kpatch_selinux(8)
β¨ kpatch_selinux(8) β¨ β SELinux Policy for kpatch, bestie π
πΈ NAME πΈ
kpatch_selinux β the Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the kpatch processes. Yep, that's the whole name vibe, and the manual is kpatch_selinux(8). π
π DESCRIPTION π
okay so Security-Enhanced Linux secures the kpatch processes via flexible mandatory access control. That's the whole point, no cap.
The kpatch processes execute with the kpatch_t SELinux type. You can check if you have these processes running by executing the ps command with the -Z qualifier.
For example:
ps -eZ | grep kpatch_t
π¦ ENTRYPOINTS π¦
The kpatch_t SELinux type can be entered via the kpatch_exec_t file type. That's the doorway, bestie. πͺβ¨
The default entrypoint paths for the kpatch_t domain are the following:
/usr/bin/kpatch
π PROCESS TYPES π
SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system. It's giving organized chaos, but make it security. π
You can see the context of a process using the -Z option to ps.
Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. SELinux kpatch policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their kpatch processes in as secure a method as possible.
The following process types are defined for kpatch:
kpatch_t
Note:semanage permissive -a kpatch_tcan be used to make the process typekpatch_tpermissive. SELinux does not deny access to permissive process types, but the AVC (SELinux denials) messages are still generated.
π BOOLEANS π
SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. kpatch policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run kpatch with the tightest access possible. So many little switches, so little time. ποΈβ¨
daemons_dontaudit_schedulingβ If you want to dontaudit all daemons scheduling requests (setsched,sys_nice), you must turn on thedaemons_dontaudit_schedulingboolean. Enabled by default. Runsetsebool -P daemons_dontaudit_scheduling 1.deny_execmemβ If you want to deny user domains applications to map a memory region as both executable and writable, this is dangerous and the executable should be reported in bugzilla, you must turn on thedeny_execmemboolean. Disabled by default. Runsetsebool -P deny_execmem 1.mmap_low_allowedβ If you want to control the ability to mmap a low area of the address space, as configured by/proc/sys/vm/mmap_min_addr, you must turn on themmap_low_allowedboolean. Disabled by default. Runsetsebool -P mmap_low_allowed 1.nis_enabledβ If you want to allow system to run with NIS, you must turn on thenis_enabledboolean. Disabled by default. Runsetsebool -P nis_enabled 1.secure_mode_insmodβ If you want to disable kernel module loading, you must turn on thesecure_mode_insmodboolean. Disabled by default. Runsetsebool -P secure_mode_insmod 1.selinuxuser_execheapβ If you want to allow unconfined executables to make their heap memory executable. Doing this is a really bad idea. Probably indicates a badly coded executable, but could indicate an attack. This executable should be reported in bugzilla, you must turn on theselinuxuser_execheapboolean. Disabled by default. Runsetsebool -P selinuxuser_execheap 1.selinuxuser_execstackβ If you want to allow unconfined executables to make their stack executable. This should never, ever be necessary. Probably indicates a badly coded executable, but could indicate an attack. This executable should be reported in bugzilla, you must turn on theselinuxuser_execstackboolean. Disabled by default. Runsetsebool -P selinuxuser_execstack 1.
π MANAGED FILES π
The SELinux process type kpatch_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions. yes, both layers, bestie β SELinux said "and I oop" π«Ά
file_typeβ all files on the system
π§ FILE CONTEXTS π§
SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
You can see the context of a file using the -Z option to ls.
Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. SELinux kpatch policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their kpatch processes in as secure a method as possible.
π STANDARD FILE CONTEXT π
SELinux defines the file context types for the kpatch, if you wanted to store files with these types in a different paths, you need to execute the semanage command to specify alternate labeling and then use restorecon to put the labels on disk.
semanage fcontext -a -t kpatch_exec_t '/srv/kpatch/content(/.*)?'
restorecon -R -v /srv/mykpatch_content
Note: SELinux often uses regular expressions to specify labels that match multiple files.
The following file types are defined for kpatch:
kpatch_exec_tβ Set files with thekpatch_exec_ttype, if you want to transition an executable to thekpatch_tdomain.kpatch_var_lib_tβ Set files with thekpatch_var_lib_ttype, if you want to store the kpatch files under the/var/libdirectory.
Note: File context can be temporarily modified with thechconcommand. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use thesemanage fcontextcommand. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to userestoreconto apply the labels.
π COMMANDS π
semanage fcontextcan also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.semanage permissivecan also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.semanage modulecan also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.semanage booleancan also be used to manipulate the booleans.system-config-selinuxis a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings.
π AUTHOR π
This manual page was auto-generated using sepolicy manpage.
π₯ SEE ALSO π₯
selinux(8), kpatch(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8), setsebool(8)
okay that's the whole page, bestie π«Ά β source/version: kpatch, date: 26-10-06, and this manual is kpatch_selinux(8). mwah πβ¨
π¦ where this page comes from
- opensuse-leap 16.0: selinux-policy-doc 20250627+git412.dbf877ab7-160000.1.1 Β· GPL-2.0-or-later
- π girlified by deepseek-ai/DeepSeek-V4.1-Flash-1017 on : a language model's rewrite of the original, under its terms