RFC 4370

Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) Proxied Authorization Control

๐Ÿ“… published February 2006, from ietf

RFC 4370: Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) Proxied Authorization Control ๐ŸŽ€

okay bestie, let's get the title block sorted first โœจ This is RFC 4370, a Standards Track document, written by Rob Weltman of Yahoo!, Inc. and published in February 2006 ๐Ÿ’… It doesn't obsolete or update any other RFCs, so it's a fresh start ๐ŸŒธ It's an actual standards track protocol for the Internet community, so the status is official, not just vibes ๐Ÿ‘‘

Fun fact: the authors' names show up in a few different ways across the document (Rob Weltman, R. Weltman, Mark Wahl, Mark Smith), so keep your eyes peeled ๐Ÿ™ˆ

Status of This Memo ๐Ÿฆ‹

This is an Internet standards track protocol for the Internet community, and it's open for discussion and suggestions for improvements ๐Ÿ’œ If you want the current standardization state and status of this protocol, check the current edition of the "Internet Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) ๐Ÿงš Distribution of this memo is unlimited, so share it with everyone ๐ŸŒˆ

Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006) ๐Ÿ’–

Abstract ๐ŸŒธ

This document defines the Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) Proxy Authorization Control ๐ŸŽ€ The Proxy Authorization Control lets a client ask that an operation be processed under a provided authorization identity, instead of under the current authorization identity tied to the connection ๐Ÿ”ฅ

1. Introduction โœจ

okay so proxy authorization lets a client say "run this operation as someone else" instead of as whoever is currently logged into the connection ๐Ÿ’… This document defines support for that using the Control mechanism [RFC2251] ๐Ÿฆ‹ LDAP [LDAPV3] can use the Simple Authentication and Security Layer [SASL] for authentication, and it can supply an authorization identity that's different from the authentication identity, but that identity applies to the whole LDAP session ๐Ÿซถ

The Proxy Authorization Control is the upgrade ๐Ÿ˜ญ It lets you specify an authorization identity per operation, which is super helpful for clients that need to do stuff efficiently for lots of different users ๐Ÿ‘‘

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", and "MAY" used in this document are to be interpreted as described in [KEYWORDS] ๐Ÿ’œ

2. Publishing Support for the Proxy Authorization Control ๐ŸŽ€

Here's how a server says it supports this control ๐Ÿงš If the Object Identifier (OID) "2.16.840.1.113730.3.4.18" shows up in the supportedControl attribute [RFC2252] of a server's root DSA-specific Entry (DSE), then it's supported ๐ŸŒˆ

3. Proxy Authorization Control ๐Ÿ’–

A single Proxy Authorization Control MAY be included in any search, compare, modify, add, delete, or modify Distinguished Name (DN) or extended operation request message ๐Ÿฆ‹ The exception is any extension that changes authentication, authorization, or data confidentiality [RFC2829], like Start TLS [LDAPTLS], when it's part of the controls field of the LDAPMessage defined in [RFC2251] ๐Ÿ˜ญ

The controlType is "2.16.840.1.113730.3.4.18" ๐Ÿ”ฅ

The criticality MUST be present and MUST be TRUE ๐Ÿšจ This is the big safety rule ๐Ÿ’… It stops clients from accidentally sending a request that runs as the wrong authorization identity ๐Ÿซถ

Clients MUST include the criticality flag and MUST set it to TRUE ๐ŸŽ€ Servers MUST reject any request that has a Proxy Authorization Control without a criticality flag, or with the flag set to FALSE, using a protocolError error ๐Ÿ’€ Same energy as the rule above, because it keeps clients from running requests as an identity they never meant to use ๐Ÿ™ˆ

The controlValue SHALL be present, and it SHALL either contain an authzId [AUTH] for the authorization identity of the request, or be empty if an anonymous association is going to be used โœจ

How the server decides who gets proxy rights is up to the server's own proxy authorization policy ๐Ÿงš

