RFC 6908
Deployment Considerations for Dual-Stack Lite
Deployment Considerations for Dual-Stack Lite 🎀
Part 1 of 3 ✨
Okay bestie, this is RFC 6908 🦋 It's titled Deployment Considerations for Dual-Stack Lite, and it was published in March 2013. The authors are Y. Lee (Comcast), R. Maglione (Cisco Systems), C. Williams (MCSR Labs), C. Jacquenet, and M. Boucadair (France Telecom). It's an Informational RFC, so it's not a standards-track spec. It's real-world advice from people who actually ran these networks 💅 The ISSN is 2070-1721. The title block doesn't list any RFCs it obsoletes or updates, so it stands on its own 👑
Abstract ✨
This document is all about the deployment problems and requirements for running Dual-Stack Lite (DS-Lite) 🌸 It covers the different deployment considerations and where the DS-Lite architecture actually fits.
Status of This Memo 📜
This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification. It's published for informational purposes 💜
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It went through public review and was approved for publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Not every document the IESG approves is a candidate for any level of Internet Standard, so see Section 2 of RFC 5741 for the details 🧚
Info about this document's current status, any errata, and how to give feedback is at http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6908
Copyright Notice ©️
Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) as they stand on the date of publication. Please read these carefully, because they spell out your rights and restrictions for this document. Code Components pulled out of this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions, and they come without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License 🌈
Table of Contents 🗂️
1. Overview ........................................................3
2. AFTR Deployment Considerations ..................................3
2.1. Interface Consideration ....................................3
2.2. MTU and Fragmentation Considerations .......................4
2.3. Logging at the AFTR ........................................4
2.4. Blacklisting a Shared IPv4 Address .........................5
2.5. AFTR's Policies ............................................5
2.5.1. Outgoing Policy .....................................5
2.5.2. Incoming Policy .....................................6
2.6. AFTR Impacts on Accounting Process .........................6
2.7. Reliability Considerations of AFTR .........................7
2.8. Strategic Placement of AFTR ................................8
2.9. AFTR Considerations for Geographically Aware Services ......8
2.10. Impacts on QoS Policy .....................................9
2.11. Port Forwarding Considerations ............................9
2.12. DS-Lite Tunnel Security ..................................10
2.13. IPv6-Only Network Considerations .........................10
3. B4 Deployment Considerations ...................................10
3.1. DNS Deployment Considerations .............................11
3.2. IPv4 Service Monitoring ...................................11
3.2.1. B4 Remote Management ...............................11
3.2.2. IPv4 Connectivity Check ............................11
4. Security Considerations ........................................12
5. Acknowledgements ...............................................12
6. References .....................................................12
6.1. Normative References ......................................12
6.2. Informative References ....................................121. Overview 🌟
[RFC6333] defines DS-Lite, and it's a transition technique that lets operators share public IPv4 addresses while only giving users IPv6 🦋 It's designed so IPv4 services keep working while operators gradually move their networks over to IPv6. DS-Lite combines an IPv4-in-IPv6 softwire [RFC2473] with a Network Address Translator IPv4/IPv4 (NAT44) [RFC3022], so more than one user can share one public IPv4 address. It's giving clever teamwork 🫶
Appendix A of [RFC6333] explains how to deploy DS-Lite in specific scenarios. This document is different: it describes the problems you run into when deploying DS-Lite and the guidance for working through them. The info comes from real deployment experience, and it's all compiled into one comprehensive document. That way operators don't have to hunt through a pile of RFCs trying to figure out which sections apply to their DS-Lite deployment 💖
