RFC 7216
Location Information Server (LIS) Discovery Using IP Addresses and Reverse DNS
RFC 7216: Location Information Server (LIS) Discovery Using IP Addresses and Reverse DNS π
Authors: M. Thomson (Mozilla) and R. Bellis (Nominet UK) π Category: Standards Track π ISSN: 2070-1721 Date: April 2014 π Obsoletes / Updates: Neither is listed in this header, so this one doesn't replace or patch any earlier RFC π«Ά
Abstract
okay so the residential gateway (aka your home router π ) is literally everywhere now, and it's a whole vibe. The problem is that finding a Location Information Server (LIS) is a must if you want location info for location-based services π, and when a residential gateway is in the way, finding the LIS gets messy. You need a method that works around the gateway, and that's the drama this doc is about π
This document describes a solution. It gives alternative domain names as input to the LIS discovery process, and those names are based on the network addresses assigned to a Device. Iconic, honestly π¦
Status of This Memo
This is an Internet Standards Track document β¨
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community, received public review, and was approved for publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). If you want more about Internet Standards, check Section 2 of RFC 5741 π
For the current status, any errata, and how to send feedback, go to http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7216 π
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved π
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) as they were in effect on the publication date. Please read those carefully, because they spell out your rights and restrictions for this doc π§Ύ Code Components pulled out of this document must include Simplified BSD License text, as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions, and they come without warranty, as the Simplified BSD License says π
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Problem Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. Residential Gateway . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.2. Security Features of Residential Gateways . . . . . . . . 7
4. IP-based DNS Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.1. Identification of IP Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.2. Domain Name Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.3. Shortened DNS Names . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.4. When To Use the Reverse DNS Method . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.5. Private Address Spaces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.6. Necessary Assumptions and Restrictions . . . . . . . . . 11
4.7. Failure Modes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.8. Deployment Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7. IAB Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1. Introduction β¨
okay so a Location Information Server (LIS) is a service that an access network provides π The LIS uses what it knows about the access network's topology, plus other info, to make location information for Devices. Any Device sitting inside an access network can grab location info from a LIS π
The link between a Device and an access network might be temporary π¦ Making sure the Device is configured with the correct LIS is what keeps the location info accurate. Without location info, some network services just don't work π
Setting a LIS IP address on a Device needs some kind of automated process. This matters even more because Devices can roam between different access networks, each served by a different LIS πββοΈ LIS Discovery [RFC5986] describes a method that uses the Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCPv4 [RFC2131], DHCPv6 [RFC3315]) as input to U-NAPTR [RFC4848] discovery π₯
A residential gateway, or home router, does a bunch of networking jobs for the Devices on the network it serves. Unfortunately, in most cases those jobs stop DHCP from working for LIS discovery π
The catch with DHCP is that rolling out a new option everywhere takes forever β³ Networking gear often has to be updated before it can support the new option. The biggest worry is the millions of residential gateway devices that give homes and businesses their Internet access π‘ [RFC5986] describes functions that residential gateways could provide to support LIS discovery, but gateways built before this specification came out aren't expected to provide those functions, and they probably can't π€
This document explores the problem of giving Devices a LIS address when a residential gateway sits between the Device and the access network π§ Section 3 defines the problem, and Section 4 describes a way to work out a domain name that can be used to discover the LIS πΊοΈ
Sometimes the solution in this document is based on a UNilateral Self-Address Fixing (UNSAF) [RFC3424] method π οΈ In those cases it's considered transitional, meaning it sticks around only until the recommendations for residential gateways in [RFC5986] are widely deployed πΈ Considerations for UNSAF applications are in Section 7 π«Ά
2. Conventions Used in This Document π
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119] π
This document uses terminology established in [RFC6280] and [RFC5012]. The terms "Device" and "LIS" are capitalized throughout when they're used to name the roles defined in [RFC6280] π
3. Problem Statement π§©
Figure 1 shows a simplified network topology for fixed wire-line Internet access π This setup is super typical when wired Internet access is provided. The diagram has two network segments: the access network run by an Internet service provider (ISP), and the residential network served by the residential gateway ποΈ
________
(/ \)
(( Internet ))
(\________/)
|
|
.- - -|- - - - - - - - - - - -.
