RFC 5218

What Makes for a Successful Protocol?

๐Ÿ“… published July 2008, from ietf

RFC 5218 ๐Ÿ’–โœจ

What Makes for a Successful Protocol? ๐ŸŽ€

Authors: D. Thaler and B. Aboba (IAB) ๐Ÿงš Category: Informational ๐Ÿ“š Date: July 2008 ๐Ÿ“… This doc doesn't obsolete or update anything in its header. ๐Ÿซถ

Status of This Memo โœจ

Okay bestie, first the boring-but-important bit ๐Ÿ’…. This memo just provides information for the Internet community. It is not an Internet standard of any kind, so don't go treating it like one ๐Ÿ™ˆ. Distribution of this memo is unlimited, so share it with everyone you know ๐Ÿฆ‹.

Abstract ๐ŸŒธ

The Internet community has specified a LOT of protocols so far, and they've had all kinds of success stories ๐Ÿ‘‘. This doc looks at case studies to figure out what helps a protocol succeed and what holds one back ๐Ÿ”ฅ. The hope is that these observations can guide future protocol work, so future us can make better choices ๐Ÿ’œ.

Table of Contents

1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
  1.1.  What is Success? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
  1.2.  Success Dimensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
    1.2.1.  Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
  1.3.  Effects of Wild Success  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
  1.4.  Failure  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
  2.  Initial Success Factors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
    2.1.  Basic Success Factors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
      2.1.1.  Positive Net Value (Meet a Real Need)  . . . . . . . .  7
      2.1.2.  Incremental Deployability  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
      2.1.3.  Open Code Availability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
      2.1.4.  Freedom from Usage Restrictions  . . . . . . . . . . . 10
      2.1.5.  Open Specification Availability  . . . . . . . . . . . 10
      2.1.6.  Open Maintenance Processes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
      2.1.7.  Good Technical Design  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
    2.2.  Wild Success Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
      2.2.1.  Extensible . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
      2.2.2.  No Hard Scalability Bound  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
      2.2.3.  Threats Sufficiently Mitigated . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
  3.  Conclusions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
  4.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
  5.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
  Appendix A.  Case Studies  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
    A.1.  HTML/HTTP vs. Gopher and FTP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
      A.1.1.  Initial Success Factors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
      A.1.2.  Wild Success Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
      A.1.3.  Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
    A.2.  IPv4 vs. IPX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
      A.2.1.  Initial Success Factors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
      A.2.2.  Wild Success Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
      A.2.3.  Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
    A.3.  SSH  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
      A.3.1.  Initial Success Factors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
      A.3.2.  Wild Success Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
      A.3.3.  Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
    A.4.  Inter-Domain IP Multicast vs. Application Overlays . . . 20
      A.4.1.  Initial Success Factors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
      A.4.2.  Wild Success Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
      A.4.3.  Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
    A.5.  Wireless Application Protocol (WAP)  . . . . . . . . . . . 22
      A.5.1.  Initial Success Factors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
      A.5.2.  Wild Success Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
      A.5.3.  Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
    A.6.  Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
      A.6.1.  Initial Success Factors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
      A.6.2.  Wild Success Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
      A.6.3.  Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
    A.7.  RADIUS vs. TACACS+ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
      A.7.1.  Initial Success Factors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
      A.7.2.  Wild Success Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
      A.7.3.  Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
    A.8.  Network Address Translators (NATs) . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
      A.8.1.  Initial Success Factors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
      A.8.2.  Wild Success Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
      A.8.3.  Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
  Appendix B.  IAB Members at the Time of This Writing . . . . . . . 26

1. Introduction ๐Ÿงš

One of the goals of the IETF (Internet Engineering Task Force) is to define protocols that actually hit their implementation and deployment goals ๐ŸŽฏ. This doc uses case studies to pinpoint the factors that push a protocol toward success or failure ๐Ÿ’…. It's meant to be useful for these crews:

  • IESG members deciding whether to charter a Working Group to do work on a specific protocol ๐Ÿ‘‘
  • Working Group participants picking between protocol proposals ๐Ÿซถ
  • Document authors developing a brand new protocol specification โœจ
  • Anyone evaluating the success of a protocol experiment ๐Ÿ”ฌ

1.1. What is Success? ๐Ÿค”

Before we talk about what helps or hurts a protocol, we need to define "success" ๐Ÿ’–. A protocol can be successful even if it isn't widely deployed, as long as it meets its original goals ๐ŸŒธ. But in this doc, a successful protocol is one that does both: it meets its original goals and it's widely deployed ๐Ÿ”ฅ. Quick note though: "widely deployed" does not mean "inter-domain" ๐Ÿ™ˆ. Successful protocols like DHCP [RFC2131] can be widely deployed purely for intra-domain use, and that still counts ๐Ÿ’….

Here are some examples of successful protocols:

Inter-domain: IPv4 [RFC0791], TCP [RFC0793], HTTP [RFC2616], DNS [RFC1035], BGP [RFC4271], UDP [RFC0768], SMTP [RFC2821], SIP [RFC3261].
Intra-domain: ARP [RFC0826], PPP [RFC1661], DHCP [RFC2131], RIP [RFC1058], OSPF [RFC2328], Kerberos [RFC4120], NAT [RFC3022].

1.2. Success Dimensions ๐Ÿ“

Two big dimensions for judging a protocol are scale and purpose ๐Ÿ“ˆ. When a protocol gets designed, it's aimed at a certain range of purposes and built for a particular scale ๐ŸŽ€.

Figure 1 shows this visually, so check it out ๐Ÿ‘€:

       Scale ^
             |
             |             +------------+
             |             |            |
             |             |  Original  |
             |             |  Protocol  |
             |             |   Design   |
             |             |   Space    |
             |             |            |
          <-----------------------------------------------> Purpose

                              Figure 1

So by these metrics, a "successful" protocol is one used for its original purpose at the originally intended scale ๐Ÿ’œ. A "wildly successful" protocol goes way past its original goals ๐Ÿš€. That can be in terms of purpose (used in scenarios far beyond the initial design), in terms of scale (deployed on a much bigger scale than anyone imagined), or both ๐ŸŒˆ. Basically it has outgrown its bounds and ventured "into the wild" ๐Ÿฆ‹.

