RFC 6622
Integrity Check Value and Timestamp TLV Definitions for Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANETs)
Title Block 🎀
This is RFC 6622, Integrity Check Value and Timestamp TLV Definitions for Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANETs), written by U. Herberg (Fujitsu Laboratories of America) and T. Clausen (LIX, Ecole Polytechnique). It's on the Standards Track, ISSN 2070-1721, dated May 2012. The header doesn't list anything it obsoletes or updates, so there's no other RFC to chase. 💜
Abstract ✨
okay so this doc gives you flexible TLVs (the little tag-length-value bits) for carrying cryptographic Integrity Check Values (ICVs) 💅. ICVs are either digital signatures or Message Authentication Codes (MACs), and you can also attach timestamps with them. It all rides on the generalized MANET packet/message format from RFC 5444 🦋. It defines two Packet TLVs, two Message TLVs, and two Address Block TLVs, which attach ICVs and timestamps to a packet, a message, and an address respectively. Iconic ✨
Status of This Memo 📜
this is an Internet Standards Track document 🔥. It's a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), it represents the consensus of the IETF community, it got public review, and the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG) approved it for publication. If you want more on Internet Standards, check Section 2 of RFC 5741.
For the current status, any errata, and how to send feedback, go to http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6622 🌸.
Copyright Notice ©️
Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved 🫶.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) as in effect on the date of publication. Please read these carefully, because they spell out your rights and restrictions for this doc 🙈. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text, as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions, and they come without warranty, as described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents 🗺️
1. Introduction ....................................................3
2. Terminology .....................................................3
3. Applicability Statement .........................................3
4. Security Architecture ...........................................4
5. Overview and Functioning ........................................5
6. General ICV TLV Structure .......................................6
7. General Timestamp TLV Structure .................................6
8. Packet TLVs .....................................................7
8.1. Packet ICV TLV .............................................7
8.2. Packet TIMESTAMP TLV .......................................7
9. Message TLVs ....................................................8
9.1. Message ICV TLV ............................................8
9.2. Message TIMESTAMP TLV ......................................8
10. Address Block TLVs .............................................8
10.1. Address Block ICV TLV .....................................8
10.2. Address Block TIMESTAMP TLV ...............................9
11. ICV: Basic .....................................................9
12. ICV: Cryptographic Function over a Hash Value ..................9
12.1. General ICV TLV Structure ................................10
12.1.1. Rationale .........................................11
12.2. Considerations for Calculating the ICV ...................11
12.2.1. Packet ICV TLV ....................................11
12.2.2. Message ICV TLV ...................................11
12.2.3. Address Block ICV TLV .............................11
12.3. Example of a Message Including an ICV ....................12
13. IANA Considerations ...........................................13
13.1. Expert Review: Evaluation Guidelines .....................13
13.2. Packet TLV Type Registrations ............................14
13.3. Message TLV Type Registrations ...........................15
13.4. Address Block TLV Type Registrations .....................16
13.5. Hash Functions ...........................................17
13.6. Cryptographic Functions ..................................18
14. Security Considerations .......................................18
15. Acknowledgements ..............................................19
16. References ....................................................19
16.1. Normative References .....................................19
16.2. Informative References ...................................211. Introduction 🌈
this doc specifies a couple of things, bestie 💖:
- Two TLVs for carrying Integrity Check Values (ICVs) and timestamps in packets, messages, and address blocks, as defined by [RFC5444].
- A generic framework for ICVs. It accounts for the mutable message header fields (
<msg-hop-limit>and<msg-hop-count>) when those fields are present in messages.
It also sets up IANA registries for recording code points for hash-function and ICV calculation, respectively 🍓.
Then, in Section 12, it defines the following:
- One common method for generating ICVs as a cryptographic function, calculated over the hash value of the content 🧚.
2. Terminology 📖
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" are to be read as described in [RFC2119] 🫶. That's the rule for how they're used here.
This doc uses the terminology and notation from [RFC5444] 💅. Specifically, it uses these TLV fields from [RFC5444]:
<msg-hop-limit>is the hop limit of a message, as specified in Section 5.2 of [RFC5444].<msg-hop-count>is the hop count of a message, as specified in Section 5.2 of [RFC5444].<length>is the length of a TLV in octets, as specified in Section 5.4.1 of [RFC5444].