( | )
( +--------+ +-------+ )
Access ( | Access |. . . .| LIS | )
Network ( | Node | | | )
(ISP) ( +--------+ +-------+ )
( \ \ )
`- - - -\- - - - - - - -\- - -'
\ \
\ |
.- - - - -\- - - - - - - + -.
( \ | )
( +-------------+ : )
( | Residential | | )
Residential ( | Gateway | : )
Network ( +-------------+ | )
( / \ / )
( / \ / )
( +--------+ +--------+ )
( | Device | | Device | )
( +--------+ +--------+ )
( )
`- - - - - - - - - - - - - -'
Figure 1: Simplified Network Topology
There are a bunch of variations on this setup, as covered in Section 3.1 of [RFC5687] π In every one of them, the goal of LIS discovery is to find the LIS in the access network π―
A really important thing about this setup is how small the area is that the residential gateway covers π‘β¨ If the area is small enough, it makes sense for the ISP to take on the job of giving the Devices inside the residential network their location info π The ISP can give location info that pins down the residence, which should be good enough for a wide range of purposes π
A residential network covering a bigger area might need a dedicated LIS π’ That's a case this document doesn't cover π ββοΈ
The goal of LIS discovery is to find a LIS that can give the Device accurate location info. In this topology, that means finding the LIS in the access network. And the residential gateway is a major obstacle to getting there π§π
3.1. Residential Gateway π
okay so a residential gateway is literally a whole buffet π It can be a modem, an Ethernet switch, a wireless access point, a router, a network address translation (NAT) box, a DHCP server, a DNS relay, and a firewall, all in one. Out of all of those, the NAT function is the one that hits LIS discovery the hardest β¨
An ISP is usually super stingy with IP addresses π€ Each customer only gets a limited number of them. That's why NAT is everywhere in gateways. NAT lets lots of Devices share the residential network, but it also means the ISP doesn't configure those Devices directly π
This is where things get messy for discovering a LIS. Configuration is the ideal way to hand over the info needed for discovery, but Devices behind residential gateways usually get a generic config with zero info about the ISP network π For example, DNS config usually points at a DNS relay on the gateway itself. This keeps the local network working even without a connection to the ISP, but it also means the Devices are basically clueless about the ISP network.
[RFC5986] describes several methods a residential gateway can use to help Devices get location info. For instance, the gateway could forward LIS address info to the hosts on its network. The catch? That kind of active involvement only works for new residential gateway devices that implement those recommendations π©
For gateways that already exist, the gateway would need to be updated or replaced before it could be directly involved in LIS discovery. Replacing it is a hard sell for the owner, especially since the gateway still does its main job: Internet access π« Also, updating the software isn't feasible in many cases. Even when updates are offered, many residential gateways can't be updated remotely, so some portion of them will just never get updated π
So this document describes a method Devices can use to find their LIS without any help from the network π¦
3.2. Security Features of Residential Gateways π‘οΈ
Residential gateways often come with a firewall function as a security measure, and security features like intrusion detection systems help protect users from attacks. One of these protections is a port filter that blocks both inbound and outbound traffic on certain TCP and UDP ports. So any solution has to think about the chance that its traffic gets blocked π«
4. IP-based DNS Solution πβ¨
LIS discovery [RFC5986] is built on a DNS-based Dynamic Delegation Discovery Service (DDDS) system. The input to this process is a domain name. The DHCP way of getting that domain name is specified, but other ways of getting it are allowed too π
This document lays out how a Device can find several alternative domain names to feed into the DDDS process. These domain names are based on the Device's IP address. To be specific, they're a chunk of the reverse DNS trees: either the .in-addr.arpa. tree or the .ip6.arpa. tree πΈ
The whole point is to make just a few DDDS queries to find a LIS. After the DHCP-based process in [RFC5986] has failed to find one, a Device can do the following:
- Collect a set of IP addresses that refer to the Device (Section 4.1).
- Convert each IP address into DNS names in the
in-addr.arpa.orip6.arpa.tree (Section 4.2). - Perform the DDDS process for LIS discovery on those DNS names ([RFC5986]).
- Shorten the DNS names by some number of labels and repeat the DDDS process (Section 4.3).