2. AFTR Deployment Considerations 🏠
2.1. Interface Consideration 🔌
The Address Family Transition Router (AFTR) is a network element deployed inside the operator's network. An AFTR can be a stand-alone device or be built into a router. It's the IPv4-in-IPv6 tunnel termination point and the NAT44 device 💅 It sits at the IPv4-IPv6 network border, where the tunnel interface is IPv6 and the external NAT44 interface is IPv4. The Basic Bridging BroadBand (B4) element [RFC6333] is a function on a dual-stack-capable node (a host device or a home gateway) that creates a tunnel to an AFTR 🧚 An operator can set up both softwire tunnel termination and the NAT44 interface on a single physical interface, though they should still be kept logically separated. There are scenarios where we recommend two individual interfaces instead (one dedicated to IPv4 and one dedicated to IPv6) so the functions stay segregated 🎀
- The access network between the B4 and the AFTR is an IPv6-only network, and the network between the AFTR and the IPv4 network is an IPv4-only network. In this scenario, the AFTR's interface to the IPv6-only network and its interface to the IPv4 network should use two physical interfaces on the AFTR 🌸
- Operators may use Operations Support System (OSS) tools (for example, Multi Router Traffic Grapher) to collect interface data packet count info. If an operator wants to separate the softwire function and the NAT44 function onto different physical interfaces to collect packet counts, and the AFTR doesn't support packet count for logical interfaces, they should use two physical interfaces on the AFTR 📊
2.2. MTU and Fragmentation Considerations 📦
DS-Lite is part tunneling protocol, and tunneling adds overhead to the packet, which shrinks the effective MTU after encapsulation 😭 Users may run into problems with apps, like not being able to load Internet pages or transfer big files.
Fragmentation and reassembly aren't optimal, so the operator should do everything possible to get rid of the need for them 💀 If the operator uses the simple IPv4-in-IPv6 softwire [RFC2473], it's recommended that the MTU size of the IPv6 network between the B4 and the AFTR accounts for the additional 40 bytes of overhead. If the access network MTU is fixed and can't be changed, the operator should be aware that the B4 and the AFTR must support fragmentation as defined in [RFC6333]. The operator should also know that reassembly at the Tunnel Exit-Point is resource intensive, since a large number of B4s may terminate on the same AFTR. Scalability of the AFTR is advised in this scenario 🚀
2.3. Logging at the AFTR 📝
A source-specific log is essential for backtracking specific hosts when there's a problem with one of the AFTR's NAT-ed addresses 🔍 The source-specific log contains the B4 IPv6 source address, the transport protocol, the source port, and the source IPv4 address after it has been NAT-ed. With it, operators can uniquely identify a specific host when a DS-Lite host has trouble reaching the IPv4 network 🫶 To maximize the IPv4 shared ratio, an operator may configure a short timeout value for NAT44 entries. That results in a large number of logs created by the AFTR. Operators who want to aggregate the logs can configure the AFTR to preallocate a range of ports to each B4. That range will be used in the NAT44 function, and the AFTR will create one log entry for the whole port range. This aggregation can significantly reduce the log size for source-specific logging ✨
Some operators may need to log both source and destination info for a host's connections. This is called a destination-specific log 🧾 It contains the B4's IPv6 address, the transport protocol, the source port, the source IPv4 address after it has been NAT-ed, the destination port, and the destination IPv4 address. A destination-specific log is session-based, so operators should know they won't be able to aggregate log entries. Because of the huge number of log entries the AFTR can create, the operator must be careful here. Some AFTR implementations may keep logs in main memory, which can be CPU and memory intensive. Operators should configure the AFTR to periodically send logs to a storage facility and then purge them from the AFTR 🧹
2.4. Blacklisting a Shared IPv4 Address 🚫
