UNCONFINED_SCREEN_SELINUX(8)
π unconfin...n_selinux(8) β bestie, your SELinux policy page is here
Okay so this is the unconfined_screen_selinux page from the SELinux Policy manual family β yeah the title got cropped in the terminal header, iconic of it honestly β and it's literally all about how the unconfined_screen processes get to live their truth under Security-Enhanced Linux. Let's get into it π«Ά
β¨ NAME β¨
unconfined_screen_selinux β the Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the unconfined_screen processes. That's the whole name, no cap.
πΈ DESCRIPTION πΈ
So SELinux secures the unconfined_screen processes through flexible mandatory access control β yes bestie, M A C, the mandatory kind, not the makeup kind (though honestly both slay).
The unconfined_screen processes execute with the unconfined_screen_t SELinux type. Wanna check if you've got these processes running? Run the ps command with the -Z qualifier. Like this:
ps -eZ | grep unconfined_screen_t
That's it, that's the vibe check π
π¦ ENTRYPOINTS π¦
The unconfined_screen_t SELinux type can be entered via the screen_exec_t file type. So that's the doorway, okay?
The default entrypoint paths for the unconfined_screen_t domain are literally these:
/usr/bin/tmux, /usr/bin/screen
Both of them. tmux girlies and screen girlies, we contain multitudes π
π PROCESS TYPES π
SELinux defines process types (also called domains, iykyk) for each process running on the system.
You can see the context of a process using the -Z option to ps. Simple as that.
Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. The SELinux unconfined_screen policy is very flexible β it allows users to set up their unconfined_screen processes in as secure a method as possible. Flexible AND secure, she's got range β¨
The following process types are defined for unconfined_screen:
unconfined_screen_t
Note:semanage permissive -a unconfined_screen_tcan be used to make the process typeunconfined_screen_tpermissive. SELinux does not deny access to permissive process types, but the AVC (SELinux denials) messages are still generated. So like β she's not blocking you, but she IS still taking notes ππ
π BOOLEANS π
SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required β minimal queen behavior honestly. And the unconfined_screen policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that let you manipulate the policy and run unconfined_screen with the tightest access possible. Tighter than your favorite corset, fr fr.
π
If you want to deny user domains applications to map a memory region as both executable and writable β okay this is dangerous, and the executable should be reported in bugzilla β you must turn on the deny_execmem boolean. Disabled by default.
setsebool -P deny_execmem 1
π
If you want to control the ability to mmap a low area of the address space, as configured by /proc/sys/vm/mmap_min_addr, you must turn on the mmap_low_allowed boolean. Disabled by default.
setsebool -P mmap_low_allowed 1
π
If you want to disable kernel module loading, you must turn on the secure_mode_insmod boolean. Disabled by default.
setsebool -P secure_mode_insmod 1
π
If you want to allow unconfined executables to make their heap memory executable β okay so doing this is a really bad idea. Probably indicates a badly coded executable, but could indicate an attack. This executable should be reported in bugzilla. You must turn on the selinuxuser_execheap boolean. Disabled by default.
setsebool -P selinuxuser_execheap 1
π
If you want to allow unconfined executables to make their stack executable β this should never, ever be necessary. Probably indicates a badly coded executable, but could indicate an attack. This executable should be reported in bugzilla. You must turn on the selinuxuser_execstack boolean. Disabled by default.
setsebool -P selinuxuser_execstack 1
Bestie I need you to hear me: those last two? Never, ever. Not the move π
π§ MANAGED FILES π§
The SELinux process type unconfined_screen_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. The paths listed are the default paths for these file types. Note that the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions β SELinux isn't out here doing DAC's homework for it, periodt.
file_type
- all files on the system
Yep. All of them. She's got main character energy and the whole filesystem is her stage π
β COMMANDS β
semanage fcontextcan also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.semanage permissivecan also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.semanage modulecan also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.semanage booleancan also be used to manipulate the booleans.system-config-selinuxis a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. A whole GUI, for the girlies who prefer a vibe-forward interface π₯οΈπ
π AUTHOR π
This manual page was auto-generated using sepolicy manpage . β yes, she was born from a script, and she's still serving.
πΈ SEE ALSO πΈ
selinux(8), unconfined_screen(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8), setsebool(8)
And that's the whole page bestie! This one came from unconfined_screen, dated 26-10-06, living in the unconfin...n_selinux(8) manual section (yes the header truncates her name, she's aware, she's choosing to be unbothered πβ¨). Go forth and chcon responsibly, mwah π«Άπ
π¦ where this page comes from
- opensuse-leap 16.0: selinux-policy-doc 20250627+git412.dbf877ab7-160000.1.1 Β· GPL-2.0-or-later
- π girlified by deepseek-ai/DeepSeek-V4.1-Flash-1017 on : a language model's rewrite of the original, under its terms