A Device might be reachable at a bunch of different IP addresses π¦ So in this process, the Device first figures out every IP address it could potentially be reached at. Then, from each of those addresses, it picks up to three domain names to use for discovery. Those domain names are then used as input to the DDDS process β¨
4.1. Identification of IP Addresses π
A Device identifies a set of potential IP addresses that currently result in packets being routed to it. These are sorted by proximity, so addresses used on adjacent network segments get favored over ones used in public or remote networks. The first addresses in the set are the ones assigned to local network interfaces π‘
A Device can use the Session Traversal Utilities for NAT (STUN) [RFC5389] mechanism to figure out its public, reflexive transport address. The host sends a "Binding Request" message and uses the "XOR-MAPPED-ADDRESS" parameter that comes back in the response π
Other methods for finding more IP addresses MAY be used by the Device. If they're enabled, the Port Control Protocol (PCP) [RFC6887], Universal Plug and Play (UPnP) [UPnP-IGD-WANIPConnection1], and NAT Port Mapping Protocol (NAT-PMP) [RFC6886] can each tell you the external address of a residential gateway device. Proprietary methods for finding other addresses might be around too π But since there's no guarantee that any access network supports these methods, they aren't mandated. Also, heads up: in some cases, methods that look at the network from the residential gateway device could reveal an address in a private address range (see Section 4.6) β οΈ
A lot of the time, the IP address produced might come from a private address range. For example, the address on a local network interface could be from a private range that the residential gateway handed out. In other cases, methods that look at the network from the residential gateway device (UPnP, NAT-PMP) could reveal a private address if the access network also uses NAT. For a private IP address, the derived domain name only works where the DNS server being used has data for that private IP address range π§
4.2. Domain Name Selection π·οΈ
The domain name picked for each IP address is the name that would be used for a reverse DNS lookup. A domain name derived from an IP version 4 address lives in the .in-addr.arpa. tree and follows the construction rules in Section 3.5 of [RFC1035]. A domain name derived from an IP version 6 address lives in the .ip6.arpa. tree and follows the construction rules in Section 2.5 of [RFC3596] π§
4.3. Shortened DNS Names βοΈ
Extra domain names get added so a single DNS record can cover a bigger set of addresses. If the search on the domain derived from the full IP address doesn't turn up a NAPTR record with the desired service tag (e.g., "LIS:HELD"), a similar search is repeated using a shorter domain name, made from a part of the IP address:
- For IP version 4, the resulting domain name SHOULD be shortened successively by one and two labels, and the query repeated. This corresponds to a search on a /24 or /16 network prefix. This allows for fewer DNS records in the case where a single access network covering an entire /24 or /16 network is served by the same LIS.
- For IP version 6, the resulting domain SHOULD be shortened successively by 16, 18, 20, and 24 labels, and the query repeated. This corresponds to a search on a /64, /56, /48, or /32 network prefix.
This set of labels gives network operators some flexibility in where LIS discovery records can go, without blowing up the number of DNS names that get searched π§ It doesn't attach any other significance to these specific zone cuts, and it doesn't create a classful addressing hierarchy based on the reverse DNS tree. Not a thing π ββοΈ
For example, the IPv4 address "192.0.2.75" could result in queries to:
75.2.0.192.in-addr.arpa.2.0.192.in-addr.arpa.0.192.in-addr.arpa.
Similarly, the IPv6 address "2001:DB8::28e4:3a93:4429:dfb5" could result in queries to:
5.b.f.d.9.2.4.4.3.9.a.3.4.e.8.2.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.8.b.d.0.1.0.0.2.ip6.arpa.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.8.b.d.0.1.0.0.2.ip6.arpa.0.0.0.0.0.0.8.b.d.0.1.0.0.2.ip6.arpa.0.0.0.0.8.b.d.0.1.0.0.2.ip6.arpa.8.b.d.0.1.0.0.2.ip6.arpa.
