RFC 7124

Ethernet in the First Mile Copper (EFMCu) Interfaces MIB

📅 published February 2014, from ietf

RFC 7124: Ethernet in the First Mile Copper (EFMCu) Interfaces MIB ✨

Okay bestie, let's get into this one 💖 It's the Ethernet in the First Mile Copper (EFMCu) Interfaces MIB, and it's a Standards Track doc by E. Beili of Actelis Networks, published February 2014 🎀. It updates RFC 5066 and doesn't obsolete anything. The ISSN is 2070-1721 if you're into that kind of thing 🙈

The whole point is that the EFM-CU-MIB module moved from the wrapped-up IETF Ethernet Interfaces and Hub MIB Working Group over to the IEEE 802.3 working group 🦋

Abstract

This doc updates RFC 5066 🌸 It tells the Internet community that the EFM-CU-MIB module has been handed off from the concluded IETF Ethernet Interfaces and Hub MIB Working Group to the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 802.3 working group, so everyone knows where the action is now 💅

Status of This Memo

This is an Internet Standards Track document 🔥

This doc is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) 💜 It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It went through public review and got approved for publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). For more on Internet Standards, check out Section 2 of RFC 5741 ✨

You can find the current status, any errata, and a place to send feedback at http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7124 🌈

Copyright Notice

This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) as they stand on the publication date. Please actually read these, because they spell out your rights and restrictions for this doc 🙏 Code Components pulled out of this document must include Simplified BSD License text, as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions, and they come without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License 💀

1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
2.  The Internet-Standard Management Framework  . . . . . . . . .   3
3.  Mapping between EFM-CU-MIB and IEEE8023-EFM-CU-MIB  . . . . .   3
4.  Updating the MIB Modules  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
6.  Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
7.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
  7.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
  7.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5

1. Introduction 🦋

Okay so, RFC 5066 [RFC5066] defines two MIB modules 💅

EFM-CU-MIB, which has a set of objects for managing 10PASS-TS and 2BASE-TL Ethernet in the First Mile Copper (EFMCu) interfaces 🌸
IF-CAP-STACK-MIB, which has a set of objects describing the cross-connect capability of a managed device with multi-layer (stacked) interfaces. It extends the stack management objects in the Interfaces Group MIB and the Inverted Stack Table MIB modules 🧚

Once the [HUBMIB] working group wrapped up, the job of maintaining and developing a MIB module for managing 2BASE-TL and 10PASS-TS interfaces got passed to the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 802.3 [IEEE802.3] working group 🎀 In 2011, the IEEE made the IEEE8023-EFM-CU-MIB module, based on the original EFM-CU-MIB module [RFC5066]. The current revision of IEEE8023-EFM-CU-MIB is defined in IEEE Std 802.3.1-2013 [IEEE802.3.1] ✨

The IEEE8023-EFM-CU-MIB and EFM-CU-MIB modules can coexist 🌈 Existing deployments of the EFM-CU-MIB don't need to be upgraded, but operators using the MIB should expect that new equipment will use the IEEE8023-EFM-CU-MIB 👑

Heads up: the IF-CAP-STACK-MIB module was NOT transferred to IEEE and is still as defined in RFC 5066 🙈 This memo adds an updated security considerations section for that module, because the original RFC didn't list any security considerations for IF-CAP-STACK-MIB 🫶

2. The Internet-Standard Management Framework 🌸

For a deep dive on the docs that describe the current Internet-Standard Management Framework, look at section 7 of RFC 3410 [RFC3410] 🤓

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119] 💜

3. Mapping between EFM-CU-MIB and IEEE8023-EFM-CU-MIB 🧚

The current version of IEEE8023-EFM-CU-MIB, defined in IEEE Std 802.3.1-2013, has a MODULE-IDENTITY of ieee8023efmCuMIB with an object identifier allocated under this sub-tree:

{ iso(1)
  iso-identified-organization(3) ieee(111)
  standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) lan-man-stds(802)
  ieee802dot3(3) ieee802dot3dot1mibs(1) }

The EFM-CU-MIB has a MODULE-IDENTITY of efmCuMIB with an object identifier allocated under the mib-2 sub-tree 🦋

The object names in the first version of IEEE8023-EFM-CU-MIB are identical to the ones in EFM-CU-MIB 💅 But since both MIB modules have different OID values, they can coexist, which means you can manage the newer IEEE MIB-based devices alongside the legacy IETF MIB-based ones 🎀

4. Updating the MIB Modules 🌈

Once the EFM-CU-MIB module's maintenance and development moved to the IEEE 802.3 working group, the EFM-CU-MIB defined in RFC 5066 became the last version of that MIB module 🔥

All future development of the EFM Copper Interfaces MIB will happen in the IEEE 802.3 working group, in the IEEE8023-EFM-CU-MIB module ✨ Requests and comments about the EFM Copper Interfaces MIB should go to the IEEE 802.3.1 task force, which is currently chartered with MIB development, through its mailing list [LIST802.3.1] 💌

