SYSTEMD_SOCKET_PROXYD_SELINUX(8)
π systemd_socket_proxyd_selinux β a girl's guide to keeping your processes in check β¨
okay so bestie, buckle up because we're talking about systemd_socket_proxyd_selinux(8) and honestly? it's giving security realness π this is the SELinux policy manual for the systemd_socket_proxyd processes and i promise it's less scary than it sounds.
πΈ NAME πΈ
systemd_socket_proxyd_selinux β it's literally the Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the systemd_socket_proxyd processes, no cap π
β¨ DESCRIPTION β¨
so Security-Enhanced Linux secures the systemd_socket_proxyd processes via flexible mandatory access control. that's the whole vibe β MAC (mandatory access control, not the makeup, tho both are iconic) keeping everything locked down π¦
the systemd_socket_proxyd processes execute with the systemd_socket_proxyd_t SELinux type. you can check if you have these processes running by executing the ps command with the -Z qualifier, like so:
ps -eZ | grep systemd_socket_proxyd_t
literally just run that and you'll see what's up π
πͺ ENTRYPOINTS πͺ
the systemd_socket_proxyd_t SELinux type can be entered via the systemd_socket_proxyd_exec_t file type. that's the doorway bestie, the main character entrance π
the default entrypoint paths for the systemd_socket_proxyd_t domain are the following:
/usr/lib/systemd/systemd-socket-proxyd
one path, one icon, periodt β¨
π― PROCESS TYPES π―
SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system. you can see the context of a process using the -Z option to ps.
Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. SELinux systemd_socket_proxyd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their systemd_socket_proxyd processes in as secure a method as possible π«Ά
the following process types are defined for systemd_socket_proxyd:
systemd_socket_proxyd_t
Note:semanage permissive -a systemd_socket_proxyd_tcan be used to make the process typesystemd_socket_proxyd_tpermissive. SELinux does not deny access to permissive process types, but the AVC (SELinux denials) messages are still generated. so like, it's chill but it's still snitching to the logs π
ποΈ BOOLEANS ποΈ
SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required β the "you get exactly what you need and nothing more" energy we love to see π and systemd_socket_proxyd policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run systemd_socket_proxyd with the tightest access possible.
- if you want to allow
systemd-socket-proxydto bind any port instead of one labelled withsystemd_socket_proxyd_port_t, you must turn on thesystemd_socket_proxyd_bind_anyboolean. Disabled by default.
setsebool -P systemd_socket_proxyd_bind_any 1
- if you want to allow
systemd-socket-proxydto connect to any port instead of labelled ones, you must turn on thesystemd_socket_proxyd_connect_anyboolean. Disabled by default.
setsebool -P systemd_socket_proxyd_connect_any 1
- if you want to dontaudit all daemons scheduling requests (
setsched,sys_nice), you must turn on thedaemons_dontaudit_schedulingboolean. Enabled by default.
setsebool -P daemons_dontaudit_scheduling 1
- if you want to allow all domains to execute in
fips_mode, you must turn on thefips_modeboolean. Enabled by default.
setsebool -P fips_mode 1
- if you want to allow system to run with NIS, you must turn on the
nis_enabledboolean. Disabled by default.
setsebool -P nis_enabled 1
π PORT TYPES π
SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports. you can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
semanage port -l
Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports. SELinux systemd_socket_proxyd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their systemd_socket_proxyd processes in as secure a method as possible π
the following port types are defined for systemd_socket_proxyd:
systemd_socket_proxyd_port_t
π MANAGED FILES π
the SELinux process type systemd_socket_proxyd_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. the paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note: the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions, so like, SELinux is doing its part but your user perms still matter too, iykyk π
cluster_conf_t
/etc/cluster(/.*)?
cluster_var_lib_t
/var/lib/pcsd(/.*)?
/var/lib/cluster(/.*)?
/var/lib/openais(/.*)?
/var/lib/pengine(/.*)?
/var/lib/corosync(/.*)?
/usr/lib/heartbeat(/.*)?
/var/lib/heartbeat(/.*)?
/var/lib/pacemaker(/.*)?
cluster_var_run_t
/run/crm(/.*)?
/run/cman_.*
/run/rsctmp(/.*)?
/run/aisexec.*
/run/heartbeat(/.*)?
/run/pcsd-ruby.socket
/run/corosync-qnetd(/.*)?
/run/corosync-qdevice(/.*)?
/run/pcsd.socket
/run/corosync.pid
/run/cpglockd.pid
/run/rgmanager.pid
/run/cluster/rgmanager.sk
krb5_host_rcache_t
/var/tmp/krb5_0.rcache2
/var/cache/krb5rcache(/.*)?
/var/tmp/nfs_0
/var/tmp/DNS_25
/var/tmp/host_0
/var/tmp/imap_0
/var/tmp/HTTP_23
/var/tmp/HTTP_48
/var/tmp/ldap_55
/var/tmp/ldap_487
/var/tmp/ldapmap1_0
root_t
/sysroot/.aleph-version.json
/sysroot/ostree/deploy/.*-atomic/deploy(/.*)?
/
/initrd
/var/lib/ntp
π·οΈ FILE CONTEXTS π·οΈ
SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. you can see the context of a file using the -Z option to ls π
Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. SELinux systemd_socket_proxyd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their systemd_socket_proxyd processes in as secure a method as possible.
π STANDARD FILE CONTEXT π
SELinux defines the file context types for the systemd_socket_proxyd. if you wanted to store files with these types in a different paths, you need to execute the semanage command to specify alternate labeling and then use restorecon to put the labels on disk. like this:
semanage fcontext -a -t systemd_socket_proxyd_exec_t '/srv/systemd_socket_proxyd/content(/.*)?'
restorecon -R -v /srv/mysystemd_socket_proxyd_content
Note: SELinux often uses regular expressions to specify labels that match multiple files. regex girlies rise up π§
the following file types are defined for systemd_socket_proxyd:
systemd_socket_proxyd_exec_t
- set files with the
systemd_socket_proxyd_exec_ttype, if you want to transition an executable to thesystemd_socket_proxyd_tdomain.
systemd_socket_proxyd_unit_file_t
- set files with the
systemd_socket_proxyd_unit_file_ttype, if you want to treat the files as systemd socket proxyd unit content.
Note: file context can be temporarily modified with thechconcommand. if you want to permanently change the file context you need to use thesemanage fcontextcommand. this will modify the SELinux labeling database. you will need to userestoreconto apply the labels. temporary fix vs permanent slay β choose wisely π
π οΈ COMMANDS π οΈ
βsemanage fcontext can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
βsemanage permissive can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
βsemanage module can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
βsemanage port can also be used to manipulate the port definitions
βsemanage boolean can also be used to manipulate the booleans
system-config-selinux is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings β for the girlies who prefer a lil visual moment π
βοΈ AUTHOR βοΈ
this manual page was auto-generated using sepolicy manpage. the robots did this one, not me π
π SEE ALSO π
selinux(8), systemd_socket_proxyd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8), setsebool(8)
okay that's the whole thing bestie, you ate that reading session π this was systemd_socket_proxyd from the systemd..._selinux(8) fam, dropping on 26-10-06 β go forth and secure your processes, you've got this fr fr πππ¦
π¦ where this page comes from
- opensuse-leap 16.0: selinux-policy-doc 20250627+git412.dbf877ab7-160000.1.1 Β· GPL-2.0-or-later
- π girlified by deepseek-ai/DeepSeek-V4.1-Flash-1017 on : a language model's rewrite of the original, under its terms