RFC 4282
The Network Access Identifier
RFC 4282: The Network Access Identifier ๐
Title block tea โ This is RFC 4282, The Network Access Identifier, published in December 2005. It's a Standards Track doc, so it's an actual internet standard ๐ฅ. The authors are B. Aboba (Microsoft), M. Beadles (ENDFORCE), J. Arkko (Ericsson), and P. Eronen (Nokia). It obsoletes RFC 2486 ๐ฆ, and the title block doesn't list any "Updates" entry. Part 1 of the rewrite starts now ๐
Status of This Memo โจ
This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited.
Copyright Notice ๐
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005).
Abstract ๐ธ
Okay so, to offer roaming services you need a standardized way to identify users ๐ชช. This document defines the syntax for the Network Access Identifier (NAI), which is the user identity the client submits during network authentication. "Roaming" can be loosely defined as being able to use any one of multiple Internet Service Providers (ISPs) while keeping a formal, customer-vendor relationship with only one of them ๐ง. Examples of where roaming might be needed include ISP "confederations" and ISP-provided corporate network access support.
This document is a revised version of RFC 2486, which originally defined NAIs. The enhancements include international character set and privacy support, plus a bunch of corrections to the original RFC ๐.
Table of Contents ๐
1. Introduction ....................................................2
1.1. Terminology ................................................3
1.2. Requirements Language ......................................4
1.3. Purpose ....................................................4
2. NAI Definition ..................................................4
2.1. Formal Syntax ..............................................4
2.2. NAI Length Considerations ..................................6
2.3. Support for Username Privacy ...............................6
2.4. International Character Sets ...............................7
2.5. Compatibility with E-Mail Usernames ........................8
2.6. Compatibility with DNS .....................................8
2.7. Realm Construction .........................................8
2.8. Examples ..................................................10
3. Security Considerations ........................................10
4. IANA Considerations ............................................11
5. References .....................................................11
5.1. Normative References ......................................11
5.2. Informative References ....................................12
Appendix A. Changes from RFC 2486 ................................14
Appendix B. Acknowledgements .....................................14
1. Introduction ๐ฆ
Lots of people are obsessed with the idea of "roaming capability" for network access ๐ญ. It covers dialup Internet users, Virtual Private Network (VPN) usage, wireless LAN authentication, and more. The interested parties include:
- Regional ISPs operating within a particular state or province, combining their efforts with other regional providers to offer dialup service over a wider area.
- National ISPs that want to team up with one or more ISPs in another nation to offer more comprehensive dialup service across a group of countries or a continent.
- Wireless LAN hotspots providing service to one or more ISPs.
- Businesses that want to give their employees a full package of dialup services on a global basis. Those services may include Internet access as well as secure access to corporate intranets via a VPN, enabled by tunneling protocols such as the Point-to-Point Tunneling Protocol (PPTP) [RFC2637], the Layer 2 Forwarding (L2F) protocol [RFC2341], the Layer 2 Tunneling Protocol (L2TP) [RFC2661], and the IPsec tunnel mode [RFC2401].
To make roaming services work together better, you need a standardized way to identify users ๐ซถ. This document defines the syntax for the Network Access Identifier (NAI). Examples of implementations that use the NAI, plus descriptions of what it means, can be found in [RFC2194].
This document is a revised version of RFC 2486 [RFC2486], which originally defined NAIs. The differences and enhancements compared to RFC 2486 are listed in Appendix A ๐.
1.1. Terminology ๐ง
This document frequently uses the following terms:
Network Access Identifier
The Network Access Identifier (NAI) is the user identity submitted by the client during network access authentication. In roaming, the purpose of the NAI is to identify the user as well as to assist in the routing of the authentication request. Please note that the NAI may not necessarily be the same as the user's e-mail address or the user identity submitted in an application layer authentication ๐ฌ.
