unconfi..._selinux(8)

💌 unconfined_sendmail_selinux(8) — the SELinux policy page for unconfined_sendmail, but make it make sense 💅

Okay bestie, gather round, because this is the manual page for unconfined_sendmail_selinux (yes the man page title is literally abbreviated to unconfi..._selinux(8) in the header, she's shy, she's mysterious, she's an 8) and we are going to get through it together. It's the Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the unconfined_sendmail processes. That's the whole vibe. Let's go. ✨

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🌸 NAME 🌸

unconfined_sendmail_selinux — Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the unconfined_sendmail processes. That's her. That's the whole name. Iconic, lowkey.

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🦋 DESCRIPTION 🦋

Security-Enhanced Linux secures the unconfined_sendmail processes via flexible mandatory access control. Yes, mandatory. She doesn't ask, she tells. 💅

The unconfined_sendmail processes execute with the unconfined_sendmail_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the ps command with the -Z qualifier.

For example:

ps -eZ | grep unconfined_sendmail_t

Run it, see what's up, no cap. 🔍

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🚪 ENTRYPOINTS 🚪

So the unconfined_sendmail_t SELinux type can be entered via the sendmail_exec_t file type. That's the door. That's the doorway she walks through. 🚪✨

The default entrypoint paths for the unconfined_sendmail_t domain are the following:

/usr/bin/sendmail(.sendmail)?, /usr/bin/esmtp, /usr/bin/msmtp,
/usr/bin/rmail, /usr/bin/smtpd, /usr/bin/ssmtp, /usr/bin/msmtpd,
/usr/lib/sendmail, /usr/bin/esmtp-wrapper, /var/qmail/bin/sendmail,
/usr/bin/sendmail.postfix

Copy them exactly, babes, don't be creative with the paths. 🙈

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👑 PROCESS TYPES 👑

SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system. Every process gets a little label, it's giving name tags at a party. 🎀

You can see the context of a process using the -Z option to ps.

Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. SELinux unconfined_sendmail policy is very flexible, allowing users to setup their unconfined_sendmail processes in as secure a method as possible. Flexible and secure, she contains multitudes.

The following process types are defined for unconfined_sendmail:

• unconfined_sendmail_t

Note: semanage permissive -a unconfined_sendmail_t can be used to make the process type unconfined_sendmail_t permissive. SELinux does not deny access to permissive process types, but the AVC (SELinux denials) messages are still generated. So like, she stops blocking you, but she is still writing it all down in her notes app. 📝💀

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🔥 BOOLEANS 🔥

SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. The unconfined_sendmail policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run unconfined_sendmail with the tightest access possible. Toggle responsibly, bestie. 🎛️

Every single one of these is disabled by default, so you gotta opt in. Here we go:

• If you want to deny user domains applications to map a memory region as both executable and writable, this is dangerous and the executable should be reported in bugzilla, you must turn on the deny_execmem boolean. Disabled by default.

setsebool -P deny_execmem 1

• If you want to control the ability to mmap a low area of the address space, as configured by /proc/sys/vm/mmap_min_addr, you must turn on the mmap_low_allowed boolean. Disabled by default.

setsebool -P mmap_low_allowed 1

• If you want to disable kernel module loading, you must turn on the secure_mode_insmod boolean. Disabled by default.

setsebool -P secure_mode_insmod 1

• If you want to allow unconfined executables to make their heap memory executable — doing this is a really bad idea, probably indicates a badly coded executable, but could indicate an attack, and this executable should be reported in bugzilla — you must turn on the selinuxuser_execheap boolean. Disabled by default.

setsebool -P selinuxuser_execheap 1

• If you want to allow unconfined executables to make their stack executable — this should never, ever be necessary, probably indicates a badly coded executable, but could indicate an attack, and this executable should be reported in bugzilla — you must turn on the selinuxuser_execstack boolean. Disabled by default.

setsebool -P selinuxuser_execstack 1

Fr fr, the last two are red flags in executable form. If you're reaching for them, something is wrong and bugzilla needs to hear about it. 🚩😭

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🗂️ MANAGED FILES 🗂️

The SELinux process type unconfined_sendmail_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions — SELinux is not out here overriding your regular permissions, she's a layer, not a replacement. 🫶

• file_type — all files on the system

Yep. All of them. She said "everything" and meant it. 💀

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🛠️ COMMANDS 🛠️

​semanage fcontext` can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.

semanage permissive can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.

semanage module can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.

semanage boolean can also be used to manipulate the booleans.

system-config-selinux is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. For when you want buttons instead of typing, valid, we respect it. 🖱️✨

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🧚 AUTHOR 🧚

This manual page was auto-generated using sepolicy manpage .

No human wrote this, she was born from a script, and honestly? Slay. 🤖💅

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🔗 SEE ALSO 🔗

selinux(8), unconfined_sendmail(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8), setsebool(8)

Go read those next, bestie, the lore is deep. 📚🌈

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And that's the page! 💖 Originally she's from unconfined_sendmail, dated 26-10-06, and her header/footer both rock the abbreviated unconfi..._selinux(8) — short name, big energy. Bye bestie, go forth and setsebool responsibly! 🎀🦋