RFC 6750

RFC 6750: The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework: Bearer Token Usage 🎀

Okay bestie, this one is from the IETF, and it's Standards Track 📜 (ISSN 2070-1721). It was written by M. Jones at Microsoft and D. Hardt (Independent), and it's dated October 2012 🗓️. The title block doesn't say it obsoletes or updates anything. 🌸

---

Abstract ✨

Okay so this spec explains how to use bearer tokens in HTTP requests to get into OAuth 2.0 protected resources 🔐. The main vibe is that anyone holding a bearer token (the "bearer") can use it to get access to the stuff it's tied to, and they don't have to prove they hold any cryptographic key 🗝️. So bearer tokens need protecting from being disclosed, both while they're stored and while they're in transit, or else someone can misuse them 🙈.

---

Status of This Memo 💅

This is an Internet Standards Track document. 📜

This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) 🌈. It represents the consensus of the IETF community, it got public review, and the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG) approved it for publication ✅. If you want more info on Internet Standards, check out Section 2 of RFC 5741 📚.

For info on the current status of this document, any errata, and how to give feedback on it, go to http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6750 🔗.

---

Copyright Notice 🦋

Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved 💜.

This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) as they stood on the publication date. Please read these carefully, because they're the rules for your rights and restrictions with this document 📖. Any Code Components pulled out of this document must include Simplified BSD License text, as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions, and they come without warranty, as the Simplified BSD License describes 💀.

---

Table of Contents 🧚

   1. Introduction ....................................................2
      1.1. Notational Conventions .....................................3
      1.2. Terminology ................................................3
      1.3. Overview ...................................................3
   2. Authenticated Requests ..........................................4
      2.1. Authorization Request Header Field .........................5
      2.2. Form-Encoded Body Parameter ................................5
      2.3. URI Query Parameter ........................................6
   3. The WWW-Authenticate Response Header Field ......................7
      3.1. Error Codes ................................................9
   4. Example Access Token Response ..................................10
   5. Security Considerations ........................................10
      5.1. Security Threats ..........................................10
      5.2. Threat Mitigation .........................................11
      5.3. Summary of Recommendations ................................13
   6. IANA Considerations ............................................14
      6.1. OAuth Access Token Type Registration ......................14
           6.1.1. The "Bearer" OAuth Access Token Type ...............14
      6.2. OAuth Extensions Error Registration .......................14
           6.2.1. The "invalid_request" Error Value ..................14
           6.2.2. The "invalid_token" Error Value ....................15
           6.2.3. The "insufficient_scope" Error Value ...............15
   7. References .....................................................15
      7.1. Normative References ......................................15
      7.2. Informative References ....................................17
   Appendix A. Acknowledgements ......................................18

---

1. Introduction ✨

Okay so OAuth lets clients get into protected resources by grabbing an access token 🎟️. The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework [RFC6749] defines that token as "a string representing an access authorization issued to the client" 💖. So the client doesn't have to use the resource owner's credentials directly, which is giving secure 🔐.

Authorization servers hand tokens out to clients, but only when the resource owner approves 🙌. The client then uses that access token to reach the protected resources on the resource server 🌸. This spec is all about how to make protected resource requests when the OAuth access token is a bearer token 🦋.

This spec defines bearer tokens over HTTP/1.1 [RFC2616], with Transport Layer Security (TLS) [RFC5246] to reach protected resources 🔒. TLS is mandatory to implement and use with this spec, and other specs can extend this one for other protocols 🧚. This was designed for access tokens that come out of OAuth 2.0 authorization [RFC6749] flows, but honestly it defines a general HTTP authorization method. It works with bearer tokens from any source, to get into any resources those tokens protect 👑. The Bearer authentication scheme is mainly meant for server authentication using the WWW-Authenticate and Authorization HTTP headers, but it doesn't rule out proxy authentication either 💅.

1.1. Notational Conventions 📚

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be read as described in "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels" [RFC2119] 🫶.