Network Access Server
The Network Access Server (NAS) is the device that clients connect to in order to get access to the network. In PPTP terminology, this is referred to as the PPTP Access Concentrator (PAC), and in L2TP terminology, it is referred to as the L2TP Access Concentrator (LAC). In IEEE 802.11, it is referred to as an Access Point ๐ก.
Roaming Capability
Roaming capability can be loosely defined as the ability to use any one of multiple Internet Service Providers (ISPs), while maintaining a formal, customer-vendor relationship with only one. Examples of cases where roaming capability might be required include ISP "confederations" and ISP-provided corporate network access support ๐.
Tunneling Service
A tunneling service is any network service enabled by tunneling protocols such as PPTP, L2F, L2TP, and IPsec tunnel mode. One example of a tunneling service is secure access to corporate intranets via a Virtual Private Network (VPN) ๐.
1.2. Requirements Language ๐
In this document, the key words MAY, MUST, MUST NOT, OPTIONAL, RECOMMENDED, SHOULD, and SHOULD NOT are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119] ๐ .
1.3. Purpose ๐ฏ
As described in [RFC2194], there are a bunch of providers offering network access services, and the number of Internet Service Providers involved in roaming consortia is growing super fast ๐.
To offer roaming capability, one of the requirements is being able to identify the user's home authentication server. For roaming, this is handled through the Network Access Identifier (NAI) that the user submits to the NAS in the initial network authentication. It's also expected that NASes will use the NAI as part of the process of opening a new tunnel, so they can figure out the tunnel endpoint ๐.
2. NAI Definition ๐
2.1. Formal Syntax ๐งฉ
The grammar for the NAI is given below, described in Augmented Backus-Naur Form (ABNF) as documented in [RFC4234]. The grammar for the username is based on [RFC0821], and the grammar for the realm is an updated version of [RFC1035] โจ.
nai = username
nai =/ "@" realm
nai =/ username "@" realm
username = dot-string
dot-string = string
dot-string =/ dot-string "." string
string = char
string =/ string char
char = c
char =/ "\" x
c = %x21 ; '!' allowed
; '"' not allowed
c =/ %x23 ; '#' allowed
c =/ %x24 ; '$' allowed
c =/ %x25 ; '%' allowed
c =/ %x26 ; '&' allowed
c =/ %x27 ; ''' allowed
; '(', ')' not allowed
c =/ %x2A ; '*' allowed
c =/ %x2B ; '+' allowed
; ',' not allowed
c =/ %x2D ; '-' allowed
; '.' not allowed
c =/ %x2F ; '/' allowed
c =/ %x30-39 ; '0'-'9' allowed
; ';', ':', '<' not allowed
c =/ %x3D ; '=' allowed
; '>' not allowed
c =/ %x3F ; '?' allowed
; '@' not allowed
c =/ %x41-5a ; 'A'-'Z' allowed
; '[', '\', ']' not allowed
c =/ %x5E ; '^' allowed
c =/ %x5F ; '_' allowed
c =/ %x60 ; '`' allowed
c =/ %x61-7A ; 'a'-'z' allowed
c =/ %x7B ; '{' allowed
c =/ %x7C ; '|' allowed
c =/ %x7D ; '}' allowed
c =/ %x7E ; '~' allowed
; DEL not allowed
c =/ %x80-FF ; UTF-8-Octet allowed (not in RFC 2486)
; Where UTF-8-octet is any octet in the
; multi-octet UTF-8 representation of a
; unicode codepoint above %x7F.
