ima_load_data(9)

πŸ“¦ version 7.3.1, in nixpkgs unstable

πŸ’– ima_load_data(9) β€” the kernel API manual, but make it make sense πŸ’–

okay so bestie, this is ima_load_data(9) from the Kernel API Manual, and we're gonna get into it. no cap, it's shorter than your last situationship's attention span, but it matters. 🫢


✨ NAME ✨

ima_load_data β€” appraise decision based on policy

like, it's the vibe check for load data, and the policy is the one deciding whether you pass. πŸ’…


🌸 SYNOPSIS 🌸

int ima_load_data (enum kernel_load_data_id id , bool contents );

that's the whole signature, character for character, don't come for me. πŸŽ€


πŸ¦‹ ARGUMENTS πŸ¦‹

  • id β€” kernel load data caller identifier. it's giving "who dis" but for the kernel. πŸ‘€
  • contents β€” whether the full contents will be available in a later call to ima_post_load_data. so like, are we getting the whole story later or not, bestie? πŸ”₯

πŸ’œ DESCRIPTION πŸ’œ

okay so real talk: callers of this LSM hook can not measure, appraise, or audit the data provided by userspace. not me, not you, not anyone. 😭

what it does do is enforce policy rules requiring a file signature β€” eg. kexec'ed kernel image. periodt. πŸ‘‘

for permission, return 0. otherwise, return -EACCES. so like, you're either in or you're getting the door. no in-between. πŸ’€


🌈 SEE ALSO 🌈

the whole friend group, honestly. iykyk. 🌟


bestie warning: if you're not returning 0 or -EACCES, you're not doing it right. this is not the place to freestyle. πŸ™ˆ

πŸ’– that's the whole page, bestie β€” no cap, every detail kept, every vibe slayed. πŸ’–

source: ./security/integrity/ima, version: October 2026, and yeah, the footer said ima_load_data(9) β€” so like, we been knew. πŸŽ€βœ¨πŸ¦‹

πŸ“¦ where this page comes from