The limited number of labels each name gets shortened by is there to keep the number of DNS queries Devices make in check. If no LIS turns up with this method, the result is that no more than five U-NAPTR resolutions get invoked for each IP address π
4.4. When To Use the Reverse DNS Method β°
The DHCP method described in [RFC5986] MUST be attempted on all local network interfaces before this method gets tried. This method is used either because DHCP is unavailable, because the DHCP server doesn't provide a value for the access network domain name option, or because a request to the resulting LIS gets a HELD "notLocatable" error or an equivalent π«Ά
4.5. Private Address Spaces π
Addresses from a private-use address space can be used as input to this method. In lots of cases, that means addresses defined in [RFC1918], though other address ranges could have limited reachability where this advice also applies. This only works if a DNS server with a view of the same address space is used. Public DNS servers can't provide useful records for private addresses π§
Using an address from a private space in discovery can give a more specific answer, as long as the DNS server has records for that space. Figure 2 shows a network setup where addresses from an ISP network could better point to the right LIS. Records in DNS B can be provided for the 10.0.0.0/8 range, which could split that range up so a more local LIS can be picked πΊοΈ
_____ ________
( DNS ).....(/ \) Public
(__A__) (( Internet )) Address
(\________/) Space
|
[NAT]
_____ _____|_____
( DNS )....(/ \) Private
(__B__) (( ISP Network )) Address Space
(\___________/) (e.g., 10.0.0.0/8)
|
[Gateway]
____|____
(/ \) Private
(( Residence )) Address Space
(\_________/) (e.g., 192.168.0.0/16)
Figure 2: Address Space Example
The goal of automatic DNS configuration is usually to pick a local DNS, and that suits setups like the one shown. But using a public DNS or STUN server means a public IP address is likely to turn up. For STUN in particular, picking a public server cuts down on the reconfiguration needed when a Device moves πββοΈ Adding records for the public address space an access network uses makes sure the discovery process succeeds when a public address is used π
4.6. Necessary Assumptions and Restrictions β¨
okay so when a Device uses this for LIS discovery, it's an UNSAF application, which means the limitations in Section 7 apply π«Ά
the IP address doesn't have to be unique to the Device. it just has to be somehow related to the Device or the access network that serves it. that gives you some wiggle room in how you pick the value π but security considerations (Section 6) might say the address needs to be verified so nobody can fake it π
this solution assumes the public, reflexive transport address a Device uses is somehow controlled by the access network provider or some other related party. which means that party can update the corresponding .in-addr.arpa. or .ip6.arpa. record to include a useful value for the LIS address πΈ
4.7. Failure Modes π
bestie, using private addresses only works if there's a DNS server that has records for the address space being used π using a public IP address makes that way more likely. this document relies on STUN to give the Device a public, reflexive transport address, and you NEED a STUN server configured for that to work reliably π₯
if a virtual private network (VPN) or another tunnel is in the mix, the entity giving out the public IP address might not be able to provide location information. it's assumed that this entity can spot the problem and tell the Device about it (using the "notLocatable" HELD error or something similar) π this is explained in more detail in [RFC5985].
4.8. Deployment Considerations π
an access network provider SHOULD provide NAPTR records for each public IP address used for Devices in the access network. lowkey the main move π
any DNS server inside a NAT SHOULD also include records for the private address range. those records might only be handed out to clients asking from inside that private range π§ this lets clients in the private range find a LIS based on their IP address before any address translation happens. in geographically spread-out networks using a private address range, that means different locations can use different LISes based on the IP range at each place πΊοΈ using a public, translated IP address can still work too, it just might pick a less ideal LIS β¨
a network that operates network address translation SHOULD provide NAPTR records that point to a LIS endpoint with a public address π¦ that needs an IP address and port reserved for the LIS. so requests going to the LIS from the private address space don't have to go through the NAT and get their source addresses mapped. networks can make that happen by giving a direct route to the LIS π£οΈ and clients doing discovery through public DNS or STUN servers are easier to trace based on source address info, so keep that in mind π
NAPTR records can be provided for individual IP addresses. but to stop a pile of identical records from multiplying, you can put a single record higher up the tree (that's /24 and /16 for IPv4, and /64, /56, /48, and /32 for IPv6) π a record higher in the tree (shorter prefix) applies to every address lower down (longer prefix), and records lower down override the ones above them. that's how you carve out exceptions π
5. Privacy Considerations π
bestie, geolocation info is serious business. it's SO important that steps are taken so location info doesn't end up with unauthorized parties π€ this mechanism is mostly about a device figuring out its own location so it can share that with apps. we assume a device learning its own location isn't a privacy risk. that leaves two remaining privacy risks: apps using geolocation, and people abusing the location configuration protocol π«£
the privacy stuff around apps using geolocation really depends on the app context π· a framework for location privacy in applications is in [RFC6280].