The AFTR is a NAT device, and it lets multiple B4s share a single public IPv4 address. [RFC6269] discusses some considerations when sharing an IPv4 address 💜 When a public IPv4 address gets blacklisted by a remote peer, multiple users or hosts can be affected. Operators deploying DS-Lite should know that Internet hosts may not realize a single IPv4 address is actually shared by multiple B4s. A content provider might block services for a shared IPv4 address, which then impacts every B4 sharing that address. The operator would likely get calls about a service outage and would then need to take appropriate corrective actions 📞 [RFC6302] describes the information needed to identify a user or host in a shared address environment. It's also worth mentioning that [NAT-REVEAL] analyses different approaches to identifying a user or host in a shared address environment 🕵️♀️
2.5. AFTR's Policies 📋
There are two types of AFTR policies:
- Outgoing Policies apply to packets originating from a B4 going to the AFTR. These policies should be provisioned on the AFTR's IPv6 interface that's connected to the B4s 🌷
- Incoming Policies apply to packets originating from IPv4 networks going to B4s. These policies should be provisioned on the IPv4 interface connected to the IPv4 network 🌙
2.5.1. Outgoing Policy
okay so Outgoing Policies can include Access Control List (ACL) and Quality of Service (QoS) settings 💅 these policies control the packets going from B4s to the AFTR 🫶 for example, the operator can set the AFTR to only accept B4 connections that came from specific IPv6 prefixes configured in the AFTR 🎀 we'll get into this use case more in Section 2.12 ✨ an operator can also tell the AFTR to give priority to packets marked with certain Differentiated Services Code Point (DSCP) values [RFC2475] 🔥 and an AFTR can apply an Outgoing Policy to limit the rate of port allocation for a single B4's IPv6 address 🦋
some operators offer different service level agreements (SLAs) so users get what they need 🌸 some users want more ports, and some want different service priority 👑 in this scenario, the operator can set Outgoing Policies for a user's B4, or for a group of B4s sharing the same policies 💖
2.5.2. Incoming Policy
similar to the Outgoing Policy, an Incoming Policy can also include ACL and QoS settings 🧚 the Outgoing Policy controls packets coming from the IPv4 network to the B4s 💀 incoming packets are normally treated equally, so these policies are applied globally 🌈 for example, an operator wants to use a predefined DSCP value to signal the IPv6 access network to apply certain traffic policies ✨ in that case, the operator can configure the AFTR to mark incoming packets with the predefined DSCP value 🫶 this policy applies to all incoming packets from the IPv4 network 🙌
2.6. AFTR Impacts on Accounting Process
this section is all about IPv4 and IPv6 traffic accounting in the DS-Lite environment 🧾 in a typical broadband setup (think DSL or Cable), the B4 lives inside a Residential Gateway 🏠 the edge router for the B4s in the provider's network is an IPv6 edge router 🛜 that edge router is usually in charge of IPv6 accounting and user management stuff like authentication, authorization, and accounting (AAA) 😤 but here's the twist: IPv4 traffic gets encapsulated in an IPv6 packet at the B4 and only decapsulated at the AFTR 😭 so the edge router needs extra functionality to link IPv4 accounting info to the B4 IPv6 address 🙈 if DS-Lite is the only thing using the IPv4-in-IPv6 protocol in the IPv6 access network, the operator can set the edge router to check the Next Header field in the IPv6 header, identify the protocol type (that's 0x04), and collect IPv4 accounting info 💅
alternatively, the AFTR may do the IPv4 accounting itself 🤔 but operators need to know this brings some challenges, especially in DSL deployments 🙃 in DSL, the AAA transaction usually happens between the edge router (aka the Broadband Network Gateway) and the AAA server 📡 [RFC6333] does not require the AFTR to interact with the AAA server or the edge router 🙅 so the AFTR might not have the AAA parameters (like Account Session ID) tied to B4s to generate an IPv4 accounting record 💀 IPv4 traffic accounting at the AFTR is not recommended when the AAA parameters needed for complete IPv4 accounting records aren't available 🚫 the accounting process at the AFTR is only necessary if the operator needs to separate per-B4 accounting records for IPv4 and IPv6 traffic 🍓 if the per-B4 IPv6 accounting records collected by the edge router are enough, then the extra complexity of enabling IPv4 accounting at the AFTR isn't needed 🧠 and it's important to notice that since IPv4 traffic is encapsulated in IPv6 packets, the data the edge router collects for IPv6 traffic already contains the total amount of traffic (IPv4 and IPv6) 🫶
