RFC 3097

RSVP Cryptographic Authentication -- Updated Message Type Value

📅 published April 2001, from ietf

RFC 3097: RSVP Cryptographic Authentication, Updated Message Type Value ✨

Okay bestie, here's the tea 🫖💖 RFC 3097 is titled "RSVP Cryptographic Authentication -- Updated Message Type Value." It came out in April 2001 from the Network Working Group. It's on the Standards Track 💅, so it's an official Internet standards-track protocol doc. The authors are R. Braden (ISI) and L. Zhang (UCLA). It updates RFC 2747 🦋, and that's the whole reason this doc exists.

Status of This Memo 📜

This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited.

Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2001). All Rights Reserved.

Abstract 🌸

This memo fixes a duplicate in the assignment of RSVP Message Types. It does this by changing the Message Types that RFC 2747 assigned to the Challenge and Integrity Response messages. Iconic fix, honestly 🔥

1. Introduction 💭

Okay so, [RFC2747] ("RSVP Cryptographic Authentication") gives RSVP Message Type 12 to an Integrity Response message. Meanwhile, [RFC2961] ("RSVP Refresh Overhead Reduction Extensions") gives that same number to a Bundle message. 😭 Two different messages, one number, total chaos. This memo settles the Type 12 fight by giving the Integrity Response message a different Message Type value under RFC 2747.

It's believed that the RFC 2961 protocol was already in use in the field before the RFC was published and before anyone noticed the conflicting Message Type. It's also believed that it may be easier to install new software in environments that already deployed the Integrity object than in ones that deployed the refresh reduction extension. Main character energy for the refresh extension, ngl 👑

To keep interoperability problems from this change to a minimum, we also give RFC 2747's Challenge message a new Message Type value. The Integrity Response message is a reply to that Challenge, so they get updated together 🫶

2. Modification 🛠️

Message Types defined in the RSVP Integrity extension [RFC 2747] shall be changed as follows:

  • Challenge message has Message Type 25.
  • Integrity Response message has Message Type 25+1.

3. Compatibility 🤝

Two communicating nodes whose Integrity implementations are conformant with this modification will interoperate. They use Message Type 12 for Bundle messages, and Message Types 25 and 26 for the Integrity handshake 🦋

A non-conformant implementation of the Integrity extension will not interoperate with a conformant implementation. Two non-conformant implementations can still interoperate like before though, so they're not left out 🥹

There's no way an Integrity handshake succeeds by accident because of this change. Both sides of the handshake use either the new numbers or the old numbers, never a mix. Plus, the Integrity Response message includes a 32-bit cookie that must match a cookie in the Challenge message. If it doesn't match, the challenge fails. Finally, a non-conformant implementation should never receive a Bundle message that it reads as an Integrity Response message, because RFC 2961 requires that Bundle messages be sent only to a Bundle-capable node. Very safe, very cute 🔒✨

4. References 📚

  • [RFC2747] Baker, F., Lindell, R. and M. Talwar, "RSVP Cryptographic Authentication", RFC 2747, January 2000.
  • [RFC2961] Berger, L., Gan, D., Swallow, G., Pan, P., Tommasi, F. and S. Molendini, "RSVP Refresh Overhead Reduction Extensions", RFC 2961, April 2001.

Security Considerations 🔐

No new security considerations are introduced beyond RFC 2747 itself and the compatibility issues above. Still, take the compatibility section seriously, bestie, because that's where any surprises would come from 💀

Authors' Addresses 📮

Bob Braden
USC Information Sciences Institute
4676 Admiralty Way
Marina del Rey, CA 90292

Phone: (310) 822-1511
EMail: Braden@ISI.EDU


Lixia Zhang
UCLA Computer Science Department
4531G Boelter Hall
Los Angeles, CA 90095-1596 USA

Phone: 310-825-2695
EMail: lixia@cs.ucla.edu

Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2001). All Rights Reserved.

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The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns.

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Acknowledgement 🌷

Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the Internet Society.

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