RFC 6889

Analysis of Stateful 64 Translation

πŸ“… published April 2013, from ietf

Analysis of Stateful 64 Translation πŸ’–

RFC 6889 πŸŽ€ Β· Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)

okay bestie, here's the title block tea β˜• It's an Informational doc (category: Informational, not a Standards Track thing πŸ¦‹), published by the IETF in April 2013. The ISSN is 2070-1721. The authors are R. Penno, T. Saxena, and S. Sivakumar from Cisco Systems, plus M. Boucadair from France Telecom. The header doesn't list anything it obsoletes or updates, so I'm not making that up for you πŸ™ˆ


Abstract 🌸

okay so NAT-PT got deprecated by the IETF because of some specific problems 😭 Since then, people have been cooking up new ways to do IPv6-IPv4 translation. This doc checks how well those new stateful translation mechanisms dodge the problems that got NAT-PT cancelled πŸ’…

Status of This Memo πŸ“œ

This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is published for informational purposes.

This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has received public review and has been approved for publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Not all documents approved by the IESG are a candidate for any level of Internet Standard; see Section 2 of RFC 5741.

Information about the current status of this document, any errata, and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6889.

Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.

This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents πŸ—ΊοΈ

1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  2
  1.1.  Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  2
  1.2.  Context  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
  1.3.  Scope  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
2.  Analysis of 64 Translation against Concerns of RFC 4966  . . .  4
  2.1.  Problems Impossible to Solve . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
  2.2.  Problems That Can Be Solved  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
  2.3.  Problems Solved  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
3.  Conclusions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
4.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6.  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
  6.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
  6.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

1. Introduction ✨

1.1. Definition πŸ“–

okay so this doc uses stateful 64 (or just 64 for short) to mean the stuff defined in these documents:

  • IP/ICMP Translation Algorithm [RFC6145]
  • Stateful NAT64: Network Address and Protocol Translation from IPv6 Clients to IPv4 Servers [RFC6146]
  • DNS64: DNS Extensions for Network Address Translation from IPv6 Clients to IPv4 Servers [RFC6147]
  • IPv6 Addressing of IPv4/IPv6 Translators [RFC6052]
  • Framework for IPv4/IPv6 Translation [RFC6144]

1.2. Context 🌈

stateful 64 is kinda the main vibe for letting IPv6-only networks and IPv4-only networks talk to each other 🫢 One of its building blocks is splitting the DNS job away from the actual protocol translation. Pragmatic, honestly iconic.

This works because NAT handling doesn't depend on any particular DNS implementation. As long as something (like DNS64 [RFC6147] or some other means) can build an IPv6-embedded IPv4 address out of a preconfigured IPv6 prefix, an IPv4 address, and a suffix (see [RFC6052]), NAT64 is good to go πŸ’…

stateful 64 is all about deployment, not the nitty-gritty implementation details πŸ™ˆ As long as a NAT64 box behaves the way the deployment scenario expects, the details don't matter that much. Here's what [RFC6146] says about it:

A NAT64 MAY perform the steps in a different order, or MAY perform different steps, but the externally visible outcome MUST be the same as the one described in this document.

1.3. Scope 🎯

This doc analyzes how the proposed set of documents for stateful IPv6-only to IPv4-only translation hold up against the issues raised in [RFC4966]. They're meant to replace Network Address Translation - Protocol Translation (NAT-PT) [RFC2766].

quick reminder: the analysis is limited, because hosts on IPv6 networks can start a conversation with the IPv4 network/Internet, but not the other way around πŸ₯Ί This matches Scenarios 1 and 5 from [RFC6144]. So the scenario where servers move to IPv6 while clients stay IPv4 is still unaddressed. IPv6-to-IPv4 communication can still work if static or explicit bindings (e.g., [RFC6887]) are configured on the stateful NAT64.

stateful 64, like any other technique still being built, has some pros and some cons πŸ“ The ups and downs need to be clearly understood as it keeps developing.

The scope of this document does not include stateless translation.