This doc uses the Augmented Backus-Naur Form (ABNF) notation from [RFC5234] 🧩. It also pulls in these rules from HTTP/1.1 [RFC2617]: auth-param and auth-scheme. And from "Uniform Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax" [RFC3986], it pulls in URI-reference 🎀.

Unless it says otherwise, all the protocol parameter names and values are case sensitive 🔥.

1.2. Terminology 💜

Bearer Token : A security token with the property that any party in possession of the token (a "bearer") can use the token in any way that any other party in possession of it can. Using a bearer token does not require a bearer to prove possession of cryptographic key material (proof-of-possession) 🦋.

Every other term means what "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework" [RFC6749] says it means 📖.

1.3. Overview 🌈

OAuth gives clients a way to access a protected resource on behalf of a resource owner ✨. In the general case, a client first has to get an authorization grant from the resource owner, and then swap that grant for an access token 🎟️. The access token represents the grant's scope, duration, and other attributes that the authorization grant gave out 💖. The client gets to the protected resource by showing the access token to the resource server 🔐. Sometimes a client can just present its own credentials to an authorization server to get an access token, no authorization grant from a resource owner needed 👑.

The access token is an abstraction. It replaces different authorization constructs (like username and password, or assertion) with a single token the resource server understands 🧚. This means access tokens can be valid for a short time, and the resource server doesn't need to understand a whole bunch of authentication schemes 🙌.

  +--------+                               +---------------+
  |        |--(A)- Authorization Request ->|   Resource    |
  |        |                               |     Owner     |
  |        |<-(B)-- Authorization Grant ---|               |
  |        |                               +---------------+
  |        |
  |        |                               +---------------+
  |        |--(C)-- Authorization Grant -->| Authorization |
  | Client |                               |     Server    |
  |        |<-(D)----- Access Token -------|               |
  |        |                               +---------------+
  |        |
  |        |                               +---------------+
  |        |--(E)----- Access Token ------>|    Resource   |
  |        |                               |     Server    |
  |        |<-(F)--- Protected Resource ---|               |
  +--------+                               +---------------+

Figure 1: Abstract Protocol Flow 🌸

Figure 1 is the abstract OAuth 2.0 flow, and it shows how the client, resource owner, authorization server, and resource server all talk to each other (see [RFC6749]). This spec only nails down the following two steps 🦋:

• (E) The client requests the protected resource from the resource server and authenticates by presenting the access token.
• (F) The resource server validates the access token and, if it's valid, serves the request.

This doc also puts semantic requirements on the access token that gets returned in step (D) 💅.

---

2. Authenticated Requests 🔐

This section defines three ways to send bearer access tokens in resource requests to resource servers 🧚. Clients MUST NOT use more than one method to transmit the token in each request 🙅‍♀️.

2.1. Authorization Request Header Field 💖

When the access token goes in the "Authorization" request header field defined by HTTP/1.1 [RFC2617], the client uses the "Bearer" authentication scheme to send it 🎀.

For example:

GET /resource HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com
Authorization: Bearer mF_9.B5f-4.1JqM

The syntax of the "Authorization" header field for this scheme follows the Basic scheme's usage, from Section 2 of [RFC2617] 🧩. Heads up, though: like Basic, it doesn't follow the generic syntax from Section 1.2 of [RFC2617]. It's still compatible with the general authentication framework being built for HTTP 1.1 [HTTP-AUTH], even though it skips the preferred practice that framework lays out. That's so it matches existing deployments 🙈. Here's the syntax for Bearer credentials:

b64token    = 1*( ALPHA / DIGIT /
                  "-" / "." / "_" / "~" / "+" / "/" ) *"="
credentials = "Bearer" 1*SP b64token

Clients SHOULD make authenticated requests with a bearer token using the "Authorization" request header field with the "Bearer" HTTP authorization scheme 🫶. Resource servers MUST support this method 👑.

