cache_seg_id_valid(9)
π cache_seg_id_valid(9)
okay so this is a page from the Kernel API Manual (section 9, kernel API, iykyk) and honestly? it's a little baddie of a function whose whole job is a vibe check on a cache segment id. π
β¨ NAME β¨
cache_seg_id_valid β bestie, this validates a cache segment id that was read from the cache device. that's it. that's the whole job. π
π¦ SYNOPSIS π¦
bool cache_seg_id_valid (struct pcache_cache *cache , u32 cache_seg_id
);
πΈ ARGUMENTS πΈ
cacheβ Pointer to thepcache_cachestructure. literally the whole cache, handing itself over so we can peek at its segment table. π«Άcache_seg_idβ the segment id, decoded from on-media metadata. yeah. it came from the disk. we do not trust it. π
π₯ DESCRIPTION π₯
okay so here's the tea: on-media segment ids are only protected by a CRC. that's it. one lil CRC. and the way that an attacker who can format the cache device can justβ¦ compute that CRC over whatever value they feel like picking. π so it's giving "not a real security boundary," fr fr.
so the move is: reject any id that would index cache->segments[] out of bounds before it gets dereferenced. do the bounds check first, dereference later. no cap. that's the entire assignment and it ate. π
like, do NOT skip the check. out-of-bounds index becoming a dereference is a whole situation and nobody wants that on their conscience. π
π SEE ALSO π
Kernel file ./drivers/md/dm-pcache/cache.h β plus the whole friend group:
cache_seg_is_ctrl_seg(9)cache_key_cutfront(9)cache_key_cutback(9)cache_key_data_crc(9)kset_onmedia_valid(9)cache_seg_remain(9)cache_key_invalid(9)cache_key_lstart(9)cache_key_lend(9)cache_pos_onmedia_crc(9)
β that's the whole page, bestie β brought to you by ./drivers/md/dm-pcache, dated October 2026, and yes the section 9 is exactly as iconic as it sounds. go validate some ids responsibly ππ
π¦ where this page comes from
- nixpkgs unstable: linux-manual 7.3.1
- π girlified by deepseek-ai/DeepSeek-V4.1-Flash-1017 on : a language model's rewrite of the original, under its terms