; Note that c must also satisfy rules in
; Section 2.4, including, for instance,
; checking that no prohibited output is
; used (see also Section 2.3 of
; [RFC4013]).
x = %x00-FF ; all 128 ASCII characters, no exception;
; as well as all UTF-8-octets as defined
; above (this was not allowed in
; RFC 2486). Note that x must nevertheless
; again satisfy the Section 2.4 rules.
realm = 1*( label "." ) label
label = let-dig *(ldh-str)
ldh-str = *( alpha / digit / "-" ) let-dig
let-dig = alpha / digit
alpha = %x41-5A ; 'A'-'Z'
alpha =/ %x61-7A ; 'a'-'z'
digit = %x30-39 ; '0'-'9'
2.2. NAI Length Considerations โจ
okay so first things first, bestie: any device that handles NAIs MUST support an NAI length of at least 72 octets. ๐ Supporting 253 octets is RECOMMENDED, which is the real glow-up goal. But there are some implementation gotchas you need to know about ๐
- NAIs often ride along in the User-Name attribute of RADIUS (Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service). Sadly, RFC 2865 [RFC2865], Section 5.1, says that "the ability to handle at least 63 octets is recommended." ๐ญ So NAIs longer than 63 octets might not survive the trip through every device. Also, a RADIUS message can only carry a single User-Name attribute, and the maximum attribute length is 253 octets. That means RADIUS literally can't handle NAIs longer than 253 octets. Rip. ๐
- NAIs can also travel in the User-Name attribute of Diameter [RFC3588], which allows content lengths up to 2^24 - 9 octets. ๐ So NAIs that only ever touch Diameter nodes can be super long. The catch is that an NAI sent over Diameter might eventually get translated to RADIUS, and then all the RADIUS limits above apply again. Plot twist ๐
2.3. Support for Username Privacy ๐
the meaning of the username part of the NAI depends on which realm it belongs to. ๐ Because of that, the "username" part SHOULD be treated as opaque data by any node that isn't part of the authoritative domain for that realm (in the sense of Section 4). Hands off, not your business ๐ซถ
Sometimes NAIs get paired with a separate authentication method that can carry the username part more securely, which boosts privacy. โจ In that situation, NAIs MAY be shortened by leaving out the username part. Omitting it is RECOMMENDED over slapping on a fixed username like "anonymous", because leaving it out clearly signals whether the username is meant to pinpoint one specific user. Clarity is everything ๐
For roaming, the realm part is usually required ๐ธ Before the authentication conversation can move forward, you typically have to find the right backend authentication server for the NAI. The realm is what gets the exchange routed to the correct server, so it's basically the GPS of the whole thing ๐ง
2.4. International Character Sets ๐
this spec lets you use international usernames AND realms, which is so inclusive ๐ณ๏ธโ๐ International usernames are built on Unicode characters, encoded as UTF-8, and then run through a specific algorithm so there's one canonical representation. The internationalization of the realm portion is based on "Internationalizing Domain Names in Applications (IDNA)" [RFC3490].
To keep things canonical, the characters in the username portion of an NAI MUST satisfy the ABNF in this specification AND the requirements in [RFC4013]. Those requirements are:
- Mapping requirements, from Section 2.1 of [RFC4013]. Mapping swaps certain characters for others (like SPACE) so comparisons are more likely to work. ๐ช
- Normalization requirements, from Section 2.2 of [RFC4013], which also exist to make comparisons easier. โจ
- Prohibited output. Some characters just aren't allowed in properly formed strings that follow Section 2.3 of [RFC4013]. Making sure an NAI matches its ABNF isn't enough. You also have to make sure it doesn't contain prohibited output. Double-check, bestie ๐
- Bidirectional characters are handled as described in Section 2.4 of [RFC4013]. ๐
- Unassigned code points are covered in Section 2.5 of [RFC4013]. Using unassigned code points is prohibited, no exceptions ๐ซ
The mapping, normalization, and bidirectional character processing MUST be done by end systems that take international text as input. In a network access setting, those end systems are usually the client and the Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) server. NAIs travel over the wire already in canonical form, so nodes that just pass NAIs along or receive them from the network typically don't need to do tasks like normalization. End systems MUST also check for prohibited output and unassigned code points. Other systems MAY do those checks when they know a particular data item is an NAI. Efficient and iconic ๐