More sections are coming, so stay tuned for part 2 💜🦋

2.2. Form-Encoded Body Parameter

Okay so, when you're sending the access token inside the HTTP request entity-body 💌, the client adds it to the request-body using the access_token parameter. But bestie, the client MUST NOT use this method unless all of these are true 🫶:

• The HTTP request entity-header includes the Content-Type header field set to application/x-www-form-urlencoded.
• The entity-body follows the encoding requirements of the application/x-www-form-urlencoded content-type as defined by HTML 4.01 [W3C.REC-html401-19991224].
• The HTTP request entity-body is single-part.
• The content to be encoded in the entity-body MUST consist entirely of ASCII [USASCII] characters.
• The HTTP request method is one for which the request-body has defined semantics. In particular, this means that the GET method MUST NOT be used.

The entity-body MAY include other request-specific parameters, and if it does, the access_token parameter MUST be properly separated from them using "&" character(s) (ASCII code 38). ✨

For example, the client makes the following HTTP request using transport-layer security:

POST /resource HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

access_token=mF_9.B5f-4.1JqM

The application/x-www-form-urlencoded method SHOULD NOT be used except in application contexts where participating browsers do not have access to the Authorization request header field. Resource servers MAY support this method. 🙈

---

2.3. URI Query Parameter

When sending the access token in the HTTP request URI, the client adds it to the request URI query component as defined by "Uniform Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax" [RFC3986], using the access_token parameter. 🦋

For example, the client makes the following HTTP request using transport-layer security:

GET /resource?access_token=mF_9.B5f-4.1JqM HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com

The HTTP request URI query can include other request-specific parameters, and if it does, the access_token parameter MUST be properly separated from them using "&" character(s) (ASCII code 38). For example:

https://server.example.com/resource?access_token=mF_9.B5f-4.1JqM&p=q

Clients using the URI Query Parameter method SHOULD also send a Cache-Control header containing the "no-store" option. Server success (2XX status) responses to these requests SHOULD contain a Cache-Control header with the "private" option. 🧚

Because of the security weaknesses associated with the URI method (see Section 5), including the high likelihood that the URL containing the access token will be logged, it SHOULD NOT be used unless it is impossible to transport the access token in the Authorization request header field or the HTTP request entity-body. Resource servers MAY support this method. 💀

This method is included to document current use; its use is not recommended, due to its security deficiencies (see Section 5) and also because it uses a reserved query parameter name, which is counter to URI namespace best practices, per "Architecture of the World Wide Web, Volume One" [W3C.REC-webarch-20041215]. Honestly, it's giving "we know, we know" 😭

---

3. The WWW-Authenticate Response Header Field ✨

If the protected resource request does not include authentication credentials, or does not contain an access token that enables access to the protected resource, the resource server MUST include the HTTP WWW-Authenticate response header field. It MAY include it in response to other conditions as well. This header field uses the framework defined by HTTP/1.1 [RFC2617]. 🎀

All challenges defined by this specification MUST use the auth-scheme value Bearer. This scheme MUST be followed by one or more auth-param values. The auth-param attributes used or defined by this specification are as follows. Other auth-param attributes MAY be used as well. 💅

A realm attribute MAY be included to indicate the scope of protection in the manner described in HTTP/1.1 [RFC2617]. The realm attribute MUST NOT appear more than once. 🌸

The scope attribute is defined in Section 3.3 of [RFC6749]. It's a space-delimited list of case-sensitive scope values indicating the required scope of the access token for accessing the requested resource. Scope values are implementation defined; there is no centralized registry for them, and allowed values are defined by the authorization server. The order of scope values is not significant. In some cases, the scope value will be used when requesting a new access token with sufficient scope of access to utilize the protected resource. Use of the scope attribute is OPTIONAL. The scope attribute MUST NOT appear more than once. The scope value is intended for programmatic use and is not meant to be displayed to end-users. 🧠

Two example scope values follow. These are taken from the OpenID Connect [OpenID.Messages] and the Open Authentication Technology Committee (OATC) Online Multimedia Authorization Protocol [OMAP] OAuth 2.0 use cases, respectively:

scope="openid profile email"
scope="urn:example:channel=HBO&urn:example:rating=G,PG-13"