2. Analysis of 64 Translation against Concerns of RFC 4966 πŸ”

okay so of all the problems called out in [RFC4966], stateful 64 fixes some of them and leaves others hanging πŸ’€

A few of the issues in [RFC4966] were solved by [RFC4787], [RFC5382], and [RFC5508]. When NAT-PT was published, those recs weren't around yet, but they're orthogonal to the translation algorithm itself, so NAT-PT could have used them too. NAT64 [RFC6146] explicitly says these recs need to be followed, so they count as part of a complete spec ✨

Also, stateful 64's scope is smaller than NAT-PT's. Here's the point-by-point breakdown. This doc sorts the issues from [RFC4966] into three buckets:

  1. Problems impossible to solve.
  2. Problems that can be solved.
  3. Problems solved.

2.1. Problems Impossible to Solve 😭

These are the problems from [RFC4966] that are impossible to solve:

  1. Inability to redirect traffic for protocols that lack de-multiplexing capabilities or are not built on top of specific transport-layer protocols for transport address translations (Section 2.2 of [RFC4966]).

Analysis: This issue is not specific to 64 but to all NAT-based solutions.

  1. Loss of information due to incompatible semantics between IPv4 and IPv6 versions of headers and protocols (Section 2.4 of [RFC4966]).

Analysis: This issue is not specific to 64 but is due to the design of IPv4 and IPv6.

  1. Need for the NAT64-capable device to act as proxy for correspondent node when IPv6 node is mobile, with consequent restrictions on mobility (Section 2.7 of [RFC4966]).

Analysis: This is not specific to NAT64 but to all NAT flavors. Refer to [NAT64-HARMFUL] for an early analysis on mobility complications encountered when NAT64 is involved.

2.2. Problems That Can Be Solved ✨

Okay bestie, these are the problems from [RFC4966] that can actually be solved πŸŽ€:

  1. Disruption of all protocols that embed IP addresses (and/or ports) in packet payloads or apply integrity mechanisms using IP addresses (and ports) (Section 2.1 of [RFC4966]).

Analysis: For FTP [RFC0959], this can be mitigated in a few ways. You can use an FTP64 Application Layer Gateway (ALG) [RFC6384] or put the fix in the FTP client (e.g., [FTP64]) 🧚

For SIP [RFC3261], 64 doesn't cause any specific issue, no cap πŸ™Œ The same NAT traversal techniques work when a NAT64 is in the path, like Interactive Connectivity Establishment (ICE) [RFC5245], maintaining SIP-related NAT bindings as per Section 3.4 of [RFC5853], media latching [MIDDLEBOXES], embedded SIP ALGs, etc. [RFC6157] gives more discussion on how to set up SIP sessions between IPv4 and IPv6 SIP user agents πŸ“ž

The functioning of other protocols is left for future study πŸ‘€ Also, traversal of NAT64 by applications that embed IP address literals isn't specific to NAT64. It's generic to all NAT-based solutions πŸ¦‹

  1. Interaction with Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) [RFC4960] and multihoming (Section 2.6 of [RFC4966]).

Analysis: Only TCP and UDP transport protocols are within the scope of NAT64 [RFC6146]. SCTP is out of scope of this document πŸ™ˆ

  1. Inability to handle multicast traffic (Section 2.8 of [RFC4966]).

Analysis: This problem is not addressed by the current 64 specifications 😭

  1. Scalability concerns together with introduction of a single point of failure and a security attack nexus (Section 3.2 of [RFC4966]).

Analysis: This isn't specific to NAT64. It applies to all stateful NAT flavors πŸ’… Whether there's a single point of failure depends on the deployment. Some service providers may deploy state synchronization means, while others may only rely on a distributed NAT64 model 🌸

  1. Restricted validity of translated DNS records: a translated record may be forwarded to an application that cannot use it (Section 4.2 of [RFC4966]).

Analysis: If a node on the IPv4 side forwards the address of the other endpoint to a node that cannot reach the NAT box, or isn't covered under the endpoint-independent constraint of NAT, then that new node won't be able to start a successful session πŸ’€

Actually, this isn't a limitation of 64 (or even NAT-PT). It's a deployment context where the IPv4 addresses managed by the NAT64 aren't globally reachable ✨ The same limitation can show up when referrals (even without any NAT in the path) include reachability information with limited reachability scope. See [REFERRAL] for more discussion about issues related to reachability scope πŸ”₯

  1. IPsec traffic using AH (Authentication Header) [RFC4302] in both transport and tunnel modes cannot be carried through NAT-PT without terminating the security associations on the NAT-PT. That's because AH's cryptographic integrity protection covers IP header fields [RFC3715] (Section 2.1 of [RFC4966]). In addition, IPsec traffic using ESP (Encapsulating Security Payload) [RFC4303] in transport mode generally uses UDP encapsulation [RFC3948] for NAT traversal (including NAT-PT traversal) to avoid the problems described in [RFC3715] (Section 2.1 of [RFC4966]) πŸ”

Analysis: This isn't specific to NAT64. It's an issue for all NAT flavors 🫢

  1. Address selection issues when either the internal or external hosts implement both IPv4 and IPv6 (Section 4.1 of [RFC4966]).

