLRLIBlBb7"
    Version="2.0"
    xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion">
   <Issuer>https://saml-idp.example.com</Issuer>
   <ds:Signature xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">
    [...omitted for brevity...]
   </ds:Signature>
   <Subject>
    <NameID
     Format="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.1:nameid-format:emailAddress">
     brian@example.com
    </NameID>
    <SubjectConfirmation
      Method="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:cm:bearer">
     <SubjectConfirmationData
       NotOnOrAfter="2010-10-01T20:12:34.619Z"
       Recipient="https://authz.example.net/token.oauth2"/>
     </SubjectConfirmation>
    </Subject>
    <Conditions>
      <AudienceRestriction>
        <Audience>https://saml-sp.example.net</Audience>
      </AudienceRestriction>
    </Conditions>
    <AuthnStatement AuthnInstant="2010-10-01T20:07:34.371Z">
      <AuthnContext>
        <AuthnContextClassRef>
          urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:ac:classes:X509
        </AuthnContextClassRef>
      </AuthnContext>
    </AuthnStatement>
  </Assertion>

Figure 1: Example SAML 2.0 Assertion

To present the Assertion shown in the previous example as part of an access token request, for example, the client might make the following HTTPS request (with extra line breaks for display purposes only):

  POST /token.oauth2 HTTP/1.1
  Host: authz.example.net
  Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

  grant_type=urn%3Aietf%3Aparams%3Aoauth%3Agrant-type%3Asaml2-
  bearer&assertion=PEFzc2VydGlvbiBJc3N1ZUluc3RhbnQ9IjIwMTEtMDU
  [...omitted for brevity...]aG5TdGF0ZW1lbnQ-PC9Bc3NlcnRpb24-

Figure 2: Example Request 🌸

5. Interoperability Considerations ✨

okay so, for systems to actually work together (no cap, this is the whole point 💅), everyone has to agree on a few things first. That means the values for the Issuer and Audience identifiers, where the token endpoint lives, the key used to sign and verify the digital signature over the Assertion, whether Assertions can be used one time only, the maximum Assertion lifetime allowed, and the specific Subject and attribute requirements of the Assertion. 🔑 This spec does NOT cover how you swap that info, bestie. Typically you'd do it alongside existing SAML Web SSO deployments that already have a way to share it. "Metadata for the OASIS Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) V2.0" [OASIS.saml-metadata-2.0-os] is one common method for sharing SAML info about system entities 🌸

The RSA-SHA256 algorithm, from [RFC6931], is a mandatory-to-implement XML signature algorithm for this profile. So it's a must-have, no skipping 🙈

6. Security Considerations

The security considerations from these specs all apply here too: "Assertion Framework for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication and Authorization Grants" [RFC7521], "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework" [RFC6749], and "Security and Privacy Considerations for the OASIS Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) V2.0" [OASIS.saml-sec-consider-2.0-os]. Read them. Seriously. 😭

The spec does not mandate replay protection for the SAML Assertion usage, for either the authorization grant or client authentication. It's an optional feature, and implementations can use it at their own discretion. So if you're building this, don't assume replay protection is handled for you. Think about it yourself 🚨

7. Privacy Considerations

A SAML Assertion can hold privacy-sensitive info, so to keep it away from the wrong people, it should only be sent over encrypted channels, like Transport Layer Security (TLS) 🔐 If you want to keep certain info hidden from the client, the Subject and/or individual attributes of a SAML Assertion should be encrypted to the authorization server 🫶

Deployments should figure out the minimum amount of information needed to finish the exchange, and only put that in an Assertion. Usually that means limiting what goes in an <AttributeStatement> or leaving it out altogether 🧚 In some cases the Subject can be an anonymous or pseudonymous user value, as described in Section 6.3.1 of the OAuth Assertion Framework [RFC7521]. Main character privacy energy 💜

8. IANA Considerations

8.1. Sub-Namespace Registration of urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:saml2-bearer

This section registers the value grant-type:saml2-bearer in the IANA "OAuth URI" registry set up by "An IETF URN Sub-Namespace for OAuth" [RFC6755]. Registry entry, iconic 📝

  • URN: urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:saml2-bearer
  • Common Name: SAML 2.0 Bearer Assertion Grant Type Profile for OAuth 2.0
  • Change Controller: IESG
  • Specification Document: RFC 7522

8.2. Sub-Namespace Registration of urn:ietf:params:oauth:client-assertion-type:saml2-bearer

This section registers the value client-assertion-type:saml2-bearer in the IANA "OAuth URI" registry set up by "An IETF URN Sub-Namespace for OAuth" [RFC6755]. Another one, another slay 💖

  • URN: urn:ietf:params:oauth:client-assertion-type:saml2-bearer
  • Common Name: SAML 2.0 Bearer Assertion Profile for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication
  • Change Controller: IESG
  • Specification Document: RFC 7522

9. References

9.1. Normative References

[OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os]
           Cantor, S., Kemp, J., Philpott, R., and E. Maler,
           "Assertions and Protocols for the OASIS Security Assertion
           Markup Language (SAML) V2.0", OASIS Standard
           saml-core-2.0-os, March 2005, <http://docs.oasis-open.org/
           security/saml/v2.0/saml-core-2.0-os.pdf>.