the mechanism here lets a device discover its local LIS, and then it gets its location through a Location Configuration Protocol (LCP) [RFC5687]. if an unauthorized third party can spoof the LCP to get a target's location info, then this mechanism could let them find the right server to attack for a given IP address π± so it's super important that a LIS meets the security requirements of the LCP it implements. for HELD, those requirements are laid out in Section 9 of [RFC5985] π
a Device that finds a LIS using the methods in this document MUST NOT give that LIS extra info that could reveal its position, like the location measurements described in [RFC7105], unless it has a secondary way to check the LIS is legit, like a white list π«π
6. Security Considerations π
the security considerations in [RFC5986] apply to the discovery process as a whole π‘οΈ the biggest worry is an attacker pretending to be a LIS. yikes π
a third party being able to find out who a LIS is doesn't add any new concerns, since a LIS's identity is considered public info π€·ββοΈ
this document also brings in new security considerations about identifying the IP address π an attacker could try to hand over a falsified IP address to mess with the rest of the process π
[RFC5389] describes attacks where an attacker makes sure a Device gets a falsified reflexive address π
ββοΈ an on-path attacker might be able to make sure a falsified address reaches the Device. even though STUN messages are protected by a MESSAGE-INTEGRITY attribute (an HMAC that uses a shared secret), an on-path attacker can still capture and modify packets, changing source and destination addresses to give falsified addresses π€
this could turn into a denial of service, or a way to deliver a deliberately misleading service π₯² notably, any LIS identified from a falsified IP address could still be a valid LIS for that IP address. it just wouldn't be useful for giving the Device location info π in that case, the LIS gives back a HELD "notLocatable" error or an equivalent. and if the falsified IP address is under the attacker's control, misleading (but verifiable) DNS records could point to a malicious LIS that gives false location info π
In all cases of falsification, the best remedy is to perform some form of independent verification of the result.
for real, that's the big takeaway π¨ no specific mechanism exists right now to stop attacks based on falsified reflexive addresses. it's suggested that Devices try to independently verify the reflexive transport address they get is accurate π an independent, trusted source of location info could help with verification, even if that source can't be as accurate as the LIS you discovered π«Ά
using private address space basically stops you from using the usual trust anchors for DNSSEC π΅βπ« only a DNS server that can see the same private address space can give useful records. a Device that relies on DNS records in the private address space portion of the .in-addr.arpa. or .ip6.arpa. trees MUST either use an alternative trust anchor for those records or rely on other means of making sure the DNS records are legit π
DNS queries that aren't blocked as [RFC6303] demands, or that go to servers outside the network, can expose the addresses in use inside the network to the outside world ποΈ for resolvers inside the network, implementing [RFC6303] avoids this issue. otherwise, the problem can't be avoided without blocking DNS queries to external servers π§
7. IAB Considerations π
the IAB has studied the problem of Unilateral Self-Address Fixing (UNSAF) [RFC3424]. that's the general process where a client tries to figure out its address in another realm on the other side of a NAT, using a collaborative protocol reflection mechanism like STUN πͺ
this section only applies to Devices using this method of LIS discovery. it doesn't apply to third-party LIS discovery π ββοΈ
the IAB requires that protocol specifications defining UNSAF mechanisms document a set of considerations. here they are, bestie π
- Precise definition of a specific, limited-scope problem that is to be solved with the UNSAF proposal. Section 3 describes the limited scope of the problem addressed in this document. π―
- Description of an exit strategy/transition plan. [RFC5986] describes behavior that residential gateways need in order for this short-term solution to become unnecessary. once implementations of the recommendations in LIS discovery are widely available, this UNSAF mechanism can be made obsolete π¦
- Discussion of specific issues that may render systems more "brittle". A description of the necessary assumptions and limitations of this solution is included in Section 4.6. Using STUN for discovery of a reflexive transport address is inherently brittle when there are multiple NATs or address realms π§± brittleness is added by the requirement to use a DNS server that can view the address realm containing the IP address in question. and if address realms use overlapping addressing space, there's a risk the DNS server gives info that isn't useful to the Device π¬
- Identify requirements for longer-term, sound technical solutions; contribute to the process of finding the right longer-term solution. a longer-term solution is already provided in [RFC5986]. but that solution relies on widespread deployment π the UNSAF solution here is an interim solution that enables LIS access for Devices that can't benefit from deployment of the recommendations in [RFC5986] yet π«Ά
- Discussion of the impact of the noted practical issues with existing deployed NATs and experience reports. the UNSAF mechanism depends on experience deploying STUN [RFC5389]. on the whole, existing residential gateway devices can reliably provide access to STUN and DNS service π₯° though you should pay attention to the size of the DNS response (see [RFC5625]) π
8. Acknowledgements π«Ά
Richard Barnes provided the text in Section 5. the goat πβ¨
9. References π
9.1. Normative References πβ¨
okay so these are the must-read docs, the ones the spec is literally built on π«Ά
[RFC1035] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, November 1987.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC3596] Thomson, S., Huitema, C., Ksinant, V., and M. Souissi, "DNS Extensions to Support IP Version 6", RFC 3596, October 2003.
