RFC 1511
Common Authentication Technology Overview
Common Authentication Technology Overview π¦
okay bestie, let's talk about RFC 1511 π It's the Common Authentication Technology Overview π, written by John Linn (J. Linn) at Geer Zolot Associates, dated September 1993, from the Network Working Group πΈ. It's an info memo for the Internet community, not a standard. It's not a specification, so there's no spec-level stuff to implement from it π«Ά The original title block also has no Obsoletes or Updates entries, so this doc doesn't replace or change any other RFC π₯
Status of this Memo β¨
This memo gives information to the Internet community and does not specify an Internet standard. Distribution of this memo is unlimited π£
Overview π
the IETF's Common Authentication Technology (CAT) working group has been on a whole journey with a bunch of connected work π§ They're doing both service interfaces AND protocols. The big goal is to separate the security implementation tasks from putting security data elements into caller protocols. That way, different experts can handle each part on their own π It's giving divide and conquer, and it's lowkey genius because one security implementation can plug into and be used by many caller protocols, so the IETF security crew gets major leverage π₯ Protocol implementers also get to focus on what their protocols are actually for, instead of the specifics of each security mechanism, because there's an abstract service that multiple mechanisms can realize β¨
The CAT WG agreed on a common service interface, the Generic Security Service Application Program Interface (GSS-API), which lets callers invoke security functions π They also agreed on a common security token format. It includes a way to identify the mechanism type that the security data elements should be interpreted with, which is so iconic π The GSS-API is a mechanism-independent model for security integration. It gives peer entity authentication to a bunch of different protocol callers and keeps those callers away from the messy details of the underlying mechanisms π«Ά With certain underlying mechanisms, it can also do per-message protection: data origin authentication, data integrity, and data confidentiality π All of this lives in a pair of RFCs: RFC-1508 (GSS-API) and RFC-1509 (concrete bindings for the GSS-API in the C language) π
Meanwhile, the CAT WG was also working on agreements about the underlying security technologies and their protocols that implement the GSS-API model π Two candidate mechanisms are available right now as Internet specifications, and more are expected to show up later πΈ RFC-1510 is a standards-track specification. It documents Kerberos Version 5, a secret-key cryptography technology contributed by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology π RFC-1507 is an experimental specification. It documents the Distributed Authentication Services technology, which is based on X.509 public-key technology and was contributed by Digital Equipment Corporation π
References π
- [1] Kaufman, C., "Distributed Authentication Security Service", RFC 1507, Digital Equipment Corporation, September 1993.
- [2] Linn, J., "Generic Security Service Application Program Interface", RFC 1508, Geer Zolot Associates, September 1993.
- [3] Wray, J., "Generic Security Service API : C-bindings", RFC 1509, Digital Equipment Corporation, September 1993.
- [4] Kohl, J., and C. Neuman, "The Kerberos Network Authentication Service (V5)", Digital Equipment Corporation, USC/Information Sciences Institute, September 1993.
Security Considerations ππ
this section is serious, so pay attention π The security issues are discussed throughout the references listed above. Go read those! The security story lives there, and skipping it is a big no π
Author's Address π§
John Linn
Geer Zolot Associates
One Main St.
Cambridge, MA 02142 USA
Phone: +1 617.374.3700
Email: Linn@gza.com
π¦ where this page comes from
- ietf: rfc1511 1993-09
- π girlified by claude-haiku-5-5 on : a language model's rewrite of the original, under its terms