RFC 6170

Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure -- Certificate Image

📅 published May 2011, from ietf

Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure -- Certificate Image 🎀

Okay bestie, welcome to RFC 6170 🦋 Here's the quick title-block tea before we dive in ✨

Document: RFC 6170, published by the IETF in May 2011 📅
Category: Standards Track, ISSN 2070-1721 👑
Updates: RFC 3709 🫶
Authors: S. Santesson (3xA Security), R. Housley (Vigil Security), S. Bajaj (Symantec Corp.), and L. Rosenthol (Adobe) 💜

Abstract 🦋

Okay so this doc is about giving a certificate its own visual look 👀 It binds a certificate image to a public key certificate as defined in RFC 5280, and it does that by creating a brand new "otherLogos" image type under RFC 3709. Iconic 🔥

Status of This Memo 📝

This is an Internet Standards Track document 💅

This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has received public review and has been approved for publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 5741 ✨

Information about the current status of this document, any errata, and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6170 🌸

Copyright Notice 🌈

This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, because they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document 🙈 Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions, and they are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License 🍓

Table of Contents 🗺️

   1. Introduction ....................................................2
      1.1. Terminology ................................................3
   2. Certificate Image ...............................................3
   3. LogotypeImageInfo ...............................................4
   4. Embedded Images .................................................5
   5. Certificate Image Formats .......................................6
      5.1. PDF ........................................................6
      5.2. SVG ........................................................6
      5.3. PNG ........................................................7
   6. Security Considerations .........................................7
   7. Acknowledgements ................................................8
   8. References ......................................................9
      8.1. Normative References .......................................9
      8.2. Informative References .....................................9
   Appendix A.  ASN.1 Module .........................................10
   Appendix B.  Example ..............................................11

1. Introduction ✨

Okay so this standard tells you how to bind a certificate image to a certificate (defined in [RFC5280]). The image gives you a visual version of that certificate, using the Logotype extension from [RFC3709], and it's specified as a new "otherLogos" type 🎀

The whole point of the certificate image is to help a human understand a certificate by giving the user UI meaningful visual info 👀🦋

There are a few typical moments when a human needs to look at what a certificate looks like 💅

A person sets up a secured channel with an authenticated service. They need to figure out who the service is from its authenticated credentials 🔐
A person checks the signature on critical info, like signed executable code, and needs to figure out who the signer is from the signer's certificate 🧚
A person has to pick the right certificate for authenticating to a service or an Identity Management infrastructure. They need to see the available certificates so they can tell them apart while choosing 💜

Showing certificate info to humans is kinda hard, ngl 😭 There aren't well-defined semantics for critical identity attributes. Unless the app has out-of-band knowledge about a particular certificate, it won't know what the data in common identification attributes like serialNumber, organizationName, country, and so on actually means. So the app can show the raw data, but then it has to figure out how to label that data in the UI and tell the human what it really means (its semantics). It's also tricky for the app to decide which identification attributes are important to show and what order to put them in 🙈

RFC 3709 [RFC3709] defines a certificate extension for binding images to a certificate, like a community logo or an issuer logo, which makes certificate info way easier to read 🌈 The syntax is extensible and lets you include new image types using the otherLogos structure. This standard explains how to include a complete certificate image using that extensibility mechanism of RFC 3709 🫶

1.1. Terminology 📖

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119] 💅

2. Certificate Image 🖼️

This section defines the certificate image as a new otherLogos type, following Section 4.1 of [RFC3709] 🦋

The certificate image otherLogos type is identified by the Object Identifier (OID) id-logo-certimage 🔑

      id-pkix  OBJECT IDENTIFIER  ::=
           { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
           security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) }

      id-logo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 20 }

      id-logo-certimage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-logo 3 }

When it's present, the certificate image MUST be a complete visual representation of the certificate 💖 That means the display of this image shows all the info about the certificate that the issuer subjectively decides is relevant to show a typical human user within the typical intended use of the certificate. It has to give adequate info about at least these three aspects of the certificate ✨

Certificate Context
Certificate Issuer
Certificate Subject

Certificate Context is the visual marks and/or textual info that helps the typical user understand the typical usage and/or purpose of the certificate 🌸

It's up to the issuer to decide what info, in the form of text, graphical symbols, and elements, makes up a complete visual representation of the certificate 🎀 However, the visual representation of the Certificate Subject and Certificate Issuer info from the certificate MUST have the same meaning as the textual representation of that info in the certificate itself 👑

Applications that provide a Graphical User Interface (GUI) to the certificate user MAY present a certificate image according to this standard in any application interface, as the only visual representation of a certificate 🧚

3. LogotypeImageInfo 🍓

The optional LogotypeImageInfo structure is defined in [RFC3709], and it's included here for convenience 💜

     LogotypeImageInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
        type          [0] LogotypeImageType DEFAULT color,
        fileSize      INTEGER,  -- In octets
        xSize         INTEGER,  -- Horizontal size in pixels
        ySize         INTEGER,  -- Vertical size in pixels
        resolution    LogotypeImageResolution OPTIONAL,
        language      [4] IA5String OPTIONAL }  -- RFC 3066 Language Tag

NOTE: The referenced RFC 3066 in the structure above (from RFC 3709) is obsolete and is currently replaced by RFC 5646 [RFC5646]. The language tag may carry info about the language used to express any textual elements within the image, as well as any audio info associated with the image 🌈

When the optional LogotypeImageInfo is included with a certificate image, the parameters shall be used with the following semantics and restrictions 🙈

xSize and ySize represent the recommended display size for the image 🦋 When the value is 0 (zero), no recommended display size is specified. When non-zero values are present and they differ from the corresponding size values in the referenced image file, then the referenced image SHOULD be scaled to fit within the size parameters of LogotypeImageInfo, while keeping the x and y ratio intact 📐

The resolution parameter is redundant for all image formats that are relevant for certificate images, so it MUST NOT be specified 💅

4. Embedded Images 🧚

The certificate image otherLogos type defined in this specification, and all logotype types defined in RFC 3709 [RFC3709], MAY be stored within the logotype extension using the "data" URL scheme defined in RFC 2397 [RFC2397]. This applies when the logotype image is provided through direct addressing, meaning the image is referenced using the LogotypeDetails structure 🫶

The syntax of Logotype details from RFC 3709 is included here for convenience 🎀

      LogotypeDetails ::= SEQUENCE {
         mediaType       IA5String, -- MIME media type name and optional
                                    -- parameters (see Section 5)
         logotypeHash    SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF HashAlgAndValue,
         logotypeURI     SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF IA5String }

The syntax of the "data" URL scheme from RFC 2397 is included here for convenience 🌸

      dataurl    := "data:" [ mediatype ] [ ";base64" ] "," data
      mediatype  := [ type "/" subtype ] *( ";" parameter )
      data       := *urlchar
      parameter  := attribute "=" value

When you include the image data in the logotype extension using the "data" URL scheme, these conventions apply 👑

The value of mediaType in LogotypeDetails MUST be identical to the media type value in the "data" URL 💖
The hash of the image MUST be included in logotypeHash, and it MUST be calculated over the same data it would have been if the image had been referenced through a link to an external resource 🔥

NOTE: Because the "data" URL scheme is processed as a data source rather than as a URL, the image data is typically not limited by any URL length limit settings that otherwise apply to URLs in general 🌈

NOTE: Implementations need to be cautious about the size of images included in a certificate, so that the size of the certificate doesn't stop it from being used as intended 🙈

5. Certificate Image Formats 📸

Implementations of this specification MUST support JPEG and GIF as defined in RFC 3709 [RFC3709] ✨ On top of these mandatory-to-implement formats, this specification also specifies the use of the Portable Document Format (PDF), Scalable Vector Graphics (SVG), and Portable Network Graphics (PNG) as image formats 🦋

To be continued, bestie 🌈

5.1. PDF 📄

okay so a certificate image MAY come as a Portable Document Format doc, following [ISO32000] and the conventions in this section 💖

if your image is a PDF, it MUST also be formatted according to the profile PDF/A [ISO19005] 🙈

when you include a PDF as a certificate image, the MIME media type from [RFC3778] MUST be used as the mediaType in LogotypeDetails, and that type is:

application/pdf

5.2. SVG 🎨

a certificate image MAY be a Scalable Vector Graphics (SVG) image. It MUST follow the SVG Tiny profile [SVGT], with these amendments that are giving strict vibes:

The SVG image MUST NOT contain any Internationalized Resource Identifier (IRI) references to information stored outside of the SVG image of type B, C, or D, according to Section 14.1.4 of SVG Tiny 1.2 [SVGT]. 🚫
The SVG image MUST NOT contain any 'script' element, according to Section 15.2 of SVG Tiny 1.2 [SVGT]. 🙅
The XML structure in the SVG file MUST use <LF> (linefeed 0x0A) as the end-of-line (EOL) character when calculating a hash over the SVG image. 📏

the referenced SVG file MAY be provided in GZIP-compressed [RFC1952] form as an SVGZ file 🎁 in that case, the extension 'svgz' is used as an alias for 'svg.gz' [RFC1952], i.e., octet streams of type image/svg+xml, subsequently compressed with gzip as specified in [SVGR]. the hash over the SVGZ file is calculated over the decompressed SVG content with canonicalized EOL characters (<LF>) as specified above ✨

the following MIME media type, defined in Appendix M of [SVGT], MUST be included as mediaType in LogotypeDetails for all SVG and SVGZ images:

image/svg+xml

when the SVG image is embedded using the "data" URL scheme as defined in Section 4, SVG image data MUST be provided in SVGZ (GZIP compressed) form (i.e., it MUST NOT be provided in uncompressed SVG form). no uncompressed SVG in data URLs, period 🌈

compliant implementations of this specification SHOULD be able to process SVG images that are formatted according to this section 💅