[RFC5986] Thomson, M. and J. Winterbottom, "Discovering the Local Location Information Server (LIS)", RFC 5986, September 2010.
[RFC7105] Thomson, M. and J. Winterbottom, "Using Device-Provided Location-Related Measurements in Location Configuration Protocols", RFC 7105, January 2014.
9.2. Informative References π¦π
these ones are the extra reading, the bonus content that gives the whole vibe more context πΈ no cap, go explore
[RFC1918] Rekhter, Y., Moskowitz, R., Karrenberg, D., Groot, G., and E. Lear, "Address Allocation for Private Internets", BCP 5, RFC 1918, February 1996.
[RFC2131] Droms, R., "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol", RFC 2131, March 1997.
[RFC3315] Droms, R., Bound, J., Volz, B., Lemon, T., Perkins, C., and M. Carney, "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6)", RFC 3315, July 2003.
[RFC3424] Daigle, L. and IAB, "IAB Considerations for UNilateral Self-Address Fixing (UNSAF) Across Network Address Translation", RFC 3424, November 2002.
[RFC4848] Daigle, L., "Domain-Based Application Service Location Using URIs and the Dynamic Delegation Discovery Service (DDDS)", RFC 4848, April 2007.
[RFC5012] Schulzrinne, H. and R. Marshall, "Requirements for Emergency Context Resolution with Internet Technologies", RFC 5012, January 2008.
[RFC5389] Rosenberg, J., Mahy, R., Matthews, P., and D. Wing, "Session Traversal Utilities for NAT (STUN)", RFC 5389, October 2008.
[RFC5687] Tschofenig, H. and H. Schulzrinne, "GEOPRIV Layer 7 Location Configuration Protocol: Problem Statement and Requirements", RFC 5687, March 2010.
[RFC6280] Barnes, R., Lepinski, M., Cooper, A., Morris, J., Tschofenig, H., and H. Schulzrinne, "An Architecture for Location and Location Privacy in Internet Applications", BCP 160, RFC 6280, July 2011.
[RFC6303] Andrews, M., "Locally Served DNS Zones", BCP 163, RFC 6303, July 2011.
[RFC6887] Wing, D., Cheshire, S., Boucadair, M., Penno, R., and P. Selkirk, "Port Control Protocol (PCP)", RFC 6887, April 2013.
[UPnP-IGD-WANIPConnection1] UPnP Forum, "Internet Gateway Device (IGD) Standardized Device Control Protocol V 1.0: WANIPConnection:1 Service Template Version 1.01 For UPnP Version 1.0", DCP 05-001, Nov. 2001, <http://upnp.org/specs/gw/UPnP-gw-WANIPConnection-v1-Service.pdf>.
[RFC6886] Cheshire, S. and M. Krochmal, "NAT Port Mapping Protocol (NAT-PMP)", RFC 6886, April 2013.
[RFC5625] Bellis, R., "DNS Proxy Implementation Guidelines", BCP 152, RFC 5625, August 2009.
[RFC5985] Barnes, M., "HTTP-Enabled Location Delivery (HELD)", RFC 5985, September 2010.
Authors' Addresses β¨π
and here are the bestie authors who made all of this happen π₯Ήπ slay
Martin Thomson
Mozilla
Suite 300
650 Castro Street
Mountain View, CA 94041
US
EMail: martin.thomson@gmail.com
Ray Bellis
Nominet UK
Edmund Halley Road
Oxford OX4 4DQ
United Kingdom
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π¦ where this page comes from
- ietf: rfc7216 2014-04
- π girlified by claude-haiku-5-5 on : a language model's rewrite of the original, under its terms