RFC 1968
The PPP Encryption Control Protocol (ECP)
RFC 1968: The PPP Encryption Control Protocol (ECP) π
okay bestie, here's the title block first π
Stream: Network Working Group πΈ Author: G. Meyer of Spider Systems β¨ Category: Standards Track π¦ Date: June 1996 π Obsoletes / Updates: nothing is listed in the header, so it doesn't obsolete or update anything else π§
Status of this Memo β¨
this is an Internet standards track protocol for the Internet community, and it's literally asking for discussion and suggestions for improvements π£οΈ. If you want to know where this protocol stands in standardisation, check the current edition of "Internet Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) π. Distribution of this memo is unlimited π.
Conventions π§
okay so these are the language conventions used for the items of specification in this doc:
- MUST: the item is an absolute requirement of the specification, no wiggle room π₯. MUST is only used where it's actually required for interoperability, not to force implementors into one particular method when interoperability doesn't need it π .
- SHOULD: the item is meant to be followed for all but exceptional circumstances π«Ά.
- MAY or optional: truly optional π¦. You can follow it or ignore it, depending on what your implementation needs.
fun fact π€: the lowercase "should" and "may" show up too, but only in their everyday meanings, not as the spec terms.
Table of Contents π
1. Introduction ........................................... 2
2. Encryption Control Protocol (ECP) ...................... 2
2.1 Sending Encrypted Datagrams ....................... 3
3. Additional Packets ..................................... 4
3.1 Reset-Request and Reset-Ack ....................... 5
4. ECP Configuration Options .............................. 6
4.1 Proprietary Encryption OUI ........................ 7
4.2 Publicly Available Encryption Types ............... 8
4.3 Negotiating an Encryption Algorithm ............... 9
5. Security Considerations ................................ 10
Abstract π
PPP [1] gives us a standard way to transport multi-protocol datagrams over point-to-point links π. It also defines an extensible Link Control Protocol, which is so cute π.
This document defines a method for negotiating data encryption over PPP links π. Main character energy.
1. Introduction π·
okay so, to talk over a PPP link, each end has to send LCP packets first to configure and test the data link during the Link Establishment phase π§. After the link is up, optional facilities can be negotiated as needed β¨.
one of those facilities is data encryption π. A whole bunch of encryption methods can be negotiated, though typically only one method gets used in each direction of the link π.
each direction can even use a different encryption algorithm, depending on speed, cost, memory or other considerations π¦. Iconic flexibility.
2. Encryption Control Protocol (ECP) π
the Encryption Control Protocol (ECP) is in charge of configuring and enabling data encryption algorithms on both ends of the point-to-point link π.
ECP uses the same packet exchange mechanism as LCP. ECP packets may not be exchanged until PPP has reached the Network-Layer Protocol phase π. ECP packets received before this phase is reached should be silently discarded π.
ECP is exactly the same as LCP [1], with the following exceptions:
Frame Modifications
The packet may utilise any modifications to the basic frame format that were negotiated during the Link Establishment phase β¨.
Data Link Layer Protocol Field
Exactly one ECP packet gets encapsulated in the PPP Information field, where the PPP Protocol field indicates type hex 8053 (Encryption Control Protocol) π§.
when individual link data encryption is used in a multiple link connection to a single destination [2], the PPP Protocol field indicates type hex 8055 (Individual link Encryption Control Protocol) π«Ά.
Code Field
ECP uses (decimal) codes 1 through 7 (Configure-Request, Configure-Ack, Configure-Nak, Configure-Reject, Terminate-Request, Terminate-Ack and Code-Reject) π’. And it may also use code 14 (Reset-Request) and code 15 (Reset-Ack) π. Other codes should be treated as unrecognised and should result in Code-Rejects π ββοΈ.
Negotiation
ECP packets may not be exchanged until PPP has reached the Network-Layer Protocol phase π. An implementation should be prepared to wait for Authentication and Link Quality Determination to finish before it times out waiting for a Configure-Ack or other response β³.
