OPENSSL-FIPSINSTALL(1ossl)

📦
version 3.5.9 · 8 versions
, in alpine 3.23, alpine 3.24

💖 NAME 💖

okay bestie, welcome to OPENSSL-FIPSINSTALL(1ossl) — this is the manual page for openssl-fipsinstall, and its whole job is: perform FIPS configuration installation ✨

✨ SYNOPSIS ✨

no cap, here's the exact command shape, so you can see all the flags at once 🫶

openssl fipsinstall [-help] [-in configfilename] [-out configfilename]
[-module modulefilename] [-provider_name providername] [-section_name
sectionname] [-verify] [-mac_name macname] [-macopt nm:v] [-noout]
[-quiet] [-pedantic] [-no_conditional_errors] [-no_security_checks]
[-hmac_key_check] [-kmac_key_check] [-ems_check]
[-no_drbg_truncated_digests] [-signature_digest_check]
[-hkdf_digest_check] [-tls13_kdf_digest_check] [-tls1_prf_digest_check]
[-sshkdf_digest_check] [-sskdf_digest_check] [-x963kdf_digest_check]
[-dsa_sign_disabled] [-no_pbkdf2_lower_bound_check] [-no_short_mac]
[-tdes_encrypt_disabled] [-rsa_pkcs15_padding_disabled]
[-rsa_pss_saltlen_check] [-rsa_sign_x931_disabled] [-hkdf_key_check]
[-kbkdf_key_check] [-tls13_kdf_key_check] [-tls1_prf_key_check]
[-sshkdf_key_check] [-sskdf_key_check] [-x963kdf_key_check]
[-x942kdf_key_check] [-ecdh_cofactor_check] [-self_test_onload]
[-self_test_oninstall] [-corrupt_desc selftest_description]
[-corrupt_type selftest_type] [-config parent_config]

🌸 DESCRIPTION 🌸

okay so this command is the one that generates a FIPS module configuration file 🎀 You can use that configuration file every single time a FIPS module is loaded, in order to pass data to the FIPS module self tests. The FIPS module always verifies its MAC — always, periodt — but it optionally only needs to run the KAT's once, at installation.

So what's actually inside the generated configuration file? Bestie, it's giving:

  • A MAC of the FIPS module file. 👑
  • A test status indicator. This tells you whether the Known Answer Self Tests (KAT's) have successfully run ✅
  • A MAC of the status indicator. 🔥
  • A control for conditional self tests errors. By default, if a continuous test (e.g a key pair test) fails, then the FIPS module will enter an error state, and after this point no services or cryptographic algorithms will be able to be accessed. The default value of '1' will cause the fips module error state to be entered. If the value is '0' then the module error state will not be entered. Regardless of whether the error state is entered or not, the current operation (e.g. key generation) will return an error. The user is responsible for retrying the operation if the module error state is not entered. 🫶
  • A control to indicate whether run-time security checks are done. This indicates if run-time checks related to enforcement of security parameters such as minimum security strength of keys and approved curve names are used. The default value of '1' will perform the checks. If the value is '0' the checks are not performed and FIPS compliance must be done by procedures documented in the relevant Security Policy. 💅

This file's full lore is described in fips_config(5) 🌈

✨ OPTIONS ✨

okay bestie, buckle up, this is the long part. every single flag is here, and yes we're doing all of them 💅