1.2.1. Examples ๐ŸŒŸ

HTTP is the classic "wildly successful" protocol, because it blew past its design in both purpose and scale ๐Ÿ˜ญ:

    Scale ^  +---------------------------------------+
          |  | Actual Deployment                     |
          |  |                                       |
          |  |                                       |
          |  |            +------------+             |
          |  |            |  Original  |             |
          |  | (Web       |   Design   | (Firewall   |
          |  |  Services) |   Space    |  Traversal) |
          |  |            |   (Web)    |             |
       <-----------------------------------------------> Purpose

IPv4 is another wildly successful one ๐Ÿ’…. It was designed for all purposes ("Everything over IP and IP over Everything") ๐Ÿคฏ, and it's been deployed on a way bigger scale than it was originally designed for ๐ŸŒ. The limited address space only became a problem after IPv4 had already vastly surpassed its original design ๐Ÿ˜….

ARP is an example of a successful protocol ๐ŸŽ€. It was originally meant for a more general purpose: resolving network layer addresses to link layer addresses, no matter the media type or network layer protocol ๐Ÿง . In practice it was widely deployed for a narrower set of uses (resolving IPv4 addresses to Ethernet MAC addresses) ๐Ÿ”Œ. Then it got adopted for other uses too, like detecting network attachment (Detecting Network Attachment in IPv4 (DNAv4) [RFC4436]) ๐Ÿ™Œ. Also, like IPv4, ARP is deployed on a much bigger scale than originally expected, in terms of number of machines (though not number on the same subnet) ๐Ÿ’–.

    Scale ^  +-------------------+
          |  | Actual Deployment |
          |  |                   |
          |  |                   |   Original Design Space
          |  |     +-------------+--------------+
          |  |     |(IP/Ethernet)|(Non-IP)      |
          |  |(DNA)|             |              |
          |  |     |             |(Non-Ethernet)|
          |  |     |             |              |
       <-----------------------------------------------> Purpose

1.3. Effects of Wild Success ๐ŸŒช๏ธ

Wild success can be both good and bad ๐Ÿ˜ฌ. A wildly successful protocol is so useful that it can solve more problems, cover more scenarios, or work on more devices ๐Ÿ™Œ. That can be a sign that it's time to revise the protocol so it better fits the new design space ๐Ÿ”„.

But if a protocol gets used for a purpose other than the one it was designed for, a few things can go wrong ๐Ÿ‘€:

  • There may be undesirable side effects, because design decisions that were right for the originally intended purpose may be wrong for the new one ๐Ÿ’€.
  • There may be performance problems if the protocol wasn't designed to scale to the extent it was deployed ๐Ÿข.
  • Implementers may try to add or change functionality to work around the design limitations, without fully understanding how that affects the overall protocol behavior and invariants ๐Ÿงฉ.
  • Wildly successful protocols become high value targets for attackers, because of their popularity and because uses or extensions that are less well understood and tested than the original protocol offer a chance for exploitation ๐ŸŽฏ.

So a wildly successful protocol is vulnerable to "death by success", collapsing under attacks or scaling limits ๐Ÿ˜ญ๐Ÿ•ฏ๏ธ.

1.4. Failure ๐Ÿ’€

okay so, failure (aka not being successful yet) can't be called until enough time has passed, like 5-10 years for an average protocol ๐Ÿ•ฐ๏ธ nobody gets to decide a protocol flopped on day one. The failure signs are:

  • No mainstream implementations. Hardly anyone supports it in hosts, routers, or other kinds of relevant devices ๐Ÿฅ€
  • No deployment. The devices that support it aren't out there, or they are but the protocol isn't turned on ๐Ÿ“ต
  • No use. It might be deployed, but no apps or scenarios actually use it ๐Ÿ‘ป

when a protocol is first designed, all three of those are true, which is exactly why you have to give it time before you call it a success or a flop ๐Ÿซ 

the lack of a value chain can make it hard for a new protocol to go from implementation to deployment to use. people love calling this the "chicken-and-egg" problem ๐Ÿ”๐Ÿฅš, but the lack of implementation, deployment, or use isn't what causes failure. it's just a symptom, bestie ๐Ÿ’…

there are lots of strategies people have used to get past that starting lack of implementations, deployment, and use, but none of them guarantee success ๐Ÿคž some examples:

  • Address a critical and imminent problem. if the need is severe enough, the industry is motivated to adopt it as soon as implementations exist, and a well-known need is enough to motivate implementations ๐Ÿ”ฅ NAT is the example here, since it gave the person deploying it an immediate address sharing capability (Appendix A.8) ๐Ÿ™Œ so when you're making a protocol, think about whether it can be easily tailored or expanded to directly target a critical problem. if it only solves part of the problem, think about what else would be needed on top โœจ
  • Provide a "killer app" with low deployment costs. this one can create demand where none existed before ๐ŸŽ€ check out the HTTP case study in Appendix A.1 for an example ๐ŸŒธ
  • Provide value for existing unmodified applications. this solves the chicken-and-egg problem by making sure there's already use the second the protocol gets deployed, so the benefit can be felt right away ๐Ÿฆ‹ see the Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) case study in Appendix A.6 for an example ๐Ÿงš
  • Reduce complexity and cost by narrowing the intended purpose and/or scope to an area where it's easiest to succeed. this can let you cut out complexity that isn't needed for the narrow purpose ๐Ÿ“ cutting complexity lowers the cost of implementation and deployment, so the cost can end up being really low compared to the benefit ๐Ÿ’– for example, link-scoped multicast is way more successful than, say, inter-domain multicast (see Appendix A.4) ๐Ÿ‘‘
  • A government or other entity may provide incentives or disincentives that motivate implementation and deployment. for example, specific cryptographic algorithms may be mandated ๐Ÿ” another example: Japan started an economic incentive program to generate IPv6 [RFC2460] implementations and deployment ๐Ÿ‡ฏ๐Ÿ‡ตโœจ

as we'll see, these strategies often work because they directly target the top success factors ๐Ÿ†