Analysis: This is out of scope of 64, since Scenarios 1 and 5 of [RFC6144] assume IPv6-only hosts πŸ™…β€β™€οΈ

So this issue isn't resolved, and mitigation techniques outside the 64 need to be used (e.g., [ADDR-SELECT]). These techniques may let you offload NAT64 resources and prefer native communications that don't involve address family translation πŸ¦‹ Avoiding NAT devices in the path is encouraged for mobile nodes, because it saves power consumption from the keepalive messages that are required to maintain NAT states ("always-on" services) πŸ”‹ An in-depth discussion can be found in [DNS64] πŸ“š


2.3. Problems Solved ✨

Okay, now the problems identified in [RFC4966] that have actually been solved πŸŽ€

  1. Constraints on network topology (as it relates to DNS-ALG; see Section 3.1 of [RFC4966]).

Analysis: The severity of this issue has been mitigated by separating DNS from the NAT functionality πŸ’– Still, a minimal coordination may be required. The NAT64 that gets crossed (the one the IPv4-Converted IPv6 address returned to a requesting host points to) must be in the path, and it must also have sufficient resources to handle received traffic 🧚

  1. Need for additional state and/or packet reconstruction in dealing with packet fragmentation. Otherwise, implement no support for fragments (Section 2.5 of [RFC4966]).

Analysis: This issue isn't specific to 64. It's for all NAT-based solutions 🌈 [RFC6146] specifies how to handle fragmentation, and recommendations to avoid fragmentation-related DoS (Denial-of-Service) attacks are proposed (e.g., limit the resources dedicated to out-of-order fragments) πŸ›‘οΈ

  1. Inappropriate translation of responses to A queries from IPv6 nodes (Section 4.3 of [RFC4966]).

Analysis: DNS64 [RFC6147] does not alter A queries πŸ’…

  1. Address selection issues and resource consumption in a DNS-ALG with multi-addressed nodes (Section 4.4 of [RFC4966]).

Analysis: Since no DNS-ALG is required to be co-located with NAT64, there's no need to maintain temporary states in anticipation of connections πŸ™Œ Note that explicit bindings (see Section 3 of [RFC6887]) are required to allow communications initiated from an IPv4-only client to an IPv6-only server πŸ¦‹

  1. Limitations on DNS security capabilities when using a DNS-ALG (Section 2.5 of [RFC4966]).

Analysis: A DNSSEC validating stub resolver behind a DNS64 in server mode isn't supported 😬 So if a host wants to do its own DNSSEC validation and wants to use a NAT64, the host also has to perform its own DNS64 synthesis πŸ” Refer to Section 3 of [RFC6147] for more details.

  1. Creation of a DoS threat relating to exhaustion of memory and address/port pool resources on the translator (Section 3.4 of [RFC4966]).

Analysis: This specific DoS concern on Page 6 of [RFC4966] is under a DNS-ALG heading in that document. It refers to NAT-PT's creation of NAT mapping state when a DNS query occurred πŸ•ΈοΈ With the new IPv6-IPv4 translation mechanisms, DNS queries don't create any mapping state in the NAT64 ✨

To mitigate the exhaustion of port pool issue (Section 3.4 of [RFC4966]), 64 must enforce a port limit similar to the one defined in [RFC6888] πŸ”’

So this concern can be fully eliminated in 64 πŸ‘‘

  1. Requirement for applications to use keepalive mechanisms to work around connectivity issues caused by premature timeout for session table and Binding Information Base entries (Section 2.3 of [RFC4966]).