even if detailed IPv4 accounting records aren't required, it can be useful for an operator, in some scenarios, to have info that the edge router generates for IPv6 traffic 🧚 this info can identify which AFTR is handling the IPv4 traffic for that B4 ✨ you can get there by adding extra info to the IPv6 accounting records 🎀 for example, operators can use RADIUS attribute information specified in [RFC6519] or a new attribute to be specified in Internet Protocol Detailed Record (IPDR) 👑
2.7. Reliability Considerations of AFTR
for robustness, reliability, and load distribution, operators may deploy multiple AFTRs 🌈 in that case, the IPv6 prefixes and the algorithm for building the tunneling mechanisms configured on each AFTR will be the same 🫶 [RFC6333], Appendix A.3 mentions that High Availability (HA) is the operator's responsibility 🙌 since DS-Lite is a stateful mechanism, all requirements for load-balancing and failover mechanisms apply 🔥 there are lots of ways to do HA in a stateful mechanism, but the most common are Cold Standby mode and Hot Standby mode 💅 more on deploying these two modes for NAT can be found in [NAT-STANDBY] 📚
in Cold Standby mode, the AFTR states aren't replicated from the Primary AFTR to the Backup AFTR 🥶 when the Primary AFTR fails, all the existing established sessions get flushed out 😭 the internal hosts are required to reestablish sessions with the external hosts 💔 in Hot Standby mode, session states are replicated on-the-fly from the Primary AFTR to the Backup AFTR ⚡ when the Primary AFTR fails, the Backup AFTR takes over all the existing established sessions 🙌 and in this mode, the internal hosts are not required to reestablish sessions with the external hosts 🥹
for operators, picking Cold Standby or Hot Standby depends on the trade-off between capital cost and operational cost 💸 Cold Standby doesn't need a Backup Standby AFTR to synchronize session states 🧼 that keeps the operational model simple ✨ when the Primary AFTR goes down, any AFTR with extra capacity can take over 🦋 Hot Standby gives users a smoother failover experience 🌸 the cost for operators is more careful failover planning 🧠 for most deployment scenarios, we believe Cold Standby mode should be sufficient enough and is thus recommended 💖
2.8. Strategic Placement of AFTR
in the DS-Lite environment, the AFTR is the logical next-hop router for B4s to reach the IPv4 network 🗺️ so where you put the AFTR affects traffic flows in the access network and the overall network design 🧩 generally there are two placement models 🎀 Model One puts the AFTR at the edge of the network to cover a small region 🏡 Model Two puts it at the core of the network to cover a large region 🌍
when an operator considers where to deploy the AFTR, they have to make trade-offs 🤹 the AFTR in Model One serves fewer B4s, so it needs a less powerful AFTR 💪 traffic flows are also more evenly distributed across the AFTRs ⚖️ but you need more AFTRs to cover the whole network, and operation cost usually goes up proportionally with the amount of network equipment 💸
the AFTR in Model Two covers a bigger area, so it serves more B4s 🌊 the operator could deploy just a few AFTRs for the whole user base 🙌 however, this model needs a more powerful AFTR to sustain the load at peak hours 🏋️ and since the AFTR would support B4s from different regions, it'd be deployed closer to the core network 🛰️
the DS-Lite framework can be incrementally deployed 🌱 an operator may consider starting with Model Two 💜 when demand increases, the operator can push the AFTR closer to the edge, which effectively becomes Model One 🚀
2.9. AFTR Considerations for Geographically Aware Services
by centralizing public IPv4 addresses in the AFTR, remote services can no longer rely on an IPv4 address and IPv4 routing info to figure out a host's geographical location 🗺️ for example, the IPv6 access network and the AFTR may be in two different cities 🏙️ if remote services rely on the IPv4 address to locate a host, they may think the host is in a different city 🙃 [RFC6269] Section 7 describes the problem in more detail 📖 applications could explicitly ask users to enter location info, like a postal code or telephone number, before offering geographical service 📍 on the other hand, applications could use HTTP-Enabled Location Delivery (HELD) [RFC5985] to get the location info from the Location Information Server and hand it to the remote peer 🛰️ [RFC6280] describes an architecture to enable location-based services 🧭 but to mitigate the impact, we recommend that operators deploy the AFTR as close to B4s as possible 🫶
