RFC 5613

OSPF Link-Local Signaling

๐Ÿ“… published August 2009, from ietf

Okay bestie, this is RFC 5613, an IETF Standards Track document from the Network Working Group, dated August 2009. It was written by A. Zinin (Alcatel-Lucent), A. Roy, L. Nguyen (Cisco Systems), B. Friedman (Google, Inc.), and D. Yeung (Cisco Systems). It obsoletes RFC 4813, the experimental version, so this is the glow-up that brings it onto the Standards Track ๐Ÿ’…โœจ

Abstract ๐ŸŒธ

OSPF is a link-state intra-domain routing protocol, and OSPF routers swap info on a link using packets with a super well-defined fixed format. The problem is that the format isn't flexible enough for new features that need to send arbitrary data ๐Ÿ™ˆ This document describes a backward-compatible technique for link-local signaling, which just means exchanging arbitrary data on a link. It also replaces the experimental spec from RFC 4813 and brings it onto the Standards Track ๐Ÿฆ‹

Status of This Memo ๐Ÿ“‹

This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the Internet community, and it's asking for discussion and suggestions for improvements ๐Ÿ’ฌ For the standardization state and status of this protocol, check the current edition of the "Internet Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1). Distribution of this memo is unlimited ๐ŸŒˆ

Copyright (c) 2009 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.

This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents in effect on the date of publication of this document (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info). Please review these documents carefully, because they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document ๐Ÿ“œ

Table of Contents ๐Ÿ—‚๏ธ

1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  2
  1.1.  Requirements Notation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  2
2.  Proposed Solution  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
  2.1.  L-Bit in Options Field . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
  2.2.  LLS Data Block . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
  2.3.  LLS TLVs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
  2.4.  Extended Options and Flags TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
  2.5.  Cryptographic Authentication TLV (OSPFv2 ONLY) . . . . . .  6
  2.6.  Private TLVs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
3.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
4.  Compatibility Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
5.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
6.  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
  6.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
  6.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Appendix A.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Appendix B.  Changes from RFC 4813 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

1. Introduction โœจ

This document describes an extension to OSPFv2 [OSPFV2] and OSPFv3 [OSPFV3] that lets routers on the same link trade extra info ๐Ÿซถ OSPFv2 and OSPFv3 packet formats are fixed and can't be extended, so this doc proposes tacking an optional data block onto existing OSPFv2 and OSPFv3 packets. That block is made of Type/Length/Value (TLV) triplets. When the spec applies to both versions, we just say OSPF, and when the text is specific to one, we say OSPFv2 or OSPFv3 ๐Ÿ’…

One obvious idea would be a brand-new packet type. But that means extra packets floating around the network, which might not be wanted and could cause backward compatibility drama ๐Ÿ’€ So this document shows how to exchange data using standard OSPF packet types instead. Iconic restraint ๐Ÿ‘‘

1.1. Requirements Notation ๐Ÿ“

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [KEY] ๐Ÿ”‘

2. Proposed Solution ๐ŸŒˆ

To do link-local signaling (LLS), OSPF routers stick a special data block on the end of OSPF packets. If cryptographic authentication is being used, the block goes right after the authentication data block instead ๐Ÿ” The LLS block's length doesn't count toward the OSPF packet length, but it does count toward the IPv4/IPv6 packet length. Figure 1 shows how it's attached ๐Ÿฆ‹

+---------------------+ --              --  +---------------------+
| IP Header           | ^               ^   | IPv6 Header         |
| Length = HL+X+Y+Z   | | Header Length |   | Length = HL+X+Y     |
|                     | v               v   |                     |
+---------------------+ --              --  +---------------------+
| OSPF Header         | ^               ^   | OSPFv3 Header       |
| Length = X          | |               |   | Length = X          |
|.....................| | X             | X |.....................|
|                     | |               |   |                     |
| OSPFv2 Data         | |               |   | OSPFv3 Data         |
|                     | v               v   |                     |
+---------------------+ --              --  +---------------------+
|                     | ^               ^   |                     |
| Authentication Data | | Y             | Y |  LLS Data           |
|                     | v               v   |                     |
+---------------------+ --              --  +---------------------+
|                     | ^
|  LLS Data           | | Z
|                     | v
+---------------------+ --

            Figure 1: LLS Data Block in OSPFv2 and OSPFv3

The LLS block MAY be attached to OSPF Hello and Database Description (DD) packets ๐Ÿ“ฆ The LLS block MUST NOT be attached to any other OSPF packet type when generating packets, and MUST be ignored when receiving them ๐Ÿšซ