Analysis: Since NAT64 follows some of the [RFC4787], [RFC5382], and [RFC5508] requirements, there's a high lower bound for the lifetime of sessions ⏳ In NAT-PT, this was unknown, so applications had to assume the worst case. For instance, in NAT64 the lifetime for a TCP session is approximately two hours, so not much keepalive signaling overhead is needed πŸ’€

Application clients (e.g., VPN clients) aren't aware of the timer configured in the NAT device πŸ‘€ For unmanaged services, a conservative approach would be adopted by applications that issue frequent keepalive messages, to be sure that an active mapping is still maintained by any involved NAT64 device, even if the NAT64 complies with [RFC4787], [RFC5382], and [RFC5508] 🫠

Note that keepalive messages may be issued by applications to ensure that an active entry is maintained by a firewall, with or without a NAT in the path, which is located in the boundaries of a local domain 🏠

  1. Lack of address mapping persistence: Some applications require address retention between sessions. User traffic will be disrupted if a different mapping is used. Using the DNS-ALG to create address mappings with limited lifetimes means that applications must start using the address shortly after the mapping is created, and keep it alive once they start using it (Section 3.3 of [RFC4966]).

Analysis: In the following, address persistence is used to refer to support of the "IP address pooling" behavior of "Paired" [RFC4787] πŸ’œ

In the context of 64, the external IPv4 address (representing the IPv6 host in the IPv4 network) is assigned by the NAT64 machinery, not by the DNS64 function πŸŽ€ So address persistence can be easily ensured by the NAT64 function, which complies with NAT recommendations [RFC4787] and [RFC5382]. Address persistence should be guaranteed for both dynamic and static bindings 🌷

On the IPv6 side of the NAT64, the same IPv6 address is used to represent an IPv4 host, so no issue about address persistence is raised in an IPv6 network πŸ’–

3. Conclusions ✨

okay so the analysis of stateful 64 shows that most of the problems that aren't directly about decoupling NAT and DNS are still totally unaddressed πŸ’€. Some of these problems aren't even specific to 64. They're generic to all NAT-based solutions πŸ™ˆ

this points to several shortcomings of stateful 64 that must be addressed if future network deployments are going to move reliably towards 64 as a solution to IPv6-IPv4 interconnection πŸ¦‹

some of the issues, as pointed out in [RFC4966], have possible solutions. however, these solutions will require significant updates to the stateful 64, which makes it way more complex 🧚

here's the table that sums up the conclusions from the stateful 64 analysis 🌸

+---------------+----------+---------+----------+---------+---------+
|     Issue     |  NAT-PT  |  Exists |  DNS ALG | Generic |  Can be |
|               | Specific |    in   | Specific |   NAT   | solved? |
|               |          |  NAT64  |          |         |         |
+---------------+----------+---------+----------+---------+---------+
|   Protocols   |    No    |   Yes   |    No    |   Yes   |   Yes   |
|   embedding   |          |         |          |         |         |
|   addresses   |          |         |          |         |         |
+---------------+----------+---------+----------+---------+---------+
|   Protocols   |    No    |   Yes   |    No    |   Yes   |    No   |
| without demux |          |         |          |         |         |
|   capability  |          |         |          |         |         |
+---------------+----------+---------+----------+---------+---------+
| Binding state |    No    |   Yes   |    No    |   Yes   |   Yes   |
|     decay     |          |         |          |         |         |
+---------------+----------+---------+----------+---------+---------+
|    Loss of    |    No    |   Yes   |    No    |    No   |    No   |
|  information  |          |         |          |         |         |
+---------------+----------+---------+----------+---------+---------+
| Fragmentation |    No    |    No   |    No    |   Yes   |   Yes   |
+---------------+----------+---------+----------+---------+---------+
|    SCTP and   |    No    |   Yes   |    No    |   Yes   |   Yes   |
|  Multihoming  |          |         |          |         |         |
|  interaction  |          |         |          |         |         |
+---------------+----------+---------+----------+---------+---------+
|     Proxy     |    No    |   Yes   |    No    |    No   |    No   |
| correspondent |          |         |          |         |         |
|    node for   |          |         |          |         |         |
|     MIPv6     |          |         |          |         |         |
|   Multicast   |    No    |   Yes   |    No    |   Yes   |   Yes   |
+---------------+----------+---------+----------+---------+---------+
|  IPsec tunnel |    No    |   Yes   |    No    |   Yes   |   Yes   |
|      mode     |          |         |          |         |         |
+---------------+----------+---------+----------+---------+---------+
|    Topology   |    Yes   |    No   |    Yes   |    No   |   Yes   |
|  constraints  |          |         |          |         |         |
|  with DNS-ALG |          |         |          |         |         |
+---------------+----------+---------+----------+---------+---------+
|   Scale and   |    No    |   Yes   |    No    |   Yes   |   Yes   |
|  Single point |          |         |          |         |         |
|   of failure  |          |         |          |         |         |
+---------------+----------+---------+----------+---------+---------+
|    Lack of    |    No    |   Yes   |    No    |   Yes   |   Yes   |
|    address    |          |         |          |         |         |
|  persistence  |          |         |          |         |         |
+---------------+----------+---------+----------+---------+---------+
|  DoS attacks  |    No    |   Yes   |    No    |   Yes   |   Yes   |
+---------------+----------+---------+----------+---------+---------+
|    Address    |    Yes   |    No   |    Yes   |    No   |   Yes   |
|   selection   |          |         |          |         |         |
|  issues with  |          |         |          |         |         |
|   Dual stack  |          |         |          |         |         |
|     hosts     |          |         |          |         |         |
+---------------+----------+---------+----------+---------+---------+
|   Non-global  |    Yes   |    No   |    Yes   |    No   |   Yes   |
|  validity of  |          |         |          |         |         |
| Translated RR |          |         |          |         |         |
|    records    |          |         |          |         |         |
+---------------+----------+---------+----------+---------+---------+
|   Incorrect   |    Yes   |    No   |    Yes   |    No   |   Yes   |
|  translation  |          |         |          |         |         |
|      of A     |          |         |          |         |         |
|   responses   |          |         |          |         |         |
+---------------+----------+---------+----------+---------+---------+
|  DNS-ALG and  |    No    |   Yes   |    No    |   Yes   |   Yes   |
|     Multi-    |          |         |          |         |         |
|   addressed   |          |         |          |         |         |
|     nodes     |          |         |          |         |         |
+---------------+----------+---------+----------+---------+---------+
|     DNSSEC    |    No    |   Yes   |    No    |   Yes   |   Yes   |
|  limitations  |          |         |          |         |         |
+---------------+----------+---------+----------+---------+---------+