2.10. Impacts on QoS Policy
this section describes the application of [RFC2983] to the DS-Lite deployment model ⭐ operators must make sure the QoS policy in place operates properly within the DS-Lite deployment 🎀 operators commonly use DSCP [RFC2475] to classify and prioritize different types of traffic in their networks 🚦 a DS-Lite tunnel can be seen as a particular case of the uniform conceptual tunnel model, as described in Section 3.1 of [RFC2983] 💅 the uniform model views an IP tunnel only as a necessary mechanism to forward traffic to its destination, so the tunnel has no significant impact on traffic conditioning 🦋 in this model, any packet has exactly one DSCP field used for traffic conditioning at any point, and it's the field in the outermost IP header 🧁 in the DS-Lite model, that's the Traffic Class field in the IPv6 header 🎀 according to [RFC2983], implementations of this model copy the DSCP value to the outer IP header at encapsulation, and copy the outer header's DSCP value to the inner IP header at decapsulation 🔁
operators should use this model by provisioning the network so that the AFTR copies the DSCP value in the IPv4 header to the Traffic Class field in the IPv6 header, after the encapsulation for downstream traffic 🌊 similarly, the B4 copies the DSCP value in the IPv4 header to the Traffic Class field in the IPv6 header, after the encapsulation for upstream traffic ⬆️ traffic identification and classification can be done by examining the outer IPv6 header in the IPv6 access network 🔍
2.11. Port Forwarding Considerations ✨
okay bestie, so some apps behind the B4 need to accept incoming requests 👀. If a remote app wants to talk to the app behind the B4, it has to know BOTH the NAT-ed IPv4 address the B4 uses AND the IPv4 destination port 🎯. Some apps use Universal Plug and Play (UPnP) (think popular gaming consoles 🎮) or Interactive Community Establishment (ICE) [RFC5245] to ask for incoming ports. Others rely on an Application Level Gateway (ALG) or manual port config to reserve a port in the NAT.
For the DS-Lite deployment scenario where the B4 doesn't own a full IPv4 address, the operator is the one who manages port-forwarding in the serving AFTR 💅. Operators may use Port Control Protocol (PCP) [PCP-BASE] as guidance to provide port forwarding service. Operators will deploy PCP client in the B4s. PCP permits the PCP server to be deployed in a stand-alone server. BUT, we recommend that operators consider deploying the PCP server in the AFTR. This eases the overhead of designing a global configuration for the PCP server across many AFTRs, because each PCP server is dedicated to its collocated AFTR 🧚.
When you're sharing an IPv4 address, not all of the ports are available to a B4 🙈. Some restricted ports (i.e., 0-1023) are well known, like TCP port 25 and 80. Lots of users may want to be provisioned with the restricted ports. For fairness, we recommend that operators configure the AFTR and not allocate the restricted ports to regular DS-Lite B4s. This operation model makes sure DS-Lite B4s have uniform configuration, which can simplify provisioning and operation 🫶. For users who want the restricted ports, operators can consider provisioning a full IPv4 address to those users' B4s. If an operator still wants to provision restricted ports to specific B4s, it may require implementing a static B4's configuration in the AFTR to match the B4's IPv6 address to the NAT rules. Alternatively, the B4 may dynamically allocate the ports, and the AFTR authenticates the session's request using PCP [PCP-BASE].
2.12. DS-Lite Tunnel Security 🔐
[RFC6333], Section 11 describes security issues associated with the DS-Lite mechanism 😬. To restrict the service offered by the AFTR to registered B4s only, an operator can implement the Outgoing Policy on the AFTR's tunnel interface so it only accepts the IPv6 prefixes defined in the policy. For static provisioning, the operator will need to know in advance the IPv6 prefixes provisioned to the B4s for the softwire in order to configure the policy. To keep things simple, operators should configure the AFTRs in the same region with the same IPv6 prefixes' Outgoing Policy. The AFTRs will accept both regular connections and failover connections from the B4s in the same service region 💖.