2. Initial Success Factors โœจ

in this section, we figure out the factors that contribute to success and "wild" success ๐Ÿฆ‹

a successful protocol won't necessarily have all the success factors, and some success factors can show up even in failed designs ๐Ÿ™ˆ still, experience seems to show that having success factors tends to improve the odds of success ๐Ÿ“ˆ

the success factors, and how important each one is, came from a series of case studies (Appendix A) ๐Ÿ”

2.1. Basic Success Factors ๐Ÿงƒ

2.1.1. Positive Net Value (Meet a Real Need) ๐Ÿ’ธ

it's critical to a protocol's success that the benefits of deploying it (monetary or otherwise) outweigh the costs, and the costs include:

  • Hardware cost: protocols that don't need hardware changes are easier to deploy than ones that do ๐Ÿ”ง overlay networks are one way to skip hardware changes ๐ŸŒ but hardware updates are often needed even for protocols whose functionality could be provided purely in software ๐Ÿ˜ค vendors often put new functionality only in later branches of the code tree, which may only run on new hardware ๐Ÿ’€ so the safest way to dodge hardware upgrade costs is to design for backward compatibility with both existing hardware and software ๐Ÿซถ
  • Operational interference: protocols that don't require changes to other operational processes and tools are easier to deploy than ones that do ๐Ÿ› ๏ธ for example, IPsec [RFC4301] interferes with NetFlow [RFC3954] deep packet inspection, which can matter a lot to operators ๐Ÿ‘€
  • Retraining: protocols with no configuration, or that are super easy to configure and manage, are cheaper to deploy ๐Ÿง 
  • Business dependencies: protocols that don't require changes to a business model (for implementers or deployers) are easier to deploy than ones that do ๐Ÿ’ผ changing billing and accounting systems and retraining the people who run them costs money, and on top of that, the assumptions the old business model was built on may change ๐Ÿ˜ตโ€๐Ÿ’ซ for example, a while ago lots of service providers had business models built around dial-up, assuming machines weren't connected all the time ๐Ÿ“ž so protocols that wanted always-on connectivity made the business model change, since the networks weren't optimized for always-on ๐Ÿ”Œ similarly, some service providers have business models that assume upstream bandwidth is underutilized, and peer-to-peer protocols may make that business model change ๐Ÿ“ค finally, lots of service providers charge based on the amount of bandwidth consumed on the link to a customer ๐Ÿงพ multicast protocols mess with that, since they give a customer a way to use less bandwidth on the source link by sending multicast traffic, instead of paying more to source lots of unicast streams ๐Ÿ˜ฌ unless some other mechanism covers the cost of replication in the network (e.g., router CPU, downstream link bandwidth, extra management) ๐Ÿงฎ multicast protocols also complicate business models that charge the source of traffic based on the amount of multicast replication, since the source may not be able to predict the cost until a bill arrives ๐Ÿ™ƒ

there are also many types of benefits, including:

  • Relieving pain: protocols that drastically lower costs (monetary or otherwise) that exist before deploying the protocol are easier to show direct benefit from, since they address a burning need ๐Ÿ”ฅ
  • Enabling new scenarios: protocols that enable new capabilities, scenarios, or user experiences can provide significant value ๐Ÿš€ though the benefit may be harder to realize, since there may be more risk involved ๐Ÿ˜ฐ
  • Incremental improvements: protocols that provide incremental improvements (e.g., better video quality) generate a small benefit, so they can succeed as long as the cost is small too ๐ŸŽž๏ธ

there are at least two example cases of cost/benefit tradeoffs ๐Ÿง in the first case, the benefit outweighs the cost even upon initial deployment ๐Ÿ’… in the second case, there's an upfront cost that outweighs the initial benefit, but the benefit grows over time (e.g., as more nodes or applications support it) ๐Ÿ“ˆ the first model makes initial deployment way easier ๐Ÿฅณ but over time, both can be successful โœจ the second model has a danger for the early deployments: if others don't deploy the protocol, the early deployers have lost value, so they have to take on some risk by deploying it ๐Ÿ˜ฌ

success comes most easily when the natural incentive structure lines up with the deployment requirements ๐Ÿ’œ that means the people who have to deploy, manage, or configure something are the same people who get the most benefit ๐ŸŽฏ so in summary, it's best if there's significant positive net value at each organization where a change is required ๐Ÿซถ

2.1.2. Incremental Deployability ๐ŸŒฑ

a protocol is incrementally deployable if early adopters gain some benefit even though the rest of the Internet doesn't support it yet ๐Ÿฃ there are a few aspects to this:

protocols that a single group or team can deploy (e.g., intra-domain) have a better shot at success than ones that need cooperation across organizations (or, in the worst case, need a "flag day" where everyone has to change at the same time) ๐Ÿ“…๐Ÿ˜ฑ for example, protocols that don't need changes to infrastructure (e.g., router changes, service provider support, etc.) have a better shot than ones that do, since less coordination is needed ๐Ÿค NAT is the canonical example ๐Ÿ™Œ similarly, protocols that give benefit when only one end changes have a better shot than ones that need both ends of a communication to support the protocol ๐Ÿซฑ๐Ÿซฒ

finally, protocol updates that are backward compatible with older implementations have a better shot at success than ones that aren't ๐Ÿ”™โœจ

2.1.3. Open Code Availability ๐Ÿ†“

protocols with freely available implementation code have a better shot at success than protocols without it ๐Ÿ’ป honestly, this often matters more than any technical consideration ๐Ÿคฏ for example, it can be argued that when choosing between IPv4 and Internetwork Packet Exchange (IPX) [IPX], this was the deciding factor, even though in many ways IPX was technically superior to IPv4 ๐Ÿ˜ญ similar arguments have been made for the success of RADIUS [RFC2865] over TACACS+ [TACACS+] ๐Ÿซ  see Appendix A for more discussion ๐Ÿ“š

2.1.4. Freedom from Usage Restrictions ๐Ÿ•Š๏ธ

freedom from usage restrictions means that anyone who wants to implement or deploy can do so without legal or financial hindrance ๐Ÿ™Œ within the IETF, this often comes up when comparing technologies where one has known Intellectual Property attached to it โš–๏ธ and the industry often picks the one with no known Intellectual Property, even if it's technically inferior ๐Ÿฅฒ