3. Applicability Statement 🦋
MANET routing protocols that use the format from [RFC5444] get to carry extra info in control messages and packets by including TLVs 🌸. Info included this way MAY be used by a MANET routing protocol, or by an extension of one, according to that protocol's spec.
This doc explains how to include an ICV for a packet, for a message, and for addresses in address blocks inside a message, using these TLVs ✨. It also covers two things: a) how to handle the "mutable" fields, namely <msg-hop-count> and <msg-hop-limit>, if they're in the message header when you calculate ICVs, so any recipient can verify the ICV correctly; and b) how to include the ICV itself 👑.
This doc describes a generic framework for creating ICVs and for putting them into TLVs. Section 12 gives an example method for calculating the ICVs, using a cryptographic function over the hash value of the content 🔥.
4. Security Architecture 🔐
so basic MANET routing protocol specs are often "oblivious to security" 💀. They do have a clause, though, that lets a control message get rejected as "badly formed" or "insecure" before it's processed or forwarded. Protocols like the Neighborhood Discovery Protocol (NHDP) [RFC6130] and the Optimized Link State Routing Protocol version 2 [OLSRv2] recognize outside reasons for rejecting a message that counts as "invalid for processing", like failing to verify an ICV 🙈.
This whole setup exists because, when it comes to security in MANETs, "one size rarely fits all" 💅. Deployment domains have all kinds of security needs, anywhere from "unbreakable" to "virtually none" 😭. The big win is that MANET routing protocol specs (and implementations) can stay "generic", while extensions bring the proper security mechanisms for each deployment domain 🌈.
So the MANET routing protocol "security architecture", where this spec sits, goes like this:
- Security-oblivious MANET routing protocol specs, with a clause letting an extension reject a message (before processing/forwarding) as "badly formed" or "insecure".
- MANET routing protocol security extensions that reject messages as "badly formed" or "insecure", as needed for a given security requirement in a particular deployment domain.
- Code points and an exchange format for info, needed to specify those MANET routing protocol security extensions ⭐.
This document handles the last item on that list. It sets up a common exchange format for cryptographic ICVs, reserving code points in the Packet TLV, Message TLV, and Address Block TLV registries of [RFC5444], to be used and shared among MANET routing protocol security extensions 🫶.
For the specific breakdown of an ICV into a cryptographic function over a hash value (covered in Section 12), this doc creates two IANA registries: one for code points for hash functions, and one for cryptographic functions that follow [RFC5444] 🍓.
As for how this doc relates to [RFC5444] 💜:
- It's meant for the non-normative, but intended, mode of use described in Appendix B of [RFC5444].
- It's a specific example of the Security Considerations section of [RFC5444] (the authentication part) 🎀.
5. Overview and Functioning ✨
okay so this doc is giving a syntax for security info that rides along with [RFC5444] addresses, messages, and packets 🎀 it also sets up IANA registrations for the TLV types and type extension registries that go with them 💅
it also gives guidelines for how MANET routing protocols (and their extensions) should treat ICV and Timestamp TLVs, plus mutable fields in messages 🦋 and bestie, this is NOT a standalone protocol 😭 MANET routing protocols and extensions that use this spec MUST provide instructions for handling packets, messages, and addresses that carry security info attached the way this doc describes 🫶
TLV types get assigned out of the Packet, Message, and Address Block TLV registries from [RFC5444] 🌸 every time a TLV type gets assigned from one of those, IANA makes a registry for type extensions for that type 🧚 this doc uses those type extension registries to define the internal structure of the <value> field of a TLV (and how to process it) 💜
for example, an ICV TLV with type extension = 0 says the <value> field has no predefined internal structure and is just a sequence of octets 🍓 an ICV TLV with type extension = 1 says the <value> field has a predefined internal structure, and this doc defines how to interpret it ✨
(the <value> field here is a cryptographic operation over a hash value, with fields saying which hash function and which cryptographic operation were used. that's Section 12, btw 👑)
other docs can ask for assignments of other type extensions 🌈 if they do, they MUST specify the internal structure (if any) and how to interpret it 💖
6. General ICV TLV Structure 🦋
the ICV TLV's value looks like this:
<value> := <ICV-value>where
<ICV-value>is a field of <length> octets holding the info that the ICV verification process interprets, as the type extension says 🫶
this doesn't tell you how to calculate <ICV-value> or what's inside it (if anything) 🙈 that info MUST come from the type extension for the ICV TLV type. see Section 13 💅 this doc specifies two type extensions: one for ICVs with no predefined structure, and one for ICVs built using a cryptographic operation over a hash value 🔥
7. General Timestamp TLV Structure ⭐
the Timestamp TLV's value looks like this:
<value> := <time-value>where
<time-value>is an unsigned integer field of length <length> that holds the timestamp 🧚
this doesn't say how to calculate <time-value> or what's inside it (if anything) 💀 that info MUST be specified by the type extension for the TIMESTAMP TLV type. see Section 13 ✨
a timestamp is basically "freshness info" 🌸 so how it gets set and read is up to the MANET routing protocol (or extension) using it 💜 it could be a UNIX timestamp, a GPS timestamp, or just a simple sequence number 🍓
8. Packet TLVs 💖
two Packet TLVs are defined: one to carry a packet's cryptographic ICV, and one to carry the timestamp for when that ICV was calculated 🎀
8.1. Packet ICV TLV 🌈
a Packet ICV TLV is an example of an ICV TLV (see Section 6) 💅
the following considerations apply:
- Packets as defined in [RFC5444] are never forwarded by routers 🦋 so no special handling is needed for mutable fields (like
<msg-hop-count>and<msg-hop-limit>, if they're there) when calculating the ICV 🙈 - Any Packet ICV TLVs already in the Packet TLV block MUST be removed before calculating the ICV, and the Packet TLV block size MUST be recalculated to match. removed ICV TLVs MUST be restored after the ICV value has been calculated 🔥
the reason for removing any Packet ICV TLV that's already there before calculating is that several ICVs can be added to the same packet, e.g., using different ICV functions 👑
8.2. Packet TIMESTAMP TLV ✨
a Packet TIMESTAMP TLV is an example of a Timestamp TLV (see Section 7) 🫶 if a packet has both a TIMESTAMP TLV and an ICV TLV, the TIMESTAMP TLV SHOULD be added to the packet before any ICV TLV, so that it gets included in the ICV calculation 🧚
9. Message TLVs 🌸
two Message TLVs are defined: one to carry a message's cryptographic ICV, and one to carry the timestamp for when that ICV was calculated 💜
9.1. Message ICV TLV 🍓
a Message ICV TLV is an example of an ICV TLV (see Section 6) 💖 when figuring out the <ICV-value> for a message, the following considerations MUST be applied:
- The fields
<msg-hop-limit>and<msg-hop-count>, if present, MUST both be assumed to have the value 0 (zero) when calculating the ICV 🎀 - Any Message ICV TLVs already in the Message TLV block MUST be removed before calculating the ICV, and the message size as well as the Message TLV block size MUST be recalculated to match. removed ICV TLVs MUST be restored after the ICV value has been calculated 🌈
the reason for removing any Message ICV TLV that's already there before calculating is that several ICVs can be added to the same message, e.g., using different ICV functions 💅
9.2. Message TIMESTAMP TLV 🦋
a Message TIMESTAMP TLV is an example of a Timestamp TLV (see Section 7) 🙈 if a message has both a TIMESTAMP TLV and an ICV TLV, the TIMESTAMP TLV SHOULD be added to the message before the ICV TLV, so that it gets included in the ICV calculation 🔥
10. Address Block TLVs 👑
two Address Block TLVs are defined: one to associate a cryptographic ICV with an address, and one to carry the timestamp for when that ICV was calculated ✨
10.1. Address Block ICV TLV 🫶
an Address Block ICV TLV is an example of an ICV TLV (see Section 6) 🧚 the ICV is calculated over the address, concatenated with any other values associated with that address (for example, other Address Block TLV <value> fields) 🌸 a MANET routing protocol or extension that uses Address Block ICV TLVs MUST specify how to include any such concatenated attribute of the address in the ICV verification process 💜 when figuring out the <ICV-value> for an address, the following consideration MUST be applied:
- If other TLV values are concatenated with the address for the ICV calculation, those TLVs MUST NOT be Address Block ICV TLVs already associated with the address 🍓
the reason for not concatenating the address with any ICV TLV values already associated with it is that several ICVs can be added to the same address, e.g., using different ICV functions 💖
10.2. Address Block TIMESTAMP TLV 🎀
an Address Block TIMESTAMP TLV is an example of a Timestamp TLV (see Section 7) 🌈 if both a TIMESTAMP TLV and an ICV TLV are associated with an address, the TIMESTAMP TLV <value> MUST be covered when calculating the ICV value in the ICV TLV (i.e., concatenated with the associated address and any other values as described in Section 10.1) 💅
11. ICV: Basic 🦋
the basic ICV, represented by an ICV TLV with type extension = 0, is a simple bit field holding the cryptographic ICV 🙈 this assumes the mechanism for calculating and verifying ICVs is set up outside this spec, e.g., through administrative configuration or external out-of-band signaling 🔥 so when using type extension = 0, the <ICV-value> is:
<ICV-value> := <ICV-data>where
<ICV-data>is an unsigned integer field of length <length> that holds the cryptographic ICV 👑
12. ICV: Cryptographic Function over a Hash Value ✨
one common way to calculate an ICV is to apply a cryptographic function over a hash value of the content 🫶 this section spells out that breakdown, using type extension = 1 in the ICV TLVs 🧚
12.1. General ICV TLV Structure 🌸
this data structure lets you represent a cryptographic ICV, including which hash function and cryptographic function were used to calculate it 💜
<ICV-value> := <hash-function>
<cryptographic-function>
<key-id-length>
<key-id>
<ICV-data>where
