RFC 6367

Addition of the Camellia Cipher Suites to Transport Layer Security (TLS)

πŸ“… published September 2011, from ietf

RFC 6367: Addition of the Camellia Cipher Suites to Transport Layer Security (TLS) πŸŽ€

Okay bestie, let's get into RFC 6367 πŸ’… It's Informational (so it's not a Standards Track spec, just published for info) and it came out in September 2011. The authors are S. Kanno from NTT Software Corporation and M. Kanda from NTT. The ISSN is 2070-1721. Nothing in the title block says it obsoletes or updates anything, so it stands on its own πŸ¦‹

Status of This Memo ✨

Here's the official vibe check: this is not an Internet Standards Track spec, it's just here for informational purposes πŸ“š

It's a product of the IETF, meaning it reflects the consensus of the IETF community. It got public review and was approved for publication by the IESG (Internet Engineering Steering Group). Not every IESG-approved doc is a candidate for any level of Internet Standard, so check Section 2 of RFC 5741 if you want the deets 🧐

If you want the current status, errata, or a way to send feedback, head to http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6367 🌸

Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.

This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) as they're in effect on the date of publication. Please read these carefully, because they spell out your rights and restrictions for this document πŸ“œ

Code Components pulled out of this document must include Simplified BSD License text, as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions. They come without warranty, as described in the Simplified BSD License πŸ”₯

Table of Contents 🧚

1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
  1.1.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2.  Proposed Cipher Suites  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
  2.1.  HMAC-Based Cipher Suites  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
  2.2.  GCM-Based Cipher Suites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
  2.3.  PSK-Based Cipher Suites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.  Cipher Suite Definitions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
  3.1.  Key Exchange  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
  3.2.  Cipher  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
  3.3.  PRFs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
  3.4.  PSK Cipher Suites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
6.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
  6.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
  6.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Abstract 🌈

This document specifies forty-two cipher suites for the Transport Security Layer (TLS) protocol to support the Camellia encryption algorithm as a block cipher πŸ“

1. Introduction ✨

Okay so Camellia cipher suites were already specified in RFC 5932 [15], using SHA-256-based Hashed Message Authentication Code (HMAC) with asymmetric key encryption. This doc is proposing new cipher suites for the Transport Layer Security (TLS) [8] protocol so Camellia [4] can work as a block cipher algorithm πŸ”₯

The proposed suites include variants that use the SHA-2 family of cryptographic hash functions [13] and Galois Counter Mode (GCM) [14]. Elliptic curve cipher suites and pre-shared key (PSK) [5] cipher suites are in the mix too πŸ’…

1.1. Terminology πŸ“–

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [3] πŸŽ€

2. Proposed Cipher Suites πŸ‘‘

2.1. HMAC-Based Cipher Suites πŸ¦‹

The eight cipher suites use Camellia [4] in Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) [4] mode with a SHA-2 family HMAC using the elliptic curve cryptosystem. Here they are, bestie πŸ’–

 CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 = {0xC0,0x72};
 CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 = {0xC0,0x73};
 CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256  = {0xC0,0x74};
 CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384  = {0xC0,0x75};
 CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256   = {0xC0,0x76};
 CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384   = {0xC0,0x77};
 CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256    = {0xC0,0x78};
 CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384    = {0xC0,0x79};

2.2. GCM-Based Cipher Suites πŸ’œ

The twenty cipher suites use the same asymmetric key algorithms as the ones in the previous section, but they use the authenticated encryption modes defined in TLS 1.2 [8] with Camellia in GCM [14]. Iconic 🌸

CipherSuite TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256          = {0xC0,0x7A};
CipherSuite TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384          = {0xC0,0x7B};
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256      = {0xC0,0x7C};
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384      = {0xC0,0x7D};
CipherSuite TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256       = {0xC0,0x7E};
CipherSuite TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384       = {0xC0,0x7F};
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256      = {0xC0,0x80};
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384      = {0xC0,0x81};
CipherSuite TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256       = {0xC0,0x82};
CipherSuite TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384       = {0xC0,0x83};
CipherSuite TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256      = {0xC0,0x84};
CipherSuite TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384      = {0xC0,0x85};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256  = {0xC0,0x86};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384  = {0xC0,0x87};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256   = {0xC0,0x88};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384   = {0xC0,0x89};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256    = {0xC0,0x8A};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384    = {0xC0,0x8B};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256     = {0xC0,0x8C};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384     = {0xC0,0x8D};