2.1.5. Open Specification Availability ๐Ÿ“–

open specification availability means the protocol specification is made available to anyone who wants to use it ๐ŸŒ this is true for all Internet Drafts and RFCs, and it's contributed to the success of protocol specifications developed within or contributed to the IETF ๐ŸŽ€

the various aspects of this factor include:

  • World-wide distribution: is the specification accessible from anywhere in the world? ๐Ÿ—บ๏ธ
  • Unrestricted distribution: are there no legal restrictions on getting the specification? ๐Ÿ“œ
  • Permanence: does the specification stick around even after its creator is gone? โณ
  • Stability: is there a stable version of the specification that doesn't change? ๐ŸงŠ

2.1.6. Open Maintenance Processes ๐Ÿ—ณ๏ธ

this factor means the protocol is maintained through open processes, there are mechanisms for public comment on the protocol, and the maintenance process lets every constituency affected by the protocol take part ๐Ÿซถ no gatekeeping, we love to see it ๐Ÿ‘‘โœจ

2.1.7. Good Technical Design ๐Ÿง โœจ

Okay so this factor is about protocols that follow good design principles, which makes them easier to implement and helps them interoperate. The big reference here is "Architectural Principles of the Internet" [RFC1958] ๐Ÿ“–. Simplicity, modularity, and robustness to failures are all key design factors ๐Ÿงฉ. Clarity in specifications is another part of good design, since it helps with interoperability and makes implementing things way easier ๐Ÿ’…. Here's the tea though: experience shows that good technical design has minimal impact on initial success compared with the other factors ๐Ÿซ .

2.2. Wild Success Factors ๐ŸŒˆ

Okay, these factors don't seem to seriously affect initial success, but they can totally decide whether a protocol becomes wildly successful ๐Ÿ‘‘.

2.2.1. Extensible ๐Ÿงฉ

Protocols that are extensible are more likely to become wildly successful, because people end up using them for stuff nobody planned for ๐Ÿฆ‹. An extensible protocol might carry general purpose payloads or options, or it might be easy to add a brand new payload or option type. This is giving main character energy for protocols that are meant to work for every purpose, like IP ๐ŸŒ. But for protocols built for one specialized job, you should think carefully before adding extensibility ๐Ÿค”.

2.2.2. No Hard Scalability Bound ๐Ÿ“ˆ

Protocols with no inherent limit near the edge of the scale they were originally imagined for are more likely to be wildly successful in terms of scale ๐Ÿš€. IPv4 is a perfect example. It had no inherent limit near its originally envisioned scale, and its address space limit didn't get hit until it was already wildly successful ๐Ÿ˜ญ. Another kind of inherent limit is a performance "knee" that causes a meltdown once a scaling limit is passed, like a broadcast storm ๐ŸŒช๏ธ.

2.2.3. Threats Sufficiently Mitigated ๐Ÿ›ก๏ธ

The more successful a protocol gets, the more attractive a target it becomes ๐ŸŽฏ. Protocols with security flaws can still become wildly successful, as long as they're extensible enough for those flaws to be fixed in later revisions ๐Ÿ”ง. Secure SHell version 1 (SSHv1) and IEEE 802.11 with WEP are examples of this. But the combo of security flaws and limited extensibility is literally deadly ๐Ÿ’€. Some early server-based multiplayer games ultimately failed due to insufficient protections against cheating, even though they started out successful ๐ŸŽฎ.

3. Conclusions ๐ŸŽ€

The case studies in Appendix A show that the most important initial success factors are filling a real need and being incrementally deployable ๐Ÿ’–. When there are competing proposals with comparable benefit and deployability, open specifications and code become big success factors ๐Ÿ”‘. Open source availability matters more than open specification maintenance at the start ๐ŸŒธ.

Technical quality usually wasn't the main factor in initial success. Honestly, many successful protocols wouldn't pass IESG review today ๐Ÿ™ˆ. Technically inferior proposals can win if they're openly available ๐Ÿ†. Factors that don't seem to be significant for initial success (but may affect wild success) include good design, security, and having an open specification maintenance process ๐Ÿง.

Lots of the case studies are about protocols that were developed outside the IETF, and the IETF only helped improve them after initial success was already certain ๐Ÿซถ. The IETF focuses on design quality, which isn't a factor in determining initial success. Once a protocol succeeds, though, good technical design may be the key to it staying successful or dealing with wild success ๐Ÿ‘‘. Allowing extensibility in an initial design lets initial shortcomings get addressed later โœจ.

Security vulnerabilities don't seem to limit initial success, since they often only become interesting to attackers after a protocol is widely deployed enough to be a useful target ๐Ÿ•ต๏ธโ€โ™€๏ธ. And open specification maintenance isn't important to initial success either, because many successful protocols were first developed outside the IETF or other standards bodies and only got standardized later ๐Ÿ“ฆ.

In light of all this, we recommend asking these questions when evaluating protocol designs ๐Ÿ“:

  • Does the protocol exhibit one or more of the critical initial success factors?
  • Are there implementers who are ready to implement the technology in ways that are likely to be deployed?
  • Are there customers (especially high-profile customers) who are ready to deploy the technology?
  • Are there potential niches where the technology is compelling?
  • If so, can complexity be removed to reduce cost?
  • Is there a potential killer app? Or can the technology work underneath existing unmodified applications?
  • Is the protocol sufficiently extensible to allow potential deficiencies to be addressed in the future?
  • If it is not known whether the protocol will be successful, should the market decide first? Or should the IETF work on multiple alternatives and let the market decide among them? Are there factors listed in this document that may predict which is more likely to succeed?

In the early stages (BOFs, designing new protocols), evaluating the initial success factors is important for helping things succeed ๐Ÿฃ. Similarly, efforts to revise unsuccessful protocols should check whether the initial success factors (or enough of them) were present, instead of focusing on wild success, which isn't a problem yet ๐Ÿฅฒ. For a revision of a successful protocol, focusing on the wild success factors is more appropriate ๐Ÿš€.