                    Table 1: Summary of NAT64 analysis

4. Security Considerations πŸ’€

this doc doesn't specify any new protocol or architecture πŸ™…β€β™€οΈ it only analyzes how BEHAVE WG 64 documents mitigate the concerns raised in [RFC4966], and which ones are still unaddressed. the security side is all about those leftover problems, so don't skip past them πŸ”₯

5. Acknowledgements 🫢

huge thanks to M. Bagnulo, D. Wing, X. Li, D. Anipko, and S. Moonesamy for their review and comments πŸ’–

D. Black provided the IPsec text πŸŽ€

6. References πŸ“š

6.1. Normative References

[RFC0959]  Postel, J. and J. Reynolds, "File Transfer Protocol",
           STD 9, RFC 959, October 1985.

[RFC3261]  Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston,
           A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E.
           Schooler, "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261,
           June 2002.

[RFC3948]  Huttunen, A., Swander, B., Volpe, V., DiBurro, L., and M.
           Stenberg, "UDP Encapsulation of IPsec ESP Packets",
           RFC 3948, January 2005.

[RFC4302]  Kent, S., "IP Authentication Header", RFC 4302,
           December 2005.

[RFC4303]  Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)",
           RFC 4303, December 2005.

[RFC4787]  Audet, F. and C. Jennings, "Network Address Translation
           (NAT) Behavioral Requirements for Unicast UDP", BCP 127,
           RFC 4787, January 2007.

[RFC4960]  Stewart, R., "Stream Control Transmission Protocol",
           RFC 4960, September 2007.

[RFC4966]  Aoun, C. and E. Davies, "Reasons to Move the Network
           Address Translator - Protocol Translator (NAT-PT) to
           Historic Status", RFC 4966, July 2007.

[RFC5382]  Guha, S., Biswas, K., Ford, B., Sivakumar, S., and P.
           Srisuresh, "NAT Behavioral Requirements for TCP", BCP 142,
           RFC 5382, October 2008.

[RFC5508]  Srisuresh, P., Ford, B., Sivakumar, S., and S. Guha, "NAT
           Behavioral Requirements for ICMP", BCP 148, RFC 5508,
           April 2009.

[RFC6052]  Bao, C., Huitema, C., Bagnulo, M., Boucadair, M., and X.
           Li, "IPv6 Addressing of IPv4/IPv6 Translators", RFC 6052,
           October 2010.