The realm name is an "IDN-unaware domain name slot," as defined in [RFC3490]. In other words, it can only contain ASCII characters. An implementation MAY support Internationalized Domain Names (IDNs) using the ToASCII operation. Check [RFC3490] for the full scoop ๐
Converting internationalized domain names to ASCII is left to the end systems, like network access clients and AAA servers. ๐ซง We also expect domain name comparisons, matching, resolution, and AAA routing to happen on the ASCII versions of those names. That gives you a canonical representation, means intermediate systems like AAA proxies don't have to do any translating, and it should keep working through systems that don't know about international character sets. Everyone gets invited to the party ๐
2.5. Compatibility with E-Mail Usernames ๐ง
in this document, the Network Access Identifier looks like user@realm. ๐ Heads up, though: even though the user portion is based on the BNF in [RFC0821], it's been extended for internationalization and for the purposes of Section 2.7. So it's not necessarily compatible with e-mail usernames. Also, the internationalization rules for NAIs and e-mail addresses are different, because NAIs only ever get typed in by the user and their own operator, not by random other people ๐
2.6. Compatibility with DNS ๐
the BNF for the realm portion lets the realm start with a digit. That's something the BNF in [RFC1035] does NOT allow. ๐ This change was made to match current practice. Even though [RFC1035] doesn't permit it, Fully Qualified Domain Names (FQDNs) like 3com.com are used everywhere and accepted by current software. Real life wins ๐
2.7. Realm Construction ๐บ๏ธ
NAIs are used, among other things, for routing AAA transactions to the user's home realm. Usually the home realm shows up in the realm portion of the NAI, but sometimes a different realm can be used. That can be handy when the home realm is only reachable through another mediating realm. ๐ฆ
BUT, this kind of usage can break interoperability unless everyone involved has agreed it's allowed. > Specifically, NAIs MUST NOT use a different realm than the home realm unless the sender has explicit knowledge that (a) the specified other realm is available and (b) the other realm supports such usage. The sender can figure out whether those conditions are met through a database, dynamic discovery, or some other means that isn't specified here. Also, condition (a) is affected by roaming, since whether the other realm is available may depend on where the user is or which application they want. ๐งญ
The use of the home realm MUST be the default unless it's configured otherwise. ๐ก
When both conditions are met, an NAI like
user@homerealm.example.net
MAY be written as
homerealm.example.net!user@otherrealm.example.net
In that case, the part before the (non-escaped) '!' MUST be a realm name as defined in the ABNF in Section 2.1. That realm name is an "IDN-unaware domain name slot," just like the realm after the "@" character. Check Section 2.4 for the details ๐ When a node receives an NAI like this, the other realm MUST convert the format back to "user@homerealm.example.net" when it passes the NAI forward, and it also has to apply the right AAA routing for the transaction. โจ
The conversion can happen recursively too. ๐ After the conversion, the result can still contain one or more '!' characters in the username. For example, this NAI:
other2.example.net!home.example.net!user@other1.example.net
would first get converted at other1.example.net into:
home.example.net!user@other2.example.net
and then at other2.example.net, finally, into:
user@homerealm.example.net
Note that the syntax in this section is optional and is NOT part of the ABNF. ๐ The '!' character can show up in the username portion of an NAI for other reasons too. When it does, the rules here don't apply. The meaning of the username is up to whatever agreement exists between the identified user and the realm after the '@' character. ๐
2.8. Examples ๐ฌ
Here are some examples of valid Network Access Identifiers:
bob
joe@example.com
fred@foo-9.example.com