4. Security Considerations ๐Ÿ”

This document discusses attributes that affect the success of protocols. It has no specific security implications ๐Ÿ™‚. Recommendations on security in protocol design can be found in [RFC3552] ๐Ÿ’œ.

5. Informative References ๐Ÿ“š

   [IEEE-802.11]  IEEE, "Wireless LAN Medium Access Control (MAC) and
                  Physical Layer (PHY) Specifications", ANSI/IEEE
                  Std 802.11, 2007.

   [IMODE]        NTT DoCoMo, "i-mode",
                  <http://www.nttdocomo.com/services/imode/index.html>.

   [IPX]          Novell, "IPX Router Specification", Novell Part
                  Number 107-000029-001, 1992.

   [ISO-8879]     ISO, "Information processing -- Text and office
                  systems -- Standard Generalized Markup Language
                  (SGML)", ISO 8879, 1986.

   [RFC0768]      Postel, J., "User Datagram Protocol", STD 6, RFC 768,
                  August 1980.

   [RFC0791]      Postel, J., "Internet Protocol", STD 5, RFC 791,
                  September 1981.

   [RFC0793]      Postel, J., "Transmission Control Protocol", STD 7,
                  RFC 793, September 1981.

   [RFC0826]      Plummer, D., "Ethernet Address Resolution Protocol: Or
                  converting network protocol addresses to 48.bit
                  Ethernet address for transmission on Ethernet
                  hardware", STD 37, RFC 826, November 1982.

   [RFC0959]      Postel, J. and J. Reynolds, "File Transfer Protocol",
                  STD 9, RFC 959, October 1985.

   [RFC1035]      Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
                  specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, November 1987.

   [RFC1058]      Hedrick, C., "Routing Information Protocol", RFC 1058,
                  June 1988.

   [RFC1436]      Anklesaria, F., McCahill, M., Lindner, P., Johnson,
                  D., Torrey, D., and B. Alberti, "The Internet Gopher
                  Protocol (a distributed document search and retrieval
                  protocol)", RFC 1436, March 1993.

   [RFC1661]      Simpson, W., "The Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP)",
                  STD 51, RFC 1661, July 1994.

   [RFC1866]      Berners-Lee, T. and D. Connolly, "Hypertext Markup
                  Language - 2.0", RFC 1866, November 1995.

   [RFC1958]      Carpenter, B., "Architectural Principles of the
                  Internet", RFC 1958, June 1996.

   [RFC2131]      Droms, R., "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol",
                  RFC 2131, March 1997.

   [RFC2328]      Moy, J., "OSPF Version 2", STD 54, RFC 2328,
                  April 1998.

   [RFC2460]      Deering, S. and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version
                  6 (IPv6) Specification", RFC 2460, December 1998.

   [RFC2616]      Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H.,
                  Masinter, L., Leach, P., and T. Berners-Lee,
                  "Hypertext Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1", RFC 2616,
                  June 1999.

   [RFC2821]      Klensin, J., "Simple Mail Transfer Protocol",
                  RFC 2821, April 2001.

   [RFC2865]      Rigney, C., Willens, S., Rubens, A., and W. Simpson,
                  "Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)",
                  RFC 2865, June 2000.

   [RFC3022]      Srisuresh, P. and K. Egevang, "Traditional IP Network
                  Address Translator (Traditional NAT)", RFC 3022,
                  January 2001.

   [RFC3261]      Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G.,
                  Johnston, A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M.,
                  and E. Schooler, "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol",
                  RFC 3261, June 2002.

   [RFC3552]      Rescorla, E. and B. Korver, "Guidelines for Writing
                  RFC Text on Security Considerations", BCP 72,
                  RFC 3552, July 2003.

   [RFC3954]      Claise, B., "Cisco Systems NetFlow Services Export
                  Version 9", RFC 3954, October 2004.

   [RFC4120]      Neuman, C., Yu, T., Hartman, S., and K. Raeburn, "The
                  Kerberos Network Authentication Service (V5)",
                  RFC 4120, July 2005.

   [RFC4251]      Ylonen, T. and C. Lonvick, "The Secure Shell (SSH)
                  Protocol Architecture", RFC 4251, January 2006.

   [RFC4271]      Rekhter, Y., Li, T., and S. Hares, "A Border Gateway
                  Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, January 2006.

   [RFC4301]      Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the
                  Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, December 2005.

   [RFC4436]      Aboba, B., Carlson, J., and S. Cheshire, "Detecting
                  Network Attachment in IPv4 (DNAv4)", RFC 4436,
                  March 2006.

   [RFC4864]      Van de Velde, G., Hain, T., Droms, R., Carpenter, B.,
                  and E. Klein, "Local Network Protection for IPv6",
                  RFC 4864, May 2007.

   [TACACS+]      Carrel, D. and L. Grant, "The TACACS+ Protocol,
                  Version 1.78", Work in Progress, January 1997.

   [WAP]          Open Mobile Alliance, "Wireless Application Protocol
                  Architecture Specification", <http://
                  www.openmobilealliance.org/tech/affiliates/
                  LicenseAgreement.asp?DocName=/wap/
                  wap-210-waparch-20010712-a.pdf>.

Appendix A. Case Studies ๐Ÿ“

In this Appendix, we include several case studies to show why these potential success factors matter ๐Ÿ”. Many other equally good case studies could have been included, but for the sake of brevity, we only picked a sampling that's enough to back up the conclusions in the body of this document ๐Ÿซถ.

A.1. HTML/HTTP vs. Gopher and FTP ๐ŸŒ

A.1.1. Initial Success Factors โœจ

Positive net value: okay so HTTP [RFC2616] with HTML [RFC1866] gave people substantially more value than Gopher [RFC1436] and FTP [RFC0959] ๐Ÿ”ฅ. Among other things, HTML/HTTP supported forms, which opened the door for commercial uses of the technology ๐Ÿ’ฐ. So in this sense, it enabled new scenarios ๐ŸŒˆ. It also only needed changes from the entities that got the benefits, so the cost and benefits were aligned ๐Ÿซถ.

Incremental deployability: browsers and servers were incrementally deployable ๐Ÿฆ‹. Initial browsers were also backward compatible with existing protocols like FTP and Gopher, which is so smart ๐Ÿ’….