<hash-function> is an 8-bit unsigned integer field that specifies the hash function 🍓
<cryptographic-function> is an 8-bit unsigned integer field that specifies the cryptographic function 💖
<key-id-length> is an 8-bit unsigned integer field that specifies the length of the <key-id> field in octets. the value 0x00 is reserved for using a pre-installed, shared key 🎀
<key-id> is a field that specifies the identifier of the key used to calculate the message's ICV, which lets you uniquely identify different keys from the same originator 🌈 it's the responsibility of each key originator to make sure that the actively used keys they issue have distinct key identifiers 💅 if <key-id-length> equals 0x00, the <key-id> field isn't in the TLV, and a pre-installed, shared key is used 🦋
<ICV-data> is an unsigned integer field whose length is <length> - 3 - <key-id-length>, and which holds the cryptographic ICV 🙈
this version of the TLV (in this section) assumes the ICV calculation can be broken down into:
ICV-value = cryptographic-function(hash-function(content))the hash function and the cryptographic function match entries in two IANA registries, which this spec sets up and which are described in Section 13 🔥
12.1.1. Rationale 👑
the reason for splitting the hash function and the cryptographic function into two octets, instead of putting every combination in one octet (possibly as a TLV type extension), is that adding more hash or cryptographic functions later may lead to a non-contiguous number space ✨
the reason for not including a field that lists the parameters of the cryptographic ICV in the TLV is that, before a router can validate a cryptographic ICV, it has to exchange or acquire keys (e.g., public keys) 🫶 any extra parameters can be provided along with the keys during that bootstrap process 🧚 so it's not necessary, and would even add extra overhead, to send the parameters in every message 🌸 one parameter that's implicitly available is the length of the ICV, which is <length> - 3 - <key-id-length>, and which depends on the choice of cryptographic function 💜
12.2. Considerations for Calculating the ICV 🍓
the considerations in the following subsections MUST be applied when calculating the ICV for Packet, Message, and Address ICV TLVs, respectively 💖
12.2.1. Packet ICV TLV
Okay, so when you're working out the <ICV-value> for a packet, the ICV gets calculated over the fields <hash-function>, <cryptographic-function>, <key-id-length>, and <key-id> (only if it's there), in that order. Those get glued onto the entire packet: the packet header, all the Packet TLVs except Packet ICV TLVs, and every included Message along with its message header, following Section 8.1. 💖
12.2.2. Message ICV TLV
Same vibe for messages! 🦋 The ICV is calculated over <hash-function>, <cryptographic-function>, <key-id-length>, and <key-id> (if present, in that order), concatenated with the entire message. The considerations in Section 9.1 MUST be applied. Non-negotiable, bestie. 💅
12.2.3. Address Block ICV TLV
For addresses it's a little more layered 🌸 The ICV is calculated over the same fields (<hash-function>, <cryptographic-function>, <key-id-length>, and <key-id> if present, in that order), concatenated with the address, and then with any other values that go with that address. Think of another address block TLV <value> tied to the same address as an example. A MANET routing protocol or MANET routing protocol extension that uses Address Block ICV TLVs MUST specify how to include any such concatenated attribute of the address in the verification process of the ICV. The considerations in Section 10.1 MUST be applied too. Two MUSTs, iconic. 👑
12.3. Example of a Message Including an ICV
Okay, the sample message in Figure 1 is borrowed from Appendix D of [RFC5444] 🧚 It has an ICV Message TLV whose value is an ICV that's 16 octets long, calculated over the whole message, plus a 4-octet-long key identifier. The type extension of the Message TLV is 1, which is the specific decomposition of an ICV into a cryptographic function over a hash value, as specified in Section 12. ✨
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| PV=0 | PF=8 | Packet Sequence Number | Message Type |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| MF=15 | MAL=3 | Message Length = 44 | Msg. Orig Addr|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Message Originator Address (cont) | Hop Limit |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Hop Count | Message Sequence Number | Msg. TLV Block|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Length = 27 | ICV | MTLVF = 144 | MTLVExt = 1 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|Value Len = 23 | Hash Func | Crypto Func |Key ID length=4|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Key Identifier |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| ICV Value |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| ICV Value (cont) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| ICV Value (cont) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| ICV Value (cont) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+Figure 1: Example Message with ICV
13. IANA Considerations ✨
Here's what this spec is doing for IANA 🎀 It defines the following:
- Two Packet TLV types, allocated from the 0-223 range of the "Packet TLV Types" repository of [RFC5444], as specified in Table 1.