The IF-CAP-STACK-MIB remains under IETF control and is currently maintained by the [OPSAWG] working group 👑

5. Security Considerations 💀

Okay this section is SERIOUS, bestie 😭 There are no managed objects defined in the IF-CAP-STACK-MIB module with a MAX-ACCESS clause of read-write and/or read-create. So if this MIB module is implemented correctly, there's no risk that an intruder can alter or create any management objects of this MIB module through direct SNMP SET operations 🔒

Some of the readable objects in this MIB module (meaning objects with a MAX-ACCESS other than not-accessible) may be considered sensitive or vulnerable in some network environments 🙈

In particular, ifCapStackStatus and ifInvCapStackStatus can identify the cross-connect capability of multi-layer (stacked) network interfaces, which could reveal the underlying hardware architecture of the managed device 😱

So it's really important to control even GET and/or NOTIFY access to these objects, and possibly even encrypt the values of these objects when they're sent over the network via SNMP 🔐

SNMP versions before SNMPv3 did not include adequate security. Even if the network itself is secure (for example, by using IPsec), there's no control over who on the secure network is allowed to access and GET/SET (read/change/create/delete) the objects in this MIB module 💀

Implementations SHOULD provide the security features described by the SNMPv3 framework (see [RFC3410]). Implementations claiming compliance to the SNMPv3 standard MUST include full support for authentication and privacy via the User-based Security Model (USM) [RFC3414] with the AES cipher algorithm [RFC3826]. Implementations MAY also provide support for the Transport Security Model (TSM) [RFC5591] in combination with a secure transport such as SSH [RFC5592] or TLS/DTLS [RFC6353] 🫶

Further, deploying SNMP versions prior to SNMPv3 is NOT RECOMMENDED. Instead, it is RECOMMENDED to deploy SNMPv3 and enable cryptographic security. It is then a customer/operator responsibility to make sure that the SNMP entity giving access to an instance of this MIB module is properly configured to give access to the objects only to those principals (users) who have legitimate rights to actually GET or SET (change/create/delete) them 🔐👑

6. Acknowledgments 🌸

This document was produced by the OPSAWG working group, whose efforts were advanced by contributions from the following people (in alphabetical order) 🎀

Dan Romascanu
David Harrington
Michael MacFaden
Tom Petch

This document updates RFC 5066, which was authored by Edward Beili of Actelis Networks and produced by the now-concluded HUBMIB working group 💖

7. References 📚

7.1. Normative References

[RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
           Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

[RFC3414]  Blumenthal, U. and B. Wijnen, "User-based Security Model
           (USM) for version 3 of the Simple Network Management
           Protocol (SNMPv3)", STD 62, RFC 3414, December 2002.

[RFC3826]  Blumenthal, U., Maino, F., and K. McCloghrie, "The
           Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Cipher Algorithm in the
           SNMP User-based Security Model", RFC 3826, June 2004.

[RFC5066]  Beili, E., "Ethernet in the First Mile Copper (EFMCu)
           Interfaces MIB", RFC 5066, November 2007.

7.2. Informative References

[HUBMIB]   IETF, "Ethernet Interfaces and Hub MIB (hubmib) Charter",
           <http://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/hubmib/charter/>.

[IEEE802.3.1]
           IEEE, "IEEE Standard for Management Information Base (MIB)
           Definitions for Ethernet", IEEE Std 802.3.1-2013, June
           2013, <http://standards.ieee.org/getieee802/download/
           802.3.1-2013.pdf>.

[IEEE802.3]
           IEEE, "802.3 Ethernet Working Group",
           <http://www.ieee802.org/3>.

[LIST802.3.1]
           IEEE, "802.3 MIB Email Reflector",
           <http://www.ieee802.org/3/be/reflector.html>.

[OPSAWG]   IETF, "Operations and Management Area Working Group
           (opsawg) Charter",
           <http://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/opsawg/charter/>.

[RFC3410]  Case, J., Mundy, R., Partain, D., and B. Stewart,
           "Introduction and Applicability Statements for Internet-
           Standard Management Framework", RFC 3410, December 2002.

[RFC5591]  Harrington, D. and W. Hardaker, "Transport Security Model
           for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)", RFC
           5591, June 2009.

[RFC5592]  Harrington, D., Salowey, J., and W. Hardaker, "Secure
           Shell Transport Model for the Simple Network Management
           Protocol (SNMP)", RFC 5592, June 2009.

[RFC6353]  Hardaker, W., "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Transport
           Model for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)",
           RFC 6353, July 2011.

Author's Address

Edward Beili
Actelis Networks
Bazel 25
Petach-Tikva  49103
Israel

Phone: +972-73-237-6852
EMail: edward.beili@actelis.com

📦 where this page comes from

ietf: rfc7124 2014-02
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