2.13. IPv6-Only Network Considerations 🌸
In environments where the operator wants to deploy the AFTR in an IPv6-only network, the AFTR nodes may not have direct IPv4 connectivity. In this scenario, the operator extends the IPv6-only boundary to the border of the network, and only the border routers have IPv4 connectivity. For both scalability and performance purposes, the AFTR is located in the IPv6-only network, closer to B4s. In this scenario the AFTR has only IPv6 connectivity and must be able to send and receive IPv4 packets. Enhancements to the DS-Lite AFTR are required to achieve this. [DS-LITE] describes such issues and enhancements to DS-Lite in IPv6-only deployments 🧠.
3. B4 Deployment Considerations 🎀
In order to configure the IPv4-in-IPv6 tunnel, the B4 needs the IPv6 address of the AFTR. This IPv6 address can be configured using a variety of methods, ranging from an out-of-band mechanism and manual configuration to a DHCPv6 option and RADIUS. If an operator uses DHCPv6 to provision the B4, the B4 must implement the DHCPv6 option defined in [RFC6334]. If an operator uses RADIUS to provision the B4, the B4 must implement [RFC6519].
3.1. DNS Deployment Considerations 📡
[RFC6333] recommends that the B4 send DNS queries to an external recursive resolver over IPv6. The B4 should implement a proxy resolver that will proxy a DNS query from IPv4 transport to the DNS server in the IPv6 network. [RFC6333] does not describe the DNS proxy behavior. In deployment, the operator must ensure that the DNS proxy implementation follows [RFC5625]. This is especially important for operators who have deployed, or will consider deploying, DNSSEC [RFC4035] 🔑.
Some operators may want to give hosts behind the B4 an IPv4 address of an external DNS recursive resolver. The B4 will treat the DNS packets as normal IP packets and forward them over the softwire. Note that there is no effective way to provision an IPv4 DNS address to the B4 over IPv6. Operators who use this DNS deployment model must be aware that how to provision an IPv4 DNS address over an IPv6 network is undefined, so it adds extra complexity to B4 provisioning 😭. Moreover, this increases the load on the AFTR by creating entries in the NAT table for DNS sessions. Operators may deploy a local DNS caching resolver in the AFTR to reduce the load on the NAT table. Nonetheless, this DNS model is not covered in [RFC6333] and is not recommended 🙅♀️.
3.2. IPv4 Service Monitoring 👀
3.2.1. B4 Remote Management 🛠️
B4 is connected to the IPv6 access network to offer IPv4 services. When users experience IPv4 connectivity issues, operators must be able to remotely access (e.g., TR-069) the B4 to verify its configuration and status. Operators should access B4s using native IPv6. Operators should not access B4 over the softwire.
3.2.2. IPv4 Connectivity Check 🏓
The DS-Lite framework provides IPv4 services over the IPv6 access network. Operators and users must be able to check the IPv4 connectivity from the B4 to its AFTR using ping and IPv4 traceroute. The AFTR should be configured with an IPv4 address to enable a PING test and a Traceroute test. Operators should assign the same IPv4 address (e.g., 192.0.0.2/32 [RFC6333]) to all AFTRs. IANA has allocated the 192.0.0.0/29 network prefix to provide IPv4 addresses for this purpose [RFC6333] 🦋.
4. Security Considerations 🚨
This document does not present any new security issues. [RFC6333] discusses DS-Lite related security issues. Go read it, it's serious stuff, periodt 💀.
5. Acknowledgements 🫶
Thanks to Mr. Nejc Skoberne and Dr. Maoke Chen for their thorough review and helpful comments 💜. We also want to thank Mr. Hu Jie for sharing his DS-Lite deployment experience with us. He gave us recommendations on what his company learned while testing DS-Lite in the production network 🙌.