If the protected resource request included an access token and failed authentication, the resource server SHOULD include the error attribute to provide the client with the reason why the access request was declined. The parameter value is described in Section 3.1. In addition, the resource server MAY include the error_description attribute to provide developers a human-readable explanation that is not meant to be displayed to end-users. It also MAY include the error_uri attribute with an absolute URI identifying a human-readable web page explaining the error. The error, error_description, and error_uri attributes MUST NOT appear more than once. 👑

Values for the scope attribute (specified in Appendix A.4 of [RFC6749]) MUST NOT include characters outside the set %x21 / %x23-5B / %x5D-7E for representing scope values, and %x20 for delimiters between scope values. Values for the error and error_description attributes (specified in Appendixes A.7 and A.8 of [RFC6749]) MUST NOT include characters outside the set %x20-21 / %x23-5B / %x5D-7E. Values for the error_uri attribute (specified in Appendix A.9 of [RFC6749]) MUST conform to the URI-reference syntax and thus MUST NOT include characters outside the set %x21 / %x23-5B / %x5D-7E. 🤓

For example, in response to a protected resource request without authentication:

HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized
WWW-Authenticate: Bearer realm="example"

And in response to a protected resource request with an authentication attempt using an expired access token:

HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized
WWW-Authenticate: Bearer realm="example",
                  error="invalid_token",
                  error_description="The access token expired"

3.1. Error Codes

When a request fails, the resource server responds using the appropriate HTTP status code (typically, 400, 401, 403, or 405) and includes one of the following error codes in the response: 🚨

• invalid_request: The request is missing a required parameter, includes an unsupported parameter or parameter value, repeats the same parameter, uses more than one method for including an access token, or is otherwise malformed. The resource server SHOULD respond with the HTTP 400 (Bad Request) status code.
• invalid_token: The access token provided is expired, revoked, malformed, or invalid for other reasons. The resource SHOULD respond with the HTTP 401 (Unauthorized) status code. The client MAY request a new access token and retry the protected resource request. 🔄
• insufficient_scope: The request requires higher privileges than provided by the access token. The resource server SHOULD respond with the HTTP 403 (Forbidden) status code and MAY include the scope attribute with the scope necessary to access the protected resource.

If the request lacks any authentication information (e.g., the client was unaware that authentication is necessary or attempted using an unsupported authentication method), the resource server SHOULD NOT include an error code or other error information. 🙃

For example:

HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized
WWW-Authenticate: Bearer realm="example"

---

4. Example Access Token Response 🍓

Typically, a bearer token is returned to the client as part of an OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] access token response. An example of such a response is:

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json;charset=UTF-8
Cache-Control: no-store
Pragma: no-cache

{
  "access_token":"mF_9.B5f-4.1JqM",
  "token_type":"Bearer",
  "expires_in":3600,
  "refresh_token":"tGzv3JOkF0XG5Qx2TlKWIA"
}

---

5. Security Considerations 🔐

This section is the main character of the whole doc, so pay attention! It describes the relevant security threats regarding token handling when using bearer tokens, and it describes how to mitigate these threats. 😤

5.1. Security Threats

The following list presents several common threats against protocols utilizing some form of tokens. This list of threats is based on NIST Special Publication 800-63 [NIST800-63]. Since this document builds on the OAuth 2.0 Authorization specification [RFC6749], we exclude a discussion of threats that are described there or in related documents. 📚

• Token manufacture/modification: An attacker may generate a bogus token or modify the token contents (such as the authentication or attribute statements) of an existing token, causing the resource server to grant inappropriate access to the client. For example, an attacker may modify the token to extend the validity period; a malicious client may modify the assertion to gain access to information that they should not be able to view. 👀
• Token disclosure: Tokens may contain authentication and attribute statements that include sensitive information. 🫣
• Token redirect: An attacker uses a token generated for consumption by one resource server to gain access to a different resource server that mistakenly believes the token to be for it. 🏃‍♀️
• Token replay: An attacker attempts to use a token that has already been used with that resource server in the past. 🔁

