RFC 6406
Session PEERing for Multimedia INTerconnect (SPEERMINT) Architecture
RFC 6406: Session PEERing for Multimedia INTerconnect (SPEERMINT) Architecture 🎀
okay bestie, this is RFC 6406, and it's giving peering architecture for SIP 💅 It's an Informational doc, not a Standards Track spec, so it's published for info purposes. It came out in November 2011 and has ISSN 2070-1721 ✨ The editors are D. Malas, Ed. from CableLabs and J. Livingood, Ed. from Comcast. And the title block doesn't list any obsoletes or updates, so this one doesn't replace or change any other RFC 🦋
Abstract
so this doc lays out a peering architecture for the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) 📞 plus its functional components and interfaces. It also walks through the components and the steps you need to set up a session between two SIP Service Provider (SSP) peering domains 🌸
Status of This Memo
this one is not an Internet Standards Track specification, it's just published for information 💜
this doc is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) and it represents the consensus of the IETF community 🫶 it got public review and was approved for publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). not every doc the IESG approves is a candidate for any level of Internet Standard, so check Section 2 of RFC 5741 if you want the deets 🧚
for the current status, any errata, and how to send feedback, go to http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6406 🔗
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. 🩷
this doc is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) as they stand on the publication date. please actually read those, because they spell out your rights and restrictions for this doc 📜 any Code Components pulled out of this doc have to include the Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions, and they come with no warranty, as the Simplified BSD License describes 💅
this doc may contain material from IETF Documents or IETF Contributions that were published or made publicly available before November 10, 2008. the people controlling the copyright in some of that material might not have given the IETF Trust permission to allow modifications outside the IETF Standards Process. so unless you get an adequate license from whoever controls that copyright, this doc can't be modified outside the IETF Standards Process, and derivative works can't be made outside it either. the one exceptions are formatting it for publication as an RFC or translating it into languages other than English 🌈
Table of Contents
1. Introduction ....................................................3
2. New Terminology .................................................3
2.1. Session Border Controller (SBC) ............................3
2.2. Carrier-of-Record ..........................................4
3. Reference Architecture ..........................................4
4. Procedures of Inter-Domain SSP Session Establishment ............6
5. Relationships between Functions/Elements ........................7
6. Recommended SSP Procedures ......................................7
6.1. Originating or Indirect SSP Procedures .....................7
6.1.1. The Lookup Function (LUF) ...........................8
6.1.1.1. Target Address Analysis ....................8
6.1.1.2. ENUM Lookup ................................8
6.1.2. Location Routing Function (LRF) .....................9
6.1.2.1. DNS Resolution .............................9
6.1.2.2. Routing Table ..............................9
6.1.2.3. LRF to LRF Routing ........................10
6.1.3. The Signaling Path Border Element (SBE) ............10
6.1.3.1. Establishing a Trusted Relationship .......10
6.1.3.2. IPsec .....................................10
6.1.3.3. Co-Location ...............................11
6.1.3.4. Sending the SIP Request ...................11
6.2. Target SSP Procedures .....................................11
6.2.1. TLS ................................................11
6.2.2. Receive SIP Requests ...............................11