  • -help — prints a usage message. that's it. that's the whole vibe 🫶
  • -module filename — the filename of the FIPS module you want to run an integrity check on. the path you give in filename is also what gets used to load the module when it's activated, and ngl it overrides the environment variable OPENSSL_MODULES. so like, it's got main character energy and beats the env var, periodt 👑
  • -out configfilename — the filename to output the configuration data to. default is standard output, so if you don't say anything it just spills out at you 🌊
  • -in configfilename — input filename to load configuration data from. must be used if you're specifying the -verify option, no exceptions bestie 😤
  • -verify — verifies that the input configuration file contains the correct information. vibe check on your config file fr fr ✅
  • -provider_name providername — name of the provider inside the configuration file. the default value is "fips" 🧚
  • -section_name sectionname — name of the section inside the configuration file. the default value is "fips_sect" 🎀
  • -mac_name name — specifies the name of a supported MAC algorithm to use. which MAC mechanisms are available depends on the options used when building OpenSSL, so it's giving "depends on your build" energy. to see the list of supported MAC's, run openssl list -mac-algorithms. the default is HMAC 💖
  • -macopt nm:v — passes options to the MAC algorithm. a comprehensive list of controls lives in the EVP_MAC implementation documentation (iykyk). the common control strings used for this command are:
    • key:string — specifies the MAC key as an alphanumeric string (use this if the key contains printable characters only). the string length must conform to any restrictions of the MAC algorithm. a key must be specified for every MAC algorithm. if no key is provided, the default that was specified when OpenSSL was configured is used 🔑
    • hexkey:string — specifies the MAC key in hexadecimal form (two hex digits per byte). the key length must conform to any restrictions of the MAC algorithm. a key must be specified for every MAC algorithm. if no key is provided, the default that was specified when OpenSSL was configured is used 🧮
    • digest:string — used by HMAC as an alphanumeric string (use this if the key contains printable characters only). the string length must conform to any restrictions of the MAC algorithm. to see the list of supported digests, use the command openssl list -digest-commands. the default digest is SHA-256 ⭐
  • -noout — disables logging of the self tests. quiet quitting the logs basically 🙈
  • -pedantic — configures the module to be strictly FIPS compliant rather than backwards compatible. this enables conditional errors, security checks etc. note that any previous configuration options will be overwritten, and any subsequent configuration options that violate FIPS compliance will result in an error. so like, read the room before you flip this one 💀
  • -no_conditional_errors — configures the module to not enter an error state if a conditional self test fails as described above 🙅‍♀️
  • -no_security_checks — configures the module to not perform run-time security checks as described above.
enabling the configuration option no-fips-securitychecks gives you another way to turn off the check at compile time 👀
  • -ems_check — configures the module to enable a run-time Extended Master Secret (EMS) check when using the TLS1_PRF KDF algorithm. this check is disabled by default. see RFC 7627 for info related to EMS 🦋
  • -no_short_mac — configures the module to not allow short MAC outputs. see SP 800-185 8.4.2 and FIPS 140-3 ID C.D for details 📏
  • -hmac_key_check — configures the module to not allow small keys sizes when using HMAC. see SP 800-131Ar2 for details 🔍
  • -kmac_key_check — configures the module to not allow small keys sizes when using KMAC. see SP 800-131Ar2 for details 🔍
  • -no_drbg_truncated_digests — configures the module to not allow truncated digests to be used with Hash and HMAC DRBGs. see FIPS 140-3 IG D.R for details ✂️
  • -signature_digest_check — configures the module to enforce signature algorithms using digests that are explicitly permitted by the various standards. rules are rules bestie 📜
  • -hkdf_digest_check — this option is deprecated. she's retired, don't come for her 💀
  • -tls13_kdf_digest_check — configures the module to enable a run-time digest check when deriving a key by TLS13 KDF. see RFC 8446 for details 🌈
  • -tls1_prf_digest_check — configures the module to enable a run-time digest check when deriving a key by TLS_PRF. see NIST SP 800-135r1 for details 🌸
  • -sshkdf_digest_check — configures the module to enable a run-time digest check when deriving a key by SSHKDF. see NIST SP 800-135r1 for details 🌸
  • -sskdf_digest_check — this option is deprecated. also retired, also not coming back 🫡
  • -x963kdf_digest_check — configures the module to enable a run-time digest check when deriving a key by X963KDF. see NIST SP 800-131Ar2 for details 🔥
  • -dsa_sign_disabled — configures the module to not allow DSA signing (DSA signature verification is still allowed, she's still employed). see FIPS 140-3 IG C.K for details 🚫
  • -tdes_encrypt_disabled — configures the module to not allow Triple-DES encryption. Triple-DES decryption is still allowed for legacy purposes. see SP800-131Ar2 for details 🕰️
  • -rsa_pkcs15_padding_disabled — configures the module to not allow PKCS#1 version 1.5 padding to be used with RSA for key transport and key agreement. see NIST's SP 800-131A Revision 2 for details 📦
  • -rsa_pss_saltlen_check — configures the module to enable a run-time salt length check when generating or verifying a RSA-PSS signature. see FIPS 186-5 5.4 (g) for details 🧂
  • -rsa_sign_x931_disabled — configures the module to not allow X9.31 padding to be used when signing with RSA. see FIPS 140-3 IG C.K for details ✋
  • -hkdf_key_check — configures the module to enable a run-time short key-derivation key check when deriving a key by HKDF. see NIST SP 800-131Ar2 for details 🔑
  • -kbkdf_key_check — configures the module to enable a run-time short key-derivation key check when deriving a key by KBKDF. see NIST SP 800-131Ar2 for details 🔑
  • -tls13_kdf_key_check — configures the module to enable a run-time short key-derivation key check when deriving a key by TLS13 KDF. see NIST SP 800-131Ar2 for details 🔑
  • -tls1_prf_key_check — configures the module to enable a run-time short key-derivation key check when deriving a key by TLS_PRF. see NIST SP 800-131Ar2 for details 🔑
  • -sshkdf_key_check — configures the module to enable a run-time short key-derivation key check when deriving a key by SSHKDF. see NIST SP 800-131Ar2 for details 🔑
  • -sskdf_key_check — configures the module to enable a run-time short key-derivation key check when deriving a key by SSKDF. see NIST SP 800-131Ar2 for details 🔑
  • -x963kdf_key_check — configures the module to enable a run-time short key-derivation key check when deriving a key by X963KDF. see NIST SP 800-131Ar2 for details 🔑
  • -x942kdf_key_check — configures the module to enable a run-time short key-derivation key check when deriving a key by X942KDF. see NIST SP 800-131Ar2 for details 🔑
  • -no_pbkdf2_lower_bound_check — configures the module to not perform a run-time lower bound check for PBKDF2. see NIST SP 800-132 for details 📉
  • -ecdh_cofactor_check — configures the module to enable a run-time check that ECDH uses the EC curve's cofactor value when deriving a key. this only affects the 'B' and 'K' curves. see SP 800-56A r3 Section 5.7.1.2 for details 🔎
  • -self_test_onload — do not write the two fields related to the "test status indicator" and "MAC status indicator" to the output configuration file. without these fields the self tests KATs will run each time the module is loaded. this option could be used for cross compiling, since the self tests need to run at least once on each target machine. once the self tests have run on the target machine the user could possibly then add the 2 fields into the configuration using some other mechanism. this option defaults to 0 for any OpenSSL FIPS 140-2 provider (OpenSSL 3.0.X). and is not relevant for an OpenSSL FIPS 140-3 provider, since this is no longer allowed 🧚‍♀️
  • -self_test_oninstall — the converse of -self_test_onload. the two fields related to the "test status indicator" and "MAC status indicator" are written to the output configuration file. this field is not relevant for an OpenSSL FIPS 140-3 provider, since this is no longer allowed 🪞
  • -quiet — do not output pass/fail messages. implies -noout 🤫
  • -corrupt_desc selftest_description, -corrupt_type selftest_type — the corrupt options can be used to test failure of one or more self tests by name. either option or both may be used to select the tests to corrupt. refer to the entries for st-desc and st-type in OSSL_PROVIDER-FIPS(7) for values that can be used. yes this is on purpose. no we're not okay about it 😭
  • -config parent_config — test that a FIPS provider can be loaded from the specified configuration file. a previous call to this application needs to generate the extra configuration data that is included by the base "parent_config" configuration file. see config(5) for further information on how to set up a provider section. all other options are ignored if '-config' is used. so like, she's the only one in the room 💅