[RFC6144]  Baker, F., Li, X., Bao, C., and K. Yin, "Framework for
           IPv4/IPv6 Translation", RFC 6144, April 2011.

[RFC6145]  Li, X., Bao, C., and F. Baker, "IP/ICMP Translation
           Algorithm", RFC 6145, April 2011.

[RFC6146]  Bagnulo, M., Matthews, P., and I. van Beijnum, "Stateful
           NAT64: Network Address and Protocol Translation from IPv6
           Clients to IPv4 Servers", RFC 6146, April 2011.

[RFC6147]  Bagnulo, M., Sullivan, A., Matthews, P., and I. van
           Beijnum, "DNS64: DNS Extensions for Network Address
           Translation from IPv6 Clients to IPv4 Servers", RFC 6147,
           April 2011.

[RFC6887]  Wing, D., Ed., Cheshire, S., Boucadair, M., Penno, R., and
           P. Selkirk, "Port Control Protocol (PCP)", RFC 6887,
           April 2013.

6.2. Informative References

[ADDR-SELECT]
           Matsumoto, A., Fujisaki, T., and T. Chown, "Distributing
           Address Selection Policy using DHCPv6", Work in Progress,
           April 2013.

[DNS64]    Wing, D., "IPv6-only and Dual Stack Hosts on the Same
           Network with DNS64", Work in Progress, February 2011.

[FTP64]    Liu, D., Beijnum, I., and Z. Cao, "FTP consideration for
           IPv4/IPv6 transition", Work in Progress, January 2012.

[MIDDLEBOXES]
           Stucker, B., Tschofenig, H., and G. Salgueiro, "Analysis
           of Middlebox Interactions for Signaling Protocol
           Communication along the Media Path", Work in Progress,
           January 2013.

[NAT64-HARMFUL]
           Haddad, W. and C. Perkins, "A Note on NAT64 Interaction
           with Mobile IPv6", Work in Progress, March 2011.

[REFERRAL] Carpenter, B., Boucadair, M., Halpern, J., Jiang, S., and
           K. Moore, "A Generic Referral Object for Internet
           Entities", Work in Progress, October 2009.

[RFC2766]  Tsirtsis, G. and P. Srisuresh, "Network Address
           Translation - Protocol Translation (NAT-PT)", RFC 2766,
           February 2000.

[RFC3715]  Aboba, B. and W. Dixon, "IPsec-Network Address Translation
           (NAT) Compatibility Requirements", RFC 3715, March 2004.

[RFC5245]  Rosenberg, J., "Interactive Connectivity Establishment
           (ICE): A Protocol for Network Address Translator (NAT)
           Traversal for Offer/Answer Protocols", RFC 5245,
           April 2010.

[RFC5853]  Hautakorpi, J., Camarillo, G., Penfield, R., Hawrylyshen,
           A., and M. Bhatia, "Requirements from Session Initiation
           Protocol (SIP) Session Border Control (SBC) Deployments",
           RFC 5853, April 2010.

[RFC6157]  Camarillo, G., El Malki, K., and V. Gurbani, "IPv6
           Transition in the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)",
           RFC 6157, April 2011.

[RFC6384]  van Beijnum, I., "An FTP Application Layer Gateway (ALG)
           for IPv6-to-IPv4 Translation", RFC 6384, October 2011.

[RFC6888]  Perreault, S., Ed., Yamagata, I., Miyakawa, S., Nakagawa,
           A., and H. Ashida, "Common Requirements for Carrier-Grade
           NATs (CGNs)", BCP 127, RFC 6888, April 2013.

Authors' Addresses πŸ’–

okay bestie, these are the humans who actually wrote this RFC 🫢 Here's where you can find them if you want to slide into their DMs about 64 translation πŸ¦‹

Reinaldo Penno
Cisco Systems, Inc.
170 West Tasman Drive
San Jose, California  95134
USA

EMail: repenno@cisco.com


Tarun Saxena
Cisco Systems
Cessna Business Park
Bangalore  560103
India

EMail: tasaxena@cisco.com


Mohamed Boucadair
France Telecom
Rennes  35000
France

EMail: mohamed.boucadair@orange.com


Senthil Sivakumar
Cisco Systems
7100-8 Kit Creek Road
Research Triangle Park, North Carolina  27709
USA

EMail: ssenthil@cisco.com
πŸ“¦ where this page comes from