- Two Message TLV types, allocated from the 0-127 range of the "Message TLV Types" repository of [RFC5444], as specified in Table 2.
- Two Address Block TLV types, allocated from the 0-127 range of the "Address Block TLV Types" repository of [RFC5444], as specified in Table 3.
It also created the following:
- A type extension registry for each of these TLV types, with initial values as listed in Tables 1, 2, and 3.
IANA gave the Packet TLV, Message TLV, and Address Block TLV types with the same name the same numerical value. 🧁
The following terms are used as defined in [BCP26]: "Namespace", "Registration", and "Designated Expert". The following policy is used as defined in [BCP26]: "Expert Review". 📋
13.1. Expert Review: Evaluation Guidelines
For TLV type extension registries where an Expert Review is required, the Designated Expert SHOULD take the same general recommendations into consideration as those specified by [RFC5444]. Bestie, that's a soft suggestion with real weight. 🌈
For the Timestamp TLV, the same type extensions for all Packet, Message, and Address Block TLVs SHOULD be numbered identically. Consistency is everything, periodt. 💜
13.2. Packet TLV Type Registrations
IANA has made allocations from the "Packet TLV Types" namespace of [RFC5444] for the Packet TLVs specified in Table 1. 🦋
+-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+
| Name | Type | Type | Description |
| | | Extension | |
+-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+
| ICV | 5 | 0 | ICV of a packet |
| | | | |
| | | 1 | ICV, decomposed into cryptographic |
| | | | function over a hash value, as |
| | | | specified in Section 12 of this |
| | | | document |
| | | | |
| | | 2-251 | Unassigned; Expert Review |
| | | | |
| | | 252-255 | Experimental Use |
| | | | |
| TIMESTAMP | 6 | 0 | Unsigned timestamp of arbitrary |
| | | | length, given by the TLV Length |
| | | | field. The MANET routing protocol |
| | | | has to define how to interpret |
| | | | this timestamp |
| | | | |
| | | 1 | Unsigned 32-bit timestamp, as |
| | | | specified in [IEEE 1003.1-2008 |
| | | | (POSIX)] |
| | | | |
| | | 2 | NTP timestamp format, as defined |
| | | | in [RFC5905] |
| | | | |
| | | 3 | Signed timestamp of arbitrary |
| | | | length with no constraints such as |
| | | | monotonicity. In particular, it |
| | | | may represent any random value |
| | | | |
| | | 4-251 | Unassigned; Expert Review |
| | | | |
| | | 252-255 | Experimental Use |
+-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+
Table 1: Packet TLV Types13.3. Message TLV Type Registrations
IANA has made allocations from the "Message TLV Types" namespace of [RFC5444] for the Message TLVs specified in Table 2. 🍓
+-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+
| Name | Type | Type | Description |
| | | Extension | |
+-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+
| ICV | 5 | 0 | ICV of a message |
| | | | |
| | | 1 | ICV, decomposed into cryptographic |
| | | | function over a hash value, as |
| | | | specified in Section 12 of this |
| | | | document |
| | | | |
| | | 2-251 | Unassigned; Expert Review |
| | | | |
| | | 252-255 | Experimental Use |
| | | | |
| TIMESTAMP | 6 | 0 | Unsigned timestamp of arbitrary |
| | | | length, given by the TLV Length |
| | | | field |
| | | | |
| | | 1 | Unsigned 32-bit timestamp, as |
| | | | specified in [IEEE 1003.1-2008 |
| | | | (POSIX)] |
| | | | |
| | | 2 | NTP timestamp format, as defined |
| | | | in [RFC5905] |
| | | | |
| | | 3 | Signed timestamp of arbitrary |
| | | | length with no constraints such as |
| | | | monotonicity. In particular, it |
| | | | may represent any random value |
| | | | |
| | | 4-251 | Unassigned; Expert Review |
| | | | |
| | | 252-255 | Experimental Use |