5.2. Threat Mitigation ✨

okay so bestie, this is the part where we talk about how to actually keep bearer tokens safe 🛡️💖 a whole bunch of threats can be stopped by protecting what's inside the token with a digital signature or a Message Authentication Code (MAC) 🔐 another option is for the token to just be a reference to the authorization info instead of spelling everything out. but that reference MUST be infeasible for an attacker to guess 🙈 using a reference can mean an extra trip between the server and the token issuer to look up the real info, and this spec doesn't define how that trip works 🧚

this spec also doesn't pin down the token's encoding or contents, so the nitty gritty of integrity protection is out of scope 💅 the token integrity protection MUST be sufficient to prevent the token from being modified 🔥

to stop token redirect, the authorization server should put the intended recipients (the audience) in the token 🎯 that's usually one resource server, or a list of them 👑 restricting the token to a specific scope is also RECOMMENDED 🌸

the authorization server MUST implement TLS 🔒 which versions are right will change over time, depending on what's widely deployed and what vulnerabilities are known when you build it ✨ when this was written, TLS 1.2 [RFC5246] was the newest, but barely anyone was actually running it and it might not be in toolkits yet 😭 TLS 1.0 [RFC2246] was the most widely deployed and gives the broadest interop 🦋

to protect against token disclosure, confidentiality protection MUST be applied using TLS [RFC5246] with a ciphersuite that gives both confidentiality and integrity protection 💜 that means the client-to-authorization-server conversation AND the client-to-resource-server conversation both need confidentiality and integrity protection 🫶 since TLS is mandatory to implement and to use with this spec, it's the preferred way to stop token disclosure over the wire 🌈 if the client can't see what's inside the token, then token encryption MUST be applied on top of TLS 🔐 as an extra layer, the client MUST validate the TLS certificate chain whenever it makes requests to protected resources, including checking the Certificate Revocation List (CRL) [RFC5280] 🕵️‍♀️

cookies usually go over the wire in the clear, so anything in them is at risk 😬 which means bearer tokens MUST NOT be stored in cookies that can be sent in the clear 🚫 see "HTTP State Management Mechanism" [RFC6265] for the cookie security considerations 🍓

heads up! in some setups, like ones with load balancers, the TLS connection to the resource server ends at a front-end box before it reaches the server that actually serves the resource 😱 that can leave the token unprotected between the front-end and the back-end 💀 in those setups, sufficient measures MUST be taken to keep the token confidential between the front-end and back-end servers, and encrypting the token is one possible measure 🛡️

to deal with token capture and replay, here are the recommendations 🦋 first, the token's lifetime MUST be limited, and one way to do that is a validity time field inside the protected part of the token ⏰ short-lived tokens (one hour or less) shrink the damage if one leaks 🙌 second, confidentiality protection MUST be applied to the exchanges between the client and the authorization server and between the client and the resource server 🔐 so no eavesdropper on the path can see the token exchange, and therefore an on-path adversary can't replay the token 😤 also, when presenting the token to a resource server, the client MUST verify that resource server's identity, as per Section 3.1 of "HTTP Over TLS" [RFC2818] 🧐 and again, the client MUST validate the TLS certificate chain when making these requests to protected resources 💅

seriously though: presenting the token to an unauthenticated and unauthorized resource server, or skipping certificate chain validation, lets adversaries steal the token and get unauthorized access to protected resources 💀🚨

---

5.3. Summary of Recommendations 📋✨

here's the quick cheat sheet, bestie 🍓 these are the big ones:

Safeguard bearer tokens: client implementations MUST make sure bearer tokens don't leak to unintended parties, because anyone holding one can use it to get into protected resources 🔑 this is the main security concern with bearer tokens, and everything else below builds on it 👑

Validate TLS certificate chains: the client MUST validate the TLS certificate chain when making requests to protected resources 🕵️‍♀️ skipping that can let DNS hijacking attacks steal the token and get unintended access 😱