6.3. Data Path Border Element (DBE) ............................12
7. Address Space Considerations ...................................12
8. Acknowledgments ................................................12
9. Security Considerations ........................................12
10. Contributors ..................................................13
11. References ....................................................14
11.1. Normative References .....................................14
11.2. Informative References ...................................151. Introduction ✨
okay so this doc defines a reference peering architecture for SIP [RFC3261], plus its functional components and interfaces, all in the context of session peering for multimedia interconnects 🎀 we define the reference architecture, its functional components, and the peering interface functions, looking at it from the point of view of an SSP's [RFC5486] network. so it also covers the components and steps needed to set up a session between two SSP peering domains. it's giving full blueprint energy 🧚
SSP can also be called an Internet Telephony Service Provider (ITSP). ITSP and SSP get used interchangeably a lot, but this doc and other SIP peering-related docs should use the term SSP. the reason is that SSP more accurately shows that SIP is the underlying Layer 5 signaling protocol 💅
this architecture lets two SSPs interconnect in Layer 5 peering, as defined in the SIP-based session peering requirements [RFC6271] 🦋
Layer 3 peering is out of scope for this doc, so the figures don't show routers. the whole point is to keep the focus on the Layer 5 protocol stuff 🌸
this doc uses terminology defined in "Session Peering for Multimedia Interconnect (SPEERMINT) Terminology" [RFC5486]. on top of the normative references in here, you might also find [RFC6405] helpful, but it's informative 📚
2. New Terminology 💜
[RFC5486] is the key reference for most of the SPEERMINT terminology in this doc. there are a few extra new terms though, and they're set out in this section 🫶
2.1. Session Border Controller (SBC)
a Session Border Controller (SBC) gets referred to in Section 5 🧚 an SBC can contain a Signaling Function (SF), a Signaling Path Border Element (SBE), and a Data Path Border Element (DBE). it may also perform the Lookup Function (LUF) and the Location Routing Function (LRF), as described in Section 3. whether an SBC does one or more of these functions depends pretty much on how a SIP Service Provider (SSP) configures that network element 🔥 requirements for an SBC can also be found in [RFC5853] ✨
2.2. Carrier-of-Record
a carrier-of-record, as used in Section 6.1.2.2, is defined in [RFC5067] 💅 the doc describes it as the entity that has discretion over the domain and zone content and acts as the registrant for a telephone number, as represented in ENUM. it can be any of the following:
- the service provider the E.164 number was allocated to for end user assignment, either by the National Regulatory Authority (NRA) or the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). an example is a code under "International Networks" (
+882) or "Universal Personal Telecommunications (UPT)" (+878) 🌈 - if the number got ported, the service provider the number was ported to 🦋
- where numbers are assigned directly to end users, the service provider that the end user number assignee picked to provide a Public Switched Telephone Network / Public Land Mobile Network (PSTN/PLMN) point-of-interconnect for the number 🎀
it's understood that the definition of "carrier-of-record" within a given jurisdiction can be changed by national authorities 🌸
3. Reference Architecture ✨
okay so bestie, this is the big picture 🖼️ the figure shows how two SSPs peer with each other, and every box in it has a job 💅
For more on the elements and functions in this figure, check out [RFC5486] 🎀 I'm copying the terms from Figure 1 that are defined there, just so you don't have to flip back and forth:
- Data Path Border Element (DBE): A data path border element (DBE) sits on the administrative border of a domain, and the media for an inter-domain session flows through it 🌊 Typically it does media stuff like deep packet inspection and modification, media relay, and firewall-traversal support. The DBE may be controlled by the SBE 🫶
- E.164 Number Mapping (ENUM): See [RFC6116] 📞
- Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN): See [RFC1035] 🌐
- Location Routing Function (LRF): The Location Routing Function (LRF) figures out, for the target domain of a request, where the SF is in that domain 📍 It can also optionally develop other Session Establishment Data (SED) needed to route the request to that domain. An example of the LRF may be applied to either example in Section 4.3.3 of [RFC5486] 🧚 Once the ENUM response or SIP 302 redirect comes back with the destination's SIP URI, the LRF must derive the destination peer's SF from the FQDN in the domain portion of the URI. In some cases, some entity (usually a third party or federation) provides peering assistance to the Originating SSP by doing this job 🤝 The assisting entity may provide information about direct (Section 4.2.1 of [RFC5486]) or indirect (Section 4.2.2 of [RFC5486]) peering as needed 💜
- Lookup Function (LUF): The Lookup Function (LUF) figures out, for a given request, which target domain the request should be routed to 🔍 An example of an LUF is an ENUM [4] look-up, or a SIP INVITE request to a SIP proxy that gives redirect responses for peers 💖 Again, sometimes a third party or federation provides peering assistance to the Originating SSP by doing this, and the assisting entity may provide info about direct (Section 4.2.1 of [RFC5486]) or indirect (Section 4.2.2 of [RFC5486]) peering as necessary 🌸
- Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP): See [RFC3550] 🎶
- Session Initiation Protocol (SIP): See [RFC3261] 🦋
- Signaling Path Border Element (SBE): A signaling path border element (SBE) sits on the administrative border of a domain, and inter-domain session-layer messages flow through it 🚪 Typically it provides Signaling Functions like protocol inter-working (for example, H.323 to SIP), identity and topology hiding, and Session Admission Control for a domain 👑
- Signaling Function (SF): The Signaling Function (SF) routes SIP requests to set up and keep up calls, and it helps with discovering or exchanging parameters the Media Function (MF) will use 📨 The SF is a capability of SIP processing elements like SIP proxies, SBEs, and User Agents ✨
- SIP Service Provider (SSP): A SIP Service Provider (SSP) is an entity that provides session services using SIP signaling to its customers 💅 If the SSP is also a function of the SP, it may also provide media streams to its customers. An SSP like this may additionally be peered with other SSPs 🫶 An SSP may also interconnect with the PSTN 📱
Here's the figure, served fresh 🖼️
+=============++ ++=============+
|| ||
+-----------+ +-----------+
| SBE | +-----+ | SBE |
| +-----+ | SIP |Proxy| | +-----+ |
| | LUF |<-|------>|ENUM | | | LUF | |
| +-----+ | ENUM |TN DB| | +-----+ |
SIP | | +-----+ | |
------>| +-----+ | DNS +-----+ | +-----+ |
| | LRF |<-|------>|FQDN | | | LRF | |
| +-----+ | |IP | | +-----+ |
| +-----+ | SIP +-----+ | +-----+ |
| | SF |<-|----------------|->| SF | |
| +-----+ | | +-----+ |
+-----------+ +-----------+
|| ||
+-----------+ +-----------+
RTP | DBE | RTP | DBE |
------>| |--------------->| |
+-----------+ +-----------+
|| ||
SSP1 Network || || SSP2 Network
+=============++ ++=============+
Reference Architecture
Figure 14. Procedures of Inter-Domain SSP Session Establishment 🎀
okay so here's the flow ☎️ This document assumes that, for a session to get set up from a User Agent (UA) in the Originating (or Indirect) SSP's network to a UA in the Target SSP's network, these steps happen 💕
- Determine the Target or Indirect SSP via the LUF. (Note: If the target address represents an intra-SSP resource, the behavior is out of scope with respect to this document 🙈)
- Determine the address of the SF of the Target SSP via the LRF.
- Establish the session.