The data in an LLS block attached to a Hello packet MAY be used for dynamic signaling, since Hello packets can be sent at any time โฐ That said, delivery of LLS data in Hello packets isn't guaranteed ๐Ÿ˜ฌ Data sent with DD packets is guaranteed to be delivered as part of the adjacency forming process โœจ

This document doesn't say how routers should interpret the data sent through the LLS mechanism ๐Ÿคทโ€โ™€๏ธ Routers that don't understand LLS can still receive these packets, so changes made because of LLS block TLVs don't affect basic routing when talking to non-LLS routers. Very polite of them ๐Ÿ’–

2.1. L-Bit in Options Field ๐ŸŽ€

A new L-bit (L stands for LLS) is added to the OSPF Options field (see Figures 2a and 2b) ๐Ÿ’œ Routers set the L-bit in Hello and DD packets to show that the packet has an LLS data block. In other words, the LLS data block is only looked at if the L-bit is set ๐Ÿ‘€

          +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
          | * | O | DC| L |N/P| MC| E | * |
          +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+-+-+

           Figure 2a: OSPFv2 Options Field


0                   1                       2
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4  5 6 7  8  9  0  1  2  3
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+--+-+-+--+--+--+--+--+--+
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | |L|AF|*|*|DC| R| N|MC| E|V6|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+--+-+-+--+--+--+--+--+--+

           Figure 2b: OSPFv3 Options Field

The L-bit MUST NOT be set except in Hello and DD packets that contain an LLS block ๐Ÿšจ No sneaking it in anywhere else, bestie ๐Ÿ™…โ€โ™€๏ธ

2.2. LLS Data Block ๐Ÿ“

The data block used for link-local signaling is formatted as described below. Figure 3 has the visual ๐Ÿ–ผ๏ธ

0                   1                   2                   3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|            Checksum           |       LLS Data Length         |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|                                                               |
|                           LLS TLVs                            |
.                                                               .
.                                                               .
.                                                               .
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

                 Figure 3: Format of LLS Data Block

The Checksum field has the standard IP checksum for the entire contents of the LLS block. Before computing it, the checksum field is set to 0 ๐Ÿงฎ If the checksum is incorrect, the OSPF packet MUST be processed, but the LLS block MUST be discarded ๐Ÿ—‘๏ธ Ouch, but the packet still gets handled, so the routing isn't ruined ๐Ÿ˜ญ

The 16-bit LLS Data Length field holds the length (in 32-bit words) of the LLS block, header and payload included ๐Ÿ“

Now, this one's important ๐Ÿ‘‘ If the OSPF packet is cryptographically authenticated, the LLS data block MUST also be cryptographically authenticated. In that case, the regular LLS checksum isn't calculated, and it's just set to 0 instead ๐Ÿ”

The rest of the block is a set of Type/Length/Value (TLV) triplets, described in Section 2.3. All TLVs MUST be 32-bit aligned (with padding if necessary) ๐Ÿงฉ

2.3. LLS TLVs ๐Ÿฆ‹

The contents of an LLS data block are built out of TLVs. Figure 4 shows the TLV format ๐Ÿ’…

The Type field holds the TLV ID, which is unique for each type of TLV. The Length field holds the length of the Value field (in bytes). The Value field is variable and holds arbitrary data ๐ŸŒธ

0                   1                   2                   3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|            Type               |           Length              |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|                                                               |
.                                                               .
.                             Value                             .
.                                                               .
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

                    Figure 4: Format of LLS TLVs

Note that TLVs are always padded to a 32-bit boundary. Padding bytes aren't counted in the TLV Length field, but they are counted in the LLS Data Length field in the LLS block header ๐Ÿง  Unrecognized TLV types are ignored, so no drama there ๐Ÿซถ


Part 1 wraps here, babe ๐ŸŽ€ Part 2 picks up with Section 3 (IANA Considerations) and everything after it, so stay tuned ๐Ÿ’–

2.4. Extended Options and Flags TLV โœจ

okay so this subsection is all about a TLV called the Extended Options and Flags (EOF) TLV ๐ŸŽ€ The format is shown in Figure 5.

Bits in the Value field have no semantics from the point of view of the LLS mechanism ๐Ÿฆ‹ Bits MAY be allocated to announce OSPF link-local capabilities. Bits MAY also be allocated to perform boolean link-local signaling. so much room to play, bestie ๐Ÿ’œ

The Value field in the EOF-TLV is 4 bytes long.

