unconfin..._selinux(8)
π unconfined_cronjob_selinux β the manual page, but make it make sense π
okay bestie, so this is section 8 of the manual, and it's all about unconfined_cronjob_selinux β aka the Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the unconfined_cronjob processes. pull up a chair, we're getting into it π
β¨ NAME β¨
unconfined_cronjob_selinux β Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the unconfined_cronjob processes. that's it, that's the name, slay π«Ά
πΈ DESCRIPTION πΈ
so here's the vibe: Security-Enhanced Linux secures the unconfined_cronjob processes via flexible mandatory access control. flexible and mandatory?? iconic behavior honestly π
your unconfined_cronjob processes execute with the unconfined_cronjob_t SELinux type. want to check if you've got these processes running? just run the ps command with the -Z qualifier. easy peasy π
for example:
ps -eZ | grep unconfined_cronjob_t
that's literally it. no cap. β¨
π¦ PROCESS TYPES π¦
so SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system. yes, each one. it's giving main character energy for every single process ngl π
you can see the context of a process using the -Z option to ps, same as above. lowkey obsessed with how consistent that is.
policy governs the access confined processes have to files. the SELinux unconfined_cronjob policy is very flexible, allowing users to setup their unconfined_cronjob processes in as secure a method as possible. flexible and secure?? we love a balanced icon π
the following process types are defined for unconfined_cronjob:
unconfined_cronjob_t
note:semanage permissive -a unconfined_cronjob_tcan be used to make the process typeunconfined_cronjob_tpermissive. SELinux does not deny access to permissive process types, but the AVC (SELinux denials) messages are still generated. so likeβ¦ it's chill about it, but it's still watching π
π BOOLEANS π
SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. the unconfined_cronjob policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run unconfined_cronjob with the tightest access possible. tightest access possible, bestie β we're being responsible π
- deny_execmem β if you want to deny user domains applications to map a memory region as both executable and writable, you must turn on this boolean. β οΈ this is dangerous and the executable should be reported in bugzilla. Disabled by default.
setsebool -P deny_execmem 1
- mmap_low_allowed β if you want to control the ability to
mmapa low area of the address space, as configured by/proc/sys/vm/mmap_min_addr, you must turn on this boolean. Disabled by default.
setsebool -P mmap_low_allowed 1
- secure_mode_insmod β if you want to disable kernel module loading, you must turn on this boolean. Disabled by default.
setsebool -P secure_mode_insmod 1
- selinuxuser_execheap β if you want to allow unconfined executables to make their heap memory executable, you must turn on this boolean. π doing this is a really bad idea. probably indicates a badly coded executable, but could indicate an attack. this executable should be reported in bugzilla. Disabled by default.
setsebool -P selinuxuser_execheap 1
- selinuxuser_execstack β if you want to allow unconfined executables to make their stack executable, you must turn on this boolean. π this should never, ever be necessary. probably indicates a badly coded executable, but could indicate an attack. this executable should be reported in bugzilla. Disabled by default.
setsebool -P selinuxuser_execstack 1
likeβ¦ five booleans, all off by default. that's the responsible default, periodt π«Ά
π§ MANAGED FILES π§
the SELinux process type unconfined_cronjob_t can manage files labeled with the following file types. the paths listed are the default paths for these file types. π
note: the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions. SELinux isn't out here doing DAC's job for it, okay? π
file_type- all files on the system
yeah. all files on the system. it's giving "I have access to everything" energy and honestly? main character. π
β COMMANDS β
semanage fcontextcan also be used to manipulate default file context mappings.semanage permissivecan also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive.semanage modulecan also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules.semanage booleancan also be used to manipulate the booleans.system-config-selinuxis a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. (yes, a GUI, for when the terminal is doing too much π«Ά)
π AUTHOR π
this manual page was auto-generated using sepolicy manpage. so nobody hand-wrote this, it just manifested. slay β¨
π SEE ALSO π
selinux(8), unconfined_cronjob(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1), sepolicy(8), setsebool(8)
go read those next, bestie, iykyk π
and that's the whole page, no notes π this cutie came from unconfined_cronjob, dated 26-10-06, living in unconfin..._selinux(8) β mwah, stay secure, drink water, and don't turn on selinuxuser_execstack unless you really have to ππ
π¦ where this page comes from
- opensuse-leap 16.0: selinux-policy-doc 20250627+git412.dbf877ab7-160000.1.1 Β· GPL-2.0-or-later
- π girlified by deepseek-ai/DeepSeek-V4.1-Flash-1017 on : a language model's rewrite of the original, under its terms