RFC 8479
Storing Validation Parameters in PKCS#8
Storing Validation Parameters in PKCS#8 π
- RFC: 8479 π
- Title: Storing Validation Parameters in PKCS#8 β¨
- Author: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos (the header says N. Mavrogiannopoulos), at Red Hat π§
- Stream: Independent Submission π¦
- Category: Informational πΈ
- Date: September 2018 π
- ISSN: 2070-1721
- Obsoletes / Updates: the header doesn't list any RFCs as obsoleted or updated π
Abstract
okay so this memo is about a way to store the extra parameters you need for private-key validation inside PKCS#8 format, which is defined in RFC 5208 π It works the same way for the alternative version of the Private-Key Information Syntax in RFC 5958, so it's giving versatile π
The trick is that the parameters get encoded under a private enterprise extension, and this doc is not a formal standard, just vibes and a good idea π«Ά
Status of This Memo
this one is not an Internet Standards Track spec, it's just published for info purposes π
It's a contribution to the RFC Series, separate from any other RFC stream. The RFC Editor picked to publish it at their discretion and doesn't say anything about whether you should implement it or deploy it. Docs approved by the RFC Editor aren't candidates for any level of Internet Standard, see Section 2 of RFC 7841 π
If you want the current status, errata, or a way to send feedback, check https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8479 β¨
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. π
This doc is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) as they stand on the publication date. Read those carefully, bestie, because they spell out your rights and restrictions for this document π
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. ValidationParams Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Example Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Compatibility Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Appendix A. ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1. Introduction β¨
okay so RSA or DSA private keys generated with the Shawe-Taylor prime generation algorithm from [FIPS186-4] can do parameter validation π§ That means they check whether the primes are actually prime and were generated correctly. The way they do it is by regenerating the parameters from a known seed and a chosen hash algorithm.
The problem is that if you store these parameters in a private-key format like the RSA Private-Key Syntax from PKCS#1 [RFC8017] or the usual representations for DSA private keys, there's no spot to attach the info needed for validation π So this doc describes a method that uses the Private-Key Information Syntax Specification from [RFC5208] and the alternative spec in [RFC5958] π
The approach here encodes the parameters under a private enterprise extension and isn't a formal standard. You can use the encoding as is, or use it as the basis for a standard later on π¦
2. ValidationParams Attribute π
The validation parameter info is stored as an attribute in the PrivateKeyInfo structure. The attribute is identified by the id-attr-validation-parameters object identifier, and its AttributeValue is one single ValidationParams structure π
id-attr-validation-parameters OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{1 3 6 1 4 1 2312 18 8 1}
ValidationParams ::= SEQUENCE {
hashAlgo OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
seed OCTET STRING
}
The algorithm identifier in ValidationParams SHOULD be a hash algorithm identifier for the methods described in [FIPS186-4]. And the ValidationParams sequence MUST be DER encoded [ITU-T-X690] π«Ά No skipping this part, periodt π
3. Example Structure π§
This example structure holds an RSA key made with the algorithm from Section B.3.3 of [FIPS186-4], using SHA2-384 as the hash. The seed is 8af4328c87bebcec31e303b8f5537effcb6a91d947084d99a369823b36f01462 (hex encoded) πΈ
-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----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-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
4. Compatibility Notes π
For compatibility, it is RECOMMENDED that implementations following this document support generation and validation using the SHA2-384 hash algorithm π
The extension in this doc applies to both the Private-Key Information Syntax Specification (PKCS#8) [RFC5208] and Asymmetric Key Packages [RFC5958] β¨
5. Security Considerations π₯
All the considerations in [RFC5208] and [RFC5958] apply.
This part is serious, bestie. Those two RFCs have the security details, so go read them before you implement anything π
6. IANA Considerations π
This document has no IANA actions β
7. References π
7.1. Normative References
- [FIPS186-4] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Digital Signature Standard (DSS)", FIPS PUB 186-4, DOI 10.6028/NIST.FIPS.186-4, July 2013.
- [ITU-T-X680] International Telecommunication Union, "Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1): Specification of basic notation", ITU-T Recommendation X.680, July 2002, https://www.itu.int/ITU-T/studygroups/com17/languages/X.680-0207.pdf.
- [ITU-T-X690] International Telecommunication Union, "ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)", ITU-T Recommendation X.690, July 2002, https://www.itu.int/ITU-T/studygroups/com17/languages/X.690-0207.pdf.
- [RFC5208] Kaliski, B., "Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #8: Private-Key Information Syntax Specification Version 1.2", RFC 5208, DOI 10.17487/RFC5208, May 2008, https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5208.
- [RFC5958] Turner, S., "Asymmetric Key Packages", RFC 5958, DOI 10.17487/RFC5958, August 2010, https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5958.
7.2. Informative References
- [RFC5912] Hoffman, P. and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for the Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)", RFC 5912, DOI 10.17487/RFC5912, June 2010, https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5912.
- [RFC8017] Moriarty, K., Ed., Kaliski, B., Jonsson, J., and A. Rusch, "PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2", RFC 8017, DOI 10.17487/RFC8017, November 2016, https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8017.
Appendix A. ASN.1 Module π§©
This appendix gives non-normative ASN.1 definitions for the structures in this spec, using ASN.1 as defined in [ITU-T-X680] and [RFC5912] π¦
PrivateKeyValidationAttrV1
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
private(4) enterprise(1) 2312 18 1 1 }
DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN
-- EXPORTS ALL
IMPORTS
ATTRIBUTE
FROM PKIX-CommonTypes-2009 -- [RFC5912]
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-pkixCommon-02(57) } ;
-- PrivateKeyInfo is defined in [RFC5208].
-- This definition adds the validation parameters attribute
-- to the set of allowed attributes.
PrivateKeyInfo ATTRIBUTE ::= {
at-validation-parameters, ... }
at-validation-parameters ATTRIBUTE ::= {
TYPE ValidationParams
IDENTIFIED BY id-attr-validation-parameters }
id-attr-validation-parameters OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ 1 3 6 1 4 1 2312 18 8 1 }
ValidationParams ::= SEQUENCE {
hashAlg OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
seed OCTET STRING }
END
Acknowledgements π«Ά
The author would like to thank Russ Housley for his comments and the ASN.1 module appendix π
Author's Address π
Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos Red Hat, Inc. Brno Czech Republic
Email: nmav@redhat.com β¨
π¦ where this page comes from
- ietf: rfc8479 2018-09
- π girlified by claude-haiku-5-5 on : a language model's rewrite of the original, under its terms