+-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+
Table 2: Message TLV Types13.4. Address Block TLV Type Registrations
okay so IANA went ahead and made allocations in the "Address Block TLV Types" namespace of [RFC5444] for the Packet TLVs in Table 3 💅
+-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+
| Name | Type | Type | Description |
| | | Extension | |
+-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+
| ICV | 5 | 0 | ICV of an object (e.g., an |
| | | | address) |
| | | | |
| | | 1 | ICV, decomposed into cryptographic |
| | | | function over a hash value, as |
| | | | specified in Section 12 of this |
| | | | document |
| | | | |
| | | 2-251 | Unassigned; Expert Review |
| | | | |
| | | 252-255 | Experimental Use |
| | | | |
| TIMESTAMP | 6 | 0 | Unsigned timestamp of arbitrary |
| | | | length, given by the TLV Length |
| | | | field |
| | | | |
| | | 1 | Unsigned 32-bit timestamp, as |
| | | | specified in [IEEE 1003.1-2008 |
| | | | (POSIX)] |
| | | | |
| | | 2 | NTP timestamp format, as defined |
| | | | in [RFC5905] |
| | | | |
| | | 3 | Signed timestamp of arbitrary |
| | | | length with no constraints such as |
| | | | monotonicity. In particular, it |
| | | | may represent any random value |
| | | | |
| | | 4-251 | Unassigned; Expert Review |
| | | | |
| | | 252-255 | Experimental Use |
+-----------+------+-----------+------------------------------------+Table 3: Address Block TLV Types
13.5. Hash Functions
IANA has set up a brand new registry for hash functions that can be used when creating an ICV, as laid out in Section 12 of this document 🧚 The initial assignments and allocation policies are in Table 4, so go check that out!
+-------------+-----------+-----------------------------------------+
| Hash | Algorithm | Description |
| Function | | |
| Value | | |
+-------------+-----------+-----------------------------------------+
| 0 | none | The "identity function": The hash value |
| | | of an object is the object itself |
| | | |
| 1 | SHA1 | [NIST-FIPS-180-2] |
| | | |
| 2 | SHA224 | [NIST-FIPS-180-2-change] |
| | | |
| 3 | SHA256 | [NIST-FIPS-180-2] |
| | | |
| 4 | SHA384 | [NIST-FIPS-180-2] |
| | | |
| 5 | SHA512 | [NIST-FIPS-180-2] |
| | | |
| 6-251 | | Unassigned; Expert Review |
| | | |
| 252-255 | | Experimental Use |
+-------------+-----------+-----------------------------------------+Table 4: Hash-Function Registry
13.6. Cryptographic Functions
IANA also made a new registry for the cryptographic functions, as laid out in Section 12 of this document 🎀 The initial assignments and allocation policies are in Table 5.
+----------------+-----------+--------------------------------------+
| Cryptographic | Algorithm | Description |
| Function Value | | |
+----------------+-----------+--------------------------------------+
| 0 | none | The "identity function": The value |
| | | of an encrypted hash is the hash |
| | | itself |
| | | |
| 1 | RSA | [RFC3447] |
| | | |
| 2 | DSA | [NIST-FIPS-186-3] |
| | | |
| 3 | HMAC | [RFC2104] |
| | | |
| 4 | 3DES | [NIST-SP-800-67] |
| | | |
| 5 | AES | [NIST-FIPS-197] |
| | | |
| 6 | ECDSA | [ANSI-X9-62-2005] |
| | | |
| 7-251 | | Unassigned; Expert Review |
| | | |
| 252-255 | | Experimental Use |
+----------------+-----------+--------------------------------------+Table 5: Cryptographic Function Registry
14. Security Considerations 🔥
okay this section is SERIOUS bestie, read it slowly 🙈
This document does not specify a protocol. It provides a syntactical component for cryptographic ICVs of messages and packets, as defined in [RFC5444]. It can be used to address security issues of a MANET routing protocol or MANET routing protocol extension. As such, it has the same security considerations as [RFC5444].