Always use TLS (https): clients MUST always use TLS [RFC5246] (https) or equivalent transport security when making requests with bearer tokens 🔒 not doing so exposes the token to a bunch of attacks that could give attackers unintended access 💀

Don't store bearer tokens in cookies: implementations MUST NOT store bearer tokens in cookies that can be sent in the clear (which is the default transmission mode for cookies) 🚫 implementations that do store bearer tokens in cookies MUST take precautions against cross-site request forgery 🛡️

Issue short-lived bearer tokens: token servers SHOULD issue short-lived (one hour or less) bearer tokens ⏰ especially for clients running in a web browser or other places where info might leak 🦋 short-lived tokens cut down the impact of a leak 🙌

Issue scoped bearer tokens: token servers SHOULD issue bearer tokens with an audience restriction, scoping them to the intended relying party or set of relying parties 🎯

Don't pass bearer tokens in page URLs: bearer tokens SHOULD NOT be passed in page URLs (like as query string parameters) 🙅‍♀️ instead, they SHOULD be passed in HTTP message headers or message bodies where confidentiality measures are taken 📨 browsers, web servers, and other software may not secure URLs well in browser history, server logs, and other data stores 🙈 if tokens end up in page URLs, attackers might steal them from history, logs, or other unsecured spots 😭

---

6. IANA Considerations 🌸

6.1. OAuth Access Token Type Registration 🎀

this spec registers the following access token type in the OAuth Access Token Types registry defined in [RFC6749] 💖

6.1.1. The "Bearer" OAuth Access Token Type 🦋

Type name:
   Bearer

Additional Token Endpoint Response Parameters:
   (none)

HTTP Authentication Scheme(s):
   Bearer

Change controller:
   IETF

Specification document(s):
   RFC 6750

6.2. OAuth Extensions Error Registration 💅

this spec registers the following error values in the OAuth Extensions Error registry defined in [RFC6749] ✨

6.2.1. The "invalid_request" Error Value 🙈

Error name:
   invalid_request

Error usage location:
   Resource access error response

Related protocol extension:
   Bearer access token type

Change controller:
   IETF

Specification document(s):
   RFC 6750

6.2.2. The "invalid_token" Error Value 💀

Error name:
   invalid_token

Error usage location:
   Resource access error response

Related protocol extension:
   Bearer access token type

Change controller:
   IETF

Specification document(s):
   RFC 6750

6.2.3. The "insufficient_scope" Error Value 🔥

Error name:
   insufficient_scope

Error usage location:
   Resource access error response

Related protocol extension:
   Bearer access token type

Change controller:
   IETF

Specification document(s):
   RFC 6750

7. References 📚

7.1. Normative References 🧠

[RFC2119]    Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
             Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

[RFC2246]    Dierks, T. and C. Allen, "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0",
             RFC 2246, January 1999.

[RFC2616]    Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H.,
             Masinter, L., Leach, P., and T. Berners-Lee, "Hypertext
             Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1", RFC 2616, June 1999.

[RFC2617]    Franks, J., Hallam-Baker, P., Hostetler, J., Lawrence,
             S., Leach, P., Luotonen, A., and L. Stewart, "HTTP
             Authentication: Basic and Digest Access Authentication",
             RFC 2617, June 1999.

[RFC2818]    Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818, May 2000.

[RFC3986]    Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
             Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
             RFC 3986, January 2005.

[RFC5234]    Crocker, D. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax
             Specifications: ABNF", STD 68, RFC 5234, January 2008.

[RFC5246]    Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer
             Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
             August 2008.

[RFC5280]    Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
             Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
             Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation
             List (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.

[RFC6265]    Barth, A., "HTTP State Management Mechanism", RFC 6265,
             April 2011.

[RFC6749]    Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework",
             RFC 6749, October 2012.

[USASCII]    American National Standards Institute, "Coded Character
             Set -- 7-bit American Standard Code for Information
             Interchange", ANSI X3.4, 1986.

