staff_screen_selinux(8)
πΈ staff_screen_selinux β the manual page, but make it make sense πΈ
okay so this is staff_screen_selinux(8), from the SELinux Policy staff_screen collection β and bestie, if you've ever wondered what Big Security Energy is actually doing to your screen and tmux sessions, this is the page. let's get into it π
β¨ NAME β¨
staff_screen_selinux β the Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the staff_screen processes. that's it, that's the whole name section, we love a concise queen π
π¦ DESCRIPTION π¦
Security-Enhanced Linux secures the staff_screen processes via flexible mandatory access control. yes, mandatory. not "if you feel like it" access control. mandatory. π
The staff_screen processes execute with the staff_screen_t SELinux type. you can check if you have these processes running by executing the ps command with the -Z qualifier.
for example:
ps -eZ | grep staff_screen_t
that's the vibe check for your processes, literally. run it and see who's living in staff_screen_t land π
πͺ ENTRYPOINTS πͺ
The staff_screen_t SELinux type can be entered via the screen_exec_t file type. that's the door, that's how you get in πͺβ¨
the default entrypoint paths for the staff_screen_t domain are the following:
/usr/bin/tmux
/usr/bin/screen
so it's giving "two icons, one domain" energy, no cap π«Ά
π PROCESS TYPES π
SELinux defines process types (aka domains) for each process running on the system. every process gets sorted into a little house, that's just how it is π
you can see the context of a process using the -Z option to ps.
Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. the SELinux staff_screen policy is very flexible, allowing users to set up their staff_screen processes in as secure a method as possible. obsessed with the flexibility fr fr β¨
the following process types are defined for staff_screen:
staff_screen_t
π‘ note:semanage permissive -a staff_screen_tcan be used to make the process typestaff_screen_tpermissive. SELinux does not deny access to permissive process types, but the AVC (SELinux denials) messages are still generated. so like, it's not a free pass, the receipts still exist π
π BOOLEANS π
SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. the staff_screen policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run staff_screen with the tightest access possible. toggle responsibly bestie π
fips_modeβ if you want to allow all domains to execute infips_mode, you must turn on thefips_modeboolean. Enabled by default.
setsebool -P fips_mode 1
nis_enabledβ if you want to allow system to run with NIS, you must turn on thenis_enabledboolean. Disabled by default.
setsebool -P nis_enabled 1
screen_allow_session_sharingβ if you want to determine whetherscreencan usefsetid/setuid/setgidcapability, you must turn on thescreen_allow_session_sharingboolean. Disabled by default.
setsebool -P screen_allow_session_sharing 1
use_nfs_home_dirsβ if you want to support NFS home directories, you must turn on theuse_nfs_home_dirsboolean. Enabled by default.
setsebool -P use_nfs_home_dirs 1
use_samba_home_dirsβ if you want to support SAMBA home directories, you must turn on theuse_samba_home_dirsboolean. Disabled by default.
setsebool -P use_samba_home_dirs 1
the way these are just little on/off switches for your entire security situation π flip them with setsebool -P, capital P for persistent, don't forget it π«Ά
ποΈ MANAGED FILES ποΈ
The SELinux process type staff_screen_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. the paths listed are the default paths for these file types. note: the process's UID still needs to have DAC permissions. SELinux said "i can't fix everything, ask your UID" π
faillog_t
/var/log/btmp.*
/run/faillock(/.*)?
/var/log/faillog.*
/var/log/tallylog.*
initrc_var_run_t
/run/sysconfig(/.*)?
/run/utmp
/run/keymap
/run/numlock-on
/run/setleds-on
/run/runlevel.dir
/run/setmixer_flag
/run/bootsplashctl
krb5_host_rcache_t
/var/tmp/krb5_0.rcache2
/var/cache/krb5rcache(/.*)?
/var/tmp/nfs_0
/var/tmp/DNS_25
/var/tmp/host_0
/var/tmp/imap_0
/var/tmp/HTTP_23
/var/tmp/HTTP_48
/var/tmp/ldap_55
/var/tmp/ldap_487
/var/tmp/ldapmap1_0
user_tmp_type
all user tmp files
look at all those file types, it's giving organized chaos and honestly? iconic π§
π οΈ COMMANDS π οΈ
semanage fcontextcan also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.semanage permissivecan also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.semanage modulecan also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.semanage booleancan also be used to manipulate the booleans.system-config-selinuxis a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. yes, a GUI. for the girlies who want clicky buttons π±οΈβ¨
π AUTHOR π
This manual page was auto-generated using sepolicy manpage. a bot wrote this, and honestly it ate π€π
π SEE ALSO π
selinux(8), staff_screen(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8), setsebool(8)
go read those next, iykyk π
π and that's the page!! brought to you bystaff_screen, dated26-10-06, living under thestaff_screen_selinux(8)banner. slay, stay confined, and remember: mandatory access control is not a suggestion πβ¨π
π¦ where this page comes from
- opensuse-leap 16.0: selinux-policy-doc 20250627+git412.dbf877ab7-160000.1.1 Β· GPL-2.0-or-later
- π girlified by deepseek-ai/DeepSeek-V4.1-Flash-1017 on : a language model's rewrite of the original, under its terms