2.3. PSK-Based Cipher Suites 🧚

The fourteen cipher suites describe PSK cipher suites. The first six use Camellia with GCM, and the next eight use Camellia with SHA-2 family HMAC, using either asymmetric key encryption or the elliptic curve cryptosystem. Main character energy ✨

  CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256        = {0xC0,0x8D};
  CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384        = {0xC0,0x8F};
  CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256    = {0xC0,0x90};
  CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384    = {0xC0,0x91};
  CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256    = {0xC0,0x92};
  CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384    = {0xC0,0x93};
  CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256        = {0xC0,0x94};
  CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384        = {0xC0,0x95};
  CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256    = {0xC0,0x96};
  CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384    = {0xC0,0x97};
  CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256    = {0xC0,0x98};
  CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384    = {0xC0,0x99};
  CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256  = {0xC0,0x9A};
  CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384  = {0xC0,0x9B};

Part 1 of 2 is done 🌈 Part 2 is next, and it covers Section 3 onward, including the cipher definitions, the PRFs, the security considerations, IANA, and the references 🫢

okay so the list keeps going and it's giving pure mix-and-match energy πŸŽ€βœ¨ every combo of ECDHE, ECDH, RSA, and PSK gets its own code, all paired with Camellia in GCM or CBC mode, so you can pick the one that fits your setup πŸ’…

CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256   = {0xC0,0x88};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384   = {0xC0,0x89};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256    = {0xC0,0x8A};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384    = {0xC0,0x8B};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256     = {0xC0,0x8C};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384     = {0xC0,0x8D};
CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256          = {0xC0,0x8E};
CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384          = {0xC0,0x8F};
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256      = {0xC0,0x90};
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384      = {0xC0,0x91};
CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256      = {0xC0,0x92};
CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384      = {0xC0,0x93};
CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256          = {0xC0,0x94};
CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384          = {0xC0,0x95};
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256      = {0xC0,0x96};
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384      = {0xC0,0x97};
CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256      = {0xC0,0x98};
CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384      = {0xC0,0x99};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256    = {0xC0,0x9A};
CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384    = {0xC0,0x9B};

6. References ✨

6.1. Normative References

Okay, these are the must-read docs, bestie πŸ“š Everything the spec leans on lives here.

  • [1] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104, February 1997. πŸ”
  • [2] Dierks, T. and C. Allen, "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0", RFC 2246, January 1999. 🌸
  • [3] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. 🫢
  • [4] Matsui, M., Nakajima, J., and S. Moriai, "A Description of the Camellia Encryption Algorithm", RFC 3713, April 2004. πŸ¦‹
  • [5] Eronen, P. and H. Tschofenig, "Pre-Shared Key Ciphersuites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 4279, December 2005. πŸ—οΈ
  • [6] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.1", RFC 4346, April 2006. πŸŽ€
  • [7] McGrew, D., "An Interface and Algorithms for Authenticated Encryption", RFC 5116, January 2008. ✨
  • [8] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008. πŸ‘‘
  • [9] Salowey, J., Choudhury, A., and D. McGrew, "AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM) Cipher Suites for TLS", RFC 5288, August 2008. πŸ’œ
  • [10] Rescorla, E., "TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with SHA-256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM)", RFC 5289, August 2008. 🧚
  • [11] Badra, M., "Pre-Shared Key Cipher Suites for TLS with SHA-256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode", RFC 5487, March 2009. 🌈
  • [12] Badra, M. and I. Hajjeh, "ECDHE_PSK Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 5489, March 2009. πŸ“
  • [13] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Secure Hash Standard (SHS)", FIPS PUB 180, October 2008, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips180-3/fips180-3_final.pdf. πŸ”₯
  • [14] Dworkin, M., "Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) for Confidentiality and Authentication", Special Publication 800-38D, April 2006, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38D/SP-800-38D.pdf. πŸ’…

6.2. Informative References

These ones are extra reading if you want the full tea β˜•

Authors' Addresses πŸ’Œ

Meet the brains behind it, bestie πŸ§ πŸ’–

Satoru Kanno
NTT Software Corporation

Phone: +81-45-212-9803
Fax:   +81-45-212-9800
EMail: kanno.satoru@po.ntts.co.jp


Masayuki Kanda
NTT

Phone: +81-422-59-3456
Fax:   +81-422-59-4015
EMail: kanda.masayuki@lab.ntt.co.jp

That's the whole spec, bestie! Absolute main character work from both of them πŸŒˆπŸ‘‘βœ¨

πŸ“¦ where this page comes from