If the server recognizes the requested authorization identity, and the client is allowed to adopt it, the request runs as if the proxy authorization identity sent it directly ๐Ÿ”ฅ Otherwise, result code 123 comes back ๐Ÿ’€

4. Implementation Considerations ๐ŸŒธ

Here's one way proxy authorization can interact with normal access control ๐Ÿ‘‘ When a search runs, an entry that would have come back if the proxy authorization identity asked directly might NOT come back, if the server finds the requester doesn't have the right to assume that identity for searching it ๐Ÿ˜ญ Even if the entry is within the scope of a search under a base DN that does imply those rights ๐Ÿ™ˆ So you might get fewer results, or none at all, compared to the proxy identity asking directly ๐Ÿ’…

Like, picture a system with fine-grained access control: the proxy rights requester has them at the top of a search tree, but not at or below one or more points inside the tree ๐ŸŒณ Iconic plot twist ๐Ÿซ 

5. Security Considerations ๐Ÿ’€

The Proxy Authorization Control is subject to the general LDAP security considerations [RFC2251] [AUTH] [LDAPTLS] ๐Ÿšจ The control can go over a secure channel or an insecure channel ๐Ÿ”

The control lets an extra authorization identity get passed along ๐Ÿงš In some deployments, those identities might contain confidential info that needs privacy protection ๐Ÿซถ

Note that the server is responsible for deciding whether a proxy authorization request gets honored ๐Ÿ‘‘ "Anonymous" users SHOULD NOT be allowed to assume the identity of others ๐Ÿ’€ Absolutely not, bestie ๐Ÿ™…

6. IANA Considerations ๐Ÿ“

The OID "2.16.840.1.113730.3.4.18" is reserved for the Proxy Authorization Control ๐Ÿฆ‹ It's been registered as an LDAP Protocol Mechanism [RFC3383] ๐Ÿ’œ

A result code (123) has been assigned by the IANA for when the server does not execute a request using the proxy authorization identity ๐ŸŒˆ

7. Acknowledgements ๐Ÿซถ

Shoutout to the reviewers: Mark Smith (formerly of Netscape Communications Corp.), Mark Wahl (formerly of Sun Microsystems, Inc.), Kurt Zeilenga of OpenLDAP Foundation, Jim Sermersheim of Novell, and Steven Legg of Adacel ๐Ÿ‘‘ They all gave reviews of this document, and honestly they deserve the flowers ๐Ÿ’

8. Normative References ๐Ÿ“š

  • [KEYWORDS] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
  • [LDAPV3] Hodges, J. and R. Morgan, "Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (v3): Technical Specification", RFC 3377, September 2002.
  • [SASL] Myers, J., "Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL)", RFC 2222, October 1997.
  • [AUTH] Wahl, M., Alvestrand, H., Hodges, J., and R. Morgan, "Authentication Methods for LDAP", RFC 2829, May 2000.
  • [LDAPTLS] Hodges, J., Morgan, R., and M. Wahl, "Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (v3): Extension for Transport Layer Security", RFC 2830, May 2000.
  • [RFC2251] Wahl, M., Howes, T., and S. Kille, "Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (v3)", RFC 2251, December 1997.
  • [RFC2252] Wahl, M., Coulbeck, A., Howes, T., and S. Kille, "Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (v3): Attribute Syntax Definitions", RFC 2252, December 1997.
  • [RFC2829] Wahl, M., Alvestrand, H., Hodges, J., and R. Morgan, "Authentication Methods for LDAP", RFC 2829, May 2000.
  • [RFC3383] Zeilenga, K., "Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) Considerations for the Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP)", BCP 64, RFC 3383, September 2002.

Author's Address ๐Ÿ“ฎ

Rob Weltman Yahoo!, Inc. 701 First Avenue Sunnyvale, CA 94089 USA

Phone: +1 408 349-5504 EMail: robw@worldspot.com


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