An implementation MUST NOT transmit data until ECP negotiation has completed successfully π«. If ECP negotiation is not successful, the link SHOULD be brought down π.
Configuration Option Types
ECP has a distinct set of Configuration Options π.
2.1 Sending Encrypted Datagrams π
before any encrypted packets can be communicated, PPP must reach the Network-Layer Protocol phase, and the Encryption Control Protocol must reach the Opened state π.
an encrypted packet gets encapsulated in the PPP Information field, where the PPP Protocol field indicates type hex 0053 (Encrypted datagram) π.
when using multiple PPP links to a single destination [2], there are two methods of employing data encryption π:
- The first method is to encrypt the data before it's sent out through the multiple links π.
The PPP Protocol field MUST indicate type hex 0053.
- The second is to treat each link as a separate connection, which may or may not have encryption enabled π¦.
On links which have negotiated encryption, the PPP Protocol field MUST be type hex 0055 (Individual link encrypted datagram).
only one encryption algorithm in each direction is in use at a time, and it gets negotiated before the first encrypted frame is sent π. The PPP Protocol field of the encrypted datagram shows that the frame is encrypted, but not which algorithm was used to encrypt it π΅οΈββοΈ.
the maximum length of an encrypted packet sent over a PPP link is the same as the maximum length of the Information field of a PPP encapsulated packet π. If the encryption algorithm is likely to push the message beyond that, multilink should also be negotiated so the frames can be fragmented (even if only using a single link) π§©.
if the encryption algorithm carries history between frames, it must supply a way of determining whether it's passing data reliably, or it must require the use of a reliable transport such as LAPB [3] π€.
compression may also be negotiated using the Compression Control Protocol [5]. To ensure interoperability, plain text MUST be:
- First compressed.
- Then encrypted.
this order was chosen since it should result in smaller output and more secure encryption π§ π.
4.1 Proprietary Encryption OUI β¨
Description
okay so this Configuration Option is how you negotiate a proprietary encryption protocol π basically a vendor's own secret sauce π
vendors are told apart by an Organisationally Unique Identifier (OUI) π¦ which is just the first three octets of a Vendor's Ethernet address, assigned by IEEE 802 πΈ
since the first matching encryption is the one that gets used, it is recommended that any known OUI encryption options be transmitted first π before the common options show up π«Ά
before accepting this option, the implementation must verify that the OUI identifies a proprietary algorithm it can decrypt, and that any vendor specific negotiation values are fully understood π no skipping this part bestie π
here's the Proprietary Encryption OUI Configuration Option format π the fields go left to right:
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | OUI ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
OUI | Subtype | Values...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-
Type
the Type is 0 π
Length
the Length is >= 6 π§
IEEE OUI
the IEEE OUI is the most significant three octets of an Ethernet Physical Address, assigned to the vendor by IEEE 802 π this is what says "this option belongs to this vendor" π the bits within the octet are in canonical order, and the most significant octet is transmitted first β¨
Subtype
this field is specific to each OUI and tells you which encryption type that OUI is using π¦ there is no standardisation for it, so each OUI gets to pick its own values π
Values
this field is zero or more octets of extra data, decided by the vendor's encryption protocol π
4.2 Publicly Available Encryption Types πΈ
Description
these Configuration Options let you negotiate a publicly defined encryption algorithm π«Ά
these protocols should be made available to interested parties π but they may have certain licencing or export restrictions attached π¬ for more info, check the encryption protocol documents that define each encryption type π
here's the Encryption Type Configuration Option format π again, left to right:
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Values...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-
Type
the Type is 1 to 254, and it says which encryption protocol option is being negotiated π¦ DESE [6] is option type 1 π for the other encryption protocols, look at the latest Assigned Numbers RFC π§
Length
the Length is >= 2 π
Values
this field is zero or more octets of extra data, decided by the encryption protocol π
4.3 Negotiating an Encryption Algorithm π₯
ECP uses LCP option negotiation techniques to negotiate encryption algorithms π§ here's the tea β most other LCP or NCP negotiation of multiple options ends up with several options agreed on, but ECP negotiation is expected to converge on a single mutually agreeable option (encryption algorithm), or none at all π ββοΈ encryption SHOULD be negotiated in both directions π« but the algorithms MAY be different π¦
an implementation that is willing to decrypt using a particular encryption algorithm (or one of a set of algorithms) offers that algorithm (or those algorithms) as an option (or options) in an ECP Configure-Request π we call this end the Decrypter, and we call the peer the Encrypter π
a Decrypter that supports more than one encryption algorithm may send a Configure-Request containing either:
- an ordered list of options, with the most-preferred encryption algorithm coming first π
- or it may just offer its preferred (not already Rejected) option π
an Encrypter that wants to accept the first option (of several) MAY Configure-Ack ALL Options to show complete acceptance of the first-listed, preferred, algorithm β¨
otherwise, if the Encrypter doesn't recognise an option, or is unwilling to support it, it MUST send a Configure-Reject for that option π
ββοΈ where more than one option is offered, the Encrypter SHOULD Configure-Reject all but a single preferred option π«Ά
if the Encrypter Configure-Rejects ALL offered ECP options, and the Decrypter has no further (non-rejected) options it can offer in a Configure-Request, the Encrypter SHOULD take the link down π
if the Encrypter recognises an option, but it isn't acceptable because of values in the request (or optional parameters not in the request), it MUST send a Configure-Nak with the option modified appropriately π the Configure-Nak MUST contain only those options that will be acceptable π₯ the Decrypter SHOULD send a new Configure-Request with only the single preferred option, adjusted as specified in the Configure-Nak πΈ
5. Security Considerations π
Negotiation of encryption using PPP is designed to provide protection against eavesdropping on that link π how strong that protection is depends on the encryption algorithm used, and on how carefully any 'secret' used by the encryption algorithm is protected π guard those secrets like your diary ππ
it must be recognised that complete security can only be obtained through end-to-end security between hosts π¨ this link-level protection is not the whole story, bestie π
References π
[1] Simpson, W., Editor; "The Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP)", STD 51, RFC 1661, Daydreamer, July 1994.
[2] Sklower, K., Lloyd, B., McGregor, G. and and D. Carr, "The PPP Multilink Protocol (MP)", RFC 1717, University of California, Berkeley, November 1994.
[3] Rand, D., "PPP Reliable Transmission", RFC 1663, Novell, July 1994.
[4] Reynolds, J., and Postel, J.; "ASSIGNED NUMBERS", STD 2, RFC 1700, USC/Information Sciences Institute, October 1994.
[5] Rand, D., "The PPP Compression Control Protocol (CCP)", RFC 1962, Novell, June 1996.
[6] Sklower, K., and G. Meyer, "The PPP DES Encryption Protocol (DESE)", RFC 1969, University of California, Berkeley, June 1996.
Acknowledgements π«Ά
The style and approach of this proposal owes much to the work on the Compression CP [5] β¨
Chair's Address π
The working group can be contacted via the current chair:
- Karl Fox
- Ascend Communications
- 3518 Riverside Drive, Suite 101
- Columbus, Ohio 43221
- EMail: karl@ascend.com
Author's Address ποΈ
- Gerry Meyer
- Spider Systems
- Stanwell Street
- Edinburgh EH6 5NG
- Scotland, UK
- Phone: (UK) 131 554 9424
- Fax: (UK) 131 554 0649
- EMail: gerry@spider.co.uk
π¦ where this page comes from
- ietf: rfc1968 1996-06
- π girlified by claude-haiku-5-5 on : a language model's rewrite of the original, under its terms