The Type field in the EOF-TLV is 1. The EOF-TLV MUST only appear once in the LLS data block. ๐Ÿ”ฅ

   0                   1                   2                   3
   0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |             1                 |            4                  |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                  Extended Options and Flags                   |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

Figure 5: Format of the EOF-TLV ๐Ÿ“

[OOB] and [RESTART] are currently using bits in the Extended Options field of the EOF-TLV ๐Ÿ’… The Extended Options and Flags bits themselves are defined in Section 3.

2.5. Cryptographic Authentication TLV (OSPFv2 ONLY) ๐Ÿ”

okay this one is the security queen ๐Ÿ‘‘ This document defines a special TLV used for cryptographic authentication (CA-TLV) of the LLS data block. This TLV MUST only be included in the LLS block when cryptographic authentication is enabled on the corresponding interface. The message digest of the LLS block MUST be calculated using the same key and authentication algorithm as used for the OSPFv2 packet. The cryptographic sequence number is included in the TLV and MUST be the same as the one in the OSPFv2 authentication data for the LLS block to be considered authentic. ๐Ÿซถ

The TLV is built like this:

   0                   1                   2                   3
   0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |              2                |         AuthLen               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                         Sequence Number                       |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                                                               |
   .                                                               .
   .                           AuthData                            .
   .                                                               .
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

Figure 6: Format of Cryptographic Authentication TLV

The Type field for the CA-TLV has the value 2.

The Length field in the header holds the length of the data portion of the TLV. That includes the 4 bytes for Sequence Number plus the length of the message digest block for the whole LLS block, in bytes. ๐Ÿ“

The Sequence Number field carries the cryptographic sequence number that is used to prevent simple replay attacks ๐Ÿ›ก๏ธ For the LLS block to be considered authentic, the Sequence Number in the CA-TLV MUST match the Sequence Number in the OSPFv2 packet header Authentication field (which MUST be present). If there's a Sequence Number mismatch or an Authentication failure, the whole LLS block MUST be ignored. ๐Ÿ™ˆ

The CA-TLV MUST NOT appear more than once in the LLS block. Also, when present, this TLV MUST be the last TLV in the LLS block. If it shows up more than once, only the first occurrence is processed and any others MUST be ignored. no duplicates allowed, periodt ๐Ÿ’€

The AuthData field contains the message digest calculated for the LLS data block up to the CA-TLV AuthData field. In other words, it excludes the CA-TLV AuthData itself. ๐Ÿงš

The CA-TLV is not applicable to OSPFv3, and it MUST NOT be added to any OSPFv3 packet. If it is found on reception, this TLV MUST be ignored. ๐Ÿšซ

2.6. Private TLVs ๐ŸŒˆ

LLS type values in the range of 32768-65536 are reserved for private use. The first four octets of the Value field MUST be the private enterprise code [ENTNUM]. This is what lets multiple vendor private extensions coexist in one network, which is honestly iconic ๐Ÿ’–

3. IANA Considerations ๐Ÿ“‹

This document uses the registry that was originally created in [RFC4813]. IANA updated the following registry to point to this document instead:

  • "Open Shortest Path First (OSPF) Link-Local Signalling (LLS) - Type/Length/Value Identifiers (TLV)"

IANA allocated the L-bit in the "OSPFv2 Options Registry" and "OSPFv3 Options Registry" as per Section 2.1. โœจ

LLS TLV types are maintained by IANA. Extensions to OSPF that require a new LLS TLV type MUST be reviewed by a Designated Expert from the routing area. ๐Ÿง

The criteria for allocating LLS TLVs are:

  • LLS should not be used for information that would be better suited to be advertised in a link-local link state advertisement (LSA).
  • LLS should be confined to signaling between direct neighbors.
  • Discretion should be used in the volume of information signaled using LLS due to the obvious MTU and performance implications.