5.3. PNG 🦋

if a certificate image is a bitmapped image, the PNG [ISO15948] format SHOULD be used 🖼️

PNG images are identified by the following mediaType in LogotypeDetails:

image/png

6. Security Considerations 🔥

this document is based on and inherits all security considerations from RFC 3709 [RFC3709]. this part is serious, bestie 🚨 RFC 3709 covers several issues a Certificate Authority (CA) should take into consideration when it's deciding whether to issue a certificate with a certificate image.

images brought in under RFC 3709 give a CA with bad intentions or bad security procedures an extra way to slip false, conflicting, or malicious info to relying parties 😤 a sketchy CA could, for example:

include information in graphical form that conflicts with the info in its text-based attributes or other name forms, and
include malicious data that could exploit known security bugs in common software libraries used to render graphical images.

this underlines why CAs have to provide reliable services, and why relying parties need to be careful about which CAs they trust to provide public key certificates 🔐

it also means relying parties need to keep their software libraries up to date when they render or dereference data from external sources (such as certificates). that helps cut the risk of processing potentially malicious data before it's been properly verified and validated 🛡️

referenced image files get hashed so the image is bound to the signature of the certificate. some image types, like SVG, can pull part of the image from an external source by including a reference to an external image file. if that feature were used inside a certificate image file, the hash of the image file would only cover the URI reference to the external image file, not the referenced image data 👀 Clients SHOULD verify that SVGT images meet all requirements listed in Section 5.2 and reject images that contain references to external data. 🙅‍♀️

CAs issuing certificates with embedded certificate images should be cautious when accepting graphics from the certificate requestor for inclusion in the certificate if the hash algorithm used to sign the certificate is vulnerable to collision attacks. in that situation, the accepted image may contain data that could help an attacker obtain colliding certificates with identical certificate signatures 💀

certificates, and so their certificate images, are commonly public objects and usually won't contain privacy-sensitive information 🌸 however, when a certificate image referenced from a certificate does contain privacy-sensitive information, appropriate security controls should be in place to protect the privacy of that information. details of such controls are outside the scope of this document 🔒

7. Acknowledgements 🫶

the authors recognize valuable contributions from members of the PKIX working group, the CA Browser Forum, and James Manger, for their review and sample data 💜

8. References 📚

8.1. Normative References

[RFC1952] Deutsch, P., "GZIP file format specification version 4.3", RFC 1952, May 1996.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2397] Masinter, L., "The "data" URL scheme", RFC 2397, August 1998.
[RFC3709] Santesson, S., Housley, R., and T. Freeman, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: Logotypes in X.509 Certificates", RFC 3709, February 2004.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.
[RFC5646] Phillips, A., Ed., and M. Davis, Ed., "Tags for Identifying Languages", BCP 47, RFC 5646, September 2009.
[ISO15948] ISO/IEC 15948:2004, "Information technology -- Computer graphics and image processing -- Portable Network Graphics (PNG): Functional specification", 2004.
[ISO19005] ISO 19005-1:2005, "Document management -- Electronic document file format for long-term preservation -- Part 1: Use of PDF 1.4 (PDF/A-1)", 2005.
[ISO32000] ISO 32000-1:2008, "Document management -- Portable document format -- Part 1: PDF 1.7", April 2008.
[SVGT] W3C Recommendation, "Scalable Vector Graphics (SVG) Tiny 1.2 Specification", December 2008.

8.2. Informative References

[RFC3778] Taft, E., Pravetz, J., Zilles, S., and L. Masinter, "The application/pdf Media Type", RFC 3778, May 2004.
[SVGR] "Media Type Registration for image/svg+xml", http://dev.w3.org/SVG/profiles/1.1F2/master/mimereg.html.

Appendix A. ASN.1 Module 💜

CERT-IMAGE-MODULE { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
    internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
    id-mod-logotype-certimage(68) }

DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN

  EXPORTS ALL;   -- export all items from this module

    id-logo-certImage  OBJECT IDENTIFIER  ::=
          { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
          security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-logo(20) 3 }

END

Appendix B. Example 🧚

the following example stores an embedded svgz-encoded SVG image using the "data" URL scheme 🦋

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Authors' Addresses 💌

Stefan Santesson
3xA Security (AAA-sec.com)
Bjornstorp 744
247 98 Genarp
Sweden
EMail: sts@aaa-sec.com

Russell Housley
Vigil Security, LLC
918 Spring Knoll Drive
Herndon, VA  20170
USA
EMail: housley@vigilsec.com

Siddharth Bajaj
Symantec Corp.
350 Ellis Street
Mountain View, CA  94043
USA
EMail: siddharthietf@gmail.com

Leonard Rosenthol
3533 Sunset Way
Huntingdon Valley, PA  19006
USA
EMail: leonardr@adobe.com

that's the whole spec, bestie 🌈✨👑

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ietf: rfc6170 2011-05
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