- Exchange the media, which could include voice, video, text, etc. 🎥
- End the session (BYE) 👋
The Originating or Indirect SSP would do steps 1-4, the Target SSP would do step 4, and either one can do step 5 💅
If the Target SSP changes, steps 1-4 get repeated 🔁 This is reflected in Figure 1, which shows the Target SSP with its own peering functions 🌈
5. Relationships between Functions/Elements 🧩
Pls also look at Figure 1 🖼️
- An SBE can contain a Signaling Function (SF) 📦
- An SF can perform a Lookup Function (LUF) and Location Routing Function (LRF) 🔍
- As an additional consideration, a Session Border Controller can contain an SF, SBE and DBE, and may act as both an LUF and LRF 👑
- The following functions may communicate as follows in an example SSP network, depending upon various real-world implementations 🌍
- SF may communicate with the LUF, LRF, SBE, and SF
- LUF may communicate with the SF and SBE
- LRF may communicate with the SF and SBE
6. Recommended SSP Procedures 💖
This section breaks the functions down in more detail and gives some recommendations on the role they'd play in a SIP call in a Layer 5 peering scenario 🦋
Some of the info in this section comes from [RFC6271] and is included here for continuity 🫶 It's also important to check out Section 3.2 of [RFC6404], especially about using IPsec and TLS 🔐
6.1. Originating or Indirect SSP Procedures ✨
This section describes the procedures of the Originating or Indirect SSP 📡
6.1.1. The Lookup Function (LUF) 🔍
The LUF's whole purpose is to figure out the SF of the target domain for a given request, and optionally to develop Session Establishment Data 🎯 It's important to know the LUF may use the public e164.arpa ENUM root, as well as one or more private roots 🌸 When private roots are used, specialized routing rules may be implemented, and these rules may vary depending on whether an Originating or Indirect SSP is the one querying the LUF 🧚
6.1.1.1. Target Address Analysis 🕵️♀️
When the Originating (or Indirect) SSP gets a request to communicate, it analyzes the target URI to figure out whether the call needs to be routed internally or externally to its network 🔀 The analysis method is internal to the SSP, so it's outside the scope of SPEERMINT 🙅♀️
If the target address does not represent a resource inside the Originating (or Indirect) SSP's administrative domain or federation of domains, then the Originating (or Indirect) SSP performs a Lookup Function (LUF) to determine a target address, and then it resolves the call routing data by using the Location Routing Function (LRF) 💫
For example, if the request to communicate is for an im: or pres: URI type [RFC3861] [RFC3953], the Originating (or Indirect) SSP follows the procedures in [RFC3861] 💬 If the highest priority supported URI scheme is sip: or sips:, the Originating (or Indirect) SSP skips to SIP DNS resolution in Section 5.1.3 🏃♀️ Likewise, if the target address is already a sip: or sips: URI in an external domain, the Originating (or Indirect) SSP skips to SIP DNS resolution in Section 6.1.2.1 💅 This may be the case, to use one example, with "sips:bob@biloxi.example.com" 🍓
If the target address corresponds to a specific E.164 address, the SSP may need to do some form of number plan mapping according to local policy 🗺️ For example, in the United States, a dial string beginning "011 44" could be converted to "+44", and in the United Kingdom, "00 1" could be converted to "+1" 🇺🇸🇬🇧 Once the SSP has an E.164 address, it can use ENUM 📞
6.1.1.2. ENUM Lookup 📞
If an external E.164 address is the target, the Originating (or Indirect) SSP consults the public "User ENUM" rooted at e164.arpa, following the procedures in [RFC6116] 🌐 The SSP must query for the "E2U+sip" enumservice as described in [RFC3764], but it may check for other enumservices too 💖 The Originating (or Indirect) SSP may consult a cache or alternate representation of the ENUM data instead of doing actual DNS queries 🧠 Also, the SSP may skip actual DNS queries if the Originating (or Indirect) SSP is sure the target address country code isn't represented in e164.arpa 🙌
If an im: or pres: URI is chosen based on an "E2U+im" [RFC3861] or "E2U+pres" [RFC3953] enumserver, the SSP follows the procedures for resolving these URIs to URIs for specific protocols like SIP or Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP), as described in the previous section 💬
The Naming Authority Pointer (NAPTR) response to the ENUM lookup may be a SIP address of record (AOR) (such as "sips:bob@example.com") or a SIP URI (such as "sips:bob@sbe1.biloxi.example.com") 🎀 If a SIP URI comes back, the Originating (or Indirect) SSP has enough routing info to locate the Target SSP 🎯 If a SIP AoR comes back instead, the SF then uses the LRF to figure out the URI for more explicitly locating the Target SSP 🧭
6.1.2. Location Routing Function (LRF) 🗺️
The LRF of an Originating (or Indirect) SSP analyzes the target address and target domain identified by the LUF, and discovers the next-hop Signaling Function (SF) in a peering relationship 🔎 The resource for determining the SF of the target domain might be provided by a third party, as in the assisted-peering case 🤝 The following sections define mechanisms that may be used by the LRF 💜 These aren't in any particular order, and importantly, not all of them have to be used 🫶
6.1.2.1. DNS Resolution 🧚
okay so the Originating (or Indirect) SSP follows the steps in Section 4 of [RFC3263] to figure out how to reach the receiving SSP 💅. quick recap of [RFC3263]: unless these are explicitly encoded in the target URI, a transport gets picked using NAPTR records, a port gets picked using SRV records, and an address gets picked using A or AAAA records. it's giving layers 🌸
when talking to another SSP, entities compliant to this document should select a TLS-protected transport from the Originating (or Indirect) SSP to the receiving SSP if one is available, as described further in Section 6.2.1 🔐✨
6.1.2.2. Routing Table 🗺️
if there are no End User ENUM records and the Originating (or Indirect) SSP can't discover the carrier-of-record, or if it can't reach the carrier-of-record via SIP peering, it may deliver the call to the PSTN or reject it 📞 no cap, both are valid choices bestie.