Open code availability: server code was open โœจ. Client source code was initially open to academic use only ๐Ÿ™ˆ.

Restriction-free: academic use licenses were freely available ๐ŸŽ€. The HTML encumbrance only showed up later ๐Ÿ’€.

Open specification availability: Yes ๐Ÿ’–.

Open maintenance process: not at first, but eventually ๐ŸŒธ. This shows that you don't need an open maintenance process at the start to succeed. It only becomes important after the initial success ๐Ÿ‘‘.

Good technical design: fair ๐Ÿ“. At the beginning there was no support for graphics, HTML was missing many SGML [ISO-8879] features, and HTTP 1.0 had issues with congestion control and proxy support ๐Ÿ˜ญ. These sorts of issues would typically prevent IESG approval today ๐Ÿ™ˆ. But they did not stop the protocol from becoming successful ๐Ÿ†.

A.1.2. Wild Success Factors ๐Ÿฆ‹

Extensible: extensibility was excellent along multiple dimensions, including HTTP, HTML, graphics, forms, Java, JavaScript, etc. ๐Ÿงš

No hard scalability bound: excellent ๐ŸŒŸ. There was no registration process, unlike Gopher, and that let it scale way better ๐Ÿ“ˆ.

Threats sufficiently mitigated: no ๐Ÿ’€. There was initially no support for confidentiality (for example, protecting credit card numbers), and HTTP 1.0 had cleartext passwords in Basic auth ๐Ÿ˜ญ.

A.1.3. Discussion ๐Ÿ’…

HTML/HTTP addressed scenarios that no other protocol addressed โœจ. Since deployment was easy, it quickly took off ๐Ÿ”ฅ. Security only became an issue after HTML/HTTP was already successful ๐Ÿ™ˆ. HTML/HTTP's early success happened outside the IETF ๐ŸŒ. HTTP was standardized and refined later, which fixed some of the limitations ๐ŸŽ€.


A.2. IPv4 vs. IPX ๐ŸŒธ

A.2.1. Initial Success Factors

Positive net value: there were lots of competitors at first, including IPX, AppleTalk, NetBEUI, OSI, and DECNet ๐Ÿซฃ. All of them had positive net value ๐Ÿ’œ. But NetBEUI and DECNet weren't designed for internetworking, which limited their scalability and eventually stunted their growth ๐Ÿ˜ฌ.

Incremental deployability: none of the competitors (including IPv4) had incremental deployability ๐Ÿ™…โ€โ™€๏ธ. Still, there were few enough nodes back then that a flag day was manageable ๐Ÿ—“๏ธ.

Open code availability: IPv4 had open code from BSD, but IPX didn't ๐Ÿ”“. Many people argue that this was the main reason IPv4 won ๐Ÿ‘‘.

Restriction-free: Yes for IPv4; No for IPX ๐Ÿ’–.

Open specification availability: Yes for IPv4; No for IPX ๐Ÿ“œ.

Open maintenance process: Yes for IPv4; No for IPX ๐Ÿ› ๏ธ.

Good technical design: the initial design of IPv4 was fair, but arguably IPX was better at first ๐Ÿค”. Improvements to IPv4 like DHCP came much later ๐Ÿ•ฐ๏ธ.

A.2.2. Wild Success Factors โœจ

Extensible: both IPv4 and IPX could be extended to new transports, new link types, and new applications ๐Ÿงฉ.

No hard scalability bound: neither had a hard scalability bound close to its design goals ๐ŸŒ. IPX arguably scaled higher before it hit any bound ๐Ÿ“ˆ.

Threats sufficiently mitigated: neither IPv4 nor IPX had threats sufficiently mitigated ๐Ÿ’€.

A.2.3. Discussion ๐Ÿ’…

At first, it wasn't clear that IPv4 would win ๐Ÿ˜ณ. There were other competitors too, like OSI ๐Ÿ™ƒ. But the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) funded an IPv4 implementation on BSD ๐Ÿ›๏ธ. That open source move led to lots of others picking up IPv4, and that's what made the difference ๐Ÿ”ฅ. Even though IPX initially had a technically superior design, IPv4 succeeded because of its openness ๐Ÿซถ.


A.3. SSH ๐Ÿ”

A.3.1. Initial Success Factors

Positive net value: SSH [RFC4251] gave way more value than its competitors ๐Ÿ’Ž. Kerberized telnet required deployment of a Kerberos server ๐Ÿ™„. IPsec required a public key infrastructure (PKI) or pre-shared key authentication ๐Ÿ˜ต. The benefits were comparable, but the overall costs of the alternatives were much higher ๐Ÿ’ธ. They also potentially required deployment by entities that didn't directly get the benefit ๐Ÿ™ƒ. So, unlike the alternatives, the cost and benefits of SSH were aligned ๐Ÿ’–.

Incremental deployability: yes! SSH needed SSH clients and servers, but it didn't need a key distribution center (KDC) or credential pre-configuration ๐Ÿ™Œ.

Open code availability: Yes ๐Ÿ”“.

Restriction-free: it's unclear whether SSH was truly restriction-free or not ๐Ÿคทโ€โ™€๏ธ.

Open specification availability: not at first, but eventually ๐ŸŒฑ.

Open maintenance process: not at first, but eventually ๐ŸŒฑ.

Good technical design: SSHv1 was fair ๐Ÿ“. It had a number of technical issues, which were addressed in SSHv2 ๐Ÿ› ๏ธ.

A.3.2. Wild Success Factors ๐Ÿฆ‹

Extensibility: good ๐Ÿงฉ. SSH allowed adding new authentication mechanisms ๐Ÿ”‘.

No hard scalability bound: SSH had excellent scalability properties ๐ŸŒŸ.

Threats sufficiently mitigated: no ๐Ÿ’€. SSHv1 was vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks ๐Ÿ˜ฑ.

A.3.3. Discussion ๐Ÿ’…

The "leap of faith" trust model (accept an untrusted certificate the first time you connect) got roasted by "experts" at first ๐Ÿ™„. But users loved it ๐Ÿฅฐ. It gave way more functionality and didn't need a KDC, so it was super easy to deploy ๐Ÿš€. These factors made SSH a clear winner ๐Ÿ‘‘.