[W3C.REC-html401-19991224]
             Raggett, D., Le Hors, A., and I. Jacobs, "HTML 4.01
             Specification", World Wide Web Consortium
             Recommendation REC-html401-19991224, December 1999,
             <http://www.w3.org/TR/1999/REC-html401-19991224>.

[W3C.REC-webarch-20041215]
             Jacobs, I. and N. Walsh, "Architecture of the World Wide
             Web, Volume One", World Wide Web Consortium
             Recommendation REC-webarch-20041215, December 2004,
             <http://www.w3.org/TR/2004/REC-webarch-20041215>.

7.2. Informative References

okay so these are the "good to know" references 🧠✨ they're not required reading to implement the thing, but they're where the extra context lives. bestie, check them out if you're curious 🫶

• [HTTP-AUTH] Fielding, R., Ed., and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Authentication", Work in Progress, October 2012. 📚
• [NIST800-63] Burr, W., Dodson, D., Newton, E., Perlner, R., Polk, T., Gupta, S., and E. Nabbus, "NIST Special Publication 800-63-1, INFORMATION SECURITY", December 2011, <http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/>. 🔐
• [OMAP] Huff, J., Schlacht, D., Nadalin, A., Simmons, J., Rosenberg, P., Madsen, P., Ace, T., Rickelton-Abdi, C., and B. Boyer, "Online Multimedia Authorization Protocol: An Industry Standard for Authorized Access to Internet Multimedia Resources", April 2012, <http://www.oatc.us/Standards/Download.aspx>. 🎬
• [OpenID.Messages] Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., de Medeiros, B., Mortimore, C., and E. Jay, "OpenID Connect Messages 1.0", June 2012, <http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-messages-1_0.html>. 💜

---

Appendix A. Acknowledgements 🎀

the people in this part are literally the squad that made this spec happen, so let's give them their flowers 💐👑

The following people contributed to preliminary versions of this document: Blaine Cook (BT), Brian Eaton (Google), Yaron Y. Goland (Microsoft), Brent Goldman (Facebook), Raffi Krikorian (Twitter), Luke Shepard (Facebook), and Allen Tom (Yahoo!). The content and concepts within are a product of the OAuth community, the Web Resource Authorization Profiles (WRAP) community, and the OAuth Working Group. David Recordon created a preliminary version of this specification based upon an early draft of the specification that evolved into OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749]. Michael B. Jones in turn created the first version (00) of this specification using portions of David's preliminary document and edited all subsequent versions. 🙌

The OAuth Working Group has dozens of very active contributors who proposed ideas and wording for this document, including Michael Adams, Amanda Anganes, Andrew Arnott, Derek Atkins, Dirk Balfanz, John Bradley, Brian Campbell, Francisco Corella, Leah Culver, Bill de hOra, Breno de Medeiros, Brian Ellin, Stephen Farrell, Igor Faynberg, George Fletcher, Tim Freeman, Evan Gilbert, Yaron Y. Goland, Eran Hammer, Thomas Hardjono, Dick Hardt, Justin Hart, Phil Hunt, John Kemp, Chasen Le Hara, Barry Leiba, Amos Jeffries, Michael B. Jones, Torsten Lodderstedt, Paul Madsen, Eve Maler, James Manger, Laurence Miao, William J. Mills, Chuck Mortimore, Anthony Nadalin, Axel Nennker, Mark Nottingham, David Recordon, Julian Reschke, Rob Richards, Justin Richer, Peter Saint-Andre, Nat Sakimura, Rob Sayre, Marius Scurtescu, Naitik Shah, Justin Smith, Christian Stuebner, Jeremy Suriel, Doug Tangren, Paul Tarjan, Hannes Tschofenig, Franklin Tse, Sean Turner, Paul Walker, Shane Weeden, Skylar Woodward, and Zachary Zeltsan. 🫶🌈

---

Authors' Addresses 💌

these are the two people who wrote it, and where to find them 🦋

Michael B. Jones
Microsoft

EMail: mbj@microsoft.com
URI:   http://self-issued.info/


Dick Hardt
Independent

EMail: dick.hardt@gmail.com
URI:   http://dickhardt.org/