ABRT_HANDLE_EVENT_SELINUX(8)

✨ abrt_handle_event_selinux(8) ✨

okay bestie, we're doing the abrt_handle_event_selinux page from the SELinux policy manuals, and honestly? it's giving security core 🎀 the manual name is folded right in, so you already know what we're working with. let's go 💅

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🦋 NAME 🦋

abrt_handle_event_selinux — the Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the abrt_handle_event processes, periodt 💖

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🌸 DESCRIPTION 🌸

so, Security-Enhanced Linux secures the abrt_handle_event processes via flexible mandatory access control. that's the whole vibe ✨

the abrt_handle_event processes execute with the abrt_handle_event_t SELinux type. wanna check if you've got these processes running? run the ps command with the -Z qualifier, easy:

ps -eZ | grep abrt_handle_event_t

look at you go, icon 🫶

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🧚 ENTRYPOINTS 🧚

the abrt_handle_event_t SELinux type can be entered via the abrt_handle_event_exec_t file type. that's the door, bestie 🚪✨

the default entrypoint paths for the abrt_handle_event_t domain are literally:

/usr/libexec/abrt-handle-event, /usr/bin/abrt-action-generate-backtrace

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👑 PROCESS TYPES 👑

SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system. slay, organized 💅

you can see the context of a process using the -Z option to ps.

Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. the SELinux abrt_handle_event policy is very flexible, allowing users to set up their abrt_handle_event processes in as secure a method as possible. no cap, it's lowkey customizable 🌈

the following process types are defined for abrt_handle_event:

• abrt_handle_event_t

note: semanage permissive -a abrt_handle_event_t can be used to make the process type abrt_handle_event_t permissive. SELinux does not deny access to permissive process types, but the AVC (SELinux denials) messages are still generated. so like, it's chill but it still snitches 💀

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💖 BOOLEANS 💖

SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. the abrt_handle_event policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run abrt_handle_event with the tightest access possible. obsessed with the precision honestly 🎀

if you want to deny user domains applications to map a memory region as both executable and writable — this is dangerous, and the executable should be reported in bugzilla — you must turn on the deny_execmem boolean. Disabled by default.

setsebool -P deny_execmem 1

if you want to control the ability to mmap a low area of the address space, as configured by /proc/sys/vm/mmap_min_addr, you must turn on the mmap_low_allowed boolean. Disabled by default.

setsebool -P mmap_low_allowed 1

if you want to disable kernel module loading, you must turn on the secure_mode_insmod boolean. Disabled by default.

setsebool -P secure_mode_insmod 1

if you want to allow unconfined executables to make their heap memory executable, you must turn on the selinuxuser_execheap boolean. Disabled by default. doing this is a really bad idea 🚨 probably indicates a badly coded executable, but could indicate an attack. this executable should be reported in bugzilla.

setsebool -P selinuxuser_execheap 1

if you want to allow unconfined executables to make their stack executable, you must turn on the selinuxuser_execstack boolean. Disabled by default. this should never, ever be necessary 😭 probably indicates a badly coded executable, but could indicate an attack. this executable should be reported in bugzilla.

setsebool -P selinuxuser_execstack 1

fr fr, those last two are red flags bestie. report the executable, don't just flip the boolean and walk away 🙈

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🌟 MANAGED FILES 🌟

the SELinux process type abrt_handle_event_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. the paths listed are the default paths for these file types. note: the process's UID still needs to have DAC permissions. don't forget, iykyk 💜

• file_type — literally all files on the system ✨

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⭐ FILE CONTEXTS ⭐

SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type.

you can see the context of a file using the -Z option to ls.

Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. the SELinux abrt_handle_event policy is very flexible, allowing users to set up their abrt_handle_event processes in as secure a method as possible. we love a flexible queen 👑

🎀 STANDARD FILE CONTEXT 🎀

SELinux defines the file context types for the abrt_handle_event. if you wanted to store files with these types in different paths, you need to execute the semanage command to specify alternate labeling, and then use restorecon to put the labels on disk. like this:

semanage fcontext -a -t abrt_handle_event_exec_t '/srv/abrt_handle_event/content(/.*)?'
restorecon -R -v /srv/myabrt_handle_event_content

note: SELinux often uses regular expressions to specify labels that match multiple files. regex girlies stay winning 🌸

the following file types are defined for abrt_handle_event:

💅 abrt_handle_event_exec_t

• set files with the abrt_handle_event_exec_t type if you want to transition an executable to the abrt_handle_event_t domain.

Paths:

/usr/libexec/abrt-handle-event, /usr/bin/abrt-action-generate-backtrace

note: file context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. if you want to permanently change the file context, you need to use the semanage fcontext command. this will modify the SELinux labeling database. you will need to use restorecon to apply the labels. temporary vs permanent, know the difference bestie 😌

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🔥 COMMANDS 🔥

• semanage fcontext can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.
• semanage permissive can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.
• semanage module can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.
• semanage boolean can also be used to manipulate the booleans.
• system-config-selinux is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. yes, a GUI, for the visual learners 🖥️✨

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🫶 AUTHOR 🫶

This manual page was auto-generated using sepolicy manpage. not me being mass-produced by a script and still serving looks 💀💅

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🌈 SEE ALSO 🌈

selinux(8), abrt_handle_event(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8), setsebool(8)

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and that's the whole page, bestie 🎉 this one's dated 26-10-06 and it's the abrt_handle_event page from the abrt_handle_event_selinux(8) manual — go forth and label responsibly, mwah 💖🦋