A.4. Inter-Domain IP Multicast vs. Application Overlays ๐ŸŒŠ

We're looking at a protocol that hasn't been successful yet (meaning it hasn't met its original design goals) even after a long time has passed ๐Ÿ•ฐ๏ธ. Just a heads up: this discussion only covers inter-domain multicast, not intra-domain or intra-subnet multicast ๐Ÿ“Œ.

A.4.1. Initial Success Factors

Positive net value: unclear ๐Ÿคจ. When lots of receivers get the same stream, the benefit relieves pain near the sender, and in some cases it enables new scenarios ๐ŸŒˆ. But when few receivers exist, the benefits are only incremental improvements compared with multiple streams ๐Ÿ“‰. There was positive value in bandwidth savings, but that was offset by the lack of viable business models and the lack of tools ๐Ÿงฐ. So the costs generally outweighed the benefits ๐Ÿ˜ฌ.

The costs also aren't necessarily aligned with the benefits ๐Ÿ™ƒ. Inter-domain multicast requires changes by (at least) applications, hosts, and routers ๐Ÿ–ฅ๏ธ. But it's the applications that get the main benefit ๐ŸŽฏ. For application layer overlaps, on the other hand, only the applications need to change ๐Ÿ’…. So the cost is lower (and so are the benefits), and the cost and benefits are aligned ๐Ÿซถ.

Incremental deployability: poor for inter-domain multicast ๐Ÿ˜ฉ. It required every router in the end-to-end path between a source and any receiver to support multicast, which severely limited how deployable native multicast was ๐Ÿšง. The strategy at first was an overlay network (the Multicast Backbone (MBone)) to work around this ๐Ÿงต. But the overlay network eventually had performance problems at high fan-out points ๐Ÿฅต. So adding another node meant more coordination with other organizations, to find someone who wasn't overloaded and agreed to forward traffic for the new node ๐Ÿค.

Incremental deployability was good for application-layer overlays, since only the applications need to change โœจ. But the benefit only exists when the sender(s) and receivers both support the overlay mechanism ๐Ÿ”.

Open code availability: Yes ๐Ÿ”“.

Restriction-free: Yes ๐Ÿ’–.

Open specification availability: Yes for inter-domain multicast. Application-layer overlays aren't standardized, and are left to each application ๐Ÿ“œ.

Open maintenance process: Yes for inter-domain multicast. Application-layer overlays aren't standardized, and are left to each application ๐Ÿ› ๏ธ.

Good technical design: debatable for inter-domain multicast ๐Ÿค”. In many respects the design is very efficient โšก. In other respects, it results in per-connection state in all intermediate routers, which is questionable at best ๐Ÿ˜ฌ. Application-layer overlays don't have that disadvantage, but they also get a smaller benefit ๐Ÿƒ.

A.4.2. Wild Success Factors ๐Ÿฆ‹

Extensible: Yes ๐Ÿงฉ.

No hard scalability bound: inter-domain multicast had scalability issues in terms of the number of groups and the number of sources ๐Ÿ“‰. But it scaled extremely well in terms of the number of receivers ๐Ÿ“ˆ. Application-layer overlays scale well in all dimensions, except that they don't scale as well as inter-domain multicast in terms of bandwidth, since they still result in multiple streams over the same link ๐ŸŒŠ.

Threats sufficiently mitigated: no for inter-domain multicast, since untrusted hosts can create state in intermediate routers along an entire path ๐Ÿ˜ฑ. Better for application-layer multicast ๐ŸŽ€.

A.4.3. Discussion ๐Ÿ’…

The benefits weren't enough to outweigh the costs for entities (service providers and application developers) to use it ๐Ÿ’ธ. So instead, the industry has tended to choose application overlays with replicated unicast ๐ŸŒฑ.


A.5. Wireless Application Protocol (WAP) ๐Ÿ“ฑ

The Wireless Application Protocol (WAP) [WAP] is another protocol that hasn't been successful, but it's worth comparing against other protocols ๐Ÿง.

A.5.1. Initial Success Factors

Positive net value: compared to competitors like HTTP/TCP/IP, and NTT DoCoMo's i-mode [IMODE], the relative value of WAP is unclear ๐Ÿคทโ€โ™€๏ธ. It suffered from a poor experience and a lack of tools ๐Ÿ˜ฉ.

Incremental deployability: poor ๐Ÿ’€. WAP required a WAP-to-HTTP proxy in the service provider, plus WAP support in phones ๐Ÿ“ฑ. Adding a new site often required the service provider to participate ๐Ÿ™„.

Open code availability: No ๐Ÿ”’.

Restriction-free: No. WAP has two patents with royalties required ๐Ÿ’ธ.

Open specification availability: No ๐Ÿ”’.

Open maintenance process: No, there was a US$27000 entrance fee ๐Ÿ’ธ.

Good technical design: No. A common complaint was that WAP was underspecified, so interoperability was difficult ๐Ÿ˜ตโ€๐Ÿ’ซ.

A.5.2. Wild Success Factors โœจ

Extensible: unknown ๐Ÿคทโ€โ™€๏ธ.

No hard scalability bound: excellent ๐ŸŒŸ.

Threats sufficiently mitigated: unknown ๐Ÿคทโ€โ™€๏ธ.

A.5.3. Discussion ๐Ÿ’…

WAP had a number of close competitors ๐ŸฅŠ. Incremental deployability was easier with those competitors ๐Ÿฆ‹. The restrictions on code and specification access were significant factors that hindered WAP's ability to succeed ๐Ÿšง.


A.6. Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) ๐Ÿ“ก

WEP is part of the IEEE 802.11 standard [IEEE-802.11], which succeeded in being widely deployed in spite of its faults ๐Ÿซ .

A.6.1. Initial Success Factors

Positive net value: yes! WEP provided security when there was no alternative, and it only needed changes from entities that got the benefit ๐Ÿ’–.

Incremental deployability: yes! Although you needed to configure both the access point and stations, each wireless network could deploy WEP independently ๐Ÿฆ‹.

Open code availability: essentially no, because of Rivest Cipher 4 (RC4) ๐Ÿ”’.