Following the policies outlined in [IANA], LLS type values in the range of 0-32767 are allocated through an IETF Review, and LLS type values in the range of 32768-65535 are reserved for private use. ๐Ÿ“œ

This document assigns the following LLS TLV types in OSPFv2/OSPFv3:

TLV Type    Name                                      Reference
0           Reserved
1           Extended Options and Flags                [RFC5613]
2           Cryptographic Authentication+             [RFC5613]
3-32767     Reserved for assignment by the IANA
32768-65535 Private Use

+ Cryptographic Authentication TLV is only defined for OSPFv2

IANA renamed the sub-registry from "LLS Type 1 Extended Options" to "LLS Type 1 Extended Options and Flags". ๐Ÿท๏ธ

This document also assigns the following bits in the EOF-TLV outlined in Section 2.5:

Bit                     Name                        Reference
0x00000001              LSDB Resynchronization (LR) [RFC4811]
0x00000002              Restart Signal (RS-bit)     [RFC4812]

Future allocation of Extended Options and Flags bits MUST be reviewed by a Designated Expert from the routing area. ๐Ÿฆ‹

4. Compatibility Issues ๐Ÿค

The changes to OSPF packet formats are compatible with standard OSPF, since OSPF routers that don't support LLS will ignore the LLS data block after the OSPF packet or cryptographic message digest. As of this writing, there are implementations deployed with [RFC4813]-compliant software. Routers not implementing [RFC4813] ignore the LLS data at the end of the OSPF packet. ๐ŸŒธ

Careful consideration should be given to carrying additional LLS data, as it may affect OSPF adjacency bring-up time due to additional propagation delay and/or processing time. โณ

5. Security Considerations ๐Ÿ”’

Security considerations inherited from OSPFv2 are described in [OSPFV2]. This technique gives the same level of security as basic OSPFv2 by letting LLS data be authenticated with the same cryptographic authentication that OSPFv2 uses (see Section 2.5 for more details). ๐Ÿ”

Security considerations inherited from OSPFv3 are described in [OSPFV3] and [OSPFV3AUTH]. OSPFv3 uses IPsec for authentication and encryption. With IPsec, the AH (Authentication Header), ESP (Encapsulating Security Payload), or both are applied to the entire OSPFv3 payload, including the LLS block. ๐Ÿ›ก๏ธ

This part is serious, bestie: the LLS block is only as safe as the authentication you wrap around it, so don't skip Section 2.5 on OSPFv2 or the IPsec setup on OSPFv3 ๐Ÿ’€

6. References ๐Ÿ“š

6.1. Normative References

  • [IANA] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226, May 2008.
  • [KEY] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
  • [OSPFV2] Moy, J., "OSPF Version 2", STD 54, RFC 2328, April 1998.
  • [OSPFV3] Coltun, R., Ferguson, D., Moy, J., and A. Lindem, "OSPF for IPv6", RFC 5340, July 2008.
  • [OSPFV3AUTH] Gupta, M. and N. Melam, "Authentication/Confidentiality for OSPFv3", RFC 4552, June 2006.

6.2. Informative References

  • [ENTNUM] IANA, "PRIVATE ENTERPRISE NUMBERS", http://www.iana.org.
  • [OOB] Nguyen, L., Roy, A., and A. Zinin, "OSPF Out-of-Band Link State Database (LSDB) Resynchronization", RFC 4811, March 2007.
  • [RESTART] Nguyen, L., Roy, A., and A. Zinin, "OSPF Restart Signaling", RFC 4812, March 2007.
  • [RFC4813] Friedman, B., Nguyen, L., Roy, A., Yeung, D., and A. Zinin, "OSPF Link-Local Signaling", RFC 4813, March 2007.

Appendix A. Acknowledgements ๐Ÿ’–

The authors would like to acknowledge Russ White, Acee Lindem, and Manral Vishwas for their review of this document. ๐Ÿซถ

Appendix B. Changes from RFC 4813 ๐Ÿ”„

This section describes the substantive changes from [RFC4813].

  • Added OSPFv3 support
  • Private TLVs MUST use private enterprise code
  • Clarified requirement levels at several places
  • Changed from Experimental to Standards Track

Authors' Addresses ๐ŸŽ€

Alex Zinin
Alcatel-Lucent
Singapore

EMail: alex.zinin@alcatel-lucent.com


Abhay Roy
Cisco Systems
170 West Tasman Drive
San Jose, CA  95134
USA

EMail: akr@cisco.com


Liem Nguyen
Cisco Systems
170 West Tasman Drive
San Jose, CA  95134
USA

EMail: lhnguyen@cisco.com


Barry Friedman
Google, Inc.
1600 Amphitheatre Parkway
Mountain View, CA  94043
USA

EMail: barryf@google.com


Derek Yeung
Cisco Systems
170 West Tasman Drive
San Jose, CA  95134
USA

EMail: myeung@cisco.com
๐Ÿ“ฆ where this page comes from