🌸 NOTES 🌸

so here's the tea ☕ — self test results are logged by default if the options -quiet and -noout are not specified, or if either of the options -corrupt_desc or -corrupt_type are used.

okay but listen: if the base configuration file is set up to autoload the fips module, then the fips module will be loaded and self tested BEFORE the fipsinstall application has a chance to set up its own self test callback. as a result of this the self test output and the options -corrupt_desc and -corrupt_type will be ignored. so for normal usage the base configuration file should use the default provider when generating the fips configuration file. like, don't set yourself up 😭

the -self_test_oninstall option was added, and the -self_test_onload option was made the default, in OpenSSL 3.1 ✨

the command and all remaining options were added in OpenSSL 3.0 🎀

💖 EXAMPLES 💖

Okay bestie, first up: calculate the mac of a FIPS module fips.so, run a FIPS self test for that module, and save the fips.cnf configuration file. The command is literally:

openssl fipsinstall -module ./fips.so -out fips.cnf -provider_name fips

Next, vibe check that the config file fips.cnf contains the correct info:

openssl fipsinstall -module ./fips.so -in fips.cnf  -provider_name fips -verify

Now for the chaotic one: corrupt any self tests that have the description "SHA1". Yes, that's the whole point, no cap:

openssl fipsinstall -module ./fips.so -out fips.cnf -provider_name fips \
        -corrupt_desc 'SHA1'

And finally, validate that the fips module can be loaded from a base configuration file. Set these environment variables first, then run the config command:

export OPENSSL_CONF_INCLUDE=<path of configuration files>
export OPENSSL_MODULES=<provider-path>
openssl fipsinstall -config' 'default.cnf

🌈 SEE ALSO 🌈

Go peek at these other manual pages, they're giving connected lore:

🦋 HISTORY 🦋

The openssl-fipsinstall application was added in OpenSSL 3.0. Iconic entrance, honestly.

OpenSSL 3.1 added these options to the group chat:

  • -ems_check
  • -self_test_oninstall

OpenSSL 3.2 added these:

  • -pedantic
  • -no_drbg_truncated_digests

OpenSSL 3.4 pulled up with this whole squad of options:

  • -hmac_key_check
  • -kmac_key_check
  • -signature_digest_check
  • -hkdf_digest_check
  • -tls13_kdf_digest_check
  • -tls1_prf_digest_check
  • -sshkdf_digest_check
  • -sskdf_digest_check
  • -x963kdf_digest_check
  • -dsa_sign_disabled
  • -no_pbkdf2_lower_bound_check
  • -no_short_mac
  • -tdes_encrypt_disabled
  • -rsa_pkcs15_padding_disabled
  • -rsa_pss_saltlen_check
  • -rsa_sign_x931_disabled
  • -hkdf_key_check
  • -kbkdf_key_check
  • -tls13_kdf_key_check
  • -tls1_prf_key_check
  • -sshkdf_key_check
  • -sskdf_key_check
  • -x963kdf_key_check
  • -x942kdf_key_check
  • -ecdh_cofactor_check

Copyright 2019-2025 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.

Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at <https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.

💅 That's the whole page, bestie! This slay little manual is from OpenSSL 3.5.9, dated 2026-09-29, and it's the OPENSSL-FIPSINSTALL(1ossl) page. Bye! 🎀

📦 where this page comes from