In addition, a MANET routing protocol or MANET routing protocol extension that uses this specification MUST specify how to use the framework, and the TLVs presented in this document. In addition, the protection that the MANET routing protocol or MANET routing protocol extensions attain by using this framework MUST be described. 💀
As an example, a MANET routing protocol that uses this component to reject "badly formed" or "insecure" messages if a control message does not contain a valid ICV SHOULD indicate the security assumption that if the ICV is valid, the message is considered valid. It also SHOULD indicate the security issues that are counteracted by this measure (e.g., link or identity spoofing) as well as the issues that are not counteracted (e.g., compromised keys). 🫶
15. Acknowledgements 💜
The authors would like to thank Bo Berry (Cisco), Alan Cullen (BAE), Justin Dean (NRL), Christopher Dearlove (BAE), Paul Lambert (Marvell), Jerome Milan (Ecole Polytechnique), and Henning Rogge (FGAN) for their constructive comments on the document.
The authors also appreciate the detailed reviews from the Area Directors, in particular Stewart Bryant (Cisco), Stephen Farrell (Trinity College Dublin), and Robert Sparks (Tekelec), as well as Donald Eastlake (Huawei) from the Security Directorate. ✨
16. References 📚
16.1. Normative References
[ANSI-X9-62-2005] American National Standards Institute, "Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry: The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)", ANSI X9.62-2005, November 2005.
[BCP26] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226, May 2008.
[IEEE 1003.1-2008 (POSIX)] IEEE Computer Society, "1003.1-2008 Standard for Information Technology-Portable Operating System Interface (POSIX) Base Specifications, Issue 7", December 2008.
[NIST-FIPS-180-2] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Specifications for the Secure Hash Standard", FIPS 180-2, August 2002.
[NIST-FIPS-180-2-change] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 180-2 (+ Change Notice to include SHA-224)", FIPS 180-2, August 2002, <http:// csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips180-2/fips180-2withchangenotice.pdf>.
[NIST-FIPS-186-3] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Digital Signature Standard (DSS)", FIPS 186-3, June 2009.
[NIST-FIPS-197] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Specification for the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)", FIPS 197, November 2001.
[NIST-SP-800-67] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Recommendation for the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) Block Cipher", Special Publication 800-67, May 2004.
[RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104, February 1997.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC3447] Jonsson, J. and B. Kaliski, "Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1", RFC 3447, February 2003.
[RFC5444] Clausen, T., Dearlove, C., Dean, J., and C. Adjih, "Generalized Mobile Ad Hoc Network (MANET) Packet/Message Format", RFC 5444, February 2009.
[RFC5905] Mills, D., Martin, J., Ed., Burbank, J., and W. Kasch, "Network Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and Algorithms Specification", RFC 5905, June 2010.
16.2. Informative References
[OLSRv2] Clausen, T., Dearlove, C., Jacquet, P., and U. Herberg, "The Optimized Link State Routing Protocol version 2", Work in Progress, March 2012.
[RFC6130] Clausen, T., Dearlove, C., and J. Dean, "Mobile Ad Hoc Network (MANET) Neighborhood Discovery Protocol (NHDP)", RFC 6130, April 2011.
Authors' Addresses ✨
Okay bestie, last stop: where to find the authors! 🧚 Here are the addresses for Ulrich and Thomas, exactly as they appear in the RFC, so you can reach out if you have questions. 💌
Ulrich Herberg
Fujitsu Laboratories of America
1240 E. Arques Ave.
Sunnyvale, CA 94085
USA
EMail: ulrich@herberg.name
URI: http://www.herberg.name/
Thomas Heide Clausen
LIX, Ecole Polytechnique
91128 Palaiseau Cedex
France
Phone: +33 6 6058 9349
EMail: T.Clausen@computer.org
URI: http://www.thomasclausen.org/Ulrich's the one with the Sunnyvale address 🌸, and Thomas is the one at LIX, Ecole Polytechnique in France 🇫🇷. Both of them put their contact details right here, so iykyk 💅
📦 where this page comes from
- ietf: rfc6622 2012-05
- 💖 girlified by claude-haiku-5-5 on : a language model's rewrite of the original, under its terms