note that the Originating (or Indirect) SSP may forward the call to another SSP for PSTN gateway termination, but only by prior arrangement, using the local SIP proxy routing table 🦋
if so, the Originating (or Indirect) SSP rewrites the Request-URI to address the gateway resource in the Target SSP's domain, and may forward the request on to that SSP using the procedures described in the remainder of these steps 💖
6.1.2.3. LRF to LRF Routing 🌈
the LRFs of two interconnecting SSPs may use DNS or statically provisioned IP addresses for reachability. other inputs to figure out the path may be code-based routing, method-based routing, time of day, least cost and/or source-based routing. so many options, it's literally a whole buffet 🍓
6.1.3. The Signaling Path Border Element (SBE) 🛡️
okay the Signaling Function's job is to route SIP messages, optionally implement security and policies on SIP messages, and help with discovery/exchange of the parameters the Media Function (MF) will use 🎀 the Signaling Function performs the routing of SIP messages (yes, it's said twice, we love a repeat 😭). the SBE may be a back-to-back user agent (B2BUA) or it may act as a SIP proxy 🦋
optionally, an SF may also do extra stuff like Session Admission Control, SIP Denial-of-Service protection, SIP Topology Hiding, SIP header normalization, SIP security, privacy, and encryption. the SF of an SBE can also process SDP payloads for media info like media type, bandwidth, and type of codec, and then pass that info along to the media function 💜
6.1.3.1. Establishing a Trusted Relationship 🤝
depending on the security needs and trust relationships between SSPs, different security mechanisms can be used to establish SIP calls. we'll get into those in the following subsections 👑
6.1.3.2. IPsec 🔒
in certain deployments, IPsec between the Signaling Functions of the originating and terminating domains can be used as a security mechanism instead of TLS. however, such IPsec use should be the subject of a future document, because extra specification is necessary to use IPsec properly and effectively 🥺
6.1.3.3. Co-Location 🏢
in this scenario, the SFs are co-located in a physically secure location and/or are members of a segregated network. in this case, messages between the Originating and Terminating SSPs could be sent as clear text (unencrypted) 👀
however, even in these semi-trusted co-location facilities, other security or access control mechanisms may be appropriate, such as IP access control lists or other mechanisms. don't get too comfy just because the building is locked 🙈
6.1.3.4. Sending the SIP Request 📨
once a trust relationship between the peers is established, the Originating (or Indirect) SSP sends the request. main character moment, finally 🎉
6.2. Target SSP Procedures 🎯
this section describes the Target SSP Procedures ✨
6.2.1. TLS 🔐
this section defines the usage of TLS between two SSPs [RFC5246] [RFC5746] [RFC5878]. when the receiving SSP gets a TLS client hello, it responds with its certificate. the Target SSP certificate should be valid and rooted in a well-known certificate authority 🏛️ the procedures to authenticate the SSP's originating domain are specified in [RFC5922] 💅
the SF of the Target SSP verifies that the Identity header is valid, corresponds to the message, corresponds to the Identity-Info header, and that the domain in the From header corresponds to one of the domains in the TLS client certificate. that's a lot of checking, but we respect the energy 🫶
as noted above in Section 6.1.3.2, some deployments may use IPsec rather than TLS 🦋
6.2.2. Receive SIP Requests 📬
once a trust relationship is established, the Target SSP is prepared to receive incoming SIP requests. for new requests (dialog forming or not), the receiving SSP verifies whether the target (Request-URI) is a domain it's responsible for. for these requests, there should be no remaining Route header field values. for in-dialog requests, the receiving SSP can verify that it corresponds to the top-most Route header field value 🧐
