MAC_PARTITION(4)

💖 MAC_PARTITION 💖

okay bestie, so this is the manual page for mac_partition in section 4 of the kernel interfaces manual — it's giving process partition policy energy and honestly? it eats. ✨

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🌸 NAME 🌸

mac_partition — the process partition policy, no cap 💅

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🦋 SYNOPSIS 🦋

so to compile the process partition policy into your kernel, you literally drop these lines into your kernel configuration file:

options MAC
options MAC_PARTITION

orrr, alternate route bestie: to load the process partition module at boot time, put this line in your kernel configuration file:

options MAC

and then in loader.conf(5):

mac_partition_load="YES"

like, pick your fighter. both work. 🎀

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✨ DESCRIPTION ✨

okay so the mac_partition policy module implements a process partition policy, which lets administrators place running processes into "partitions", based on their numeric process partition (which is specified in the process's MAC label). 🫶

processes with a specified partition can only see processes that are in the same partition. that's it. that's the vibe check. 🔥

if no partition is specified for a process, it can see all other processes in the system (subject to other MAC policy restrictions not defined in this man page, iykyk).

and no — there are literally no provisions for placing processes into multiple partitions. not a thing. don't ask. 💀

🎀 Label Format 🎀

partition labels take on this format, bestie:

partition/value

where value can be any integer value or "none". for example:

partition/1
partition/20
partition/none

iconic, right? 🦋

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🌈 SEE ALSO 🌈

mac(4), mac_biba(4), mac_bsdextended(4), mac_ifoff(4), mac_lomac(4), mac_mls(4), mac_none(4), mac_portacl(4), mac_seeotheruids(4), mac_test(4), maclabel(7), mac(9)

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⭐ HISTORY ⭐

the mac_partition policy module first appeared in FreeBSD 5.0 and was developed by the TrustedBSD Project. a little legend behavior, honestly. 👑

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👑 AUTHORS 👑

this software was contributed to the FreeBSD Project by Network Associates Labs, the Security Research Division of Network Associates Inc. under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 ("CBOSS"), as part of the DARPA CHATS research program. slay. 💜

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💀 BUGS 💀

okay so real talk, not me being dramatic: while the MAC Framework design is intended to support the containment of the root user, not all attack channels are currently protected by entry point checks. as such, MAC Framework policies should not be relied on, in isolation, to protect against a malicious privileged user. fr fr, please don't skip this part. 🙈

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and that's the whole page, bestie 💖 this one's from Debian, dated July 25, 2015 — MAC_PARTITION(4), mwah, go partition responsibly 🧚✨🍓