MAC_PARTITION(4)

🌸 MAC_PARTITION(4) — process partition policy, from the Kernel Interfaces Manual 🌸

💖 NAME 💖

mac_partition — process partition policy

✨ SYNOPSIS ✨

okay so if you want the process partition policy compiled into your kernel, bestie, put these lines in your kernel configuration file:

options MAC
options MAC_PARTITION

Or, if you're loading the process partition module at boot time instead, put this line in your kernel configuration file:

options MAC

and then in loader.conf(5):

mac_partition_load="YES"

🦋 DESCRIPTION 🦋

The mac_partition policy module implements a process partition policy. It lets administrators place running processes into “partitions” based on their numeric process partition — which is specified in the process's MAC label. 💅

Processes with a specified partition can only see processes that are in the same partition. If no partition is specified for a process, it can see all other processes in the system — subject to other MAC policy restrictions not defined in this man page. 👑

And no, there are no provisions for placing processes into multiple partitions available. That's just not a thing here. periodt.

🎀 Label Format 🎀

Partition labels take on the following format:

partition/value

Where value can be any integer value or “none”. For example:

partition/1
partition/20
partition/none

🌈 SEE ALSO 🌈

• mac(4)
• mac_biba(4)
• mac_bsdextended(4)
• mac_ddb(4)
• mac_ifoff(4)
• mac_lomac(4)
• mac_mls(4)
• mac_none(4)
• mac_portacl(4)
• mac_seeotheruids(4)
• mac_test(4)
• maclabel(7)
• mac(9)

⭐ HISTORY ⭐

The mac_partition policy module first appeared in FreeBSD 5.0 and was developed by the TrustedBSD Project. iconic origin story, honestly.

🫶 AUTHORS 🫶

This software was contributed to the FreeBSD Project by Network Associates Labs, the Security Research Division of Network Associates Inc. under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 (“CBOSS”), as part of the DARPA CHATS research program.

💀 BUGS 💀

⚠️ real talk, bestie: while the MAC Framework design is intended to support the containment of the root user, not all attack channels are currently protected by entry point checks. As such, MAC Framework policies should not be relied on, in isolation, to protect against a malicious privileged user. no cap.

💖 that's the whole page, bestie — brought to you by Debian, dated July 25, 2015, and filed under MAC_PARTITION(4). mwah 💖