the receiving SSP may reject incoming requests due to local policy. when a request is rejected because the Originating (or Indirect) SSP is not authorized to peer, the receiving SSP should respond with a 403 response with the reason phrase "Unsupported Peer". rude but valid 💀
6.3. Data Path Border Element (DBE) 🎧
the purpose of the DBE [RFC5486] is to handle media-related functions like media transcoding and media security implementation between two SSPs 🎶
for example, it can transform a voice payload from one codec (e.g., G.711) to another (e.g., EvRC). additionally, the MF may perform media relaying, media security [RFC3711], privacy, and encryption. so much going on in the media lane 🌟
7. Address Space Considerations 🌍
peering must occur in a common IP address space, which is defined by the federation. that space may be entirely on the public Internet, or some private address space [RFC1918] 🏡 the origination or termination networks may or may not be entirely in the same address space 🤷♀️
if they aren't, then a Network Address Translation (NAT) or something similar may be needed before the signaling or media is presented correctly to the federation. the only requirement is that all associated entities across the peering interface are reachable. that's it, that's the rule 💖
8. Acknowledgments 🫶
the working group would like to thank John Elwell, Otmar Lendl, Rohan Mahy, Alexander Mayrhofer, Jim McEachern, Jean-Francois Mule, Jonathan Rosenberg, and Dan Wing for their valuable contributions to various versions of this document. legends, every single one 👑
9. Security Considerations 🚨
okay this part is SERIOUS, bestie 😭 the level (or types) of security mechanisms implemented between peering providers depends, in practice, on the underlying physical security of SSP connections. as noted in Section 6.1.3.3, whether peering equipment sits in a secure facility or not may affect which other types of security mechanisms are appropriate. so if two SSPs peer across public Internet links, they are likely to use IPsec or TLS, because the link between the two domains should be considered untrusted 🕳️
many detailed and highly relevant security requirements for SPEERMINT have been documented in Section 5 of [RFC6271]. as a result, that document should be considered required reading 📚 do your homework, no excuses.
additional and important security considerations have been documented separately in [RFC6404]. that document describes the many relevant security threats to SPEERMINT, as well as the relevant countermeasures and security protections that are recommended to combat any potential threats or other risks. this includes a wide range of detailed threats in Section 2 of [RFC6404] 🚩
it also includes key requirements in Section 3.1 of [RFC6404], such as the requirement for the LUF and LRF to support mutual authentication for queries, among other requirements related to [RFC6271]. Section 3.2 of [RFC6404] explains how to meet these security requirements, and then Section 4 explores a wide range of suggested countermeasures. the plot thickens 🕵️♀️🔥
10. Contributors 🌸
Mike Hammer
Cisco Systems
Herndon, VA
US
EMail: mhammer@cisco.com
Hadriel Kaplan
Acme Packet
Burlington, MA
US
EMail: hkaplan@acmepacket.com
Sohel Khan, Ph.D.
Comcast Cable
Philadelphia, PA
US
EMail: sohel_khan@cable.comcast.com
Reinaldo Penno
Juniper Networks
Sunnyvale, CA
US
EMail: rpenno@juniper.net
David Schwartz
XConnect Global Networks
Jerusalem
Israel
EMail: dschwartz@xconnnect.net
Rich Shockey
Shockey Consulting
US
EMail: Richard@shockey.us
Adam Uzelac
Global Crossing
Rochester, NY
US
EMail: adam.uzelac@globalcrossing.com11. References 📖
11.1. Normative References 🧾
- [RFC1035] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, November 1987.