Restriction-free: No for RC4, but otherwise yes ๐ŸŽ€.

Open specification availability: No for RC4, but otherwise yes ๐Ÿ“œ.

Open maintenance process: Yes ๐Ÿ› ๏ธ.

Good technical design: No. WEP had an inappropriate use of RC4 ๐Ÿ’€.

A.6.2. Wild Success Factors ๐ŸŒธ

okay so this is where WEP's real life gets messy ๐Ÿ‘€. Extensible: IEEE 802.11 was extensible enough that people could build replacements for WEP ๐Ÿงš. WEP itself, though? Not extensible at all ๐Ÿ˜ญ.

No hard scalability bound: No.

Threats sufficiently mitigated: No. ๐Ÿ’€

A.6.3. Discussion ๐Ÿ’…

WEP wasn't completely open or restriction-free, and its technical design was honestly not it ๐Ÿ™ˆ. But it still got super popular! Why? Because it was incrementally deployable and it gave real value when there was literally no alternative ๐Ÿซถ. This again shows that value and deployability are way more important success factors than technical design or openness, especially when no alternatives exist โœจ.

A.7. RADIUS vs. TACACS+ ๐Ÿฆ‹

A.7.1. Initial Success Factors ๐Ÿ‘‘

Positive net value: Yes for both, and it only required changes by the entities that got the benefit ๐Ÿ’–.

Incremental deployability: Yes for both (just change clients and servers) ๐Ÿ“.

Open code availability: Yes for RADIUS; initially no for TACACS+, but eventually yes.

Restriction-free: Yes for RADIUS; unclear for TACACS+.

Open specification availability: Yes for RADIUS; initially no for TACACS+, but eventually yes.

Open maintenance process: Initially no for RADIUS, but eventually yes. No for TACACS+.

Good technical design: Fair for RADIUS (there was no confidentiality support, and no authentication of Access Requests; it had home grown ciphersuites based on MD5). Good for TACACS+ ๐ŸŒˆ.

A.7.2. Wild Success Factors โœจ

Extensible: Yes for both ๐Ÿซถ.

No hard scalability bound: Excellent for RADIUS (UDP-based); good for TACACS+ (TCP-based) ๐Ÿ”ฅ.

Threats sufficiently mitigated: No for RADIUS. It has no support for confidentiality, existing implementations are vulnerable to dictionary attacks, and the use of MD5 is now vulnerable to collisions ๐Ÿ˜ญ. TACACS+ was better since it supported encryption ๐Ÿ”.

A.7.3. Discussion ๐ŸŽ€

Since both provided positive net value and were incrementally deployable, those factors weren't the deciding ones ๐Ÿ™ˆ. TACACS+ had a better technical design in most respects, and it eventually provided openly available specifications and source code. But RADIUS had an open maintenance process, plus openly available specifications and source code early on, and that was the determining factor ๐Ÿ‘‘. This again shows that a better technical design matters less for success than other factors ๐Ÿ’….

A.8. Network Address Translators (NATs) ๐Ÿงš

Okay, so NAT isn't strictly speaking a "protocol" per se ๐Ÿค“. It's more of a "mechanism" or "algorithm". But we include a case study anyway, because there are lots of mechanisms that only require a single entity to change to get the benefit (TCP congestion control algorithms are another example in this class) ๐Ÿ“. It's important to include this class in the discussion because it's a perfect example of a key point about incremental deployability โœจ.

A.8.1. Initial Success Factors ๐ŸŒธ

Positive net value: Yes. NATs let multiple devices connect when only a limited number of addresses were available, and they also provided a (limited) security boundary as a side effect ๐Ÿ›ก๏ธ. So they both relieved the pain of acquiring multiple addresses and enabled new scenarios. Finally, they only required deployment by the entity that got the benefit ๐Ÿ’–.

Incremental deployability: Yes. You could deploy a NAT without coordinating with anyone else, including a service provider ๐Ÿฆ‹.

Open code availability: Yes.

Restriction-free: Yes at first (patents subsequently surfaced) ๐Ÿ˜ฌ.

Open specification availability: Yes.

Open maintenance process: Yes.

Good technical design: Fair. NAT functionality was underspecified, which led to unpredictable behavior in general. On top of that, NATs caused problems for certain classes of applications ๐Ÿ™ƒ.

A.8.2. Wild Success Factors ๐Ÿ’ซ

Extensible: Fair. NATs supported some but not all UDP and TCP applications. Adding application layer gateway functionality was difficult ๐Ÿ˜ฉ.

No hard scalability bound: Good. There is a scalability bound (the number of ports available), but it's nowhere near the original design goals ๐Ÿ™Œ.

Threats sufficiently mitigated: Yes โœ….

A.8.3. Discussion ๐Ÿ‘‘

The absence of an unambiguous specification wasn't a hindrance to initial success, since the test cases weren't well defined. So each implementation could decide for itself which scenarios it would handle correctly ๐Ÿคทโ€โ™€๏ธ.

Even with its technical problems, NAT succeeded because of the value it provided ๐Ÿ’–. Again, this shows that the industry is willing to accept technically problematic solutions when there is no alternative and the technology is easy to deploy ๐Ÿซถ.

Indeed, NAT became wildly successful by being used for additional purposes [RFC4864], and it scaled to a large degree, including multiple levels of NATs in places ๐Ÿš€. It's giving main character energy ๐Ÿ’…โœจ.


Appendix B. IAB Members at the Time of This Writing ๐ŸŽ€

Loa Andersson
Leslie Daigle
Elwyn Davies
Kevin Fall
Russ Housley
Olaf Kolkman
Barry Leiba
Kurtis Lindqvist
Danny McPherson
David Oran
Eric Rescorla
Dave Thaler
Lixia Zhang

Authors' Addresses ๐Ÿ’Œ

Dave Thaler
IAB
One Microsoft Way
Redmond, WA  98052
USA

Phone: +1 425 703 8835
EMail: dthaler@microsoft.com

Bernard Aboba
IAB
One Microsoft Way
Redmond, WA  98052
USA

Phone: +1 425 706 6605
EMail: bernarda@microsoft.com

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