[OASIS.saml-deleg-cs]
           Cantor, S., Ed., "SAML V2.0 Condition for Delegation
           Restriction Version 1", Committee Specification 01,
           November 2009, <http://docs.oasis-open.org/
           security/saml/Post2.0/sstc-saml-delegation-cs-01.html>.

[OASIS.saml-sec-consider-2.0-os]
           Hirsch, F., Philpott, R., and E. Maler, "Security and
           Privacy Considerations for the OASIS Security Assertion
           Markup Language (SAML) V2.0", OASIS Standard
           saml-sec-consider-2.0-os, March 2005,
           <http://docs.oasis-open.org/security/saml/v2.0/
           saml-sec-consider-2.0-os.pdf>.

[RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
           Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
           DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
           <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

[RFC3986]  Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
           Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
           RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,
           <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>.

[RFC4648]  Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
           Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006,
           <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4648>.

[RFC6749]  Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework",
           RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012,
           <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6749>.

[RFC6931]  Eastlake 3rd, D., "Additional XML Security Uniform
           Resource Identifiers (URIs)", RFC 6931,
           DOI 10.17487/RFC6931, April 2013,
           <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6931>.

[RFC7521]  Campbell, B., Mortimore, C., Jones, M., and Y. Goland,
           "Assertion Framework for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication
           and Authorization Grants", RFC 7521, DOI 10.17487/RFC7521,
           May 2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7521>.

9.2. Informative References

[OASIS.WS-Fed]
           Goodner, M. and A. Nadalin, "Web Services Federation
           Language (WS-Federation) Version 1.2", OASIS Standard, May
           2009, <http://docs.oasis-open.org/wsfed/
           federation/v1.2/os/ws-federation-1.2-spec-os.html>.

[OASIS.WSS-SAMLTokenProfile]
           Monzillo, R., Kaler, C., Nadalin, T., Hallam-Baker, P.,
           and C. Milono, "Web Services Security SAML Token Profile
           Version 1.1.1", OASIS Standard, May 2012,
           <http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss-m/wss/v1.1.1/
           wss-SAMLTokenProfile-v1.1.1.html>.

[OASIS.saml-metadata-2.0-os]
           Cantor, S., Moreh, J., Philpott, R., and E. Maler,
           "Metadata for the OASIS Security Assertion Markup Language
           (SAML) V2.0", OASIS Standard saml-metadata-2.0-os, March
           2005, <http://docs.oasis-open.org/security/saml/v2.0/
           saml-metadata-2.0-os.pdf>.

[OASIS.saml-profiles-2.0-os]
           Hughes, J., Cantor, S., Hodges, J., Hirsch, F., Mishra,
           P., Philpott, R., and E. Maler, "Profiles for the OASIS
           Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) V2.0", OASIS
           Standard OASIS.saml-profiles-2.0-os, March 2005,
           <http://docs.oasis-open.org/security/saml/v2.0/
           saml-profiles-2.0-os.pdf>.

[RFC6755]  Campbell, B. and H. Tschofenig, "An IETF URN Sub-Namespace
           for OAuth", RFC 6755, DOI 10.17487/RFC6755, October 2012,
           <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6755>.

[W3C.REC-html401-19991224]
           Raggett, D., Hors, A., and I. Jacobs, "HTML 4.01
           Specification", World Wide Web Consortium Recommendation
           REC-html401-19991224, December 1999,
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Acknowledgements

The following people contributed wording and concepts to this document, and they deserve all the flowers 🌷🌸: Paul Madsen, Patrick Harding, Peter Motykowski, Eran Hammer, Peter Saint-Andre, Ian Barnett, Eric Fazendin, Torsten Lodderstedt, Susan Harper, Scott Tomilson, Scott Cantor, Hannes Tschofenig, David Waite, Phil Hunt, and Mukesh Bhatnagar. Icons, every one 👑

Authors' Addresses

Brian Campbell Ping Identity

EMail: brian.d.campbell@gmail.com

Chuck Mortimore Salesforce.com

EMail: cmortimore@salesforce.com

Michael B. Jones Microsoft

EMail: mbj@microsoft.com URI: http://self-issued.info/

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