jack@3rd.depts.example.com
fred.smith@example.com
fred_smith@example.com
fred$@example.com
fred=?#$&*+-/^smith@example.com
nancy@eng.example.net
eng.example.net!nancy@example.net
eng%nancy@example.net
@privatecorp.example.net
\(user\)@example.net
alice@xn--tmonesimerkki-bfbb.example.net
The last example uses an IDN that's been converted into an ASCII representation. ๐ซ๐ฎโจ
And here are some examples of invalid ones, which are a no-go ๐ โโ๏ธ:
fred@example
fred@example_9.com
fred@example.net@example.net
fred.@example.net
eng:nancy@example.net
eng;nancy@example.net
(user)@example.net
<nancy>@example.net
3. Security Considerations ๐
okay bestie, this part is SERIOUS, so pay attention ๐จ Since an NAI reveals a user's home affiliation, it may help an attacker probe the username space even further. This problem is worst in protocols that send the username in clear-text across the Internet, like RADIUS, which is described in [RFC2865] and [RFC2866]. To stop people from snooping on the username, protocols may use confidentiality services provided by the protocols that carry them. Examples are RADIUS protected by IPsec [RFC3579], or Diameter protected by TLS [RFC3588]. Lock it down ๐
This specification adds the option of hiding the username part of the NAI by leaving it out. As discussed in Section 2.3, this only works when NAIs are used alongside a separate authentication method that can carry the username securely. In some cases, application-specific privacy mechanisms have also been used with NAIs. For instance, some Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) methods put method-specific pseudonyms in the username part of the NAI [RFC3748]. Neither of these approaches can protect the realm part. But their advantage over transport protection is that the privacy of the username is preserved even through intermediate nodes such as NASes. Privacy for the win ๐ฆ๐
4. IANA Considerations โจ
Okay so, the whole point here is that nobody has to invent a brand-new admin process ๐ โโ๏ธ. The NAI realm namespace just piggybacks on the DNS namespace administration that already exists. Genius, right? ๐ง
NAI realm names have to be unique ๐. The right to use a given NAI realm for roaming comes along with the right to use a particular Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN), so you get both at the same time. If you want an NAI realm name, grab the corresponding FQDN first ๐. Using a realm without owning its FQDN is asking for trouble, since it can cause conflicts, so it's to be discouraged ๐ โโ๏ธ.
Also, using an FQDN as the realm name does NOT mean you have to use DNS to find the authentication server ๐. Diameter [RFC3588] can use DNS to locate authentication servers. Existing RADIUS setups, though, usually rely on proxy configuration files to find authentication servers within a domain and handle authentication routing. The implementations described in [RFC2194] didn't use DNS for that either. Existing implementations also haven't needed dynamic routing protocols or global routing information propagation ๐ฆ. And one more thing: the NAI doesn't have to be a valid email address ๐ .
5. References
5.1. Normative References
[RFC1035] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, November 1987.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC4234] Crocker, D. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for
Syntax Specifications: ABNF", RFC 4234, October
2005.
[RFC3490] Faltstrom, P., Hoffman, P., and A. Costello,
"Internationalizing Domain Names in Applications
(IDNA)", RFC 3490, March 2003.
[RFC4013] Zeilenga, K., "SASLprep: Stringprep Profile for User
Names and Passwords", RFC 4013, February 2005.
5.2. Informative References
[RFC0821] Postel, J., "Simple Mail Transfer Protocol", STD 10,
RFC 821, August 1982.
[RFC2194] Aboba, B., Lu, J., Alsop, J., Ding, J., and W. Wang,
"Review of Roaming Implementations", RFC 2194,
September 1997.
[RFC2341] Valencia, A., Littlewood, M., and T. Kolar, "Cisco
Layer Two Forwarding (Protocol) "L2F"", RFC 2341,
May 1998.
[RFC2401] Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, "Security Architecture for
the Internet Protocol", RFC 2401, November 1998.
[RFC2486] Aboba, B. and M. Beadles, "The Network Access
Identifier", RFC 2486, January 1999.
[RFC2637] Hamzeh, K., Pall, G., Verthein, W., Taarud, J.,
Little, W., and G. Zorn, "Point-to-Point Tunneling
Protocol", RFC 2637, July 1999.