6. References 📚
6.1. Normative References
[RFC6333] Durand, A., Droms, R., Woodyatt, J., and Y. Lee,
"Dual-Stack Lite Broadband Deployments Following IPv4
Exhaustion", RFC 6333, August 2011.
[RFC6334] Hankins, D. and T. Mrugalski, "Dynamic Host
Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6) Option for
Dual-Stack Lite", RFC 6334, August 2011.
[RFC6519] Maglione, R. and A. Durand, "RADIUS Extensions for
Dual-Stack Lite", RFC 6519, February 2012.6.2. Informative References
[DS-LITE] Boucadair, M., Jacquenet, C., Grimault, J., Kassi-
Lahlou, M., Levis, P., Cheng, D., and Y. Lee,
"Deploying Dual-Stack Lite in IPv6 Network", Work in
Progress, April 2011.
[NAT-REVEAL] Boucadair, M., Touch, J., Levis, P., and R. Penno,
"Analysis of Solution Candidates to Reveal a Host
Identifier (HOST_ID) in Shared Address Deployments",
Work in Progress, March 2013.
[NAT-STANDBY] Xu, X., Boucadair, M., Lee, Y., and G. Chen,
"Redundancy Requirements and Framework for Stateful
Network Address Translators (NAT)", Work in Progress,
October 2010.
[PCP-BASE] Wing, D., Cheshire, S., Boucadair, M., Penno, R., and
P. Selkirk, "Port Control Protocol (PCP)", Work in
Progress, November 2012.
[RFC2473] Conta, A. and S. Deering, "Generic Packet Tunneling in
IPv6 Specification", RFC 2473, December 1998.
[RFC2475] Blake, S., Black, D., Carlson, M., Davies, E., Wang,
Z., and W. Weiss, "An Architecture for Differentiated
Services", RFC 2475, December 1998.
[RFC2983] Black, D., "Differentiated Services and Tunnels",
RFC 2983, October 2000.
[RFC3022] Srisuresh, P. and K. Egevang, "Traditional IP Network
Address Translator (Traditional NAT)", RFC 3022,
January 2001.
[RFC4035] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and
S. Rose, "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security
Extensions", RFC 4035, March 2005.
[RFC5245] Rosenberg, J., "Interactive Connectivity Establishment
(ICE): A Protocol for Network Address Translator (NAT)
Traversal for Offer/Answer Protocols", RFC 5245,
April 2010.
[RFC5625] Bellis, R., "DNS Proxy Implementation Guidelines",
BCP 152, RFC 5625, August 2009.
[RFC5985] Barnes, M., "HTTP-Enabled Location Delivery (HELD)",
RFC 5985, September 2010.
[RFC6269] Ford, M., Boucadair, M., Durand, A., Levis, P., and P.
Roberts, "Issues with IP Address Sharing", RFC 6269,
June 2011.
[RFC6280] Barnes, R., Lepinski, M., Cooper, A., Morris, J.,
Tschofenig, H., and H. Schulzrinne, "An Architecture
for Location and Location Privacy in Internet
Applications", BCP 160, RFC 6280, July 2011.
[RFC6302] Durand, A., Gashinsky, I., Lee, D., and S. Sheppard,
"Logging Recommendations for Internet-Facing Servers",
BCP 162, RFC 6302, June 2011.Authors' Addresses 💌
Yiu L. Lee
Comcast
One Comcast Center
Philadelphia, PA 19103
U.S.A.
EMail: yiu_lee@cable.comcast.com
URI: http://www.comcast.com
Roberta Maglione
Cisco Systems
181 Bay Street
Toronto, ON M5J 2T3
Canada
EMail: robmgl@cisco.com
Carl Williams
MCSR Labs
U.S.A.
EMail: carlw@mcsr-labs.org
Christian Jacquenet
France Telecom
Rennes
France
EMail: christian.jacquenet@orange.com
Mohamed Boucadair
France Telecom
Rennes
France
EMail: mohamed.boucadair@orange.com📦 where this page comes from
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