- [RFC1918] Rekhter, Y., Moskowitz, R., Karrenberg, D., Groot, G., and E. Lear, "Address Allocation for Private Internets", BCP 5, RFC 1918, February 1996.
- [RFC3261] Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston, A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E. Schooler, "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261, June 2002.
- [RFC3263] Rosenberg, J. and H. Schulzrinne, "Session Initiation Protocol (SIP): Locating SIP Servers", RFC 3263, June 2002.
- [RFC3550] Schulzrinne, H., Casner, S., Frederick, R., and V. Jacobson, "RTP: A Transport Protocol for Real-Time Applications", STD 64, RFC 3550, July 2003.
- [RFC3764] Peterson, J., "enumservice registration for Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Addresses-of-Record", RFC 3764, April 2004.
- [RFC3861] Peterson, J., "Address Resolution for Instant Messaging and Presence", RFC 3861, August 2004.
- [RFC3953] Peterson, J., "Telephone Number Mapping (ENUM) Service Registration for Presence Services", RFC 3953, January 2005.
- [RFC5067] Lind, S. and P. Pfautz, "Infrastructure ENUM Requirements", RFC 5067, November 2007.
- [RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008.
- [RFC5486] Malas, D. and D. Meyer, "Session Peering for Multimedia Interconnect (SPEERMINT) Terminology", RFC 5486, March 2009.
- [RFC5746] Rescorla, E., Ray, M., Dispensa, S., and N. Oskov, "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Renegotiation Indication Extension", RFC 5746, February 2010.
- [RFC5853] Hautakorpi, J., Camarillo, G., Penfield, R., Hawrylyshen, A., and M. Bhatia, "Requirements from Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Session Border Control (SBC) Deployments", RFC 5853, April 2010.
- [RFC5878] Brown, M. and R. Housley, "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Authorization Extensions", RFC 5878, May 2010.
- [RFC5922] Gurbani, V., Lawrence, S., and A. Jeffrey, "Domain Certificates in the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)", RFC 5922, June 2010.
- [RFC6116] Bradner, S., Conroy, L., and K. Fujiwara, "The E.164 to Uniform Resource Identifiers (URI) Dynamic Delegation Discovery System (DDDS) Application (ENUM)", RFC 6116, March 2011.
- [RFC6271] Mule, J-F., "Requirements for SIP-Based Session Peering", RFC 6271, June 2011.
- [RFC6404] Seedorf, J., Niccolini, S., Chen, E., and H. Scholz, "Session PEERing for Multimedia INTerconnect (SPEERMINT) Security Threats and Suggested Countermeasures", RFC 6404, November 2011.
11.2. Informative References ✨
okay bestie, these are the "read this if you're curious" ones 📚 they're informative, not normative, so you don't have to read them to implement anything 💅
[RFC3711] Baugher, M., McGrew, D., Naslund, M., Carrara, E., and K.
Norrman, "The Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP)",
RFC 3711, March 2004.
[RFC6405] Uzelac, A., Ed. and Y. Lee, Ed., "Voice over IP (VoIP) SIP
Peering Use Cases", RFC 6405, November 2011.Authors' Addresses 🎀
the two editors who put this whole thing together 🫶 say hi!
Daryl Malas (editor)
CableLabs
Louisville, CO
US
EMail: d.malas@cablelabs.comJason Livingood (editor)
Comcast
Philadelphia, PA
US
EMail: Jason_Livingood@cable.comcast.comthat's the whole RFC, bestie 🌈👑 💖
📦 where this page comes from
- ietf: rfc6406 2011-11
- 💖 girlified by claude-haiku-5-5 on : a language model's rewrite of the original, under its terms