inetd_child_selinux(8)
π inetd_child_selinux(8) β the inetd_child_selinux glow-up π
okay so bestie, this is the manual page for inetd_child_selinux, and it's literally all about the Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the inetd_child processes. buckle up, it's giving security but make it cute β¨
β¨ NAME β¨
inetd_child_selinux β Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the inetd_child processes π
πΈ DESCRIPTION πΈ
Security-Enhanced Linux secures the inetd_child processes via flexible mandatory access control. no cap, that's the whole vibe.
The inetd_child processes execute with the inetd_child_t SELinux type. you can check if you have these processes running by executing the ps command with the -Z qualifier π
for example:
ps -eZ | grep inetd_child_t
π¦ ENTRYPOINTS π¦
The inetd_child_t SELinux type can be entered via the usr_t, inetd_child_exec_t, bin_t file types. three doors, pick one πͺ
the default entrypoint paths for the inetd_child_t domain are the following β and yes, this list is long, but every single one matters, so here we go:
All executables with the default executable label, usually stored in /usr/bin and /usr/sbin. /opt/.*, /usr/.*, /hana(/.*)?, /emul/.*, /export(/.*)?, /ostree(/.*)?, /usr/doc(/.*)?/lib(/.*)?, /usr/inclu.e(/.*)?, /usr/share/rpm(/.*)?, /usr/share/doc(/.*)?/README.*, /usr/lib/modules(/.*)/vmlinuz, /usr/lib/modules(/.*)/sysctl.conf, /usr/lib/modules(/.*)/initramfs.img, /usr/lib/sysimage(/.*)?, /usr/lib/ostree-boot(/.*)?, /opt, /usr, /emul, /usr/bin/in..*d, /usr/lib/pysieved/pysieved.*.py, /usr/local/lib/pysieved/pysieved.*.py, /usr/bin/identd
ngl the /usr/inclu.e(/.*)? one is a little quirky but it's literally what the page says, so it stays π
π PROCESS TYPES π
SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system.
you can see the context of a process using the -Z option to ps π
Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. SELinux inetd_child policy is very flexible, allowing users to setup their inetd_child processes in as secure a method as possible. icon behavior fr fr.
the following process types are defined for inetd_child:
inetd_child_t
Note:semanage permissive -a inetd_child_tcan be used to make the process typeinetd_child_tpermissive. SELinux does not deny access to permissive process types, but the AVC (SELinux denials) messages are still generated. so like, it's chill but it still snitches π
π§ BOOLEANS π§
SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. inetd_child policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run inetd_child with the tightest access possible. tightest access = main character energy π
If you want to dontaudit all daemons scheduling requests (setsched, sys_nice), you must turn on the daemons_dontaudit_scheduling boolean. Enabled by default.
setsebool -P daemons_dontaudit_scheduling 1
If you want to deny user domains applications to map a memory region as both executable and writable, this is dangerous and the executable should be reported in bugzilla, you must turn on the deny_execmem boolean. Disabled by default.
setsebool -P deny_execmem 1
If you want to control the ability to mmap a low area of the address space, as configured by /proc/sys/vm/mmap_min_addr, you must turn on the mmap_low_allowed boolean. Disabled by default.
setsebool -P mmap_low_allowed 1
If you want to allow system to run with NIS, you must turn on the nis_enabled boolean. Disabled by default.
setsebool -P nis_enabled 1
If you want to disable kernel module loading, you must turn on the secure_mode_insmod boolean. Disabled by default.
setsebool -P secure_mode_insmod 1
If you want to allow unconfined executables to make their heap memory executable. Doing this is a really bad idea. Probably indicates a badly coded executable, but could indicate an attack. This executable should be reported in bugzilla, you must turn on the selinuxuser_execheap boolean. Disabled by default.
setsebool -P selinuxuser_execheap 1
π¨ bestie listen to me: "really bad idea" is a direct quote, this is highkey a red flag.
If you want to allow unconfined executables to make their stack executable. This should never, ever be necessary. Probably indicates a badly coded executable, but could indicate an attack. This executable should be reported in bugzilla, you must turn on the selinuxuser_execstack boolean. Disabled by default.
setsebool -P selinuxuser_execstack 1
π¨ "never, ever be necessary" β that's not me being dramatic, that's the manpage. report it to bugzilla fr fr.
π PORT TYPES π
SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports.
you can see the types associated with a port by using the following command:
semanage port -l
Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports. SELinux inetd_child policy is very flexible, allowing users to setup their inetd_child processes in as secure a method as possible π
the following port types are defined for inetd_child:
inetd_child_port_t
Default Defined Ports:
tcp 1,9,13,19,512,544,891,892,5666
udp 1,9,13,19,891,892
lowkey the classic "small numbered ports" lineup, she's iconic π
π MANAGED FILES π
The SELinux process type inetd_child_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions. SELinux isn't gonna do DAC's job for it, that's not the vibe π
file_type
- all files on the system
yes literally all files on the system, she said what she said π
β FILE CONTEXTS β
SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.
you can see the context of a file using the -Z option to ls π
Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. SELinux inetd_child policy is very flexible, allowing users to setup their inetd_child processes in as secure a method as possible β¨
π STANDARD FILE CONTEXT π
SELinux defines the file context types for the inetd_child, if you wanted to store files with these types in a different paths, you need to execute the semanage command to specify alternate labeling and then use restorecon to put the labels on disk. move the label, then apply the label, that's the whole combo π«Ά
semanage fcontext -a -t inetd_child_exec_t
'/srv/inetd_child/content(/.*)?'
restorecon -R -v /srv/myinetd_child_content
Note: SELinux often uses regular expressions to specify labels that match multiple files. regex girlies rise πΈ
the following file types are defined for inetd_child:
inetd_child_exec_t
- Set files with the
inetd_child_exec_ttype, if you want to transition an executable to theinetd_child_tdomain.
Paths:
/usr/bin/in..*d, /usr/lib/pysieved/pysieved.*.py,
/usr/local/lib/pysieved/pysieved.*.py, /usr/bin/identd
inetd_child_tmp_t
- Set files with the
inetd_child_tmp_ttype, if you want to store inetd child temporary files in the/tmpdirectories.
inetd_child_var_run_t
- Set files with the
inetd_child_var_run_ttype, if you want to store the inetd child files under the/runor/var/rundirectory.
Note: File context can be temporarily modified with thechconcommand. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use thesemanage fcontextcommand. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to userestoreconto apply the labels. temporary chcon = cute little trial run, semanage fcontext = making it official π
π COMMANDS π
semanage fcontext can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
semanage permissive can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
semanage module can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
semanage port can also be used to manipulate the port definitions.
semanage boolean can also be used to manipulate the booleans.
system-config-selinux is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. point-and-click girlies, this one's for you π±οΈβ¨
π¦ AUTHOR π¦
This manual page was auto-generated using sepolicy manpage. not me being written by a script and still serving looks π
π₯ SEE ALSO π₯
selinux(8), inetd_child(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8), setsebool(8)
go read those too, iykyk ππ
π okay that's the whole page bestie, every boolean, port, path and note accounted for β¨
sign-off szn: this page goes out as inetd_child, dated 26-10-06, and it's inetd_child_selinux(8) β mwah, stay labeled, stay slay π«Άπ
π¦ where this page comes from
- opensuse-leap 16.0: selinux-policy-doc 20250627+git412.dbf877ab7-160000.1.1 Β· GPL-2.0-or-later
- π girlified by deepseek-ai/DeepSeek-V4.1-Flash-1017 on : a language model's rewrite of the original, under its terms