[RFC2661] Townsley, W., Valencia, A., Rubens, A., Pall, G.,
Zorn, G., and B. Palter, "Layer Two Tunneling
Protocol "L2TP"", RFC 2661, August 1999.
[RFC2865] Rigney, C., Willens, S., Rubens, A., and W. Simpson,
"Remote Authentication Dial In User Service
(RADIUS)", RFC 2865, June 2000.
[RFC2866] Rigney, C., "RADIUS Accounting", RFC 2866, June
2000.
[RFC3579] Aboba, B. and P. Calhoun, "RADIUS (Remote
Authentication Dial In User Service) Support For
Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)", RFC 3579,
September 2003.
[RFC3588] Calhoun, P., Loughney, J., Guttman, E., Zorn, G.,
and J. Arkko, "Diameter Base Protocol", RFC 3588,
September 2003.
[RFC3748] Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J.,
and H. Levkowetz, "Extensible Authentication
Protocol (EAP)", RFC 3748, June 2004.
[netsel-problem] Arkko, J. and B. Aboba, "Network Discovery and
Selection Problem", Work in Progress, October 2005.
Appendix A. Changes from RFC 2486 ๐ฆ
This document has some glow-ups compared to the original NAI definition in RFC 2486 [RFC2486] ๐:
- International character sets are now supported for both usernames and realms ๐. Heads up though: this means character codes
128 - 255may show up in the username portion, which could be unacceptable to nodes that only support RFC 2486. Lots of devices already allow it though ๐. - Username privacy support has been added ๐ซถ. NAIs without a username (for privacy) might not be acceptable to RFC 2486-compliant nodes, but again, plenty of devices already do this ๐ .
- A recommendation to support an NAI length of at least 253 octets has been added โจ. The document also talks through compatibility between NAI lengths here and in various AAA protocols. Long NAIs might not be acceptable to RFC 2486-compliant nodes ๐ญ.
- The mediating network syntax has been fully described now, instead of just being given as an example ๐ง. This syntax isn't meant to be a complete fix for the network discovery and selection needs in [netsel-problem]. It's more of a clarification of RFC 2486 ๐.
However, as discussed in Section 2.7, this specification requires that this syntax be applied only when there is explicit knowledge that the peer system supports such syntax ๐ฆ.
- The realm BNF entry definition got changed to fix an error (infinite recursion) in the original spec ๐.
- Several clarifications and improvements have been added to the ABNF specification for NAIs ๐.
Appendix B. Acknowledgements ๐ซถ
Big thank-you energy to Glen Zorn for all the useful discussions about this problem space โจ, and to Farid Adrangi for suggesting how to represent mediating networks in NAIs ๐ก. Jonathan Rosenberg reported the BNF error ๐, and Dale Worley suggested clarifications for the x and special BNF entries ๐. Arne Norefors reported the length differences between RFC 2486 and RFC 2865 ๐, and Paul Hoffman helped out with the international character set issues ๐.
Kalle Tammela, Stefaan De Cnodder, Nagi Jonnala, Bert Wijnen, Blair Bullock, Yoshihiro Ohba, Ignacio Goyret, John Loughney, Henrik Levkowetz, Ted Hardie, Bill Fenner, Sam Hartman, and Richard Perlman all gave many useful comments on this document ๐. The ABNF validator at http://www.apps.ietf.org/abnf.html was used to check that the ABNF in Section 2.1 is syntactically correct โ
.
Authors' Addresses
Bernard Aboba
Microsoft
One Microsoft Way
Redmond, WA 98052
USA
EMail: bernarda@microsoft.com
Mark A. Beadles
ENDFORCE
565 Metro Place South Suite 300
Dublin OH 43017
USA
EMail: mbeadles@endforce.com
Jari Arkko
Ericsson
Jorvas 02420
Finland
EMail: jari.arkko@ericsson.com
Pasi Eronen
Nokia Research Center
P.O. Box 407
FIN-00045 Nokia Group
Finland
EMail: pasi.eronen@nokia.com
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